35887

National Library of Canada | Bibliothèque nationale du Canada

CANADIAN THESES ON MICROFICHE | THÈSES CANADIENNES SUR MICROFICHE

NAME OF AUTHOR/*NOM DE L'AUTEUR* Norman L. Buchignani

TITLE OF THESIS/*TITRE DE LA THÈSE* Immigration, Adaptation, and the Management of Ethnic Identity: An Examination of Fijian East Indians in British Columbia.

UNIVERSITY/*UNIVERSITÉ* Simon Fraser University

DEGREE FOR WHICH THESIS WAS PRESENTED/
GRADE POUR LEQUEL CETTE THÈSE FUT PRÉSENTÉE Ph.D.

YEAR THIS DEGREE CONFERRED/*ANNÉE D'OBTENTION DE CE DEGRÉ* 1977

NAME OF SUPERVISOR/*NOM DU DIRECTEUR DE THÈSE* Dr. Michael Kenny

Permission is hereby granted to the NATIONAL LIBRARY OF CANADA to microfilm this thesis and to lend or sell copies of the film.

The author reserves other publication rights, and neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's written permission.

L'autorisation est, par la présente, accordée à la BIBLIOTHÈQUE NATIONALE DU CANADA de microfilmer cette thèse et de prêter ou de vendre des exemplaires du film.

L'auteur se réserve les autres droits de publication; ni la thèse ni de longs extraits de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans l'autorisation écrite de l'auteur.

DATED/*DATÉ* May 24, 1977 SIGNED/*SIGNÉ*

PERMANENT ADDRESS/*RÉSIDENCE FIXÉ* 1319 East 37th Avenue,
Vancouver, B. C.

NL-91 (11-73)

National Library of Canada

Cataloguing Branch
Canadian Theses Division

Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0N4

Bibliothèque nationale du Canada

Direction du catalogage
Division des thèses canadiennes

NOTICE

The quality of this microfiche is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us a poor photocopy.

Previously copyrighted materials (journal articles, published tests, etc.) are not filmed.

Reproduction in full or in part of this film is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30. Please read the authorization forms which accompany this thesis.

THIS DISSERTATION
HAS BEEN MICROFILMED
EXACTLY AS RECEIVED

AVIS

La qualité de cette microfiche dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise au microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

S'il manque des pages, veuillez communiquer avec l'université qui a conféré le grade.

La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer, surtout si les pages originales ont été dactylographiées à l'aide d'un ruban usé ou si l'université nous a fait parvenir une photocopie de mauvaise qualité.

Les documents qui font déjà l'objet d'un droit d'auteur (articles de revue, examens publiés, etc.) ne sont pas microfilmés.

La reproduction, même partielle, de ce microfilm est soumise à la Loi canadienne sur le droit d'auteur, SRC 1970, c. C-30. Veuillez prendre connaissance des formules d'autorisation qui accompagnent cette thèse.

LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ
MICROFILMÉE TELLE QUE
NOUS L'AVONS REÇUE

IMMIGRATION, ADAPTATION, AND THE MANAGEMENT OF ETHNIC IDENTITY: AN EXAMINATION OF FIJIAN EAST INDIANS IN BRITISH COLUMBIA

by

Norman Leroy Buchignani

M.A., California State University, Hayward, 1974

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

In the Department

of

Sociology and Anthropology

(C) Norman Leroy Buchignani 1977

Simon Fraser University

May 1977

All rights reserved. This thesis may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy or other means, without permission of the author.

Approval

Name: Norman Leroy Buchignani

Degree: Doctor of Philosophy

Title of Thesis: Immigration, Adaptation and the Management of Ethnic Identity: An Examination of Fijian East Indians in British Columbia

Examining Committee:

Chairman: Robert Wyllie

Michael G. Kenny
Senior Supervisor

Hamish Dickie-Clark

Noel Dyck

Dr. Grace Anderson
External Examiner
Professor of Sociology and Anthropology
Wilfred Laurier University
Waterloo, Ontario

Date Approved: May 24th 1977

PARTIAL COPYRIGHT LICENSE

I hereby grant to Simon Fraser University the right to lend my thesis, project or extended essay (the title of which is shown below) to users of the Simon Fraser University Library, and to make partial or single copies only for such users or in response to a request from the library of any other university, or other educational institution, on its own behalf or for one of its users. I further agree that permission for multiple copying of this work for scholarly purposes may be granted by me or the Dean of Graduate Studies. It is understood that copying or publication of this work for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

Title of Thesis/Project/Extended Essay

Immigration, Adaptation, and the Management of Ethnic Identity:

An Examination of Fijian East Indians in British Columbia.

Author: _____

(signature)

Norman L. Buchignani

(name)

May 24, 1977.

(date)

Abstract

This thesis is an examination of the immigration of East Indian people from Fiji to British Columbia (1960-76). As such, it has 3 broad objectives. The first objective is to describe and explain the processes by which over 9,000 Fijian East Indians have come to Canada over the past 15 years. The second objective is to describe the ways in which these new Canadians have materially, socially, and ideologically adapted to life in the Lower Mainland of British Columbia. Because this thesis is the first detailed study of a contemporary East Indian community carried out in this province, it concentrates upon those aspects of the immigration and settlement of Fijians with which other Asian immigrants must also deal. These areas of emphasis include analyses of initial Fijian establishment in Canada, their development of sources of income and their place in the provincial economy, patterns of housing, geographical settlement, and expenditure, the structure of Fijian Canadian household and community, and the nature of social relations between Fijians and other Canadians. The third objective of this thesis is to contrast and compare Fijian East Indian immigration with earlier Asian immigration to British Columbia.

The thesis is based primarily upon participant observation fieldwork, carried out by the author in the Vancouver area between December, 1974 and January, 1977. This anthropologically-derived data base was augmented by archival research on the history of Asian immigration to British Columbia.

It was found that like earlier Asian immigration and settlement, that of Fijian East Indians is highly dependent upon the extensive activation of kinship networks. Fijian immigration is predominantly chain migration, and kin-based mutual aid assists individuals financially, informationally, and psychologically in making the initial transition to Canadian life.

Nevertheless, it was found that Fijian immigration was also subject to strong sociological and personal constraints; particularly important factors were the household head's place in the Fijian economy, the developmental stage of the family, and the perceived degree of risk incurred by immigrating to Canada. It was also found that in Canada benefits of mutual aid were largely restricted to the household economy and to Fijian Canadian social organization. For instance, Fijians have had great difficulty in securing jobs appropriate to their qualifications, chiefly due to various difficulties in translating their Fijian work experience into Canadian terms; Fijian social networks have not mitigated this problem. Despite the resulting low individual incomes, it was found that mutual assistance, combined with the tendency to form large household units, allowed Fijians particular advantages in the quick achievement of home ownership. It was also discovered that house preferences have led to a very high Fijian geographical concentration in East Vancouver.

Fijian Canadians constitute a newly-coalesced community which is experiencing rapid assimilation to Canadian norms and practices whenever doing so does not involve severe social or economic costs. These adaptations result both from a Fijian flexibility in adjusting to new practices and beliefs and from the relative absence of the severe economic and social constraints under which earlier Asian immigrants to Canada laboured. It is argued that ongoing assimilation is resulting in a continual tradeoff of the advantages of Fijian's East Indian ethnically-based social organization for increasing class-based informational, educational, and occupational advantages.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Dr. P.A.S. Saram for directing me towards this subject. The constant assistance of Doreen Indra in every aspect of this research made its completion possible. Thanks also go to Janice MacLellan for her careful preparation of this manuscript. Dr. Michael G. Kenny, Dr. Hamish Dickie-Clark and Dr. Noel Dyck all helped in their own way to make this thesis a reality.

I would like to acknowledge the continuous financial support of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology which I received during this research. A Simon Fraser University Graduate Research Stipend allowed me to concentrate upon the final organization of the thesis without interruption.

I am especially grateful for the considerate help and understanding of the Fijian Canadians with whom I worked, especially Mr. Albert Jayant.

Table of Contents

Title Page i

Approval Page ii

Abstract iii

Acknowledgements v

List of Tables xii

List of Figures, Graphs, and Maps xiii

Introduction 1

Chapter One: The Setting 5

Sojourners: the Chinese 5
The Chinese in the Economy 7
Setting the Caste Line 9
Formal Restrictions against the Chinese 12
The Japanese 13
Chinese and Japanese Immigration Curbs 18
The East Indians 20
Protest against Restriction 33
Entrepreneurial Activity 34
The End of the First Era of Asian Immigration 35
Ethnic Relations in Early British Columbia: a settler society 38
A Resource-Based Economy 40
Subordination 42
Asian Reactions to Subordination 45
Home Government Support 46
Political Motivation 48
Political Knowledge 49
Community Structure 50
Economic Motivation 50
Skills 51
Social Organization and the Economy 52
The Modern Setting: East Indians in British Columbia after World War II 52
The Modern Economy 61
Notes 64

Chapter Two: Fiji, Fijians, and Fiji Indians 77

Toward a Sugar Economy 83
The Process of Indenture 84

Chapter Two: (continued)

Homogenization and Subordination: the voyage 87
The Lines 87
Work 89
The Early East Indian Community 90
Fiji in the 1920's and 1930's: the communities 94
Fijian-Indian Relations 101
Political Organization 104
After the War 105
Economic Takeoff 109
Independent Fiji 112
Fijian Indians Today: a summary 115
Notes 118

Chapter Three: Immigration 123

A Descriptive History of Fijian Immigration to Canada 123
Fijian Immigration to Canada, 1962 to 1976 130
Ethnicity and Citizenship 134
Age and Sex Distributions 135
Occupational Class and Education 138
Typical Immigrants and their Concerns 144
Immigration Determinants: the societal context 148
Immigration Determinants: the individual context 154
Initial Resources 154
Choice Considerations: younger immigrants 156
Choice Considerations: older immigrants 158
Immigration Determinants: women 162
The Ultimate Constraint: Canadian immigration regulations 163
The Processes and Motivations Behind East Indian Immigration, Past and Present 165
Chain Migration and its Consequences 168
Fijian Indians in the Canadian Context 169
Notes 171

Chapter Four: Making a Living 175

Incorporation 175
The Trip and Initial Placement 176
Orientation 177
Finding a Job 181
Certification, Qualifications, and Informational Access: "What's your Canadian experience?" 183

Chapter Four: (Continued)

Social Constraints 188
Discrimination and Jobs 188
Work and the Family 190
Protestant and Fijian Work Ethics 194
The Protestant Ethic and Canadian Workers 195
The Fijian Work Ethic 197
Work Ethics and Job Ecologies 200
Women and Work 201
Job Distributions: the working class 203
Options and Possibilities: skilled and entrepreneurial activities 206
The Fijian Entrepreneur 208
Two Kinds of Entrepreneur 209
Personal Constraints: capital and knowledge 210
Societal and Community Constraints 212
Value Differential-Dependent Entrepreneurs 215
Value-Equivalent Entrepreneurship 220
Fijians in the Economy: another subordinate caste? 222
Economic Subordination, Statistics, and Immigrant Flow 224
Job, Family, Place, and Things 225
Notes 227

Chapter Five: A House, a Car, a Chair; Expenditure and Models for It 231

Objectives 231
Housing: from visitor to king 233
A House: the unrestricted ideal type 237
Financial Constraints 239
The Compromise 241
Buy a House, Form a Community: Fijian settlement patterns in the Lower Mainland 244
House Choice or Community Choice? 250
Fijian and Sikh Settlement Patterns Compared 251
The Collective Advantage 252
Nucleation, Assimilation, and Financial Instability 256
The House as a Home 258
Expenditure and Models for It 259
House Furnishings, Public and Private 259
Status, Conformity Pressure, and Tradition 262
Cars 264
Food and Smaller Expenditures 265

Chapter Five: (Continued)

Patterns of Expenditure: Hindu Protestantism or limited demand? 267
Functionality and Purchasing 270
Rationality and Purchasing 271
Cash and Credit 272
An Economy of Needs 274
Assimilation and the Economy of Needs 275
Notes 276

Chapter Six: Within These Walls: Fijian Canadian Household Life 280

Generalization and Reality 281
The Extended Family Household and Its Internal Relations: status, power, security, and the couple of authority 284
Significant Competitors for Status and Power 287
Primary Generation Couples 288
Ascendant Generation Couples 291
Sources of Power 293
Visitors 293
Dependency 294
Dependent Children 295
Potentially Independent Children 297
Married Children 299
Other Descending Generation Couples 302
Potentially Independent Adults 303
Household Residential Structure in the Overview 305
Female and Male Roles 306
Ideologies of Superiority and Inferiority: the view from the top 307
The View from Below 308
Male and Female Realities 309
Male and Female Conflict 312
Children: people of two worlds 316
Television and Children of all Ages 318
Children and Adults 320
Notes 324

Chapter Seven: Community: Fijian Social Relations in the Urban Context 328

Kinship Networks: the structural basis of community 328
Kinship Networks as Ethnic Networks: three Fijian communities 329
Kinship Networks as Class Networks 331

Chapter Seven: (Continued)

The Structure of Social Relations: the empirical pattern	332
Fiji and Vancouver as One Community	335
Vancouver and Outlying Communities	339
The Uses of Social Networks	341
Religious Communities	344
Fijians and Hinduism	344
The Personnel	345
Life-Cycle Rituals	345
Marriage	347
Death	349
Hindu Household and Public Observances	351
Annual Hindu Celebrations	354
Hinduism and Community	355
Moslems	356
Life-Cycle Rituals	357
Household and Public Observances	358
Moslem Fijians as a Community	361
Fijian Religious Communities, Establishment, and Direction	362
Secular Associations and Community Events	363
Economic Bases for Community	364
Fijian Community and Its Future: centrifugal and centripetal tendencies	366
Notes	

Chapter Eight: Fijian Indians in Canadian Society: Social Constraints, Social and Self Identities 375

The Social and Self Identities of Fijian Indians in Vancouver	376
The Selective Communication and Distortion of Social Identity	379
Interactional Channels	380
Intraethnic Channels	385
Media Channels	385
Reception and Integration	386
Critique of Material Culture	391
Critiques of Social and Interactional Practice	391
Interpretation and Ideological Defense	391
The Presentation of Self: announcing Fijian identity	395
East Indians as "Hindus": attempts at folk understanding	398
Canadian Ideals and Ethnic Stigma	399
Social Identity and Structure	404

Chapter Eight: (Continued)

Discrimination and the Constraints of Ethnicity 405
Fijians, Caste, and Class 409
Notes 411

Conclusion 412

List of References 419

Appendix I: A Bibliography of East Indians in Canada 434

List of Tables

		Page
Table I	Provincial Chinese Workforce Participation, 1885.	12
Table II	East Indian Immigration to Canada, Fiscal Years 1904 to 1908.	21
Table III	East Indian Immigration, March 31, 1908 to March 31, 1920.	30
Table IV	East Indian Immigration to Canada, 1956 to 1975.	59
Table V	Chinese Workforce Composition in Victoria, 1884.	66
Table VI	Provincial Asian Workforce Composition, 1925.	67
Table VII	Provincial Asian Workforce Composition, 1940.	67
Table VIII	Asian Immigration to Canada, 1886-1919.	69
Table IX	East Indian Workforce Participation, 1934-1946.	72
Table X	Occupations of Indians in Fiji, 1911.	92
Table XI	Fijian Immigration to Canada, to April, 1976.	130
Table XII	Intended Occupation of Fijian Immigrants, 1972-1974.	139
Table XIII	Intended Occupation of Fijian Immigrants, 1975, by Specific Categories.	140
Table XIV	Fijian Indian Wage and Salaried Labour, 1972, by Sector.	141
Table XV	Educational Achievement of Fijian Immigrants, 1975.	143
Table XVI	Folk Views Contrasting Fiji and Canada.	161
Table XVII	The Canadian Immigration Point System.	174
Table XVIII	Distribution of East Indian Entrepreneurial Advertising.	229
Table IXX	Intended Destination of Fijian Immigrants, 1975.	249

List of Figures, Graphs, and Maps

			Page
Figure 1.	Fijian Immigration to Canada (numbers by years), to April, 1976.	*(graph)*	129
Figure 2.	The Age Distribution of the Population of Fiji (5 year segments), 1974.	*(graph)*	136
Figure 3.	The Age Distribution of Fijian Immigrants to Canada, Numbers by Age (5 year segments).	*(graph)*	136
Figure 4.	Sex Ratios of 1974 and 1975 Fijian Immigrants to Canada, by Age.	*(graph)*	137
Figure 5.	The Sequence of Fijian-Canadian Housing.	*(illustration)*	236
Figure 6.	The Geographical Boundaries of Preferred Fijian House Types.	*(map)*	245
Figure 7.	Fijian East Indian Residential Distributions in the Lower Mainland.	*(map)*	246
Figure 8.	Sikh Residential Distributions in the Lower Mainland, 1959.	*(map)*	247
Figure 9.	Sikh Residential Distributions in the Lower Mainland, 1976.	*(map)*	248

Introduction

Since the 1960's, when the Canadian immigration regulations were loosened to allow non-Europeans to apply on equal terms with those from traditional source countries, the variety of immigrants to Canada has greatly increased. One consequence of this change for British Columbia has been the rise of a set of new communities of Asian immigrants, complementing the Chinese, Japanese, and Sikhs who have been here for over seventy years. East Indian people from Fiji are one of these new groups. This thesis is an examination of the immigration of Fijian East Indians to British Columbia and their adaptation to life in the Lower Mainland from 1960 to 1977.

The objectives of this work have been largely determined by need and method. The primary goal is to describe the structure of Fijian East Indian immigration to Canada and to explain why that structure has taken the form which it has. The descriptive nature of this objective has been shaped by the paucity of prior research on Asians in Canada; Appendix I constitutes virtually the entire corpus of printed and academic material upon East Indians in Canada. With the exception of a brief investigation of the Vancouver Sikh community done by Adrian Mayer (1959), there have been no comprehensive sociological studies done on East Indians in British Columbia since the late 1920's (Cheng 1931).

Because of this empirical vacuum, I do not feel it justifiable to concentrate upon a narrow aspect of Fijian East Indian immigration to British Columbia. Neither have I chosen to develop a single theoretical theme or an overarching hypothesis. Nevertheless, this thesis is not an

ethnography in the normal sense of the word, for I have concentrated upon certain areas of Fijian Canadian life to the exclusion of others.

Both the immigration of Fijians to Canada and their subsequent adaptation to Canadian society are currently under radical flux. There were virtually no Fijians in Canada in 1960, and now there are over 9,000 of them. More than half of those in the Lower Mainland have come since 1972. Moreover, they are a heterogeneous population to begin with, made even more so by the variety and depth of their adaptations to Canadian life. Consequently, I have concentrated upon those areas where relatively common constraints abound. I have placed a heavy emphasis upon the societal constraints under which these new Canadians must labour.

My primary research methodology was participant observation, carried out between December, 1974 and January, 1977. The decision to use this sort of methodology was based upon two related considerations. First, historical research upon Asians in Canada has shown an almost total lack of that sort of personal information which participant observation produces so well; an exhaustive reading of the past literature on East Indians in Canada leaves me without any feeling for the factors of individual values and choice which oriented these people's lives. The historical record stands mute to even such basic things as East Indian household organization and self identity. Secondly, because my primary goal was a general outline of the immigration of Fijian East Indians to Canada, I felt that participant observation held the most promise for producing a relatively holistic understanding of this process. Accordingly, I have concentrated heavily upon how Fijians themselves see their situation, and

upon what factors they consider when they attempt to immigrate, find a job, buy a house, and form a community. If there is a major theme in this work, it is that the immigration and settlement of these people in Canada cannot be understood without consideration of both societal constraints and the field of choice available to Fijians within these constraints.

During my data collection, I tried to gain an insight into the everyday lives of these people by participating as best a stranger can in their normal life; I visited people, went shopping with them, saw them off and on airplanes, and the like. In this way, I was able to establish contacts with over one hundred households, and was able to collect detailed, information on the unfolding of this immigration sequence from a number of them continuously. In gaining an insight into the place of women in these households I was often assisted by Doreen Indra, of this Department.

The use of any methodology obviously results in compromising the collection of certain sets of information in the hope of gaining ground in other areas. This methodology, and the study generated out of it are no exceptions to this rule. This inquiry does not attempt an extensive quantification of the data. It concentrates upon general problems, processes, and personal considerations, rather than upon a statistical analysis of a few specific themes.

Beyond the description of this process of immigration and settlement there is one other goal of this thesis. This is to contrast and compare Fijian East Indian immigration with earlier Asian immigration to British Columbia. British Columbia is unique in Canada in having a long history of Asian immigration -- one which goes back to the Fraser River gold rush

of 1858. This earlier situation was one of extreme conflict between Asian and white labour, and resulted in the eventual exclusion of further Asian immigration and in the subordination of resident Asians into a set of racial castes. Throughout the subsequent parts of the thesis I return to three questions: What parallels are there between earlier Asian immigrants and today's Fijian ones in backgrounds, objectives, and skills; are there similarities in their respective places in British Columbian society; and what has been the response of other British Columbians to their presence?

The sequence of the chapters reflect all these concerns. Chapter One develops an historical account of Asian immigration to Canada and describes the setting to which Fijian immigrants have come. Chapter Two deals with the background of these people, beginning with the introduction of their forefathers into Fiji as indentured labourers. Chapter Three is concerned with describing the process of immigration itself. It also outlines the criteria which Fijians have used to decide whether to immigrate, and the demographic nature of the resultant immigrant population.

Chapters Four and Five, respectively, deal with the place of Fijians in the provincial economy and the patterns of expenditure which have developed upon that economic basis. Chapters Six and Seven outline the changing structures of Fijian Canadian households and community social organization. Chapter Eight comes full circle to discuss the way in which Fijian East Indians view their place in Canadian society, how members of that society view them, and how these two aspects of Fijian life in Canada reflect earlier patterns of Asian immigration to British Columbia.

Chapter One: The Setting

Sojourners: the Chinese[1]

British Columbia has seen three Asian immigrant groups establish themselves in the province before 1920, the Chinese, Japanese, and East Indians. Chinese arriving from California to participate in the gold rush of 1858 were the first of these three, and the patterns which evolved to 'deal' with them were to order much of the subsequent history of the other two groups. Their number grew steadily, and by 1864 there were approximately 2,500 Chinese in the province, many working for whites as labourers or as cooks (Howay 1914:567-8).[2]

These immigrants had come to California mainly from eight districts of the southern Chinese province of Kwangtung (Cheng 1931:3), which were to provide a majority of the Chinese immigrants to Canada up until very recently (Cho 1970:16). The Chinese were almost exclusively from peasant populations with a long heritage of overseas enterprise. Many had been landless labourers with limited prospects in China, but few were from the absolute bottom stratum of Chinese society. Although "coolie" origins were assumed by British Columbians for all three of these Asian minorities, most of those who came fell rather into the category of those rich enough to leave but poor enough to go.[3]

The early Chinese were primarily sojourners (Siu 1952), "birds of passage", coming to North America with no initial intention of permanent residence. They were attracted to Canada and the United States by the promise of enormous economic rewards, for there existed a large differential between wages in their home country and wages in British Columbia. For

example, as late as 1900 farm labour in Kwangtung Province earned no more than 5¢ per diem (Cheng 1931:5), while wages for domestic service in British Columbia were twenty times that amount (King 1908a).[4] It was believed that funds carefully saved here were to be readily translated into a position of respectability and security upon return to China.

Immigration was viewed as a temporary condition, as a means to an end, and this had many consequences for the place of Chinese in British Columbia.[5] Because the motivation behind immigration was the accumulation of the maximum funds in the shortest possible time, achieving a high rate of savings was an important consideration. Not surprisingly, Chinese communities in North America were almost exclusively male, which meant that the typical immigrant's wage rate did not have to provide for the cost of reproduction of the labour force, save for the cost of support of the immigrant's family in China.[6] Chinese peasant parsimony, combined with the relative efficiency of male communal living (Cheng 1931:196-213) also decreased expenditure. Chinese were additionally loath to invest money in capital expenditures in Canada which were unlikely to give a quick return, and this further increased the rate of saving.

A Puritan pattern of expenditure is only one-half of savings, for income is equally important. Bonacich (1972) argues (perhaps too simplistically) that the sojourner tends to assess jobs largely in terms of extrinsic financial considerations.[7] Historically, Chinese were found willing to do what were by Canadian standards the most distasteful and repetitive of tasks, and acquiesced in working for long hours at high

levels of exertion.

The Chinese in the Economy

This sketch of the Chinese as a sojourner is admittedly a very general one, but even within its broad outlines one can see that it was inevitable that the desirability of a Chinese presence in British Columbia would become an issue among white colonists from the beginning. With those first Chinese miners from California came a number of white fortune seekers who brought with them a measure of the considerable anti-Chinese sentiment which had arisen in California. The complaint was primarily an economic one. As early as 1855, animosity had arisen in Shasta County (California), where whites and Chinese competed as small-scale independent miners and as labourers (Ward 1973:7). The California Chinese gradually replaced whites at the secondary river claims (Saxton 1971:53), but lacked the capital and the political resources necessary to compete with the rising large-scale mining concerns. Complaints against Chinese labour consequently came first from the California working class and their sympathizers.[8] As the Chinese occupational base in California broadened in the 1860's so did the anti-Chinese feelings

As early as March, 1859, the Victoria Gazette was making the claim that Chinese were degrading the wages and working conditions of white labour (Ward 1973:25). If one includes its many variations, this was to be the most significant charge to be aimed at Asian immigrants prior to World War II.

Hostility to the Chinese followed basically the same pattern of growth in early British Columbia as it did in California.[9] In the 1860's and early 1870's many British Columbians favoured Chinese immigration, arguing that only through the use of Oriental labour could the vast potential of the province be tapped; this was primarily a middle and upper class argument. Already the British Columbian economy was well along in its historical development of a basis of primary extractive industry which was highly labour intensive. Mining and the forest industries, land clearing, transportation and, later, the fishing industry all were two-class structures reminiscent of the plantation. There were many workers and, separated from them both economically and socially, few managers and owners. Like the plantation, labour in these industries was a primary cost of production, and it is understandable that those who employed significant amounts of it were in favour of Oriental labour.[10] Those involved in the smaller scale sales and service industries looked to the Chinese as a potential market (Ward 1973:34).

But the Chinese quickly lost their middle class support and were to violently polarize the working class against themselves. With its working class support, the elected political elite of the province soon became solidly against the further entry of Chinese to British Columbia. By the turn of the century, advocacy of Oriental immigration was so politically damaging that provincial economic elites, even with their considerable political power, found their position on this issue untenable.

One must keep in mind that even prior to this sequence there existed

the near universal assumption that the Chinese were distinct from white Mankind. This was taken as a given, even by supporters of the Chinese. They were, first of all, seen to be another race; British Columbians were typical of nineteenth century Europeans (Banton 1967:1-30) in viewing race as a relatively immutable combination of biological, psychological, and cultural characteristics.[11] These ideas, when coupled to the perceived threat of Asian economic competition, were to result in the castelike (Berreman 1972) subordination of the Chinese, Japanese, and East Indians in British Columbia.

Setting the Caste Line: occupational distribution

Considerable local hostility arose in the mining areas of the province as the number of Chinese increased. As early as 1864 resentment was high in the Cariboo; it increased steadily through 1869 as the Chinese, having established both a material and informational foundation for life in the province, branched out as "storekeepers, traders and packers, farmers, gardeners, and domestic servants (Howay 1914:569)." The Chinese did not entirely acquiesce to a caste line drawn so sharply that all whites were economically above them. Neither were employers of one opinion for, regardless of their personal views of the Chinese, they were tempted by the prospects of cheaper Oriental labour and by the threat it created to white labour's demands for higher pay and better working conditions.

And Chinese labour was cheaper. In the 1860's the Central Pacific Railway estimated that their overall costs for Chinese labour were two-thirds

that of its white labour and that the use of Chinese in the construction of the transcontinental railway had saved the company $5,500,000 (Saxton 1971:63).[12] From the earliest days in both British Columbia and California there arose a split labour market (Bonacich 1972), where white workers were paid significantly higher for the same job as were Orientals. Wage differentials were characteristically 30% to 40%.[13] This was to persist overtly until the 1940's, and can be seen as a limited victory for white labour.[14] This dual system of wage rates was one of the first material caste restrictions to be placed on Asians in British Columbia.

Throughout the 1860's and 1870's the Chinese in British Columbia attempted to break out into occupations other than unskilled wage labour. Entrepreneurial activities which depended on a Chinese clientele were one of the first areas secured. Merchants and suppliers of services to the Chinese community not only provided those things which were not readily available at European stores, but offered immigrant Chinese the option of buying Western commodities in a psychologically 'safe' context which did not require entry into the white community; the penalty was slightly higher prices than were available in the larger white stores (Cheng 1931:189).

Merchants serving the Chinese community also branched out into the sale of Asian commodities to the general public and into direct competition with white entrepreneurs. The grocery business, hand laundry, the restaurant trade and tailoring became economic strongholds for the Chinese by 1910. The Chinese defended these entrepreneurial outposts by offering the white public cheaper prices and longer open hours than their competition.[15]

European competitors fought back with advertising pleas to 'buy Canadian', with boycotts and with political pressure to restrict Asian licences, but none of these attempts were successful in the face of the cheapness and convenience of Chinese goods and services.

These Chinese entrepreneurial activities were strictly limited, though, by capital, labour, and by cultural constraints.[16] Large-scale industrial activity was hampered by the lack of financing. Thus, the Chinese hand laundries were non-competitive with the capital-intensive mechanized laundries which dominated the hotel and industrial trade. Part of the price differential between the Chinese and white store was dependent upon the Chinese employing family rather than wage labour, and therefore expansion beyond the family's labour resources involved increased costs. Those entrepreneurs who catered to the Chinese population itself were limited in their numbers and growth potential by the size of the Chinese community. Among entrepreneurial alternatives, the strict social caste line between whites and Chinese made the middleman option a very limited one. Access to the professions was also barred.

The one other area where Chinese were able to move out of the unskilled work force was in farming. Used to the severe land use requisites of China, they firmly secured the niche of market gardening (Donley 1928) by 1900, which they largely have held into the present.

Entrepreneurial activity aside, the Chinese, as with the Japanese and East Indians who came after them, were primarily blue collar workers located in primary industries. Cho (1970:22) summarizes the occupational distri-

bution of the Chinese in 1885 as:

Railway Construction	3,500
Mining	2,240
Farming	800
Canning	390
Mill Work	270
Services	2,670
Total	9,870

Table I. Provincial Chinese Workforce Participation, 1885[17]

By 1902 (RCCJI 1902), the Chinese were heavily concentrated in market gardening, coal mining, the lumber and shingle business, fish canning, domestic service, hand laundering, tailoring and sewing. This was not to shift materially until World War II.[18]

Formal Restrictions Against the Chinese: the head tax

Having subordinated the Chinese by lower wages, a second set of restrictions attempted to limit the numbers of Chinese in the province and to constrain those here to a subordinate class in an aristocracy of labour. The first murmurs of legislative action arose in 1865 (Andracki 1958:1; Ward 1973:32), but it was a decade before restrictive legislation was successfully enacted. A head tax of $50.00 per individual per annum was proposed to the Legislature in February, 1872, but this was defeated (Cho 1970:19). In 1875, the Chinese were disenfranchised in British Columbia.[19] Through 1878, repeated attempts were made to introduce the previously defeated head tax, this time at $10.00 per annum, but these were declared unconstitutional by the British Columbia Supreme Court. In 1878, Chinese were banned from labouring on public works (Ward 1973:71).

At the Federal level, British Columbia's M.P.s were unable to find support for their exclusionist cause until 1885, for they were in essence fighting the Canadian Pacific Railroad, which was aware of the savings made by the Central Pacific's use of Chinese and was determined to do the same. Thousands of Chinese migrated to British Columbia in the period 1878-1884. In 1885, the railroad completed, Parliament passed the first of a series of immigration curbs against Chinese. Unwilling to totally ban the Chinese, Parliament passed legislation which required that Chinese pay an entry fee of $50.00 upon arrival in Canada; the number of immigrants carried by shipping was also limited to one Chinese immigrant for every 50 tons of shipping.[20]

This restriction resulted in a temporary reduction of Chinese immigration to Canada, but its effect was more than countered by the severe depression of 1885-7 which threw thousands, Chinese and whites alike, out of work. Anti-Chinese sentiment reached the point of violence.[21] Nevertheless, as wages in British Columbia rose, inflated by the temporary slackening of Chinese immigration, it again became economically feasible to come to Canada, and the number of Chinese doubled between 1881 and 1891 to 8,910 (RCCJI 1902:7). This made Chinese Canadians one-eleventh of the total British Columbian population.

The Japanese[22]

By 1890, the destiny of the Chinese was to be linked closely to that of British Columbia's second Asian immigrant group, the Japanese, and from

this point they must be discussed simultaneously. The first Japanese came to British Columbia before 1882, possibly as early as 1878 (Sumida 1935:25). Immigration was numerically insignificant before 1885, but letters sent to Japan by those first pioneers brought a continuously increasing flow of new immigrants in the next five years.

The Japanese were immediately attracted to the growing salmon fishing industry. By 1901 over two thousand of the 4,597 Japanese then reported to be in British Columbia were involved in fishing or in related activities (RCCJI 1902:340).[23]

Japanese immigrants to Canada were largely sojourners like the Chinese, but their backgrounds were considerably more varied. Again, the sources of immigration were fairly localized, Wakayama, Shiga, Kagoshima, and Hiroshima prefectures supplying roughly one-half of the total number (Sumida 1935:55).[24] Like the Chinese, most were from rural backgrounds; about half were previously farmers, while common labourers and fishermen made up the second and third largest categories.[25]

Until 1907, when the first significant number of women immigrated, the Japanese were primarily motivated towards the betterment of their situation at home.[26] Following this pattern, large numbers of immigrants transited between Japan and Canada, staying in this country but a few years. Only one-third of the Japanese immigrants arriving in Canada before 1901 were actually here in that year. Sumida (1935:47) reports that most had immigrated in response to two factors: first, those who did so were in situations of very restricted economic mobility, and secondly, they were

young enough not to be tied directly to family responsibilities. Indeed, the average age of Japanese immigrants was less than 24 years. As with the Chinese, the wage rate differentials between Japan and Canada were very large. Typical wages for unskilled agricultural work in Japan averaged 15¢ per diem in 1897, while maximum rates for skilled labour seldom went above 30¢.[27]

Reaction to the Japanese was quickly forthcoming. They were first mentioned in the British Columbia Legislative Assembly in 1881 (Cho 1970: 14). By 1893, white salmon fishermen on the Fraser had organized the Fisherman's Benevolent and Protective Society in opposition to the growing number of Japanese fishermen (Ward 1973:127; Phillips 1967:25). The Japanese were provincially disenfranchised in 1896 (Ward 1973:151).

In the economy, an attempt was made to restrict the Japanese, like the Chinese before them, to a subordinate position. Although successful in the long term, this objective proved difficult to attain. First of all, Japanese tended to move out of wage labour in larger numbers than did the Chinese. The firmer economic base which resulted gave the Japanese a greater ability to combat restrictions. Secondly, the Japanese government stood firmly behind their citizens abroad. This gave legislative restrictions upon Japanese immigrants the potential to become international issues. The strength of the Japanese government was also ideologically important, for as perceived by Canadians the stereotypes of Japanese were seen to be in line with a national Japanese image of a proud, independent, Westernizing country. Third, both politically and economically the Japanese tended to

coalesce for mutual support, reflecting in so doing their feelings of self worth and national pride. Finally, as the Japanese in Canada became the first Asian group with a significant number of immigrant families their stake in British Columbia increased and they became far more motivated towards defense of their collective position.

Even so, as a minority, the Japanese found their resources insufficient to prevent a significant limitation of their rights and privileges in British Columbia. Throughout their pre-internment history large numbers worked as wage labourers in much the same fashion as the Chinese (for occupational statistics, see note 18). Many went initially into the wage labour market, especially into the lumber, pulp, and paper industries, where Japanese participation was significant up to World War II. In the work force the Japanese were also subject to the conditions of the same split labour market as the Chinese.[27] As late as 1934 (Sumida 1935:341), Japanese were paid consistently one-quarter to one-third less than whites in the lumber and pulp mills. Other Japanese worked at a variety of blue collar jobs, principally at fish canning (where Japanese women worked in large numbers), as domestics, cooks, gardeners, and before 1910, as railway workers and miners.[28]

Much of the hostility which arose against the Japanese derived from their strong tendency to move into competition with independent whites, particularly in the areas of fishing, farming, and small business. The Japanese were particularly successful in the fishing industry, where they concentrated primarily upon salmon gill netting. Japanese fishermen brought

with them to Canada knowledge of alternative fishing techniques and insights into the Asian market, which were to increase significantly the value of the British Columbia catch. Nevertheless, they were met with strong opposition by both white and Indian fishermen. These immigrants originated the salt herring industry (28,000 tons were put up in 1910), and with it, the Asian trade. They also initiated the salt salmon industry, which increased the value of Chum salmon, before considered the least valuable because of its poor canning qualities. They also brought with them improved trolling techniques and were leaders in motorizing the fishing industry.

Pleas for the limitation of Japanese in the fishing industry began as early as 1893, but reached particular intensity by the turn of the century. The bitter sockeye strike of 1900, which saw the Japanese fishermen finally acceding to canning company demands, further increased the cry for exclusion.[29] In that year, the British Columbia Legislature passed the first of a series of "Natal Acts", which were aimed at the immigration exclusion of both Japanese and Chinese. These acts prohibited immigration into the province of those who could not speak or read English to a level deemed sufficient by immigration officials; implicit was the qualification that Asians would not pass in any case.[30] The Japanese Consul protested that this was a discriminatory measure aimed at a friendly power, and the legislation was disallowed by the Federal Government, as was similar legislation in 1902, 1904, and 1905 (Sumida 1935:29; Sugimoto 1966:38).

There was virtually no immigration from Japan in the period 1900 to 1904, as prefecturial governors followed the dictates of the Japanese govern-

ment and restricted the issuance of overseas passports (Sugimoto 1966:23). This was in part done in consideration of the possibility of future hostilities with Russia. Protest in the fishing industry abated slightly, only to rise to even greater levels as Japanese immigration resumed in 1905.

Chinese and Japanese Immigration Curbs

During this same decade (1891-1901) two other factors combined to increase the call for the exclusion of both Chinese and Japanese. First of all, the number of Chinese in the province (who, it must be remembered, still entered under the $50 head tax of 1885) increased by 50% to 14,885 (ROAP 1927:3). This alone put the Federal government under pressure to further restrict Chinese immigration. Secondly, both Japanese and Chinese were at this time moving strongly into farming and small-scale business, thereby increasing the strength of the white middle class and farmer opposition to their presence. Only those members of the national and provincial economic elites who were dependent upon Asian labour or who feared economic retaliation from the source countries (principally from Japan) argued for continued immigration, and this they could no longer do overtly. While the Laurier government had previously argued that Asian manpower was necessary to the expanding provincial economy, this position was rapidly eroding, and with it, the Liberals' election potential in British Columbia.

Because treaty and trade considerations were not as dependent upon Canada's treatment of Chinese nationals as they were upon that of the Japanese, the Government moved first to curb Chinese immigration. Despite

pressure from the CPR, which claimed (1899) that an increase in the head tax would have a disastrous effect on the revenues of Canadian Pacific Shiplines, the Chinese head tax was raised to $100 in 1900.[31] The arguments put forward by the Royal Commission of Chinese and Japanese Immigration (1902) resulted in a further increase of the tax to $500 in 1904, effectively curtailing Chinese immigration from 1905 to 1909.[32] This tax was beyond the resources of most immigrants, and was also too high for labour contractors to advance. Chinese immigration was to increase again only when the severe rise in wages provoked by shortages of Asian labour allowed immigrants to remit savings to others in China, thereby allowing new immigrants to pay the tax.

Japanese exclusion was not so easily accomplished. Up through 1905 there had been enormous pressure upon the Government by Canadian business to be included in the Anglo-Japanese trade agreement of 1894-5, which had been shown to be so profitable to the British. The progress of negotiations on this treaty, which were concluded January 31, 1906, would have been seriously disturbed by any move made during this time to restrict Japanese immigration. The treaty itself, like many trade agreements of the day, granted reciprocal immigration and residence rights to both parties, making any subsequent Canadian restrictions on immigration contrary to the treaty (Sugimoto 1966:42). The only diplomatic recourse available to Canada was to attempt an agreement between the two governments above and beyond the treaty itself wherein Japan would agree to restrict the flow of its own nationals.[33] This goal was not achieved until late in 1907, when a Gentle-

man's Agreement was signed in Tokyo restricting the number of passports issued to male labourers coming to Canada to 468 per annum (Sumida 1935:34).

The East Indians[34]

It was during this turbulent period at the turn of the century that the third of British Columbia's Asian immigrant groups made its appearance. The first East Indians to come to the province probably did so intermittently between 1898 and 1902, coming from the Chinese and Japanese treaty ports in the capacity of merchant seamen. Long term settlement began about 1902, when it became evident that consistent work was to be had in the Port Moody sawmills. As with the Japanese, the word spread back via letter and word of mouth to those same Asian port cities, principally to Hong Kong, Shanghai, and the Malay States, prompting an increasing number of East Indians to come to Canada. By 1904, the number of East Indians in Vancouver fluctuated at around 100 to 150.[35] The great majority of these first pioneers were Sikhs, who had gone to China and South East Asia in the British Army and who, when mustered out, chose to remain in the Far East. Many of these ex-soldiers had been employed as policemen, watchmen, and as dockyard workers. The non-Sikh complement, who never comprised more than 15% of the East Indians in pre-War British Columbia, came from all over India; Gujerat, Oudh, and Bengal were significant sources (Das 1923:3).

From 1904 the number of East Indians in British Columbia increased dramatically:

Year	Number Entering
1904-5	45
1905-6	387
1906-7	2,124
1907-8	2,623

Table II. East Indian Immigration to Canada, Fiscal Years 1904 to 1908.[36]

The reasons for this increase are threefold. Perhaps the most important initiating causes were letters sent from the initial immigrants to their villages, explaining the prospects of immigration. Secondarily, the steamship companies, particularly the Canadian Pacific Steamship Company, advertised similar claims in circulars which were widely distributed in the Punjab. This was an overt attempt to mitigate the losses in Pacific traffic caused by the $500 Chinese head tax of 1904.[37] Transit from the Punjab was from Calcutta to Canada via Hong Kong and Singapore, and any increases in the India traffic directly built up that of the China to Canada run. Of least importance were the solicitations of East Indian labour contractors.

While these were the initiating causes, the wider constraints of immigration depended upon factors similar to those of Chinese and Japanese immigration and, not surprisingly, the structure of immigration was very close to that of the two previous groups. Again, the geographic area from which the majority of East Indian immigrants came was extremely bounded, in this case to an area not much more than fifty miles across. Punjabi immigration of this first era came chiefly from the districts of Jullundur, Ludhianna, Hoshiarpur, and Ferozepore, with smaller numbers from Amritsar,

Patiala and Lahore districts. The populace of these districts had a long tradition of movement and accommodation behind them prior to immigration to North America. After their strong support of the British forces during the Mutiny of 1857, the Sikh community of the Punjab enjoyed a favoured position in British policy for over fifty years. Already developed into a militant people by repeated invasions from the North West and by resistance to Moslem rule, the Sikhs were to provide enlistments to the British sepoy regiments out of all proportion to their numbers. Through army service in places as diverse as China and the Sudan, as well as through short term immigration to Australia (Kessinger 1974), Uganda (Patel 1973; Morris 1968), and South East Asia they gained a considerable knowledge of the outside world. In the 1880's and 1890's, the Sikhs also began migrating in considerable numbers to other areas of India (Aurora 1967) as well as westward in the Punjab to the developing Canal Colonies.

These Sikh immigrants were almost uniformly of the dominant Jat caste of the Punjab.[38] Most were from the landed peasantry, and a good number possessed family land in excess of 30 acres (Das 1923:1). By all Indian standards of the day, these immigrants were rather well off. Very few had been wage labourers in India.

Various economic and geographical reasons have been advanced as to why these particular areas were such dominant sources of East Indian immigration to North America and Britain. All concede that the primary motivational consideration was once again the hope of earning enough money overseas to finance the purchase of additional land or to set up in a trade or as a

moneylender (Darlings 1928:22). Wage differentials were very large, but this was true with respect to all of India.[39] Lal (1976:7) and Aurora (1967:3-15) both look to the high population density of Jullundur and Hoshiarpur, combined with a rising cost of living, Lal adding the factor of rapid land erosion in Hoshiarpur. But it seems more reasonable, as suggested by Darlings (1928:22-40) and Kessinger (1974:87-92), that immigration from these two districts, rather than being a result of deteriorating internal conditions, was the result of its opposite. Darlings notes that Hoshiarpur and Jullundur had the lowest agricultural debt in the Punjab, with Jats in these same areas being below the average. This low agricultural debt was paralleled by that in Rawalpindi and Jhelum (Darlings 1928:84), which also were significant sources of emigrés. Kessinger's study of Punjabi historical records through one hundred years illustrates the extreme fertility of the area by the absence of food shortages in Jullundur since 1880 (1974:87). In short, immigration seems to have been made possible by conditions which favoured capital accumulation and stability. Immigration in turn allowed the families of those who had immigrated to concentrate capital still further, building up financial reserves which allowed continued immigration of family members. Representative of this dense interconnection between family and immigrant, over one-half of those Sikhs polled by the 1908 Royal Commission (King 1908a) who had arrived in that year had relatives here already.

It was their unfortunate lot that these first of Canada's East Indian immigrants came onto the scene at what must have been the worst possible

time. Hostility to both Chinese and Japanese immigration had been rising steadily since 1895, and considerable momentum had gathered towards a successful ban upon all further Asian immigration. By this time the forces who supported exclusion were substantial. The white working class, including organized labour, was united in this demand. By the turn of the century so also were large segments of the small-scale entrepreneurial and farming classes; with them moved most of the ideology-producing elements of the society, from the newspapers to the clergy.[40]

Elected provincial politicians were so uniformly anti-Asian that one's stand on this issue diminished as primary election material, and the issue shifted to which party or politician would more expediently accomplish the goal of exclusion. Only the Federal Government's vested right to determine policy dealing with aliens (BNA Act, Sec. 91, No. 25), coupled with its power of disallowal of new provincial legislation (BNA Act, Sec. 90), impeded exclusion, and Federal reluctance to exclude Asians was fast becoming a political liability. Weakening of the Federal stance was indicated by the 1900 and 1904 increases in the Chinese head tax, the second obviously meant to be exclusionary.

In their initial few years, East Indians were also to be severely disadvantaged economically. British Columbia's attempt to restrict access on the part of the Japanese and Chinese to all but a narrow spectrum of occupations had been for the most part successful. For East Indians this meant that their initial entrée into the British Columbian economy had to be made in direct competition with two minority racial castes, each with

its own developed ecological niches and with its own community resource base.

The largest East Indian flows of immigrants in the years prior to World War I (fiscal years 1907 and 1908) were to come in the midst of a severe depression. Wall Street prices fell sharply March 14, 1907 as did those on the Chicago Exchange in August. With British Columbia's economy so highly dependent on resource industries, the effects of the general slowdown were greatly magnified in the province. The lumber industry, which had been booming with the rise in prairie demand, expected only 35% of the previous year's logging (Sugimoto 1966:64). By the end of the year there were 5,000 unemployed whites in Vancouver, 500 in Victoria, 1,000 in Nanaimo, and another 1,200 in the Kootenays (Phillips 1967:47). Asian labour was also affected. By September of 1908, the Chinese Board of Trade estimated that there were at that time 1,500 Chinese out of work; of the approximately 3,000 East Indians then in the province, perhaps as many as 1,000 were also unemployed (Harkin 1909:6).

In early 1906 there had been full employment, and employers were complaining about the effects of the $500 head tax on Chinese immigration (Wynne 1964:406). East Indians continued to find work, at least for the summer months. In lieu of Chinese, 150 recently arrived East Indians were brought to the Cariboo mines (Lockley 1907:52; Muthanna 1971:5), while others found work in Port Moody and New Westminster sawmills. Nevertheless, the first cries for East Indian exclusion were being raised by mid-1906. In July, both the Victoria and Vancouver Trades and Labour

Councils passed petitions opposing an East Indian presence in British Columbia (Ward 1973:189; Lal 1976:132), followed soon after by Vancouver's city council. In October, Mayor Buscome of Vancouver went so far as to order city police to bar newly arriving East Indians from leaving the CPR dockyard detention sheds.

The winter of 1906-7 hit these new immigrants severely. Without the presence of an established community they were dependent upon the larger white society for the purchase of goods and services and for all employment. They soon found that no one would rent to them at any price (Nihal Singh 1907). Food and fuel were often refused as well.[41] They found themselves ill prepared for winter weather, especially in the interior of the province; those who had gone to the Cariboo in the summer walked back in November, having been without sufficient clothing and bedding to maintain themselves there. By mid-winter there were perhaps 1,500 unemployed East Indians in Vancouver.

Not surprisingly, the classic British Columbian stereotype of the East Indian began to arise as early as this.[42] Forced to live in large numbers in scarce and inferior housing, British Columbia derived out of this suffering a folk image of the "Hindu" (as all East Indians were called, regardless of their ethnic origins). He was perceived to be dirty and unsanitary, with an 'intrinsic' Oriental tendency towards overcrowding and consequent immorality. Complaints about strange food and stranger dress arose immediately.[43] Their lack of shelter and insufficient clothing helped to nurture the nearly universal belief of this period in climatic

racial determinism; people from tropical climates were, after all, adapted to their climate, and ought to stay there. This same folk theory, when reversed, made an excellent rationale for the designation of temperate colonial areas, such as British Columbia, as 'white man's country'.[44]

As British Columbia moved into its summer period of economic activity East Indians were able to secure jobs, even in the depressed conditions of 1907. Besides the sawmills, they worked in the cement plants, cutting wood, and clearing land. Wages ranged from $1.25 to $1.50 a day. Conditions stabilized to the point that the Sikh community was able to form their first organization, the Khalsa Diwan Society of Vancouver (Lal 1976:54).

But already the Federal Government had decided to attempt a complete termination of Indian immigration. Laurier, writing to Colonel Falk Warren in January, affirmed the Government's intent to ask the Hong Kong and India Governments to distribute information to potential immigrants warning of hard conditions in British Columbia.[45] By October, the India Government had implemented this plan, and was circulating such warnings in the Punjab (London Times, October 12, 1907:5e).

It should be stressed that Laurier, as evinced in a letter to Lord Grey in September, saw East Indian immigration as more than simply another problem of Asian labour.[46] Rather, Indian immigration had Imperial consequences. Paradoxically, either exclusion or continued immigration was seen as a threat against British rule in India. Banning Indian immigration overtly would further weaken the fiction of full Indian participation in

the Empire, while a resident Indian community in British Columbia might, like those in London, Paris and San Francisco, become a centre of sedition itself. So seriously did the British view this situation that William Hopkinson of the Calcutta Police was sent to Vancouver in 1908 to investigate seditious activities on the Pacific Coast. He was to be continuously involved with this question until he was shot in Vancouver by Mewa Singh, an Indian nationalist, in 1914 (Ferguson 1975).

Provincially, the British Columbia Legislature disenfranchised East Indians in March, 1907, even though they were British subjects.[47] As the depression deepened, racial tensions in the province increased, especially as Japanese and Indian immigration continued unabated. This hostility flared into action when 600 lumberjacks forcibly evicted 200 East Indian mill workers from Bellingham, Washington, on September 5th (Ward 1973:200). Most of these East Indians crossed the border into British Columbia, despite offers by their previous employers of wages equal to white workers (Dodd 1907:1158). Two days later, Vancouver experienced its most serious anti-Oriental riot to date, when an angry crowd, variously estimated at from 6,000 to 18,000, collected to hear speakers of British Columbia's newly formed Asiatic Exclusion League. In the riot which issued, Chinese property was extensively damaged. The Japanese stood their ground in the streets and blocked advances by the crowd into their neighbourhood.[48] William L. Mackenzie King, then Deputy Minister of Labour, was sent to Vancouver to investigate the riot, and his report resulted in extensive reparations being paid to both the Chinese and Japanese by the Canadian

Government.

This international incident provoked the Federal Government into activity on the overall question of Asian immigration. In spite of the fears voiced by Canadian manufacturers that the trade treaty with Japan would be abrogated, the Government, represented by Rodolphe Lemieux, concluded the previously referred to limitation on Japanese immigration. Once its administrative machinery was in operation this agreement effectively ended the large-scale immigration of Japanese workers to Canada.[49] King was also delegated to inquire into the causes of Japanese and East Indian immigration to Canada (1908a). His investigative visit to British Columbia was followed by one to England, where he sought to come to some agreement with the British and India Governments on a policy of East Indian exclusion (1908b).

These negotiations resulted in the January 8, 1908 Order in Council, which required that all immigrants entering Canada via British Columbia ports who were not specifically covered by separate treaties must come on a continuous journey from their country of origin. And there was no such route from India. By this Order, Canada had effectively banned subsequent East Indian immigration without the embarrassment of specifically mentioning India.

It was less than two months before this Order in Council was put to a legal test. In March, the British Columbia Supreme Court ruled that this Order was technically defective in that it illegally delegated powers of the Governor General in Council to the Minister of the Interior (re:

Behari, Lal (1908), 13 BCR 415). The East Indian defendants, three of whom were residents of Fiji although born in India, were arguing entry on the grounds that as British Subjects they had rights of access throughout the Empire.[50]

This legal impediment was eliminated by the Government on March 26th (Andracki 1958:53), with a rewording which was strict enough to have banned British immigration to Canada from Australia, should it have been rigorously applied (Lal 1976:138). On May 27th, a subsequent Order in Council required that in addition to coming to Canada on a continuous journey from their place of origin, East Indians were to be in possession of $200 upon entry. Although the continuous journey clause was to be attacked again and again in the courts, being declared ultra vires in 1910 (Andracki 1958: 111) and again in 1913 (in re: Narain Singh et al, 18 BCR, 406), it was to remain in effect until 1947.

The limitations placed on East Indians by this regulation effected a near total ban upon further immigration of East Indians to Canada before the Second World War. From 2,623 arrivals in fiscal year 1907-8, immigration flow went to:

Year	Number	Year	Number
1908-9	20	1914-15	0
1909-10	31	1915-16	1
1910-11	7	1916-17	0
1911-12	7	1917-18	0
1912-13	5	1918-19	0
1913-14	88	1919-20	0

Table III. East Indian Immigration, March 31, 1908 to March 31, 1920.[51]

Prior to 1920, East Indians in British Columbia formed a community of males, in this following the pattern of Chinese immigration. Only 18 women are listed as immigrating prior to 1920. The early prohibition of East Indian immigration made the establishment of a normal family life in British Columbia an impossibility; indeed, the legislation had that goal very much in mind. In the long run, most of these East Indian pioneers left British Columbia, either to return to India or Hong Kong or to travel on to California, where Sikhs were to enjoy early success in agricultural pursuits.[52] Immigration figures show that 5,366 East Indians entered Canada before the end of 1921, and yet census figures list only 2,342 East Indians in Canada in 1911 and but 1,016 in 1921 (Cheng 1931:145).

Despite all adversities, this small East Indian population formed itself into a tightly ordered, self-contained community. The Sikh religion, with its organization developed around democratic and participatory principles and with its dogma oriented towards defense in adversity, was eminently suited to become the structural core of the community.[53] By 1908, $10,000 had been subscribed for the establishment of a permanent Sikh temple in Vancouver, and by 1912 there were temples in New Westminster, Port Moody, Fraser Mills, Barnett, and Victoria (Aryan, November, 1911:3). There is a Sikh proverb that "five Sikhs form God", and it was through religious organization, cross-cut with networks of familial, village, and political relations, that the Sikh community established itself in British Columbia.

As has been mentioned, Sikh immigration came from extremely localized

sources. One of the consequences of this localization of origins was the importation of a whole set of pre-formed social relations to Canada. These relations were not limited to those between East Indians here. Because of the dense communication networks between British Columbia and the Punjab, social relations connected Sikhs with village organization and familial expectations. As with Fijian immigration 50 years afterwards, the Sikh community of British Columbia operated under the dual constraints of both their new home and their old one.[54]

Among these early immigrants there developed a pattern of communal domestic organization which strengthened internal solidarity while at the same time allowing the rapid accumulation of funds. Typically, from five to twenty males would live together, the number depending upon their work situation and locality. Money for food and other household expenses would be pooled, and domestic duties such as cooking rotated among the group's members. If resources were sufficient, one of the group might be paid to cook exclusively for the rest of the group (Das 1923). The residential group also formed a basis for mutual support, and loans, favours, and obligations flowed freely between its members.

The usefulness of this arrangement from an economic point of view is readily evident. As noted by Cheng (1931:203), East Indian Canadians were able to accumulate savings at a considerably higher rate than either the Japanese or the Chinese. The community collectively also evinced the benefits of mutual assistance. As mentioned, they were able to collect $10,000 by 1908 towards a Vancouver Sikh temple. In that same year, the Guru Nanak Mining and Trust Company was started with a claimed capital

worth of $50,000.[55] By 1914 the community had considerable financial resources.[56] Beyond pure accumulation, East Indians were able to donate thousands of dollars to charitable and political causes, and successfully provided welfare and legal services to their own community continuously through World War II.

Protest against Restriction

This social cohesion can also be seen in early political organization. From 1908 on, the East Indian community fought loudly against the restrictions put upon them. Unlike the Japanese, they had no home government support whatsoever, and yet they campaigned relentlessly against subordination. From the first they made the maximal claim -- that, as British subjects, as "members of the Aryan Race", and as retired soldiers of the Queen, they should be accorded all of the rights of other Canadians. Neither the Japanese nor the Chinese were so explicit in their protest.

Their counter-attack against caste subordination and exclusion was not limited to the courts. Using their literate middle class as intermediaries, East Indians propagandized the Canadian public directly. English language periodicals such as the Aryan (1911-1912), Canada and India (1915-1916), the Hindustanee (1914-1915), and India and Canada (1929-1930) were aimed at least in part at the white community. The Canada India Committee of Toronto also presented East Indian grievances to the rest of Canada in a series of pamphlets (1915a; 1915b; 1916). Several early members of the community, particularly Saint Nihal Singh (1907; 1908a;

1908; 1909; 1912), Sunda Singh (1911a; 1911b; 1911c), and Nand Singh Sirha (1913a; 1913b) wrote extensively in popular journals about the conditions under which their compatriots lived. Deputations were sent to Ottawa in 1912 and to India in 1913.[57]

Political mobilization was not to be directed solely towards the amelioration of their own situation. Frustrated in the attempt to gain equality in British Columbia, many Sikhs vigorously supported a number of Indian independence organizations with time, money, and occasionally, with their lives. As early as 1908, Taraknath Das was publishing the 'seditious' journal Free Hindustan, first in Vancouver and then in Seattle. From this point until the end of World War I, East Indians in British Columbia were closely affiliated with the significant independence movement centering in San Francisco which, under the initiating inspiration of Lala Har Dayal, was crystalized into the Hindustanee Ghadr Party. Ghadr was to be the most important overseas revolutionary movement to arise prior to the thirties, and was the first which was not overtly communal.[58] East Indian workers in British Columbia also had considerable sympathy with the International Workers of the World (Laut 1913:24).

Entrepreneurial Activity

In contrast to both the Chinese and Japanese, entrepreneurial activity among early East Indians in Canada was but slightly developed. The blue collar nature of the East Indian workforce was maintained until after World War II. The only significant exceptions to this tendency were in

the wood industries, which by the 1930's were to employ over 90% of all East Indians involved in industrial wage labour.[59] By 1923, East Indians owned seven logging camps, two shingle factories, about 50 (mostly one-man) firewood businesses, and six lumber mills (Das 1923:27). Two of the latter, Mayo Lumber Company and Kapoor Mills, were to become large-scale employers in the late 1920's (Canada and India 1(3):4), and even though the Depression reduced East Indian participation in the lumber industry, East Indian mills accounted for 5% of the total provincial production in 1914 (Smith 1944).

Farming, particularly dairying, was another entrepreneurial outlet, and a few farms had been established as early as 1912 (Hindustanee, January, 1912:8). There were 25 farms noted by Das (1923:28) in 1923, and approximately this same number continued to exist into the post-War era, when the number began to increase (Button 1964). Retail business, with the exception of a limited participation in transportation and fire-wood selling, was minimal.

The End of the First Era of Asian Immigration

The onset of World War I marked the beginning of the end of an era in Asian immigration to British Columbia. By 1913, Japanese immigration had been severely reduced by treaty, and East Indian immigration had been stopped altogether. The famous Komagata Maru incident of May and June, 1914 failed to dent the continuous journey clause as it applied to East Indians (Ferguson 1975). In fact, the number of East Indians in British

Columbia went down sharply during the War as many Sikhs returned to India with revolutionary intents (Mathus 1970) or moved to the United States. Chinese immigration was only then recovering from the limitations of the 1904 head tax.[60] The disruption of shipping by the War, combined with an Order in Council (December 9, 1913) banning all labourers from immigrating to British Columbia, limited further increase in Chinese immigration temporarily.

At the 1918 Imperial War Conference it was decided that, while it was the right of the Dominions to regulate their own immigration, for humanitarian reasons the wives of alien residents in those Dominions ought to be allowed to follow their husbands. In response to this opinion, and after eleven years of forbidding it, the Canadian Government's March 26, 1919 Order in Council finally allowed the wives and dependent children of East Indian residents in Canada to enter the country. By 1940, 256 women and 423 children had done so, and the community was well on its way towards a normal social life.[61]

Subsequent to the First World War, Parliament banned totally the further immigration of Chinese workers (DHC 1923, 503). Only seven Chinese legally immigrated to Canada from 1925 through 1952. Unlike East Indian exclusion, Chinese wives and children were not allowed entry under the new regulations, and the Chinese in British Columbia were destined to remain a primarily male society until after the Second World War.

The Japanese were the last to be successfully excluded from further immigration to Canada. While the Lemieux Agreement limited the numbers

of Japanese immigrants sharply, it continued to average near to 600 a year over the twenty years from the enactment of the Agreement to 1928: 11,745 Japanese, 5,995 of them women, entered during this period. After the First World War and the successful exclusion of the Chinese, hostility towards Asians centered on the Japanese (Roy 1973). In 1922, the Federal Government was pressured to restrict the number of fishing licences held by the Japanese.[62] Propagandists continued the cry of exclusion, based on the dual thesis that the Japanese were both an economic and a political threat -- the latter because the Japanese were presumed to have total allegiance to their home government and might become a Japanese tool to win control over the Pacific Northwest.[63]

Because of their early naturalization and their consequent high proportion of families the Japanese became liable to the other charge which was instrumental in their exclusion. The Provincial Government's Report on Oriental Activities within the Province (1927) estimated that the Japanese Canadian birth rate was four times that of the general population. Exclusionists developed this evidence along the lines of a popular Empire thesis (Stoddard 1920) which suggested that unless drastic measures were taken the breeding potential of the Asian peoples would make white countries 'go yellow'. In 1928, Japanese immigration was further limited by treaty to no more than 150 a year, thereby completing the exclusion of Asians from Canada.[64]

Ethnic Relations in Early British Columbia: a settler society

Prior to the First World War, British Columbia witnessed the successive entrée of three Asian minorities, and in each case the response of the white population was one of hostility, subordination, and of attempted exclusion. Many of the answers to why this was so stand out clearly in the historical record, even in the brief fashion in which it has been related here. Considerably more understanding comes from casting this history in more general terms, particularly with reference to the sociological literature on comparative ethnic relations.

British Columbia was, first and foremost, a settler society -- a society defined and established by a body of colonizing European immigrants who came with the intention of permanent residence. Other settler societies of British origin would include the early American Colonies, New Zealand, Australia, Kenya, Rhodesia, and marginally, South Africa. In each of these cases, British Columbia included, this historical pattern of settlement was to have immediate consequences for ethnic relations. The move itself meant that one's life chances were intimately tied up with the new homeland; interests, affiliations, and most importantly, rights became more and more derivable from the settler society and less from the country of origin.[65] Group affiliation, at least in the narrow sense of economic survival, was with one's fellow emigrés, for it was the socio-economic position of this group in the colony upon which one's livelihood depended.

It is not surprising that in each of these British settler societies

the new homeland was categorically defined as "white man's country". In its nineteenth-century usage, tied up as it was with climatic and racial determinism, this thesis gave Europeans an a priori rationalization that they had rights of access and use to those areas of the globe which were climatically temperate and which were "empty", in the sense that they did not contain highly developed indigenous societies. Thus, climatically, Kenya was considered fit for white settlement while adjacent Uganda was not, British Columbia was demographically acceptable while India was not.[66]

In British Columbia, detached as it was from Eastern Canada and facing the Pacific with its "teeming millions", the ideology of white man's country included elements of Anglo-Saxon destiny and of the defense of the vanguards of Western Civilization against the "hordes of Asia". British Columbia was "empty":

> With fertile territory equal to France and Spain combined the population of British Columbia is little more than that of the city of Birmingham in England. Yet the forces of her salmon-teeming rivers could, if harnessed, equip a continent with electric light and power. She has over 180 million acres of forest and woodland. Her fisheries, along her fiord coast, are said to eclipse in capacity those of the whole Atlantic. In only one of her wonderful coal fields she can yield 10,000,000 tons a year for a thousand years. In her virgin forests and prairies there is enough fertile soil for harvest of grain and fruit to feed a thousand times her present population. (B. Mathews, The Clash of Colour,1924:48)

Canada was "the rightful patrimony of the English people, the ample appanage which God and nature has set aside in the New World for those whose lot has assigned them but insufficient portions in the Old" (Lord Durham in Neame 1907:2). But this birthright was one that needed to be guarded:

> British Columbia is one of the last frontiers of the white race against the yellow and the brown. It is a land where a hoary civilization meets a modern one, and where the swarming millions of ancient peoples, stung into restless life by modern events, are constantly impinging on an attractive land held by sparse thousands of whites. And here, the alarmed British Columbians, clamorous for Asiatic exclusion, feels that he is taking the long view ... [British Columbia is] a community of a half a million souls which stands in the sea gate on the northwest Pacific, and holds it for Saxon civilization. (Nelson 1924:171-2).

Included in this theory was an assumption that there was an intrinsic difference between members of the white settler group and both indigenous and immigrant minorities. Members of the dominant group in settler societies are potentially on the defensive with respect to their rights and privileges, in part because they cannot claim a position of privilege on the basis of indigenous citizenship. Here the notion of white man's country allows an ideological extension of home country rights to the new environ.

A Resource-Based Economy

Race relations in British Columbia were profoundly affected by the nature of the local economy, which has always been dependent upon resource extraction and staple production. Lumber, mining, fishing, agriculture, the consequent construction of communication links and the development of land have been vital supports of the economy, especially in those earlier years.

Prior to the extensive technological innovations of the mid-twentieth century, all of these industries were highly dependent upon the avail-

ability of large amounts of cheap wage labour. Because of the industrial nature of resource extraction, combined with the wide fluctuations in labour demand caused by changes in market conditions, labour organization was highly rationalized early in British Columbia's history. Workers sold their labour, and business bought it at the cheapest possible rate. There was little affiliation of workers with their jobs or their employers, and there was even less on the part of employers for their workers.

Out of this industrial structure and the conflict between workers and owners which was intrinsic to it arose several consequences for Asians in British Columbia. First in importance was obviously their utility to employers, a point dwelt upon previously. Asian workers provided the ultimate in rationalized, cheap labour for the province's resource industries. This alone would have generated a demand for exclusion by the white working class, as it had in the United States, Australia, and South Africa, but the structure of these provincial industries magnified this tendency. Because these industries were large and labour intensive and because this context generated such violent conflicts over the price of labour, unionization and worker political organization arose very early in the province's history (Phillips 1966). Employers used Asians to counter these organizational forces, in so doing producing the threat which was to solidify the ranks of labour and eventually result in the exclusion of Asians and their subordination in the work force.

The resource dependence of the British Columbian economy gave the economic elite of the province enormous powers, which were employed to

slow down eventual Asian exclusion. It also meant that the province's entrepreneurial middle class was to be torn between their acknowledged dependence on the health of the provincial resource industries and their fear of Asian competition, although the latter tendency was to prevail.

Subordination

The dominant groups in settler societies usually have three options in their defense of privileges against the claims of minorities -- assimilation of the minority group into the majority, integration of the minority into the society but as a distinct subordinate caste, and exclusion (Rex 1970:125-30). 'Societies', of course, decide nothing, but the complex contest between opposing groups within them generally result in one of these possibilities. In early British Columbia, assimilation of Asians into white society was both unthinkable and unworkable.[67] Rather, the two alternative paths were taken: exclude further immigration of Asians and restrict those remaining to a socially and economically subordinate position. In this, British Columbia followed the same path as the United States, South Africa, Australia, and Kenya.

The historical sequence leading to exclusion has already been brought out, but it is necessary to develop a bit more the nature of Asian subordination in British Columbia, especially as we must later consider to what degree any of these liabilities are placed on Fijian immigrants.

Asians were rigorously segregated socially. Communication between whites and Asians was primarily of a functional nature, and rarely touched

upon personal experience. Business transactions and employee-employer relations made up the majority of links between Asians and whites in early British Columbia. Information flow in the sphere of ethnic identity was near non-existent, with the consequence that stereotypes of Asians had very little in the way of 'objective' content to them. Racist avoidance, coupled with Asian caste segregation in occupation and in geographical location, reinforced by the centripetal tendencies of the minorities themselves, bounded each of the three communities. Most significant interactions were performed by middlemen.[68]

Asians were systematically barred from a whole range of occupational possibilities and were thereby relegated largely to the blue collar working class. Even within the working class Asians were subordinate. A split labour market was universal until the 1930's, when minimum wage laws sought to ensure preferential white participation in the work place by the legislation of equality in white and Asian rates of pay.[69] The belief was that if both received equal pay, all jobs would therefore go to whites. Asians were also restricted in their possibilities for advancement, and tended to remain for long periods of time at the same job. Managerial positions, expecially when in the control of white workers, were rarely secured by Asians. Conversely, Asians were given few opportunities to compete for skilled manual jobs, and tended to be given the most repetitive and onerous ones.[70] In the mills, a white might operate a saw and an East Indian would stack lumber; whites would fell trees and Asians would work on the green chain.

There were many other restrictions on Asian employment. Asians were informally excluded from the great majority of white collar clerical and sales jobs, in many cases up until the late 1950's. They were barred altogether from the craft unions. Provincial decree restricted them from working on public works and on the felling of Crown timber. Federal regulations limited the number of Japanese fishing licences granted from 1922 onwards (Angus 1931:8). Asians were informally restricted from employment in the Federal, Provincial, and Municipal Governments. In the professions, specific regulations of the licencing bodies in Pharmacy and Law (Angus 1931:6) reserved these occupations for whites only. Additionally, the Trade Licence Boards Act of 1928 (B.C.S. 1928, Chap. 49) provided the possibility of the severe regulation of Asian business licences should it be "in the public interest".

Social and political restrictions were equally severe. Asians legally could have been (and often were) banned from restaurants, theatres, and movie houses.[71] There was a great reluctance to sell housing to Asians, especially in middle class areas. Politically, Asians were allowed no participation whatsoever. They could not vote, either municipally, provincially, or federally, nor could they serve in the Legislative Assembly, or on municipal or school boards. Most Asian Canadians held the status of alien residents, and therefore were potentially subject to deportation or collective removal, should they individually violate Canadian law or should the law be changed.[72]

Asian Reactions to Subordination

There was much that the Chinese, Japanese and East Indian immigrants held in common, not the least of which were the preceeding restrictions under which they laboured. Each group came from a fairly localized source and from a rural background. In each case there was considerable ethnic and class uniformity, both of which were strengthened by a common Canadian experience.[73]

The pattern of immigration and the motives for it were also similar. The initiating impetus was in all instances dependent upon a flow of information and personnel between North America and home. This propagation of knowledge about Canada built up an exponentially increasing number of people immigrating which was limited only by Governmental barriers. Chinese, Japanese, and East Indians all were sojourners, and the motive for immigration was immediate gain. There were consequently few women and many young, single men.

Each group eventually accepted caste subordination (for they had no alternatives), but each hoped that in that subordinate position they would have the right to follow their own ethnic traditions; having been denied the preferred status of being separate but equal, they acquiesced to being separate, even if unequal. Within the perimeters of each group there developed a complex set of "parallel institutions" (van den Berghe 1967:34), which helped to define reality in an image of home and which provided for a wide range of needs, from religion to recreation to social welfare and education. Early British Columbia was a hybrid sort of society where, much

like blacks in present-day South Africa, Asians were subordinately integrated in the provincial economy and rigorously segregated elsewhere. Industrial wages fueled a whole diversity of traditional institutions, which were crystalized through caste subordination and entrenched by the lack of new immigrant personnel.[74]

The remarkable parallels between Chinese, Japanese, and East Indian immigration should not blind one to the variations upon the general pattern wrought by each group. In retrospect, the political and economic resources available to each group differed considerably, with the result that their contests with the forces of exclusion and segregation were each played out distinctively. These reservoirs of potential power can be separated analytically, and the differences in resources thereby made more evident. Among the political resources which were relevant to the situation of immigrant Asians were the degree of home government support, political motivation, political knowledge, and the internal structure of the community. Economic resources are also separable, and include economic motivation, skills, and again, internal community organization. Each is discussed in turn.

Home Government Support

In each case, one of the most significant factors in the determination of the place of Asian immigrants in British Columbia was the degree to which the Canadian Government and its citizens believed that discrimination against immigrants would be met by sanctions from the country of origin.

Home governments could also directly affect the course of immigration itself. This factor could and did work either positively or negatively. The Japanese were the only group which received significant support from their government and the international interests of Canada were such that restrictions on Japanese immigration were made only through treaty and were effected solely by the Japanese Government. The Japanese Government also supported its citizens in Canada through diplomatic and media channels. Japan's national image as a militarily powerful, rapidly modernizing, independent country directly affected both immigrant Japanese nationalism and self worth and the white stereotype of individual Japanese built up after that image. Japanese immigrants earned a grudging respect among whites for standing their ground, for innovation and Westernization. Of the three Asian groups, they were seen as the 'dangerous' ones -- a measure of respect in adversity.

The Chinese had no support whatsoever from their home government, and consequently the course of Canadian immigration policy which dealt with them was decided unilaterally and was based upon national interests. The national image of China as a helpless giant, governed by a decadent aristocracy and prey to any foreign nation bold enough to subjugate her, reflected negatively upon the Chinese immigrant. They, too, were seen as childlike, in need of strong control and direction, as amoral, as patient and hardworking, but incapable of innovation and only slowly adaptable to modern ways. They were dominated in accordance with the stereotype.

It was only for the East Indians that the home government worked

directly against their interests. Because India was a British colony, its policy was subject to control by Britain, and it was not in either the British or the Canadian Government's interest to allow Indian immigration to North America. It was accordingly stopped -- quickly, totally, and without dissent on the part of any of the concerned governments. East Indians derived no political resources at all from India, save for the minimal leverage which they were able to develop by publicizing their plight in Indian journals.

Political Motivation

Once in British Columbia, the degree to which Asians mobilized their counter-attacks was dependent upon several interconnected factors, motivation being a vital aspect. Motivation for political action (including defence of self and of personal honour) depended largely in turn on the reasons for immigration and on the immigrants' collective view of their self worth.

All groups came initially as sojourners, and this itself severely limited political motivation, for political activity was action directed away from the immediate concern of accumulation. The decision to stay more or less permanently, made first in significant numbers by the Japanese, resulted in an increase in concern for their future in British Columbia, and thereby increased the motivation for political action. This was so also for the East Indian community, which was able to apply enough pressure to bear that entry to Canada was allowed for their wives and children.

Political motivation was also dependent upon immigrant ideas of self and community identity, and upon the degree to which they were willing to accept the British Columbian 'premise of inequality' between whites and Asians. Within the constraints under which they lived, the Japanese fiercely defended their status, honour and property. East Indians, who had come to believe that as British Subjects they possessed definite rights in the Empire, also reacted strongly against subordination; Sikh ethnic pride augmented this feeling considerably. Although by far the smallest of the three groups, East Indians politically made up for their numbers by concerted motivation.

Political Knowledge

If one takes political knowledge loosely to include that information which allows the exercise of political options in a given context, this factor too varied considerably. Of the three, the East Indians, as participants in the British Empire, had internalized the methods of the European legal system to the greatest degree, and it was in this sphere that they stood out. From 1908 on, East Indians constantly challenged the immigration laws in the courts. Chinese and Japanese were far less active in the courts, especially in the light of their larger numbers and longer residence in British Columbia. Because of their understanding of British government organization and of Western media, East Indians were also the most effective in propagandizing their views.

Community Structure

Political motivation also depended largely upon the degree to which total community resources could be mustered, and this was in turn dependent upon community structure. Community solidarity varied among the groups, with the numerically smallest, the East Indians, exhibiting cohesion to the greatest degree. Size, length of residence, and community heterogeneity all varied together, and it was evident that among the Chinese there existed a wide range of personnel, with the effect that concerted community action was extremely difficult. Elite members of these three groups, who were the most likely vehicles for political action, were differentially tied to collective concerns, with East Indian and Japanese elites being by far more representative of the community than the Chinese.[75]

Economic resources varied, but not in such a marked degree as political resources. Neither did they result in as divergent an outcome between Chinese, Japanese, and East Indians. This is readily understandable in the light of the fact that most formal and informal limitations upon Asians concerned economic issues, and most of these restrictions pressed upon each group equally.

Economic Motivation

As has been discussed, the motivation for initial immigration was an important determinant of the immigrant's orientation towards life in Canada. As most came initially as sojourners, regardless of group, there was little to differentiate initial economic motivations. Members of all

three groups, desirous of economic positions which would give consistent and quick income, were forced into the lowest ranks of the working class. But as the Chinese and Japanese communities developed, entrepreneurial options became increasingly available. Because entrepreneurial activity was usually capital intensive, moving out of the working class was often synonymous with the decision to remain in Canada. Both the Chinese and the Japanese developed small entrepreneurial classes, while the East Indians did not. Coming to the scene at a later date, East Indian entrepreneurs could neither rely on their own small community for support nor could they compete successfully against the established Chinese and Japanese entrepreneurs for a portion of the white business. The East Indian community was to remain essentially a working class one until very recently.

Skills

It would be a grave error to suggest that immigrants from Asia came without skills. Clearly they did not. Both the Chinese and the Japanese moved significantly into agricultural pursuits, following their backgrounds. The Japanese concentration in the fishing industry was also dependent in part on prior experience. While East Indians also possessed agricultural expertise, utilization of those skills in Canada suffered from the lack of available East Indian manpower and from the necessity of competing with the dominant position of the Chinese and Japanese in vegetable and fruit farming. It is not surprising that what East Indian agricultural endeavour

there was concentrated primarily upon dairying. Although the Sikhs possessed acknowledged military and policing skills, these were not utilizable in British Columbia because of racial restrictions.

Social Organization and the Economy

Again, there was much alike in the three groups' internal social organization, especially as it affected economic pursuits. The demographically larger size of the Chinese and Japanese communities allowed the rise of an entrepreneurial class employing community members, as mentioned. And Chinese, Japanese, and East Indian community structures obviously facilitated successful competition with white wage labour. But community structure could do little to affect the primary source of economic input -- wage labour, the structure of which was determined outside of the community.

The Modern Setting: East Indians in British Columbia after World War II

After the effective termination of Asian immigration in the 1920's, the three communities stabilized socially and demographically. All three continued to make extensive adaptations towards Western cultural norms, at least in those spheres where Asians and Canadians interacted. Dress shifted, and English facility climbed.[76] A growing number of Asian Canadian children had been born and raised in the province, and through their schooling and social contacts came a massive exposure to Canadian culture and social practice.

Nevertheless, the legal and informal restrictions against Asians

persisted through World War II, during which the Japanese in British Columbia were uprooted from their homes and interned away from the coast.[77] The East Indian community, which we will now follow to the present, moved slowly towards a position of relative equality in the society while maintaining its social separation from it. Although a high degree of internal community strife persisted throughout this period, animosity between East Indians and whites mitigated considerably.[78] By the mid-1940's wage parity with whites had been achieved, at least in the larger industries, although equal occupational opportunity had not.[79]

The East Indian community of British Columbia in the 1940's remained almost entirely Jat Sikh, and was therefore extremely homogeneous in background. Save for a small number of males who had immigrated illegally, all of the men in the community had come prior to 1913 or as the dependent sons of those first immigrants. The number of Canadian-born was at that time small. Women were either the wives or daughters of immigrant men. No other relations, including the husbands of Canadian East Indian women, were allowed entry. Over the "quiet years" the community socially turned in upon itself. To 1944, only three Sikh men are reported to have married Canadian women, while no Sikh women had married Canadian men (Smith 1944).[80]

World War II saw the beginning of a new era for British Columbia's East Indian community. This change was the result of several factors. In British Columbia, East Indians renewed their fight for legal equality during the War, for the first time with significant white political support. One of the primary goals was renewal of the privilege of immigration, which was

then prohibited for "immigrants belonging to any race who are deemed unsuitable to assume the duties and responsibilities of Canadian citizenship".[81] Equally important was the destruction of the numerous social and economic limitations created by the Legislature and by regulating boards which were dependent upon keeping one off the Provincial voters' list. Following the pattern set up by the visits of Srinivasa Shastri in 1922 and Rabindranath Tagore and Rev. C.F. Andrews in 1929, several Indian notables lobbied the Federal and Provincial Governments on the franchise during the early 1940's. These included H.S.L. Polak, secretary of the Indian Overseas Association and a compatriot of Gandhi in South Africa, the Hon. Pandit Kunzru, Kodanda Rao, a member of the influential Servants of India, and Dr. D.P. Pandia, who remained to carry the fight to its conclusion. In 1945, the CCF put the issue to a vote in the Legislature, where it was narrowly defeated. Subsequently, on April 2, 1947, the Legislature passed Bill 85, which granted both East Indians and Chinese the right to vote in British Columbia, subject to the same requirements as other residents. This formally eliminated most legal restrictions upon East Indians in the province, and simultaneously gave them Dominion franchise. Municipal franchise was achieved late in the same year.

This important shift in the legal position of East Indians in British Columbia was not the simple result of a minority fight for equal rights. Rather, international events subsequent to World War II were important influences, as they were for the equally momentous changes in Canadian immigration policy which were to come. The War, like the Great War before

it, shook the foundations of the world order. One of the consequences was the decolonization of much of the Third World and the rise of the voice of these emergent nations on the world scene. With the independence of India and Pakistan, and with the growing strength and autonomy of China, Canadian domestic and international policy regarding them could no longer be made unilaterally, as it had been in the case of East Indian and Chinese immigration restrictions of the past era.

As an active participant in the creation of the United Nations, Canada became open to the charge of hypocrisy if it were to continue to discriminate against its Asian minorities; when in 1946 the Canadian Government chose not to support a resolution in the United Nations condemning the treatment of Indians in South Africa, the move was met with an adverse home press reaction which suggested parallels between Indians in South Africa and Indians in Canada (Andracki 1958:198).

The end of the war saw Canadian industry expanding rapidly, filling the vacuum created by the military destruction of the major European economic structures. Several labour shortages were soon evident, especially in primary industries, which have been historically prone to wild oscillations in their output. For the first time since 1931, immigration was looked to for a source of additional wage labour.[82] On May 1, 1947 (P.C. 1734), the Mackenzie King Government announced that thereafter, and in due regard for labour demands, immigrants from "traditional source countries" (i.e., from white, English-speaking ones) would be allowed to immigrate to Canada under extremely liberal conditions. Additionally, in deference to

the U.N. Charter the Chinese Immigration Act was repealed, and the Chinese were given the same rights to sponsor relatives as the East Indians had secured thirty years before. The onerous continuous journey clause of 1908, which had for all purposes ended East Indian immigration, was also removed.

Even so, Asians were to be maintained as a separate category for immigration purposes until 1967. By June, 1950, the previous liberalization of immigration regulations were seen to have been insufficient to meet Canadian labour demands, and they were therefore further loosened. From that point on, (white) Canadian residents would be able to sponsor relatives of any degree. Independent immigration was to be allowed in agriculture, entrepreneurial and professional occupations, and in the case of workers sponsored by Canadian employers. Asians were unaffected by the new regulations.

In the same year, the class of admissible Asian immigrants was increased to include the husbands of Asian Canadian women and their dependent children. In 1951, a series of bilateral agreements allowed the immigration of 150, 100, and 50 people per year from India, Pakistan, and Ceylon, respectively, over the number admitted as sponsored relatives (Hawkins 1972:92).[83] Attempts by the Vancouver Khalsa Diwan Society in 1952 to have the range of sponsorable relatives increased met with failure in Parliament (Corbett 1957:30). India's quota was increased to 300 in 1957, and the criteria for selection under the quota were slightly altered.[84] By the 1961 census there were only 6,774 East Indians in Canada, 4,526 of

which were resident in British Columbia (Jain 1971:6). While this was up considerably from the 1951 figures of 2,148 and 1,937, East Indians in British Columbia had only just achieved in numbers the size they had had in 1908.

Because the admissible class of East Indian immigrants up to 1962 were largely the close relatives of East Indians residing in Canada, a Sikh majority continued to be preserved in British Columbia. Marriage and sponsorship both continued to reinforce the concentration of immigrant source areas. Of those who were able to immigrate independent of sponsorship many were of other ethnic backgrounds, but their numbers were not significant. Moreover, because of the fierce competition for the few quota positions a large number of the early independent immigrants were professionals or businessmen who tended to locate in the metropolitan centres of the East, especially in Ontario. British Columbian East Indian immigration continued to be Sikh and to be working class. Adrian Mayer (1959:3) estimated that more than 9/10ths of the Vancouver area East Indian population was Sikh in 1959. Most continued to move into manual occupations, and perhaps 75% were still in one or another of the wood industries, with a heavy concentration in the mills.

Through these years, Canadian immigration policy moved increasingly in the direction of economic rationalization; requirements concerned with matching Canadian workforce demands with suitable immigrants increased, and soon were to take precedence over other considerations. Under this demand the range of countries, of ethnic backgrounds, and finally, of

colours from which immigration was acceptable also increased. This process of economic reorientation of immigration policy was acknowledged in the unification of manpower and immigration concerns under one department of Government in 1966 and in the continual restriction of sponsorship which was carried out from 1956 through 1967. In 1967 the regulations were issued under which immigration is currently conducted. Although I will have reason to qualify this assertion at a later point, they at least theoretically signified a complete rationalization of the system. From that point on, the Government formally disavowed a policy of racial or national restriction of immigrants.[85] A rationalized "point system" was established which gave weight to the factors of education, skills, occupational demand in Canada, knowledge of English or French, age, and prearranged employment. Sponsorship was reduced to dependent relations. A new hybrid class of nominated immigrants was created which mixed these socio-economic factors with consideration of support by one's nominating relatives. Theoretically, this system would be applied uniformly throughout the world, and neither would previously preferred or previously banned countries be differentially evaluated.

It was this policy change which radically altered the nature of the East Indian population of British Columbia. This shift had two aspects, both demographic, but with different consequences. First of all, the numbers of East Indian people who immigrated to Canada increased enormously:

Year	Number	Year	Number	
1956	332	1964	2,077	
1957	334	1965	3,491	
1958	459	1966	4,094	
1959	741	1967	6,000+	)
1960	691	1968-73	57,500+	) estimated[86]
1961	744	1974	20,000+	)
1962	830	1975	17,000+	)
1963	1,331			

Table IV. East Indian Immigration to Canada, 1956 to 1975.

In 1974 and 1975, for instance, people of East Indian origin comprised a minimum of 9% of the total immigrant flow to Canada -- a huge increase over the past -- but still only one-half the flow from Britain alone in those years. By my own estimates there are now roughly 45,000 East Indians resident in British Columbia, which represents more than a doubling of the population since the census of 1971, which gave the figure as 18,795.[87] With the qualification that it is only a rough estimate, these 45,000 now constitute about one-quarter of the approximately 145,000 East Indians in Canada.

The second demographic consequence of the liberalization of the immigration regulations has been a broadening of the sources of East Indian immigration, with the resultant increase in the heterogeneity of the British Columbian East Indian population. Immigrants from India are no longer only Punjabi Sikhs; there are now many India-born Hindus and Moslems in British Columbia who come from all over the Indian subcontinent. The expulsion of Asians from Uganda in 1971 and the Canadian Government's decision to grant a large number of them refugee status has resulted in the creation of a community of Ismaili Muslims in British Columbia, who now

must number well over 6,000 (Morah 1974:2). Pakistani Moslems have also begun to arrive, as have immigrants from Sri Lanka (Ceylon), Kenya, and others whose previous residence was in Britain. The Fijian East Indian community of Vancouver is at least in part a result of this new immigration policy.

There is, therefore, no longer <u>one</u> East Indian community in British Columbia properly speaking, but rather several, which are complexly interlinked by networks which follow ethnicity, nationality, religion, class, kinship and occupation. None of these sub-communities, the Fijian one included, stand as isolated and autonomous elements, and yet the sum total, the "East Indian community", no longer has much more than a definitional reality.

The exception to this generalization concerns East Indian-Canadian relations. As will be brought out in Chapter Eight, most white Canadians in British Columbia have only the most vague notions about the very real differences which exist between one East Indian and another, and therefore tend to view all East Indians as members of a relatively homogeneous group. Because of this lumping process, stereotypes and interactional patterns built up after the Sikh pioneers of yesterday are used upon the East Indians of today. Thus, whatever the background and personal affiliations of any single East Indian resident of British Columbia, he must constantly interface with a larger social context which he knows will prejudge him in accord with a universal stereotype.[88] Internally, this creates more solidarity and interaction between members of the different East Indian sub-communities than might otherwise be.

This increase in the representation of East Indians in British Columbia has not passed unnoticed by the rest of British Columbia, and there has been a considerable prejudice and hostility growing against these new immigrants from the late 1960's on. East Indian immigrants have been collectively held to be responsible for the high unemployment current in the province, for the steep rise in the cost of living, especially of housing costs, for increased taxes (these for presumed East Indian welfare and educational costs), for the deterioration of neighbourhoods, and for the demise of Canadian civilization generally. Individually, they are seen much like they were 60 years ago, as argumentative, violent, litigious, unassimilatable, and intrinsically communal. Added to this has been the high birthrate charge which was applied to the Japanese in the 1920's and 1930's. These ideas are part of the context with which Indo-Canadians must now come to terms, and while it may not be possible to generalize to all East Indians, these interactional constraints significantly modify Fijian patterns of behaviour.

The Modern Economy

A final point should be made in this introduction to British Columbia as a setting for Fijian immigrants, and this concerns the nature of the present day provincial economy. Back in 1929, primary production accounted for more than 65% of the total production of the province (British Columbia 1935:4), with forestry alone contributing about 40% of primary production. Today, the economy shows this same dependence on extractive industry.

Forest products accounted for 49% of factory shipments in 1972 (British Columbia 1972:56), and 95,000 people were employed in forest industries in 1975 (British Columbia 1975:v). Mining and agriculture are still of great importance to the economy, and most secondary industry is geared to the processing of primary resources.

Nevertheless, the economy has not remained within this basis alone. Small-scale secondary industry employing less than 50 workers has increased, while employment in service industries has exploded, increasing 71% in the last ten years (British Columbia 1975:v). Employment in trade industries has gone up by 59% in the same period. Both of these increases reflect the rise of Vancouver as a West Coast centre for shipping and finance.

While the base of the economy has widened, the ultimate importance of the extractive industries still makes for wide, industry-selective swings in employment. The economy has, since 1970-3, experienced a strong downturn, and primary industries have been particularly affected. Overall provincial unemployment has risen since 1970. It is now at 9% and has not been under 6% since 1970 (British Columbia 1975:10). While industrial employment has increased about 14% over the last four years (1972-6), it has been level over the last two, and down slightly in forestry and manufacturing. Although personal income has increased from $4,121 to $6,074 per capita over 1972-5, double-digit inflation in prices has stabilized real personal income for the last two years. Sharp rises in housing costs (the average Vancouver house now sells for $65,000), coupled with high interest rates have made house ownership prohibitive to most people without

large initial equities.[89] Food prices have increased a full 50% since 1972 (British Columbia 1975:viii). There are few indications that British Columbians expect these conditions to ameliorate significantly in the immediate future, and for many this is a time of frustration, retrenchment, and of the limitation of expectations. Simultaneously, for Fijian Canadians this is a time of establishment and pioneering, and of development of community.

Fijians, like all immigrants, come to Canada bringing with them values and expectations which are largely formed by the cultural context which was their birthright. It is to this context, to Fiji, which we must now turn, in order to gain some insight into Fijian society and with it, into its individuals, some of which have ventured to a new home in British Columbia.

Chapter One: Notes

1. As with the Japanese, no attempt will be made to provide an extensive history of the Chinese in British Columbia. For further detail, see the historical theses by Andracki (1958), Wynne (1964), and Ward (1973), the sociological study by Cheng (1931) or the geographical one by Cho (1970). See also the two Canadian Royal Commission reports (RCCI 1885; RCCJI 1902) on Asian immigration to Canada and the Provincial Report on Oriental Activities within the Province (ROAP 1927).

2. They also participated vigorously in small-scale gold mining. Howay (1941:568) notes that by 1860, Chinese claims constituted a majority in the mining records of Yale. They were a majority by 1863 in Lytton as well.

3. This classic equation holds for Fijian immigration as well. The well-off do not come and the poor cannot.

4. In the inflated wage market of the gold rush, the differential between here and China was at least as marked. A.J. Langley, writing in 1861 (1862:13) claimed that domestics in Victoria could then expect £5 to £6 per month, while J. Pemberton, then surveyor general of Vancouver Island, (1860:130), estimated that unskilled labour was being paid at the rate of $150 per year.

5. See Bonacich (1972) for a more abstract analysis of the place of the sojourner. I am drawing an ideal type, not suggesting, as did the popular stereotypes of the day, that actual Chinese consistently achieved this ideal.

6. As noted by Cho (1970:21), the population estimates of the 1885 Royal Commission gave the number of males in British Columbia as 9,870 out of a total of 10,550 Chinese. Cheng (1931:203) claims the ratio of males to females in his time to be 15 to 1. A balance was not achieved until the 1960's (Cho 1970:69). Cheng (1931) makes the point that this absence of women was crucial to saving, considering the low wage rates. While he estimated that a single Japanese male could save an average of $570 per year, Cheng maintained that Japanese with families could save nothing at all.

7. Perhaps this state, rather than the ideal type of the ascetic Protestant, constitutes pure economic rationalization at the individual level. The Protestant's ideological commitment, which gave meaning to his work situation, constrained his behaviour, often in ways which were not perfectly congruent with economic dictates. The Chinese, alienated from their work, could view labour more instrumentally. See Buchignani (1976) for a discussion of the post-Weberian debate on the subject of ideology and economic behaviour.

8. As both Saxton (1971:2) and Ward (1973:62) maintain, anti-Chinese feeling cannot, either in California or in British Columbia be explained only on the basis of cheap labour. For instance, prejudice against the Chinese as a race rather than as competitors made it difficult for white labour unions in British Columbia to accept either Chinese (Cheng 1931:212) or Japanese (Sumida 1935:142) affiliate organizations. The Canadian Trades and Labour Congress platform had an Oriental exclusion plank until the 57th conference in 1941 -- twenty years after the effective exclusion of further Asian immigration (TLC Proceedings 1941:2).

9. See Cross (1935) for a pro-labour view of the California Asian debate. One should keep in mind the extremely close communication evident between California and British Columbia in the days prior to the completion of the Canadian Pacific Railroad.

10. Robert Dunsmuir, king of the Nanaimo colleries, was an ardent supporter of Chinese labour. So was his son, James, who became Premier and later, Lt. Governor of British Columbia. The CPR powerfully supported Chinese immigration in Parliament as both a source of labour and of passenger revenue.

11. In the case of East Indian immigration, which began almost fifty years after the first Chinese arrived in British Columbia, I know of very few pieces in print in the pre-War years which assume otherwise. Even in the light of their claim to Aryan origins and their acknowledged place in the British Empire, there was a very common assumption that as a "race" East Indians were inferior to whites.

12. Saxton also notes (1971:56) that while white mine labour demanded $3.00 per day in California in 1866, when the Central Pacific was completed in 1869 its skilled Chinese miners were working for $1.50. By the account of Charles Crocker, one of the heads of that railway (RCCI 1885:xviii) Chinese miners tunneling in the Sierra were able to man-for-man outpace Cornish miners brought in from Virginia City at premium wages.

13. Cheng (1931:168-181) gives estimates of Oriental wages in the mid-1920's which average between 60% and 75% of whites, depending both upon industry and ethnic group. The Royal Commission on Chinese Immigration (1885:xl) estimated that unskilled Chinese labour at that time could be had for $15 to $20 per month, as opposed to $40 for equivalent white labour.

14. Bonacich is more unqualified in this contention, suggesting a model where employers seek to buy labour at the cheapest possible price, with ethnicity being essentially irrelevant; a split labour market by this theory arises in response to organized pressure by white labour. This

becomes problematic when one considers the history of British Columbia. First of all, it assumes that employers actually viewed Oriental labour as interchangeable with white labour. Often they did not, seeing Asians as less hard working, weaker, or less skilled than whites. Benjamin Rogers' (B.C. Sugar Refinery manager) response (RCCJI 1902: 465) is typical. He refused to hire any Asian labour. Moreover, often split labour markets arose prior to any demands on the part of whites. Finally, even a split labour market is but limited protection if the number of whites in the work place is steadily diminished; in increasing wage demands in a split labour market, white workers risk pricing themselves out of a job.

15. Cheng (1931:183) estimated that 90% of the 200 Chinese grocery stores in the Vancouver area catered primarily to whites. Their prices were about 5% to 10% cheaper than their competition, and most were open till 10:00 p.m. Tailors (Cheng 1931:184) were also able to offer clothes at 10% to 15% price differentials, as were Chinese-owned restaurants.

16. These constraints are markedly similar to those experienced by Fijian Canadian entrepreneurs (Chapter Four).

17. The range of Chinese occupations in these early years is illustrated by the Royal Commission's (1885:363) estimates of their work force composition in Victoria:

Merchants	45	Store employees	179
Girls	31	Boys under 12	10
Married Ladies	41	School Teachers	4
Doctors	12	Sewing workers	30
Barbers	20	Cigar makers	28
Boot makers	130	Washermen	90
Saw mill hands	17	Vegetable gardeners	114
Cooks & servants	180	Bricklayers	25
Brick makers	60	Match makers	7
Farm labour	40	Charcoal burners	16
Carpenters	25	Printers	3
Vegetable sellers	20	Butchers	8
Fish sellers	16	Pedlars	10
Tinsmiths	2	Fuel cutters	64
Sailors	3	Bark strippers	30
New Arrivals	380	Prostitutes	34
		Boys between 12 & 17	92

Table V. Chinese Workforce Composition in Victoria, 1884

18. The provincial Report on Oriental Activities within the Province (1927:22) gave Asian workforce distributions as:

	Male			Female	
	Chinese	Hindus	Japanese	Chinese	Japanese
Lumber industries	3,865	728	2,437	-	3
Other wood manufacturing	99	23	83	-	-
Pulp and paper	83	1	554	-	1
Manufacturing food products	1,272	8	72	7	111
Coal-mining	522	-	71	-	-
Metal-mining	54	-	73	-	2
Smelting	46	-	-	-	-
Builders' materials	260	1	1	-	-
Coast shipping	413	-	71	-	-
Contracting	93	13	53	-	-
Chemicals, etc.	116	-	76	-	-
Garment-making	28	-	9	-	7
House furnishings	1	-	-	-	-
Jewellry	1	-	-	-	-
Laundry, cleaning, dyeing	47	1	14	-	5
Leather and fur	1	1	3	-	-
Metal trades	1	-	6	-	-
Oil-refining	1	-	-	-	-
Printing & publishing	1	-	33	-	2
Street-railways, gas power, & telephones	24	4	-	-	-
Totals	6,974	788	3,460	7	131

Table VI. Provincial Asian Workforce Composition, 1925.

These figures do not include agricultural work, unskilled or independent labour. In 1940 the Department of Labour of British Columbia (1940) gave the following as the figures for those industries most commonly employing Asian labour:

	Chinese	Japanese	East Indian
Building materials	66		
Coal Mining	81		
Coastal Shipping	190	16	
Explosives, Chemicals	50	37	
Food Manufacture	2,480	2,176	
Lumber industries	1,655	1,376	530
Metal Mining	72	9	
Pulp & Paper	92	538	
Ship Building		116	
Smelting		42	
Wood, other		139	

Table VII. Provincial Asian Workforce Composition, 1940.

Total work force participation in British Columbia at that time was approximately 88,000, of which 4,950 were Chinese, 4,728 were Japanese, and 549 were East Indian.

19. As the Federal vote was determined by provincial voting roles, this effectively barred Chinese in British Columbia from the Federal vote (Andracki 1958:3).

20. The inspirations for this formula were the exclusion acts of the Australian colonies of Victoria (1855), New South Wales (1851), and South Australia (1857). Students and tourists (and merchants until 1887) were excepted. As the Royal Commission estimated (1885:366) that the typical Chinese immigrant was able to save only $46.00 per year, this head tax of $50.00 was a considerable barrier.

21. In Victoria, 2,000 marched in protest against the Chinese in 1885 (Ward 1973:96). In September, 1885, an anti-Chinese riot at Rock Springs, Wyoming resulted in the death of 28 Chinese (Andracki 1958: 61; Saxton 1971:202). One year after its charter was granted (1887), crowds in Vancouver forced Chinese who were clearing land for the new town to return to Victoria (Ward 1973:104). As the depression mitigated in 1888 the level of Hostility subsided considerably.

22. For an exhaustive socio-economic survey of the Japanese in British Columbia see Sumida (1935), and Young and Reid (1938).

23. In contrast to the Chinese, 2,692 Japanese had become naturalized by 1901 (RCCJI 1902:356). This was done primarily in order to secure fishing licences.

24. Sugimoto (1966:21) also lists Saikaido and Sanyodo as significant sources.

25. Sumida gives the proportions of prior Japanese occupations in a sample of 305 as 152 farmers, 45 labourers, and 23 fishermen, with the other 75 spread through a wide range of backgrounds.

26. The voyage itself would cost in the neighbourhood of $60. Typically the immigrant had about that same amount with him. This total was far beyond the capability of the typical farming family and many mortgaged land or secured loans at high rates of interest in order to pay the costs. Later East Indian immigrants were to do the same.

27. The CPR had high hopes of using the Japanese in large numbers as construction workers. Apparently so did the Grand Trunk Railway. Neither were able to realize this goal, and were forced to switch to white immigrant labour. For an insight into how the CPR alternatively sought to depress wage rates by the massive importation of Italian

labourers, see the report of the Royal Commission on Italian Immigration (1905), Sessional Paper 36b, 4-5 Edward VII.

29. During this strike, as in 1893, the white union locals refused to affiliate with the Japanese, thereby making their position impossible. In true British Columbian fashion, the militia was called out to end the strike in July (Phillips 1967:33-45). The strike saw a riot against the Japanese in Steveston (Sugimoto 1966:3), the intensity of which had not been equalled since the anti-Chinese protests of 1884-5.

30. Natal had used this device to bar further Indian immigration without running the risk of inflaming nationalist sentiment in India by specifically excluding Indians by name. Indian professionals in command of three European languages were not able to pass this barrier. The Home Government had assented to this legislation, and British Columbians had high hopes that the Federal Government would not disallow their model made up after it.

31. D. McNicoll, assistant manager of the CPR, wrote to Laurier, 8 July 1899, that even a rise in the head tax of $200 would cost the CPR $150,000 a year in revenue (Ward 1973:169).

32. Andracki (1958:321) summarizes Asian immigration over this period:

Period	Chinese	Japanese	East Indians
1886-1889	1,530	(300)	-
1890-1894	10,863	(800)	-
1895-1899	12,131	(4,000)	(10)
1900-1904	20,834	(7,000)	(100)
1905-1909	4,876	12,414	5,158
1910-1914	27,110	3,052	116
1915-1919	6,841	3,702	1

Table VIII. Asian Immigration to Canada, 1886-1919.

Those figures in parentheses were not included in Andracki's information, and are my own rough estimates.

33. Robert Borden, speaking in opposition in 1907, argued for "standing for the absolute exclusion of Asiatics and for keeping British Columbia a White man's country". The Laurier Government was agreeable to the establishment of a quota for Japanese immigration (Sugimoto 1966:52).

34. See the appendixed bibliography for an exhaustive list of sources on East Indians in Canada.

35. Morse (1935:9) gives the figure of 81 residents of East Indian origin

in British Columbia in 1901.

36. These are figures for incoming immigrants. The total number of East Indians resident in the province would be considerably less, as many moved immediately to the United States (Department of Citizenship and Immigration Annual Report, 1951).

37. For CPR complicity in initiating East Indian immigration see Morse (1935:14), Lal (1976:12), and King (1908a). Another theory proposed was that Sikh soldiers coming through Canada for the Queen's Royal Jubilee of 1897 influenced other Sikhs to come. This does not agree very well with the demographics of immigration, for it did not pick up until 1904.

38. Of the Sikhs returning to Calcutta on the Komagata Maru, 211 were forcibly transported to the Punjab after the Budge Budge riot of September 29, 1914. The Report of the Komagata Maru Committee of Inquiry (1914) listed 88% of these as Jats.

39. Lal (1976:29) gives wages in Hoshiarpur at 2 an. 6p. for unskilled labour and a maximum of 8 an. for skilled labour. This is a range of from 7½¢ to 17¢.

40. See Ward (1974) on the British Columbia clergy's reaction to the Chinese and Japanese. For a first-hand reading of Church views on East Indian immigration, see Grant (1915; 1923), Mackay (1914), McCrae (1916; 1918), Osterhout (1929), N.L. Ward (1925), and Pidgeon (1912).

41. See Colonel Falk Warren to Laurier, January 2, 1907, Laurier Papers No. 117771-4.

42. Extensive discussion of East Indian stereotypes must be deferred until Chapter Eight.

43. In accordance with religious dictates, the Sikhs wore the five kakkas of their religion, including a turban and a beard.

44. Mackenzie King (1908b) makes this same argument for excluding East Indians from Canada. As late as 1957 the Federal Minister of Citizenship and Immigration believed that "the Canadian way of life...was to no small extent determined by climatic conditions to which immigrants from tropical countries do not become readily adapted" (Corbett 1957: 57).

45. Laurier to Colonel Falk Warren, January 27, 1907, Laurier Papers No. 117775.

46. Laurier to Grey, September 16, 1907. Grey Papers, MG 27 #B2, Vol. 21, No. 000490-5. For the Home and India Governments' concern see British Government to Grey, February 12, 1908. Governor General's Office Records, RG 7, G 21, Vol. 199.

47. British Columbia has traditionally conferred voting rights quite widely. Requirements were that a person be twenty-one, be a natural-born British Subject, and have resided in the province for six months and his electoral district for one month (Angus 1937). Because the B.N.A. Act, in contrast to the United States Bill of Rights, does not specifically prohibit discriminatory legislation or conduct based on race, ethnicity, or religion, the British Columbia Legislature was able to formally restrict the rights of Asians.

48. Sugimoto's Japanese Immigration, the Vancouver Riots, and Canadian Diplomacy (1966) deals extensively with this event.

49. This agreement limited only the number of industrial or agricultural workers seeking entry to Canada. It did not include parents, wives, and children of resident Japanese or businessmen. In 1928, a subsequent agreement limited total Japanese immigration, including wives, to 150 per year (Sumida 1935:42).

50. Vancouver's first reaction to Fijians was an hysterical one. On March 17, 1908, the Vancouver Daily Province headlined that:

FIVE THOUSAND FIJI HINDUS ARE COMING

* * * * *

RECENT ARRIVALS FROM SOUTH SEAS HAVE REPORTED FAVORABLY ON PROSPECTS IN B.C.

* * * * *

WOULD BREAK DOWN BARRIER

* * * * *

ORDER IN COUNCIL OF QUESTIONABLE EFFICIENCY IS ALL THAT PROTECTS VANCOUVER FROM THREATENED INVASION

51. Source: Department of Citizenship and Immigration Annual Reports.

52. The Sikhs of California have been studied extensively. See Bradfield (1970), E. Brown (1975), G.T. Brown (1941; 1948), Dadabhay (1954), Das (1923), Hess (1974), Khush (1965), Shankhar (1971), Wenzel (1966; 1969), and others listed in the appendixed bibliography.

53. For an exposition of Sikh religious belief and history see Khushwant

Singh (1966) or Dhami (1943). For a sensitive inquiry into how Sikh ideology has affected individual orientation and community organization in British Columbia see Dodd (1972).

54. Aurora (1967) illustrates these controls at work with respect to East Indian immigrants to Britain, as does Mayer (1959) in his Vancouver study.

55. Some of those early capital expenditures must have been dependent at least in part upon savings brought into British Columbia by immigrants. The East Indian passengers of the Monteagle's voyage arriving in Vancouver September 15, 1907, were reported to be in possession of $25,000 (CAR 1908).

56. East Indian publications were likely to inflate actual figures to the end of illustrating their commitment to British Columbia. The Aryan (1912 (1):2)) claimed $2,000,000 had been invested in Vancouver alone, while an anonymous piece in that year gave the figure of $3,000,000. Nand Singh Sirha (1913) inflated this to $7,000,000. The 1927 provincial Report on Oriental Activities within the Province (1927:10) gave East Indian property in the province as being worth $210,309.

57. During November and December, 1912, Teja Singh, Raja Singh, and Sander Singh appealed to the Minister of the Interior, Robert Rogers, on the possibility of allowing the immigration of East Indian wives and children. Nand Singh Sirha, Balwant Singh, and Narian Singh toured the Punjab in 1913 with stories of the plight of their compatriots, and were instrumental in the passage of a motion decrying the continuous passage clause at the 1913 Indian National Congress meeting in Karachi (Bannerjee 1964:357).

58. A detailed outline of the East Indian independence movement in Canada is outside the bounds of this thesis. Although no complete work on this significant subject has been written, over 30 citations in the appendixed bibliography contain information bearing upon it.

59. As early as 1927, 751 out of 788 East Indians engaged in industrial occupations worked in the wood industries (ROAP 1927:14). Provincial Department of Labour Annual Reports give the following East Indian workforce participations:

Year	East Indians in Wood Industries	East Indians in Industry
1934	524	529
1939	601	622
1943	613	684
1946	513	575

Table IX. East Indian Workforce Participation, 1934-1946.

After 1949, information on ethnic background was not collected.

60. Paradoxically, the $500 head tax, devised to appease British Columbian exclusionists, had by this time become a large source of provincial revenue. The tax brought in over $1,500,000 in 1912 alone (Andracki 1958:128).

61. If these figures appear low, this is because of comparison to the 6,100 East Indians who immigrated to British Columbia at one time or another prior to 1943. Since there were about 600 working males in the community of 1,500 (1941), many of whom were in their fifties, the ratio of men to women and children is, in fact, a reasonable one.

62. Japanese gill netting licences were reduced from 1,989 in 1922 to 912 in 1932 (Sumida 1935:239). Surprisingly, the number of white and Indian fishing licences did not increase by anything near the same amount.

63. The list of classic anti-Japanese tracts is very long. Representative would be John Nelson's (1921) Will Canada Go Yellow?, Tom MacInnes' (1927) Oriental Occupation of British Columbia, H.H. Stevens' (1911) The Oriental Problem, and A. Hurd's (1913) The Racial War on the Pacific.

64. 1,359 Japanese actually immigrated between 1930 and 1941, an average of 113 per year.

65. This contrasted strongly with the situation where Europeans immigrated temporarily and in small numbers to the colonies, as in the British Colonies of India, Burma, and Uganda.

66. Race relations accordingly were more similar in British Columbia and Kenya, and in India and Uganda, respectively.

67. Although perhaps risking heresay to liberal dogma, it seems difficult to see how British Columbia labour could have survived without immigration curbs. Business otherwise would have been able to reduce wages and working conditions in accord with the labour supply; only with the establishment of permanent Asian communities with vested interests in their future in British Columbia and with material expectations similar to white workers would Asian immigration cease to depress the wage market.

68. As late as 1926, Sumida notes that fewer than 26% of Japanese immigrants could understand simple spoken English (Sumida 1935:64). The proportion of East Indians who could communicate in English in that year would not likely have been any greater (Dhami 1969).

69. By setting a minimum wage rate close to the rates of pay earned by whites, white labour sought to destroy the major concessions they had been forced to make in accepting a split labour market. Nevertheless, minimum wage legislation were not entirely successful. For instance, the 1934 (B.C.S. 1934, Chap. 47) minimum wage law set the wage minimum for work in the mills at 35¢ per hour -- with the provision that 25% of workers could be paid at rates 25% less. These 25% were invariably Asian.

70. This same pattern was followed by East Indian immigration to Britain in the 1950's (Aurora 1967).

71. The loss of clientel caused by the Great Depression mitigated many of these restrictions.

72. In 1908 the Canadian Government had attempted to remove the East Indians en masse to British Honduras (Harkin 1909), where they were to supplement the flagging supply of indentured labour. Cries for the total removal of Asians from British Columbia were heard through World War II, and although they were not acted upon by the Government, these demands were disconcerting to the province's Asian residents.

73. There were elites in each group, and they were important. But the common life situation here broke down many ethnic and class barriers, at least in the earlier years. For instance, East Indian observers (N.S. Sirha 1913, Indian and Canada 1929) report a considerable reduction of caste prohibitions, and East Indian elites, who would have had nothing whatever to do with the Sikh peasantry in the Punjab, openly espoused their cause here.

74. In many cases more recent Asian immigrants have been far more 'modern' than those who have lived here, frozen into ethnic castes, for forty years. A major split in the Sikh community in 1953 was based upon this very sort of conflict (Mayer 1959).

75. Chinese elites were often merchants, and their interests were hardly coincident with those of the working class Chinese immigrant. From this period on, elites in the East Indian community have also tended to drift away from the concerns of working class members. This has been especially evident with the renewal of Indian immigration in the early 1950's, which brought to Canada a number of middle class East Indians who had not shared in the experience of those already here.

76. For instance, a considerable minority of Sikhs dropped the wearing of turbans and beards. Chinese traditional dress was a rarity by the 1940's.

77. On the internment of the Japanese during World War II see La Violette (1948), Canadian Department of Labour (1945), Report on the Administration of Japanese Affairs in Canada, 1942-1944, and the British Columbia Security Commission Report (1942).

78. The level of intra-community tension is perhaps best indicated in the preliminary (typescript) report of the 1938 Federal Board of Review on Illegal Immigration. Although this Board was established and traveled the province in response to British Columbian charges that there was then large-scale illegal immigration of Japanese (the Board found none), 58 East Indians were reported to the commission as being in the country illegally -- by other East Indians.

79. Nor has equal occupational opportunity been achieved to date. I will return to this question in detail in Chapter Four. Punjabi blue collar workers are still relegated to the more menial tasks, especially in the wood industries where they continue to be heavily represented. In 1944, the skilled trades were still restricted (Smith 1944).

80. Although personal experience suggests that these figures are low, this pattern of marriage exclusivity contrasts sharply with marriage practice among Sikhs in rural California, where there was heavy intermarriage between Sikhs and Mexican American women prior to World War II (Dadabhay 1964; Wenzel 1968).

81. For an in-depth review of the fight for franchise among the Sikhs, see the Khalsa Diwan Society of Victoria's Report on Dominion, Provincial, and Municipal Franchise for the Hindus in B.C. (1947). For international commentary on this question see Holland (1943).

82. The standing Order in Council of March 21, 1931 (P.C. 695) forbade all immigration save for British Subjects from the U.K., Ireland, Newfoundland, New Zealand, Australia, and South Africa, and United States citizens; immigrants from these source countries were to be able to show that they had sufficient means to carry on in Canada. Agriculturalists with the resources to begin farming were also allowed. This policy was enforced in an exclusionary manner throughout the Depression and the Second World War.

83. These treaties were more of a symbolic nature than they were functional. J.W. Pickersgill, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, when asked by a House of Commons committee to justify the employment of 12 workers in the Delhi immigration office responded (Hawkins 1972:101):

> As a matter of fact, you know as well as I do, that we do not have an office in India for the purpose of getting immigrants, for the sake of increasing the population of

> Canada. We agreed upon this quota as a gesture for the improvement of commonwealth relations. And, having done so, we have to treat these applicants decently and have enough employees there to answer the letters and deal with the correspondence and the applications which are received.

84. See Mayer (1959:34) for the range of sponsorship allowed in the preference quota of the 1957 Canada-India Immigration Agreement.

85. Immigration still continues to come primarily from the "traditional source countries" of Mackenzie King's day, in spite of the point system. For the reasons for this one must look to the question of access to the immigration system, and to the direction of information flow about it.

86. In conjunction with their policy of "non-discrimination", figures for ethnic origin of immigrants were not kept by the Department of Manpower and Immigration after 1966. This makes determination of the flow of types of immigrants a difficult and approximate business. This 1967 figure adds the immigration total of India, Pakistan, and Fiji for that year, and is therefore too low. The 1968-73 figure sums Indian, Pakistani, Bangla Deshi, Fijian, Sri Lankan, Ugandan, and Tanzanian figures for those years, as do the totals for 1974 and 1975. Many Kenyan and British residents who immigrated were also East Indian, and they are not included, nor were those who came from the United States, Australia, and South Africa. Source: Department of Manpower and Immigration Annual Reports, 1967-75; Department of Manpower and Immigration (1974b).

87. These figures for the present East Indian population of British Columbia are determined by adding the 1971 census figures to the percentage of East Indian flow giving British Columbia as its intended destination for the subsequent years.

88. This statement about the reaction of East Indians to stereotypes is a bit simplistic, (see in Chapter Eight). Nevertheless, East Indians do have to deal with this sort of stereotyping, even if they seek to explain it in differing ways.

89. By current rule of thumb, with an average house price of $70,000 and a $15,000 down payment, a family must have an income in excess of $20,000 a year to qualify for a mortgage.

Chapter Two: Fiji, Fijians and Fiji Indians

The independent nation of Fiji is located in the South Pacific, 2,000 miles northeast of Sydney and 3,000 miles southwest of Honolulu.[1] Its 361 islands comprise a total land area of 7,022 square miles, of which the two principle islands, Vanua Levu and Viti Levu, represent 6,148 square miles, or 87% of the total (Watters 1969:2; France 1969:1). Aside from these two mountainous islands upon which the great majority of the 570,000 people of Fiji live, 94 other islands are inhabited, although only two of them exceed 100 square miles in area.

Even though Fiji is firmly within the tropics, the wide variation in geography among the islands makes for a great deal of regional variation in temperature, rainfall, and consequently, in population distribution. Because of the prevailing winds and their elevated central topography, Viti Levu and Vannua Levu have marked wet and dry coastal areas. The eastern, windward coast receives an annual rainfall in excess of 100 inches, distributed over much of the year. The natural flora is dominated by tropical forest in the low lying areas. The leeward sides of both islands get less than one-half the rainfall of the windward coasts, and this falls exclusively during the time of peak rainfall in the East. Vegetation is therefore considerably different, with grasses, reeds, and broken tree cover being most typical. Temperatures throughout Fiji rarely go below 50°F. or above 100°F. Mean average temperatures for both wet and dry zones cluster around 77°F., with a daily range of but 10° (Ward 1964:4).

Prior to the 19th Century, Fiji was inhabited by a large population with a well-developed Melano-Polynesian culture. It is possible that native

Fijians then numbered about 200,000. Subsistence was primarily based on village-organized root and tree crop agriculture, supplemented with fishing and the collections of wild plants. This economic basis generated significant social stratification and inter-village social organization. Although the pattern varied across the Fijian islands, the tendency was for populations to be divided into patrilineages (yavusa) which were seen as each sharing a single apical ancestor. Each yavusa was in turn divided into localized sub-lineages (mataqali). Mataqali tended to be village based, and were further divided into extended family households (tokatoka).[2] Above the yavusa, alliances and associations were very fluid, and there was much warfare and continual geographical displacement. No social or political organization spanned either of the two main islands.

The first Western contact with Fiji came at the turn of the 19th Century through castaways from wrecked ships. When it became known that large stands of valuable sandlewood existed on Vanua Levu, trade developed quickly. The continual warfare between chiefs was soon being manipulated to the ends of Western traders. Chiefs became involved in the sandlewood trade, and provided labour for its felling and preparation.

Missionaries began to arrive in 1835, and almost immediately upset the precarious balance between chiefs and resident traders by attempting to discredit the Fijian spiritual beliefs which in part rationalized chiefly power. At the same time, missionaries consciously made use of the stratification system, and sought to convert tribal populations through the coercive power of converted chiefs (France 1969:30). Missionaries also brought with

them English law, which they had sufficient power to begin enforcing in the 1840's.

But the most serious consequences for native Fijian life were to flow from the establishment of white agricultural pursuits; unlike previous newcomers, incoming planters by definition challenged the land tenure of native Fijians and with it, their very social order. Sheep farming was tried in the 1860's (France 1969:37), but the most significant crop of this period was cotton, which was in short supply because of the disruptions caused by the American Civil War.

From 1860 to 1870, the white population of Fiji increased from about 50 to over 2,000. European planters found it impossible to lure native Fijians into agricultural wage labour because their traditional economy was still available to them and it offered alternative resources to employment. Planters tried transporting native Fijians from other areas of the islands, thereby separating them from their homes but this, too, proved ineffectual. In response to the labour demand, Europeans went to the only means which could hold workers in an ecosystem with alternatives of equal promise -- indentured labour.[3] As early as 1864, planters began to import labour from other South Sea islands on three year indentured contracts (Gillion 1962:2).

In the late 1860's, planters attempted to secure Indian workers, following the patterns of other British-dominated plantation economies like Mauritius and the British West Indies, both of which had successfully switched from slave to indentured labour. The Fijian planting interests were rebuffed by the Government of India, which would not allow the establishment

of Indian indentured labour under a native government. Native recruitment from the New Hebrides, Solomon, and Gilbert Islands was to continue until abuses ended the approval of it by the British Consul in 1869.

During this same period, the Fijian chiefly hierarchy was formed by settler interests into a puppet native government. In 1865, a Confederation of Chiefs was formed, which was to meet annually to pass laws for all of Fiji. Cakobau was named as the first president (France 1969:73). In 1867, Cakobau was named the ruler of the Kingdom of Bau, in the hopes that his ascendancy would confer legitimacy to the alienation of large areas of Bau by white settlers. Both of these governments were largely unsuccessful, and in 1871 another Cakobau administration was formed; it was totally controlled by settlers, and rapidly proceeded with the further separation of Fijians from their land. By 1874, 854,000 acres, of which only 16,324 were under cultivation, were claimed by whites (Mayer 1963:10).

Meanwhile, cotton prices had crashed, following the reestablishment of the American plantations and the disruption in consumption created by the Franco-Prussian War (Gillion 1962:3). The cotton economy of Fiji collapsed with the price, to the extent that by 1875 planters could not afford to pay for the return voyages of three thousand islanders whose labour contracts had expired. After twenty years of increasing social disruption, the islands were formally ceded to Britain in 1874, without the threat or use of force. The Colonial administration of the first governor, Sir Arthur Gordon, was to determine the broad outlines of Fijian history for fifty years to come.

Three aspects of this policy are of crucial importance. First, Gordon deeded back to the native Fijians all land not proven to be then in legitimate freehold nor held by the Crown. This land, constituting roughly 4,000,000 out of a total 4,503,438 acres, was to be held in perpetuity by the mataqali. Each mataqali was deeded what was presumed to be its aboriginal land. From this point on, Fijian native land was to be perpetually inalienable, either to individual Fijians, to other mataqali, or to Europeans; the consequences of this policy for Indian-Fijian relations will become eminently clear later.

Secondly, Gordon adopted a unique mixture of indirect rule and a formal restructuring of the indigenous social organization. This earlier organization was fairly similar to that of other large Melanesian and Polynesian societies, and was based upon fluid, large-scale, polysegmental patrilineages. Gordon both used and changed this structure. He allowed the ownership of land to revert to the residence groups which the Government believed traditionally possessed it; as it turned out, actual patterns of Fijian land tenure were in fact geographically variable, were developed along concepts of ownership and control which were considerably at variance with British common law, and were continually being renegotiated by force and alliance.

Gordon as it were 'froze' the system, not only by associating mataqali permanently with certain pieces of property, but also by formalizing the overall hierarchical structure which was built upon it. Once recorded on the books, the colonial government took vanua (political federations of yavusa), yavusa, and mataqali to be fixed, permanent, political and social

units. As native administrators, the government also created a set of hierarchical, appointed, non-traditional chiefs.[4]

Third, in an obviously protectionist stance, Gordon violently objected to the use of Fijian labour in the Colony's plantation system. It was Gordon, who had previously been Governor of Mauritius and therefore had considerable experience with indentured labour, who formally approached the India Government on the part of Fiji in 1876. Arrangements were finalized in 1878, and the subsequent year saw the first shipload of Indian indentured labourers reach Fiji. The major terms of engagement agreed to by the Colony, as demanded by the Government of India were (Gillion 1962:16):

a. workers would be indentured for a period of five years
b. wages should be 1s. per day for workers doing normal labour
c. the voyage to Fiji would be paid by the Fiji Government
d. there would be penalties of either jail or fine for non-fulfillment of work
e. return passage would be guaranteed after ten years residence in Fiji
f. workers could remain as settlers in Fiji if they so desired

Beyond the contract itself, the agreement covered methods of recruitment, housing, and passage. It was required that 40 immigrants would be women for every 100 men recruited.

The system organized under this contract prevailed with but minor modifications from 1879 until 1916. By that time the combined influences of the First World War and rising Indian nationalism brought recruitment to a

halt. A little under 69,000 Indians registered for indentured labour in Fiji during this time.

Toward a Sugar Economy

What made indentured Indian labour a success from the point of view of the Fijian plantocracy was the development of the crop which was to become the mainstay of the Fijian economy to the present -- sugar. The switch to sugar was made during the 1870's; it was confirmed in 1880 by the location of a sugar mill at Nausori by the Colonial Sugar Refining Company of Sydney. Des Voeux, Gordon's successor (1880-1885), refused to allow the C.S.R. Company and others to use Fijian labour (Gillion 1962:71), and the C.S.R. moved to secure workers from other South Sea islands. When 220 out of 587 islanders indentured in 1881 died from disease in the cane fields by September of the following year, the C.S.R. decided to exclusively use Indian labour.

As with the other Colonies which recruited Indian indentured immigrants, the Fijian planters were required to pay the full cost of the introduction of labourers, while the Fiji Government paid the costs of repatriation and the maintenance of the immigration system (Gillion 1962:73). The high initial costs of Indian labour were to force the continual consolidation of the smaller Fijian plantations throughout the rest of the 19th Century; only those with international corporate backing were able to survive the fluctuations of the sugar price. By 1885, less than 10 cane plantations were using indentured Indians, and five companies employed 70% of the

4,000 Indian immigrants. In 1889, there were only three mills in Fiji owned by other than the C.S.R., and by the turn of the century the company produced about 82% of the total sugar exported from the Colony (Gillion 1962:79). Although the number of employers using indentured labour was to increase once more, the C.S.R. was to be the dominant factor throughout the period of indentured labour use in Fiji.

The Process of Indenture

In contrast to both European and Asian immigration to North America, immigration from India for the purposes of indentured labour was often viewed as a recourse of last resort. There was little of the chain migration typical of North American immigration patterns. Indentured immigrants were, more than anything, extracted from their social milieu. Both in North and South India there was a reluctance to emigrate overseas to areas which had not been 'secured' and proved out by kin or by village mates. Indentured immigrants moved into conditions of abject poverty and total subordination, and were not likely to put forward glowing reports of their situation. Moreover, the concern with caste position, which was always threatened by travel, was magnified by the unknown situation which indenture presented; Hindu dogma even suggested that one lost caste upon traveling across the ocean. Few immigrants who went to Fiji did so only in consideration of the higher wages in Fiji.[5] Most had been detached from their traditional roots by family or village conflicts, insolvency, or wanderlust (Gillion 1962:47). Many of these initiating causes were at least in part economi-

cally dependent, and the success of immigrant recruiters varied inversely with the success of the Indian crops. In years of good harvests immigration quotas often went unfilled.

Fiji secured its immigrants where it could find them, and the extreme heterogeneity of the initial Indian population of Fiji is a direct consequence of this practice. Through its immigration centres in Calcutta and Madras, Fiji developed large-scale immigration from both North and South India. Uttar Pradesh (then, United Provinces) provided the majority of Fiji's Indian immigrants. In the north, Bihar also contributed strongly to the immigrant flow.[6] In all, 45,833 indentured Indians passed through the Calcutta depot on their way to Fiji. In the north, primarily depressed areas provided the bulk of immigrants. Neither Punjabis nor Bengalis chose to emigrate, and those few Punjabis who did so proved to be 'resistant' to the indenture system -- to the point where they were only solicited as a last resort.

Madrasis were first indentured in 1902, when the Fiji Government established an immigration agency in Madras. In contrast to the north, many Madrasis had previous experience with short term immigration overseas, in this case to Burma, Ceylon, and Malaya, and immigrants were more easily secured. Most were recruited from the districts of North Arcot, Madras, Krishna, Godavari, Vizakhapatnam, Tanjore, Malabar, and Cormnature (Gillion 1962:51). 15,132 indentured immigrants were brought through Madras before the termination of the process in 1916.

Indian immigrants to Fiji therefore possessed a wide range of cultural

backgrounds. Although about 85% of those who immigrated from Calcutta were Hindu and most northerners spoke or could understand Hindi, 14% were Muslim, with the complement being made up of a sprinkling of Christians and Sikhs. A full range of castes, with representation fairly typical of what one would find in an Indian village (Gillion 1962:52), immigrated.[7]

Madrasis were equally varied. They spoke at least six languages, of which Tamil and Telugu have continued to be used by a diminishing number of south Indian Fijians to the present. There were understandably fewer Muslim immigrants from the south, and there was a larger proportion of cultivator castes than was exhibited by northern immigration.

Female immigrants were even more varied. The evils of the indenture system of earlier times, coupled with the desire to establish permanent colonies of Indian immigrants overseas, had led the Government of India to demand that 40 women immigrate to Fiji for every 100 men who did so. The actual proportion who arrived in Fiji constituted a little over this minimum limit. Very few families immigrated, and the immigration of single women from India was strongly against custom. Consequently, there was great difficulty in securing a sufficient number of women for indenture, and the bounties for producing women immigrants were very high. All means, both fair and foul (including abduction), were used to meet the quota. Most women who came were widows without family support, runaway or deserted wives, or women estranged from their families. Their caste distribution was roughly that of male immigrants.

Homogenization and Subordination: the voyage

The whole process of recruitment, of passage and of indentured life combined to bring together these disparate cultural backgrounds into a social structure which is uniquely Fijian. Although immigrants were recruited from all over the Indian subcontinent, the commonality of their subsequent experience leveled many of the differences between them which were incompatible with the imposed constraints of recruitment and indenture.

Caste barriers were the most susceptible to this process, and a fundamental ambiguity arose at once with respect to the dogmatic prescription against intercontinental travel. The realities of recruitment and transport caused caste restrictions on food preparation and on personal contact to give way almost immediately (Jayawardena 1971). Although provision was made for the use of Brahmin cooks and low caste sweepers during the voyage, there was little which could mitigate against the collapse of most commensal rules. A strict shipboard routine, coupled with the absence of one's traditional support group, further weakened caste by providing alternative normative patterns of behaviour enforced by authority. Hindi was already moving towards its present position as a Fijian Indian lingua franca.

The Lines

Upon landing in Fiji, the immigrant was assigned to an employer, and was quickly sent to begin his or her five year contract. From this point on, employers were to dominate the immigrant's life. Government played

only a weak regulative role. The situation of everyday life on the plantations furthered the homogenization process begun during recruitment and passage. Living units, although divided into family units when appropriate, were large, common buildings (the lines). Access to food and services, which were paid for out of wages, were relatively equal for all immigrants. Community formation by people from the same area of India was actively discouraged by plantation owners and was structurally limited by life on the lines.

The commonalities of work aside, day to day living conditions in the lines were ones of poverty and of the near total absence of health and sanitary facilities. Death rates during indenture in Fiji occasionally reached 50 per thousand workers per year, and never went below 22.1 (Gillion 1962:142). The rate for non-indentured Indians in Fiji was about 9.8. Child mortality reached 88 per thousand in the 1890's. Earlier in the same decade, over a quarter of the immigrants were either dead or repatriated as incapable of further work before the end of their five year contracts. The suicide rate in the lines between 1902 and 1912 was claimed to be 926 per million, as opposed to 147 for free Fiji Indians and 63 in the North Indian source areas (Andrews and Pearson 1916:13).

It was impossible under these conditions to recreate any semblance of the traditional Indian social order. Caste means little in the face of force, neither Hindu nor Muslim marriage customs were observed, and there was much intermarriage between all traditional Indian groups. Neither life, property, nor marriage were sacrosanct. Personnel flowed through

the system at such a rate as to mitigate against the formation of stable groups.

Work

Work was highly rationalized economically, and was very structured. The contract of indenture specified that the immigrant would receive 1 s. per diem, should he or she meet his or her daily labour output. In Fiji, output was carefully gauged in a process called tasking. A male immigrant was daily to complete a task set out for him beforehand which a normal, healthy, adult would be able to complete in 6 hours of hard work. Women's tasks were to be three-quarters of this. Tasks were, therefore, measured in quantity of output, not in time spent working. These were theoretical guidelines, and often bore little relation to reality. Indians were continually over-tasked and then penalized for non-compliance with the contract requirement. Tasks increased with the fall of sugar prices.

The organization of work was regulated closely. Workers rose together, went to the fields together, and then worked separately against their individual task quotas. They were constantly overseen by Indian sirdars, who were paid on the basis of worker output; sirdars were also the first line of enforcement on the plantations, and their rule was often ruthless. Workers could be financially penalized for non-fulfillment of work quotas or could be jailed. Jailing and fining were used to lower wage rates and to increase workers' stays in Fiji. Conviction rates for labour violations were often enormous; in 1892, 40% of the adult Indian population were

convicted of absence from work (Tinker 1974;194). Fines could range as high as £1.

It is not surprising that few indentured labourers were able to save an appreciable amount during their five years of indenture. Returnees to India brought with them an average of £10. 7 s. over 1892-6; the average was about twice this for the era around the end of indenture (Gillion 1962:93). More than half of the repatriates had no savings whatever. In consideration of their lack of financial accumulation, of their long separation from kin and home context, and of alternative opportunities in Fiji, a maximum of 24,000 India-born immigrants made use of the return trip to India.[8] Most stayed in Fiji, and it is this community of free Indians to which I must now turn.

The Early East Indian Community

Indians in Fiji who were not under indenture derived from two sources -- indenture itself, and self-initiated 'free' immigration. By the terms of indenture, an Indian was not eligible for free repatriation until five years <u>after</u> the expiration of his or her contract. The hope was that these five years would be spent either in a second indenture contract or in some other way working for white employers, thereby lessening the cost of the introduction of Indian labour. Few signed up for a second contract.[9]

When, in 1889, the first Indians became eligible for repatriation, the Colonial Government offered the lease of land and household goods to the value of £12 per adult and £6 per child to those who would commute

their return passages (Gillion 1962:139). There were no takers, but not because all of the prospective returnees intended to leave Fiji. Rather, the released Indians had found better opportunities than those offered by the government, and did not want to waste their rights of repatriation. Although plantation agriculture had been the rule in Fiji's production of sugar up to this time, expansion of the C.S.R. in the 1890's began the process of turning over cane farming itself to Indian lessees of company land. These leases were exceedingly strict, as will be illustrated shortly, but they allowed Indians the basis for a relatively coherent family and social life. In addition to the growing of cane on company land, Indians found a ready market for a wide range of agricultural products among the indentured Indians themselves.

Because so much of the prime freehold land had been tied up by corporate and private plantations, Indians were more or less precluded from the direct ownership of the lands which they farmed. Beyond C.S.R. leases, Indians sought to lease native lands and any available land in European freehold. By 1909, Indians held 16,711 acres of native Fijian land under 1,789 leases (Mayer 1963:25).

In the days prior to 1911, the procurement of a native lease was a complicated business, which resulted in uncertainty of tenure for the Indians and an uneconomic distribution of cane production for the sugar companies. The Government subsequently stepped in to regulate the terms of native leases and the areas where Indian settlement would be encouraged. Settlement was on a substantial scale, for as early as 1912 Indians were

farming over 22,000 acres under rice, cane, maize, bananas, beans, tobacco, and a number of subsidiary crops.[10] Rice and cane took up about 75% of the acreage (Gillion 1962:143).

Although ex-indentured Indians did not go exclusively into tenant farming, a great number did so. Coulter (1942:25) gives the following distribution of occupations for 1911:

Agriculture	10,357
Commercial	530
Industrial	1,896
Domestic	3,846
Sundry Occupations	126
Not stated	1,490
Total	18,245

Table X. Occupations of Indians in Fiji, 1911

The total population of Indians in Fiji was then 40,286, as contrasted with 87,000 native Fijians, 4,000 Europeans, and 9,000 others, who were principally Pacific Islanders or part Europeans (Fiji 1976a:1).

Faced with the imminent termination of indenture, the C.S.R. in 1914 made the major decision to shift the bulk of their production out of plantations and into Indian leaseholds. Recruitment of indentured Indians was formally ended in 1916, and all remaining contracts were terminated in 1920. The C.S.R. then broke most of its holdings into 10 acre tenancies with ten year, renewable leases. Renewal was normally automatic, given that contract requirements were fulfilled. By 1930, 31,000 acres of C.S.R. land was under Indian lease and in sugar production, while the company plantations cultivated some 15,000 acres. An additional 32,000 acres were farmed by Indians holding primarily native Fijian leases (Mayer 1963:49).

As suggested by Coulter's figures, Indians developed several non-agricultural pursuits. These were to become significant in later years, as since 1912 the amount of prime farm land has not greatly increased, while both Indian and native Fijian populations have. From the earliest days of indenture, free Indians had supplied their compatriots in the lines with many of the goods and services necessary for life, meagre though they then were. By 1887, white shopkeepers were complaining about Indian competition (Gillion 1962:76).

The first decade of the twentieth century saw the beginnings of independent immigration of Indians to Fiji. Unlike those who came in as indentured labourers, these enterprising immigrants came with hopes of either establishing an entrepreneurial position in Fiji or with the desire to work at a skilled occupation. Unlike most indentured immigrants, this new class of immigrants came from the two traditional Indian sources for adventurers and traders -- the Punjab and Gujarat, respectively.

Punjabi Sikhs began arriving in 1904, and by 1935 it was estimated that there were about 3,000 of them in Fiji (Coulter 1945:81). These Sikhs came from the same areas as those who had come to Canada during the same period (Gillion 1962:133). Many Punjabis became prosperous in Fiji as farmers, and secondarily, in trade and communications. As the initial flow was primarily male, many married into the ex-indentured population.

Gujaratis came in the capacity of traders, professionals, and skilled craftsmen. Most were Hindus. Although many were forced to adapt to alternative occupations in Fiji, the Gujaratis were to become a significant

factor in the politics and economics of Fiji, even though they numbered no more than 2,500 in 1935 (Coulter 1945:81). Free immigration was severely limited by the Colonial government in 1930, largely because of white middle class opposition.

In addition to Indian entrepreneurs, a significant number of Chinese shopkeepers entered the Fijian economy over this period, and numbered about a thousand by 1930 (McMillan 1929:398). They gave the Indians stiff competition, and established for themselves a secure niche in the society.

Fiji in the 1920's and 1930's: the communities

During the two decades after the First World War the basic pattern of Fijian society as it is presently constituted was to crystalize. Because Fiji is and was a polyethnic society, and because from this point on the interaction between native Fijian and Indian communities is so marked, both groups must be discussed simultaneously. Accordingly, the discussion must now return to native Fijian life, which was left at the time when Fiji was ceded to Britain.

It has often been said that in Fiji native people have suffered from too much government and Indians from not enough. As with many such aphorisms, this one contains much truth. Government weighed heavily on the individual destinies of native Fijians. While the protectionist policy of Governor Gordon no doubt was directly responsible for the native population of Fiji not going the way of the native Hawaiians, the penalties for group survival were economic stagnation in a neo-traditional society. How this was so

becomes apparent when one looks at the structure of early native administration in Fiji.

Gordon and his predecessors were sensitive to the highly group-oriented aspects of native Fijian society (incidentally ignoring the individualistic side of it) and built their administration upon these insights. Fiji was divided into a number of provinces, and in each one a native administrative chief (Roko) was appointed. The Roko was responsible directly to the Governor. Each province was divided further into tikinas, each with an appointed Buli. Each of the thousand-odd villages was to have an appointed headman.

Administrative jurisdictions were also divided up hierarchically. Tikina native courts heard disputes regarding native customary law; appeals and more serious offences went to the European Provincial Court (Roth 1951: 3). Tikina administrators also saw to it that village headmen followed governmental regulations regarding village production, collected taxes, and the like. Each tikina was given a council, presided over by the Buli, which made recommendations to the Provincial Councils; neither of these councils had any legislative powers. The Provincial Councils, made up primarily by Buli, each elected two of their number to the Council of Chiefs, which advised the Governor directly. While it must be kept in mind that this formal hierarchy of chiefs did not necessarily parallel the hierarchy of traditional chiefs, which still exists today, there was a strong tendency for the members of the higher level councils to be from important chiefly families. They therefore possessed both formal and in-

formal power, and at the same time tended to be somewhat divorced from the needs and problems of the Fijian villager. They were to be a decidedly conservative force in Fijian affairs (Watters 1969:45).

Along with this highly structured political administration came a system of land tenure and labour regulation which was to be largely responsible for a majority of native Fijians remaining subsistence farmers until after World War II. It has been mentioned that native land was totally unalienable, except to the Crown. This rule has persisted to the present, save for minor exceptions around 1905-9 (Roth 1951:5). While this regulation no doubt protected Fijians against the wholesale theft of the land which was their very life, regulations upon its use were very severe, and again were based upon the impression that Fijians were a "collective" people.

First of all, it was the various mataqali who were deeded the rights to native land. Use was reserved for native Fijians who belonged to that mataqali, much like Canadian native reserves; but unlike the latter case, no provision was made for individual use rights of mataqali members. In fact, in the early years particularly, everything possible was done to ensure that the village collectively was the major Fijian productive unit. At least by law, Fijians were required to live in their villages, unless they could demonstrate that they either had land elsewhere or had employment. Nayacakalou (1963) reports that even then this was true of Fijian migrants to urban Suva. Each male Fijian was required to farm a specified amount of a variety of crops in his village each year. He was also res-

ponsible for labour on village maintenance under the direction of the headman.

Within the village, any individual initiative had to fight through both the administrative formalities which encumbered individual action and the informal village and kin customs which had arisen in earlier days to ensure that the group would benefit from individual success.[11] In many cases this resulted in resignation to the status quo.

In the twenties and thirties, this was even more marked, and its effects can be seen in the slight degree to which Fijians had moved into wage labour or cash cropping by that time. Agriculture continued to be the mainstay of native Fijians, as with Indians, but the nature of their participation was strikingly different. While most Indian agriculturalists were cash cropping almost exclusively, if for nothing else but in order to pay for their tenancies, most Fijian agriculturalists in the twenties and thirties were subsistence farmers. The most significant exception was in the case of copra production, which had been a native Fijian preserve since the depression of the price in 1884 drove many of the European planters out of the business (Mayer 1963:16). While it would be difficult to argue that the standard of living of the typical Indian agriculturalist of the twenties and thirties was materially higher than his Fijian counterpart, he was firmly tied into the cash economy and was economically unencumbered by extensive communal obligations.

In terms of non-agricultural occupations, there was a divergence between Fijian and Indian pursuits, but one which was not substantively on

the side of either group up into the 1950's. Fijians were concentrated in agricultural labour, gold mining, construction labour, and government employment. The 1936 census also indicates that 556 Fijians had chosen to become independent farmers (Coulter 1945:63). It is important to note that working native Fijians were mainly wage labourers. Participation in entrepreneurial activity such as retail and wholesale trade and the provision of services was negligible.

This same period saw the Indian population coalesce into ordered communities. Indians distributed themselves over the countryside wherever usable lease land was available, forming scattered village-like communities which were loosely patterned after continental Indian models, but which were at the same time greatly modified by the cash economy in which most participated. Each cane farm was a relatively autonomous production unit, depending far less on networks of obligation for the fulfillment of services than would a farm in rural India. Although the empirical evidence is slight, it seems that even before 1920 communities had developed "complex household and ward groupings" (Mayer 1963:145) based on kinship, regional background, religion, and increasingly, on class. Nevertheless, economic success -- in strong contrast to the situation of the native Fijian -- was dependent upon a highly rationalized system of work based upon money and upon individualist effort.

It should be noted that sugar contrasts with many traditional native crops in that it is not a food crop, at least in the sense that it cannot of itself supply much in the way of the food requirements of those who

farm it. Cane farmers were, therefore, cash farmers, even though in most material respects they were no better off than subsistence farmers.

. Not only did the farmer participate in a monetary economy because of cash cropping, but the system was further rationalized because of the nature of sugar cane farming itself. Several factors are of consequence. First, cane itself has a long growing season, some fifteen to eighteen months. Each farmer therefore staggered planting of his land in order to guarantee a relatively consistent annual production. Nevertheless, the nature of the crop dictated that farmers would be linked into a complex system of credit with stores and with providers of foodstuffs. Credit in rural Fijian Indian society was, of necessity, a way of life.[12] Secondly, except for times of planting and harvesting, which were ones of furious activity, the crop itself required little tending. This was to allow farm members the ability to develop the options of temporary, non-farm employment.

Equally important were the efforts of the C.S.R. Company. Whether the Indian cane farmer leased C.S.R. or native land, the C.S.R. sugar mill was the only outlet for his product, and he was tied to a highly complex contract with it. C.S.R. lessees were held to very strict conditions indeed, which included the manner of crop rotation, fertilization, weeding, and the use of specific varieties of cane (Mayer 1973:39). Both the C.S.R. lessees and those who contracted to supply the company with cane (appropriately called 'contractors') were tied to a collective price for their cane, based on a complex formula which included factors of lessee

and company costs as well as the world sugar price. Production quotas were also included.[13] Harvesting of cane in Fiji is done by local harvesting gangs, which cut and deliver all the cane in a specified area. The individual cane farmer, under the Grower's Harvesting Agreement (Mayer 1973:98), was required either to participate in this labour or to pay a substitute. Wages and work requirements were closely specified. The result of these controls was an overall sugar production system which was competitive with plantation systems elsewhere.

These factors contributed to the marked individuality of Indian farmers and to the consequent weakness of settlement-wide social controls. Village panchayats were evidently common very early, but they lacked the equivalent sanctions that comparative groups would have had in India (Gillion 1962:145). The most significant early organizations among Fiji Indians were either political or religious, and sometimes were both. While the processes of economic rationalization continued to level cultural differences between one Indian Fijian and another, the income produced by participation in a cash economy allowed the introduction of massive inputs of social and religious 'orthodoxy' from India during this same time. In a very real sense, Fijian Indians underwent a collective process of "Sanskritization" (Srinivas 1966:1-45) while at the same time undergoing rapid Westernization.

It is not surprising that the Indian population was to form itself most definitely into groups based on religion and ethnic background. A division between north and south Indian Hindus and between both of them

and the primarily northern Muslims were the most significant. Although the remarkable social tolerance which existed between these groups during the indentured period was to continue to the present, the 1920's saw a coalescence into partially separate social groups, and intermarriage, the prime indicator of Indian social distance, became infrequent.[14]

A large input of orthodoxy came through the ministrations of holy men, who came and went from India and from other overseas Indian settlements. Finding most of its converts among the northern Hindus, the reformist Arya Samaj was the first organization to start successful schools for Indian children in Fiji (Gillion 1962:1, 8-9).[15] The Sanatan Dharm Sabha represented orthodox Hindus from both the north and south. Muslim mosques were also founded early, and the Muslim League was soon established as the social and political focal point for this group.[16]

Political concerns brought forward a number of groups with widely divergent backing. The Indian Reform League, established in 1924, was a secular, liberal, organization which pushed for a general amelioration of Indian conditions (Mayer 1963:46). The Arya Samaj pressed both secular and religious concerns, while the Then Ikya Sanmarga Sangam advocated south Indian educational and language rights.

Fijian-Indian Relations

The structure of Fijian society before World War II was clearly such that conflicts between native and Indian Fijian concerns were inevitable. On one hand, the native Fijians owed their survival to the protection

which was afforded them by the colonial administration. The secure basis which their land tenure gave the native Fijians enabled them to maintain continuity with their origins in a modernizing world. But, at the same time, protectionist policies had created a plural society in Fiji, the problems of which are far from solution today.

The paradoxes of the situation were many. Fijian natives owned most of the land, and yet the same policy which secured it for them denied the native population many options in its use. Communal obligations, reinforced by governmental dictate and communally-based economic development programs (Watters 1969) did not interface well with the structure of the impersonal, rationalized economy outside of the village (Spate 1959; 1961). Increasing Westernization created increased demands, both materially and socially, and yet most native Fijians were without the economic means to realize these goals.

The Indian population was almost at the opposite pole. Deeply involved in the cash economy, they had little control over land, which was, as it was for the native Fijians, their ultimate basis for survival. Indians, if anything, complained of the lack of government involvement in their situation. Their weak position vis-a-vis the C.S.R. Company was strengthened not by governmental concern over the conditions of its Indian citizenry, but by grass roots farmer organization.[17] Indian settlements had no local governmental structure until 1970 (Dyck 1975:91). Schooling and other social services were only grudgingly offered to Indians. Perhaps most importantly, Indians argued that while they were directly respon-

sible for the production of a majority of the colony's economic output, they were without effective political representation.

Native and Indian Fijians both saw their unsatisfactory condition as at least in part stemming from the actions of the other group; there was much chauvinism on both sides. Native Fijians complained vigorously that Indian lessees had control over all the best cane land, and that this denied them access to cane farming. They felt threatened by what was seen as an insatiable Indian thirst for more land, and in reaction raised the conditions of the Deed of Cession to inviolate status. The perceived Indian threat drove Fijians and Europeans into an alliance which persists to today.

In day to day interaction, Fijians constantly met Indians in situations where Fijians felt dependence. Stores and transportation would likely as not be Indian. So also would be the buyer of produce and the money lender. The Fijian stereotype of the Indian was of an effeminate, crafty fellow who was not to be trusted.

Indian complaints about supposed Fijian faults were equally ethnocentric. In contrast to the intensive utilization of land on their own farms, Indians protested that the Fijian native did not 'properly' use his land. Rather, Indians argued that their industry was what allowed the native Fijian a stereotyped situation of indolence and ease. To Indians, native Fijians were an agreeable but lazy people who would work only when they had some particular goal in mind; they cared nothing for accumulation of wealth, but rather were required by custom to distribute

anything they had to any of their kin or village mates who wanted it.

Political Organization

The problems of land use and of ethnic-based opportunity have been at the heart of political efforts by both native and Indian Fijians. Throughout the colonial period, the British administration adhered to a policy of gradualism, increasing the representation of local Fijian communities in government, but always playing the dominant role itself. The original colonial administration of 1875 consisted of an Executive Council and a Legislative Council, both sitting at the sufferance of the Governor (Meller and Anthony 1968:4); both bodies represented only the Europeans. In 1904, the composition of the Legislative Council was changed, and its membership then was to be made up of ten official representatives, six elected European settlers, and two nominated native Fijians. The European members would be elected by the European population only. Indians had no representation.

In 1916, in the face of vigorous Indian agitation, the Legislative Council was expanded to include one nominated Indian among twelve official representatives.[18] The twenties saw Indians pressing for further representation in government, arguing particularly that in the light of their numbers and their importance to the colonial economy the non-official members of the Legislative Council should be elected on the basis of a common role (Mayer 1963:51). In this they were supported by the Government of India.[19] In 1929, the Legislative Council was again restructured,

increasing Indian representation to three members, who were communally elected (Meller and James 1968:13). All three elected Indian representatives resigned over the Government's refusal to allow a common role. 1937 saw the last changes in the Council which were to occur before 1963. For the twenty-five intervening years, the Legislative Council was to be made up of thirty-one members, sixteen of whom were official representatives. Of the complement of fifteen, five were to be from each of the three major communities.[20] Communal roles were still used to decide the elected representatives.

After the War

From the beginning of the 1940's, Fijian society has experienced a yearly increasing rate of change which has affected all aspects of life. These three decades have seen Fiji become more and more integrated into world networks of trade, communications, and values. The Fiji of today, although basically structured as it was in the 1930's, is far removed from the stagnating and isolated sugar colony that it once was.

In 1939, both Indians and native Fijians were overwhelmingly agriculturalists. Indians continued their dominance of sugar production, producing 97% of the cane in that year (Mayer 1963:121). Of the total Indian population, perhaps 60% were dependent upon sugar farming, while about two-thirds of the rest were either farmers or fishermen (Stanner 1953:179).

The Depression, coupled with the related collapse in sugar consumption

and sugar prices, had a severe effect on Indian attempts to achieve a comfortable level of existence on the farm, and it drove many Indian traders out of business.[21] Rural Indians were suffering under high levels of debt, coupled with very low payments for their crops.[22] Native Fijians felt the Depression less acutely, as they were able to shift back to subsistence agriculture. The 1940's saw few mitigating changes in this pattern, save for the transient effect of money pumped into Fiji during the War, and for higher prices for sugar which resulted from the end of the Depression.

During the War itself, several factors did, however, contribute to a straining of relationships between Fijian natives and Indians. In response to native concerns over the management of their lands and to Indian problems with security of leases, a Native Lands Trust Board was created in 1940. While the Board was empowered to act as an intermediary between the mataqali and the Indian leaseholder, regulating and universalizing the terms of the lease, it also was directed to consolidate Fijian land for future use by the selective non-renewal of leases.[23] These lands set aside, which were termed reserves, were the source of much frustration on the part of Indians, who charged that they were being displaced from productive lands only to have their fields go back to bush.[24]

During the War, native Fijians supported the British effort vigorously, with about 10% of the total population volunteering for service. Indians, both for reasons of necessity and for lack of enthusiasm for British rule, did not participate, and were accordingly belittled by the native Fijians.

A severe cane growers' strike in 1943 did little to increase native sympathy for Indian causes, even though to Indians it represented the beginnings of effective Indian political organization.

The end of the War saw both major communities very closely matched in terms of non-farm economic access. In wage labour, Indians and Fijians represented 50.8% and 39.5% of the workforce in 1946, the year when Indians first became the largest of the Fijian communities.[25] These percentages correspond roughly to Indian and Fijian population distributions.[26] About 80% of both native and Indian wage earners were unskilled labourers working for minimal wages (Stanner 1953:219).

The 1950's saw Fiji weather a period of slow growth, rising prices, and of increasing population. For the Indian farmer it was a time of severe underemployment. Many cane farms were only an acre or two, and were insufficient in themselves to support a family (O'Loughlin 1953:59). In 1953, the average amount of cane harvested per grower was only six acres.[27] This put increasing pressure upon Indians to secure at least part-time income from either wage labour or entrepreneurial activities, both of which were then severely limited. The C.S.R. did not allow its leaseholds to be divided among one's heirs, with the consequence that in each generation there were many young people who had to look elsewhere for a living. The high level of farm debt persisted (Mayer 1973:53).[28]

During this decade, many Fijian natives also attempted to break away from agricultural life, seeking in the urban centres both economic rewards and freedom from communal obligations (R.G. Ward 1961:257-9).

Others remained in the rural areas, but formally broke away from their villages in order to become independent farmers (galala). By 1960, perhaps one-third of all Fijian natives lived away from their villages (R.G. Ward 1961:261).

Increasing labour participation by both Fijians and Indians resulted in the quick post-War development of trade and agricultural unions. While there were but two cane growers' unions in 1943, there were eleven in 1957; there were perhaps a dozen trade unions functioning at the same time (Mayer 1963:113). Unionism effected a considerably positive change in working conditions and in agricultural contracts, while at the same time providing a vehicle for the use of both native and Indian political leaders. Strikes against the C.S.R. in 1957 and 1960 led, in the subsequent year, to the Company forming a semi-autonomous Fijian subsidiary, the South Pacific Sugar Mills, Ltd.

The 1950's also saw governmental attempts at merging the administrations of native Fijians and Indians. This was only partially successful, primarily because of the opposition of the Council of Chiefs. The colonial government desired a single local government to deal with both communities (remember that at this time there was still no Indian local authority), and a joint school system for both Fijians and Indians. Neither of these plans were effected, although the school curriculum was standardized and English was made the primary language of instruction above the fifth grade in all schools.[29]

Economic Takeoff

It was not until the mid-1960's that the Fijian economy began the rapid expansion which continues to the present. Several related factors fueled this expansion. Notable was a larger Fijian income from sugar, which was due primarily to steeply-increased world prices and from the nationalization of the S.P.S.M. subsequent to independence. Actual production over 1965 to 1975 has actually decreased slightly, but the value of the crop has increased almost four times (Fiji 1976a:71). Growers in 1974 realized almost exactly three times the price paid for a ton of cane in 1965 ($F20.94 as opposed to $F6.70). As late as 1975, sugar was responsible for 81.7% of Fiji's exports (Fiji 1976:67), but other exports, such as bananas, coconut oil, timber, gold, and manufactured goods have shared in the rise in export values.[30]

A second factor has been the development of tourism from almost nothing to Fiji's second most important producer of external income. The rise of jet passenger service in the Pacific, coupled with the establishment of Nandi as an international-calibre airport connecting Hawaii with Australia, has made this tourist industry a reality. Source countries of tourists are primarily Australia, the United States, New Zealand and Canada, in descending order. Tourism now provides direct employment for over 4,000 people, up five times in the last ten years.

Along with the ever increasing interconnections between the Fijian and world economies has come a massive input of Western ideas. While the Indian peasant agriculturalist of the 1950's might have but rarely come

face to face with the world of Europeans and European values (Mayer 1973: 153), today such contacts are continual. Tourists and the structure created to serve them have both been transmitters of alternative life styles; while the tourist rarely has anything but service contacts with most of the Fiji population, European tourism provides both natives and Indians with a powerful, albeit fuzzy picture of the outside world.

As the economy experiences continued rationalization, with more and more Fijians working within a modern economy, economic motivations and the techniques for their implementation are under flux. Although the proportion of Fijians working for wages or salary is still small by comparison with Western societies, kin and companion links have spread information gleaned through it across the islands.[31] Work and labour are becoming much more skilled, and consequently demand greater adjustment to Western ways than they once did.

Perhaps the most massive input of Western ideas comes through the schools, to which both native and Indian Fijians are heavily committed. The percentage of children of primary school age who are attending school is above 90% for both communities (Fiji 1973:49), and the schools, based as they are on British models, are fairly rigorous. In 1972, about 28% of Fiji's total population was in school. Over 80% of those who entered first grade in 1964 were in school eight years later.

This concentration upon education is both a cause and an effect of modernization. As an effect, parents now realize that the future life chances of their children may depend heavily upon their educational quali-

fications. As a cause, the curriculum is now heavily oriented towards European events, values, and techniques. English is the medium of instruction, and the national English literacy rate for 15 to 19 year olds is 75%. By comparison, for those over 40 it is below 15% for Indians and below 50% for Fijian natives (Fiji 1973:57).[32] English is also the official national language. Beyond introducing new values into Fijian society, schooling is also contributing to a growing inter-generational divergence between parents and children. As with any rapidly changing social context, Fiji is losing some of the continuity with the past it once had.

Communications, taken widely, have also expanded. Although there is no television service in Fiji (it is now in the planning stage), radio, the newspapers, and political pamphlets saturate Fiji. The Fijian national radio network serves not only as a vehicle for current island and international events, but also as a central message exchange for the islands.[33] Such messages not only connect Fijians with each other, but also give some idea of their actions overseas.

Fiji has two substantial English language daily newspapers as well as weeklies in Fijian (Nailalai) and Hindi (Shanti Dut and Jai Fiji). The English language papers, the Fiji Times and the Fiji Sun, are completely modern in format and style, down to the supermarket ads and the Peanuts cartoons. Save for content, they would be indistinguishable from a typical larger-circulation British or North American small town paper.[34] Movies, books, and other printed material from both English and Indian

sources have also made their impact.

Independent Fiji

Another modernizing force has been the increasing political concern and participation by all Fijian communities since limited elected positions were first allowed by the colonial administration in 1963. Because the political structure of independent Fiji is of some consequence in understanding why Fijians have come to Canada, the evolution of nationhood must be briefly reviewed.

In 1963, an election was held to determine membership in the Legislative Council; its makeup had been under attack by Indian politicians for many years previously. For these elections, the prior voting qualifications based on property and income were removed, and women were allowed to vote (Meller and Anthony 1968:3). Fijians were to vote in a colony-wide election for the first time. The reconstituted Council would number thirty-seven members, with the government holding nineteen seats -- a majority of one. The eighteen other positions were divided equally among native Fijians, Europeans and Indians.[35] Four members of each ethnic delegation were elected on separate communal roles.

This election in many ways saw polarizations on issues which replicated previous political concerns, but these stands were brought forward more loudly by the campaign. For native Fijians, the question of constitutional reform was universally qualified by the assertion that Fijian rights outlined in the Deed of Cession be maintained. European candidates,

whose constituencies were dependent upon maintanence of the status quo and who were fearful of an Indian domination of government, strongly supported this stand (Meller and Anthony 1968:70).[36] Indians avoided the subject, save for opposing Fijian domination of government. Access to land was one of the prime concerns expressed by Indian politicians, and the question of setting aside reserve lands for Fijians was an important consideration (Chauhan 1970).[37]

Almost immediately after the election the home government entered into talks with the new Legislative Council which portended eventual independence. In 1964, an unofficial majority was allowed in the Executive Council, which was the chief colonial policy-making body. Three of these unofficial members, one from each ethnic group, were given ministerial positions.

In 1965, the members of the Legislative Council were called to London to participate in a Fiji Constitutional Conference. The result was a new Constitution, which was ratified in December, 1965, over the loud protests of five of the six Indian M.L.C.s (Meller and Anthony 1968:120).[38]

From that point on, the Legislative Council was to have an unofficial majority, to be elected under a complicated system of both communal and common role voting. Fijian representation was proportionately increased, while European participation was decreased slightly.[39] The Governor was still to maintain ultimate control over the government, and could appoint ministers from the M.L.C.s when he deemed it appropriate.

1965 saw the consolidation of formal party organizations across Fiji.

A.D. Patel's Federation Party, based securely upon the cane unions out of which it grew, dominated Indian politics, although the new Muslim Minority Party, fearful of Hindu political control, and the National Congress Party were significant splinter groups. The Fijian Association, under Ratu K.K. T. Mara, consolidated support among the native population.

The elections of 1966 resulted in a Legislative Council majority for the Alliance Party, a loose coalition made up primarily by Fijian, European and anti-Federation Indian leaders. In September, 1967, the Governor shifted the Executive Council to the status of a Council of Ministers, with Ratu Kamisese Mara becoming Chief Minister (HMSO 1967:5). From this point on, the Alliance and Federation Parties have continuously been the government and major opposition parties in Fiji.

Another London Constitutional Conference was held during April and May, 1970, which resulted in independence for Fiji and a new Constitution. Fiji became a self-governing Dominion within the Commonwealth, with a legislative system much like Canada's, including an appointed Senate and a House of Representatives.

The actual structure of election and appointment to these two bodies is complicated, and still includes the use of communal roles, thus assuring that the Indian majority in Fiji cannot become the Government without monolithic internal organization and large-scale non-Indian support.[40] Moreover, any issue dealing with Fijian lands must be passed by the Senate, which has an assured Fijian majority.[41]

The first general election to be held since independence took place

in April, 1972, and resulted in the continuance of the Alliance Party in power with a majority of 14 seats; Alliance won 33 seats and the National Federation Party, under the leadership of S.M. Koya, won 19.[42] The result has been a government dominated by Fijian and European leadership. Ratu Kamisese Mara continues in the capacity of Prime Minister. Of fourteen cabinet portfolios, native Fijians presently hold nine, Europeans hold three, and Indians hold but two (Fiji 1976b:8). Only six out of twenty-two Senators are Indian.

Fijian Indians Today: a summary

It is a difficult matter to adequately categorize the Indian people of Fiji without in some way doing violence to the wide variability which exists among them. If one were to take the easy route and define an average, normative adult Fijian Indian, he or she would be young, for the average age of the Indian population is about sixteen. Our average Indian would be living in a rural context, with a high likelihood of being involved directly in agriculture. Someone else in the family probably works in the nearby town. He or she would be surviving adequately, but frugally, for it must be remembered that Fiji is still a Third World country by material standards. Housing would be sufficient for Fiji's mild climate, but would be small, perhaps made of wood with a thatched roof, in need of repair, and would be shared by family members beyond one's nuclear family. There would likely be no electricity, although a few of one's neighbours might have it, and therefore none of the normal electrical

appliances, except for battery-powered radios. Lighting and cooking would be done with kerosene or gas, and the presence or absence of running water would depend largely upon geographical location.

Depending upon age and sex, this average Indian would most likely know a considerable amount of English, especially if he was young or male; it is also likely that his or her parents know very little English, and have had only slight contact with Europeans. Despite the ability to use English or, at least, to understand it, Hindi would be used in everyday conversation unless necessity demanded the use of English or Fijian.

But at the same time, in some ways the variability between one Indian and another is great, and continues to increase, particularly in terms of economic position. Ethnic divisions between northern Hindus, southern Hindus and Muslims are still of consequence, at least when it comes to questions of marriage or mutual obligation. The Christian Indian population, though small and not strongly separate from the Hindus, is important because most of its members are literate and well-to-do. Being a Gujarati or a recently expatriated continental Indian also implies a considerably different background and standard of living.[43]

The range of Westernization evident within the Indian ethnic subcommunities is also highly variable. Small numbers of Indians live today much as their grandfathers did in their time, and the grandfathers of today are truly of another age. At the same time, a smaller number of Indians live lives which are fundamentally no different than the European population of Fiji, down to using English for domestic conversation.[44]

As there always have been there are also important class and status divisions within the Fijian Indian community; there are rich people and poor people, people on the way up and others on the way down. There are 'proper' people and rogues, religious vegetarians and atheistic drunkards.

Within this variability, constrained by Fijian society as it is presently constituted and within individual situations determined by unique personal histories, some of these people have decided to leave Fiji and come to Canada. Knowing something of the makeup and historical trends of both Fijian and British Columbian society, we must now look to the process of the immigration of Fijians to Canada to see how these two contexts interface with individual decision-making to produce the demographic makeup of Canadian Fijian society.

Chapter Two: Notes

1. There are several excellent geographical studies of Fiji, particularly R.G. Ward (1965) and Watters (1969).

2. Native social organization was very complex, and has not altogether been sorted out, see Dyck (1975), Geddes (1959), Belshaw (1964), and Sahlins (1962). Groves' (1963) review article of Sahlins (1962) outlines current opinion on Fijian social organization, while Roth (1951) outlines the 'official' view of Fijian "indirect rule".

3. As noted some seventy years ago by Herman Nieboer (1910), slavery and indenture tend to arise only in those situations where labour has alternative and relatively equivalent economic resources available to wage labour.

4. Administrative chiefs sometimes corresponded to traditional ones, but not of necessity.

5. Wages were about 4 to 5 times that of unskilled labour in India, but so were many costs (Gillion 1962:41). Moreover, wages were considerably lower than those which the contract suggested were being paid.

6. Of 21,368 who immigrated from the Calcutta depot from 1879 to 1900, 10,258 were from the Northwest Provinces (48%), 5,885 were from Oudh (27.8%), and 3,734 came from Bihar and Bengal (17.4%).

7. It is a certainty that many hid their high caste status, as recruiters were instructed to select members of the agricultural castes if at all possible (Tinker 1974:51). Gillion (1962:54) notes that the C.S.R. requested that its agents not send Punjabis, literate Indians of any sort, or discharged soldiers, as these types of immigrants were likely to cause trouble for the company.

8. Gillion (1962:190) gives this figure by summing up Labour Department records in Suva up to 1957. But it is my personal experience that many people have made use of the privilege in order to have one-half of a return trip to India paid for by the government. These people are included in the records, yet have returned to Fiji.

9. Gillion (1962:138) notes that only 515 Indians were in their second contract at the end of 1912.

10. Tinker (1974:320) gives the figure as 46,000 acres being in Indian hands in 1912.

11. Watters (1969) has studied economic development closely in four villages. In each case there is a considerable, but variable, negative effect from collective duties and responsibilities.

12. Fijian Indian facility with credit systems is of direct consequence in their economic orientation in Canada. In the past, credit use had plunged much of the Indian rural population of Fiji deeply into debt.

13. Major international sugar producers and consumers have set up a system of yearly production quotas for each country, with the hope of stabilizing sugar prices.

14. But intermarriage, especially between northern and southern Hindus, seems to be on the increase at present. Hindus and Muslims both celebrate the Hindu Holi festival and Hindus used to attend Muslim Moharram. Everybody celebrates Christmas.

15. Indian schools were to be community organized and largely self-financed until very recently. The colonial administration was reluctant to spend money on Indian education, while the missionaries, who had been so successful among the native Fijians, did not expect many Indian converts and shied away from the construction of Indian schools.

16. The Muslim League split into two groups in 1933, when a leader of the non-orthodox Ahmadiya sect arrived in Fiji. His adherents formed the Muslim Association of Fiji.

17. Cane farmers first struck the C.S.R. in 1921 (Mayer 1963:39), following upon a general strike by Indian labourers in 1920. The formation of the first two unions of cane farmers, the Kisan Sangh (1937) and the Akhil Fiji Krishak Maha Sangh (1941) led to the severe strike of 1943, and later, to considerably better conditions for cane farmers.

18. One additional European representative was also added.

19. It must be remembered that during this period the Fijians had an additional political avenue through the Council of Chiefs.

20. Three of both the European and Indian blocks were to be elected. All five Fijian representatives were nominated.

21. O'Loughlin (1953:5) estimates that about one-third of the 1,500 licenced Indian traders were forced out of business.

22. C.S.R. lessees, on the average, were only paid £80 for their 1938 crop (Stanner 1953:179).

23. The Indian farmers secured the condition of 30 year leases, but without guarantee of renewal.

24. The charge might have been well founded with respect to the use of particular parcels of land, but overall Indian farm lands have not shown an appreciable decrease. In fact, over 1956-1966 Indian cane lands increased from 115,654 acres to 153,000 (Anderson 1969:32). No one denies, however, that by modern agricultural standards Fijian lands are grossly under-utilized.

25. Native Fijians suffered from a declining population until 1921, when the population stabilized. Indian birth and child mortality rates were very much better during the subsequent period, accounting for their numerical majority. Indian birth rates are now sharply down, and this, coupled with out-migration, has kept the Indian population at 51% of the total Fijian population since 1966 (Fiji 1976:1).

26. In 1946, the Indian and native Fijian populations stood at 120,000 and 118,000 respectively. But of those working for wages, 55% of Fijian natives worked full-time, while only 38% of Indians did so; the participation rates are therefore roughly equal (Stanner 1953:240).

27. The 1956 census revealed that 16,883 Indians were involved in cane farming, and claimed that this was 6,000 above the requirements of farming (Watters 1969:20).

28. Watters (1969:8) estimated that in 1961 the average Indian farmer owed about 64% of his average annual income ($533) in outstanding debts.

29. There were 75,000 students enrolled in school in 1959. Of the primary grades, this constituted about 75% of the children of school age.

30. This is slightly skewed by the monumental but temporary rise in the price of sugar in late 1974. Nevertheless, sugar conservatively produces 75% of Fiji's export flow.

31. In 1972 (Fiji 1972:59), only 55,619 Fijians are listed as being employed at either white or blue collar work. This is, of course, a very high rate by Third World standards. Of these, about 70% were above the level of unskilled labour (Fiji 1973:64).

32. The marked difference between Fijian native and Indian English literacy for older people reflects the successful efforts of missionaries among the native population and the use of Hindi in earlier Indian schools.

33. For a fee, which varies with the time of day, Fijians can have births, deaths, and other messages broadcast on the radio. In a country with limited and expensive phone service this radio communications system is vital, and radio audiences are large.

34. Circulations are high, about 15,000 daily for each.

35. This distribution reflected the enormous economic power of the Europeans, who numbered only a few thousand, and the traditional rights of the native Fijians, who constituted about 42% of the population.

36. This alliance between Fijians and Europeans had a considerable tradition behind it. In 1962, native Fijians and Europeans had emphatically rejected the government's suggestion that Fiji move towards a member system of government, where unofficial members control cabinet departments.

37. Meller and Anthony (1968) have recreated candidates' stands for the 1963 election through published statements. It is my impression through talking with people who were involved in this election that Indians were quite vociferous on the question of land tenure in their unrecorded speeches.

38. The four M.L.C.s of the Indian Federation Party, led by A.D. Patel, were unanimous in their disapproval.

39. There would be thirty-six unofficial members, and no more than four official ones. Nine native Fijians and nine Indians would be elected communally, as would seven Europeans. Two Fijians would be nominated by the Council of Chiefs. Additionally, nine more positions were to be elected at large, but three would be reserved for each ethnic group. Thus, the total composition would be:

    14 Fijians
    12 Indians
    10 Europeans
     4 Officials (Maximum)

40. The current system guarantees that of the 52 members of the House of Representatives, the total makeup would be:

    22 Fijians
    22 Indians
     8 General Electors

    General electors consist of Europeans, Part Europeans (should they decide not to register on the Fijian role), and Chinese.

41. Of the twenty-two Senators, eight are appointed by the Council of Chiefs, seven by the Prime Minister, six by the Leader of the Opposition, and one by the Council of Rotuma.

42. S.M. Koya replaced A.D. Patel as Opposition Leader upon the latter's death in 1969. Alliance has since lost three seats, two by members

shifting to independents and one as the result of a resignation and subsequent by-election defeat. The next general election must be held by April, 1977, at the latest.

43. Indicative of this sort of split, marriages between Gujaratis and those who are descendants of indentured labourers are still very rare. On the other side, many Fiji-born Indians are suspicious of the Gujaratis, especially in business and politics, and tend to consider Indian expatriates (who are often professionals) as unwarrantly elitist.

44. But I have not met a Fijian Indian, save those who were primarily brought up in Canada, who does not know an Indian language. Even the most Westernized Fiji Indians are still heavily tied by kin links to Indian ways of doing, even if they do not themselves practise many of them.

Chapter Three: Immigration

This chapter outlines the pattern of Fijian immigration to Canada. This is no easy task, for in such a community immigration is of central concern to everyday life. Immigration means separation from kin and country; immigration means finding a new way under strange conditions; immigration of one's friends and relatives helps to establish coherence in a newborn community and binds that community in a network of communication and concern to one's homeland. For the Fijian community, where fully one-half of the total population has come since the end of 1973, the importance of immigration cannot be overestimated.[1]

Because immigration colours so much of Fijian Canadian life, it will be intimately tied in with every subsequent aspect of this inquiry. Here, the focus is more narrow, and concerns the development and understanding of the actual process of coming to Canada. This chapter seeks to describe the nature of the immigration flow itself and to offer some insights into why it exists and why it has taken the form it has.

A Descriptive History of Fijian Immigration to Canada

Before attempting any explanation of the process of immigration it is necessary to know something about it, at least in broad outline. This particularly important because, even though Fijian immigration to Canada has a very short history, its structure has shifted considerably with time.

As with previous Asian immigrants to British Columbia, Fijians have a prior collective experience with immigration; although Canada is currently the most important acceptor of Fijian emigrées, it is not the first by any

means. Like earlier Asian immigrants to Canada, Fijian Indians first developed a pattern of sojourner immigration. This began to be significant after World War II. Although both Australia and New Zealand maintained racially restrictive immigration policies until recently, work permits which allowed three to six month stays were available in the early 1950's, and many Indians made use of them (Mayer 1973:186). Many more learned of the possibility. This form of short-term (male) immigration increased in frequency through the years, to the point that by the late 1960's visits to Australia and New Zealand were a commonplace, even in the rural villages (Mayer 1973:212).

In the 1960's, short-term work in the smaller islands, notably the New Hebrides, was frequent for both Indian and native Fijians. The density of this flow of personnel is indicated by the very high present rates of departures from Fiji. In 1975, for instance, the total number of Fijian residents who left Fiji numbered 28,597, 53% of which were heading for Australia or New Zealand (Fiji 1976a:105). This figure includes Fijians on holiday or business excursions.

Most of this emigration from Fiji was cyclic and, save for those who left on holiday, much of it was firmly oriented towards the accumulation of savings. In a country where scarce wage-paying jobs returned an average of 28¢ an hour in 1965 (Fiji 1976a:83), the incentive for sojourner immigration was very large. Although the average wage rates in Fiji are now around 65¢ an hour, wages for work overseas have risen accordingly. The desire for overseas work continues among both native and Indian Fijians,

and is limited primarily by the labour requirements of the receiving countries.

While sojourner immigration is a qualitatively different endeavour than leaving Fiji permanently with one's family, this sort of overseas flow has given Fijians considerable insight into the possibilities of immigration and into the nature of European-oriented countries. It enabled a comparison between life at home and life overseas which could scarcely be said to have existed before the War. It has also developed mechanisms whereby the immigrant can be temporarily detached from his everyday obligations.

Permanent immigration from Fiji started feebly, perhaps primarily because of the racially restrictive policies of the potential receiving countries. Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States all prohibitied large-scale Indian immigration until after World War II. While the United Kingdom did not, lack of financial resources, distance considerations, and lack of information about conditions there limited immigration (Mayer 1973:186). Through the 1950's, a very small number of Fijian Indians emigrated to the United States, settling primarily in the San Francisco and Los Angeles areas of California.[3] A handful were able to pass through the tough restrictions of the Australian and New Zealand immigration laws; these few were primarily highly Westernized professionals. Immigration from Fiji to Canada was prohibited entirely during the 1950's, save for Europeans and the wives and children of Fijian-Canadian legal residents, of which there were very few.

The honour of being the first Fijian to be resident in Canada is already claimed by many. In all probability it must go to a Punjabi gentleman who came to Canada from India in the late 1940's. He had spent the majority of his life in Fiji as a successful cane farmer and had then returned to India. A handful of native Fijians also seem to have taken up residence in Vancouver in the early 1950's after jumping ship. Neither of these cases was of consequence in initiating the present flow of immigrants.

Rather, it seems that changes in Canadian immigration laws and their implementation are chiefly responsible for initiating Fijian immigration. This is so in two ways. The first is quite simply the limiting case; changes in the law allowed immigration from Fiji when it was once forbidden. In 1962, the immigration laws were modified in such a way that Asians and Blacks would be allowed to enter Canada on the basis of skills or the sponsorship of immediate relatives (Department of Manpower and Immigration 1974b:28).

The first immigrants to come under the new regulations did so in the winter of 1962-3. Two of these four men were Sikh, and one of them had heard at a meeting in his gudwara that an article in one of the vernacular papers claimed that Canada was interested in immigrants. This initiated their subsequent inquiries. Upon arrival in Canada, they stayed the first few nights in the Vancouver Sikh temple, and then rented an apartment.[4] None of the four had relatives here. They were powerfully affected by the cold and by the anonymity of the city where they knew no one. Two soon

returned to Fiji, while the other two quickly got a series of manual jobs. Eventually, the two who left were to return, and all four were to bring over their families.

This pattern was independently repeated several times over the next two years. In mid-1963, for instance, seven other Fijian Indians took advantage of the second important change in immigration procedure; the Canadian consulate officials had begun to come to Suva to interview prospective immigrants. Previously one had to apply at the Consulate offices in Sydney, 2,000-odd miles away. These seven were, by Fijian standards, skilled men. Several were white collar workers, one was a barber, and all of them could get along in English.

Like our four previous adventurers, these seven came to Canada by ship. Upon arrival in Vancouver they followed the typical sojourner pattern. They first sought an apartment and then a job, seeking employment through the local Manpower office. After holding a number of distasteful or short-term jobs, they all secured acceptable employment and, their immediate future secured, they brought over their families.[5]

As these early immigrants established themselves in the Vancouver area, they quickly began to develop a network of relationships between themselves. These were based both upon prior connections back home and upon the simple commonality of their all being Fijian in an alien society.[6] A community began to coalesce.

Before 1968, the number of incoming Fijian Indians was very low, never going above three hundred a year. Newer immigrants were able to be

incorporated into the relatively inclusive network of those who had come before them. There were few deep divisions between immigrants (except personally), and few immigrants either separated themselves from the Fijian Canadian network, or arrived and established themselves without first joining it.

The establishment of a resident community in Vancouver had several consequences for immigration itself. Most importantly, it began the process of chain migration, which presently dominates Fijian immigration patterns. The very first immigrants approached a Canadian commitment very tentatively, as was evinced by the relative rarity of whole families coming together to Canada. Rather, male members came first to test the ground. If they were successful, then a larger commitment could be made. If not, then one's alternatives in Fiji would have been hardly disturbed by a short absence in Canada.

As with the first wave of Sikh immigration to British Columbia, the establishment of a resident community of Fijian Indians also prompted further immigration because of the rise of frequent communication between Canada and Fiji. Most Fijian Indians are literate, and letters circulate continuously between Fiji and Canada; many early immigrants claim that their first concrete contact with the possibilities of Canadian immigration came through letters from people here. As the financial reserves of the Canadian community were built up, this also allowed people to return to Fiji for visits and for business, thereby injecting more ideas about Canada into Fijian society.

A resident community also stimulated immigration because of the nature of the Canadian immigration laws, which, by allowing people to support their relatives' immigration, roughly paralleled what would have been Indian custom anyway. On a limited basis, the pre-1967 law allowed the sponsorship of one's immediate relatives, which Fijian Indians were quick to do. They also gave relatives material support in immigrating, commonly advancing the very costly plane fare.[7]

The Canadian immigration laws were further modified in 1966 to give more weight to skills and less to the racial or national origins of the prospective immigrant. The new class of nominated immigrants was formed, which was comprised of more distant relatives who fulfilled the long-term criteria of the new points system but did not have the short-term requisites like a guaranteed job. Both of these changes worked in favour of Fijian applicants, and immigration continued to increase, as illustrated by the following graph and table:



Figure 1. Fijian Immigration to Canada (numbers by years) to April,1976

Year	Number of Immigrants		Year	Number of Immigrants	
pre-1962	50	(est.)	1969	590	
1962)			1970	776	
1963)	209		1971	721	
1964)			1972	636	
1965	304		1973	987	
1966	271		1974	1,530	
1967	172		1975	2,323	
1968	253		1976	335	(first quarter)

Table XI. Fijian Immigration to Canada, to April, 1976.[8]

Fijian Immigration to Canada, 1962 to 1976

As the graph shows, recent years have shown an exponential increase in Fijian immigration. More immigrants, for instance, came in 1975 than did so in all the time before mid-1970. Under the high incorporation rates of the past few years, a certain amount of incoherence and disorder would be expected in any community, and it easily makes itself visible in the present day. Because of the present size of the community, because internal network boundaries have now reestablished themselves, because of the limitations on communications due to work schedules, and because of this high rate of influx there is currently nothing like a seamless Fijian Indian community. Instead, what stands as a community at present is a complex set of networks based on class, kin, prior acquaintance, religion, age, and sex, which, while strongly binding some members, is equally weak between others.

The process of immigration is a gamble which some win and others lose. Moreover, not all immigrants play for the same stakes nor work with the

same odds. Chance, too, does not help all equally. This leads to fundamental readjustments in status, standards for leadership, and patterns of behaviour. The less-than-well-off cane farmer from the Fijian hinterland may have flourished in Canada, while the one-time civic leader, newly immigrated, searches for work as a janitor. At the same time as differential success increases the distinctions between one Fijian Canadian and another, acculturation and immigration continue to have their effects. Many children are now very Canadian in outlook, while at the same time the process of putting down roots which allows such significant acculturation also provides the security of place which motivates people to send for their parents, uncles, and aunts, thereby at least partially maintaining the force of tradition.[9]

There is one other facet of immigration which needs consideration, and that is the practice of visiting Canada. Prior to the fall of 1974, a legal visitor to Canada could apply for landed immigrant status while still within the country. Many Fijians made use of this option, as did immigrants of all other nationalities. A short-lived tradition therefore arose whereby male Fijian Indians who were interested in immigrating would enter Canada on a visitor's visa, subsequently applying for permanent residence if they found things acceptable here. This option is now gone.

Since October of 1974, no visas have been issued to people who are within Canada, save under very restricted extenuating circumstances. Neither can a prospective immigrant be in the country while his application is being processed. For Fijians, this means that at present almost all

applications for Canadian landed immigrant status are made in Fiji (95% of applications in 1975 [Heath 1976]). And so the far more expensive option of coming to Canada on a visitor's visa, returning to Fiji, and then applying for Canadian residency has been much developed in the last two years by those who have the necessary financial resources.

In addition to these visits by prospective immigrants, many Fijians come to Canada simply for holidays, often with the subsidiary purpose of attending a relative's wedding or funeral, seeing one's Canadian-born grandchildren and the like. The total flow of visitors is very large; for instance in 1975, 2,323 Fijians entered Canada as landed immigrants, while 3,595 Fijians are listed (Fiji 1976a:105) as leaving Fiji destined to Canada in the same year. In addition, many of the 2,303 people giving the United States as a destination in 1975 also visited Canada, making the total number of visitors, returning immigrants and new immigrants, not including the large number of Fijians resident in the United States who visited in Canada, over 4,000 for the single year. To say that immigration touches much of Fijian Canadian life would seem justified even on the narrow basis of numbers.

In the immediately preceding history I have consciously allowed the use of a dual fiction, that there is a conveniently normative Fijian and that Fijians as a collectivity act monolithically, as is implied by statements of the sort, "Fijians often see immigration as a gamble". Fijians collectively do nothing of the kind, although most individual Fijians do. In order to gain any fundamental insight into Fijian immigration to Canada

the level of abstraction must be reduced considerably. Two things are primal: who comes, and why do they do so.

Clearly these two questions are intimately linked, and a perfect theoretical model of the "whys" ought to generate the spectrum of people who actually immigrate. Unfortunately, one does not have access to such a complete model, even logically, for it would be equivalent to reality itself, and therefore no more understandable by itself than the original. One must abstract, and consequently aim at more limited objectives.

There are, really, only two ways to approach migration theory, and they should in fact simply reflect different conceptual levels of the same system. One can ask what social and material forces exist in a given social context which might lead a certain type of person to immigrate; essentially this method links observed immigrant flows to large-scale societal variables. Such an approach has considerable explanatory utility, especially as an augmenting and subsidiary argument.

But even though recognizing that social facts can be analyzed as being causal to other social facts, one must concede that no social fact ever did anything, and that the only vehicles for social observables are people making decisions and acting upon them. It is at this level that primary explanations of immigration must be found. No Fijian immigrates independently through any mechanism other than through deciding to make the attempt.

While the extreme of this position leads to the morass of methodological individualism, rarely does one have access to the massive empirical

data necessary to construct models out of the simple summation of the decisions of individuals. Rather, some method of typical or ideal types (Weber 1964:87-120) must be used to create abstract, pure form models based on what can be seen of empirical situations. This will be the primary approach here.

Fijian Indians constitute a highly variable population, which complicates such a method. In order to define an empirical base which is more amenable to analysis, one must first attempt to delimit the nature of the immigrant population. There are three significant ways in which this can be done -- through their background histories, through their reasons for coming, and through their present circumstances. I defer the third to the subsequent chapters, and seek some insights into the second by describing the first.

Ethnicity and Citizenship

The immigrant Fijian population is dominantly, overwhelmingly Indian, with a Chinese representation which is significant only in the light of their small (4,000) Fijian population. Native Fijians make up 44% of the Fijian population, but very few have come to Canada. At the same time, 3.5% of the total Fijian Indian population is here. This extreme contrast ought to indicate something about the ways in which Indian and native Fijians view their positions at home.

It is my impression that in the Fijian Indian population of the Lower Mainland, northern Hindus, southern Hindus, and Muslims are rep-

resented in about their proportions in the Fijian Indian population at large, which are approximately 55%, 30%, and 15% respectively.[10] Christian Indians, who form a very small minority in Fiji, are definitely over-represented. About 87% of all Fijian immigrants currently hold Fijian passports, with 12% holding British ones (Heath 1976). They truly are Fijian Indians, for more than 95% of immigrants were born in Fiji; there is little 'through' immigration.

Age and Sex Distributions

More than half of the Indian population of Fiji was under the age of seventeen (Fiji 1976a:22) in 1975. Approximately 45% of the Indian population were either under fourteen or over fifty-nine and could be considered as dependents (Fiji 1973:18). It is, in short, a very young population. The sex ratio is one to one.

The distribution of ages and sexes among immigrant Fijians is considerably different. The modal age for 1973-4 immigrants is around twenty-five, and the age which divides the immigrant population in half is about twenty-two. A far lower number of dependents immigrate, only 31.5% being below fourteen or above fifty-nine. These figures correspond closely to the Canadian national averages for all immigrants.[11]



Figure 2. The Age Distribution of the Population of Fiji (5 year segments), 1974



Figure 3. The Age Distribution of Fijian Immigrants to Canada, 1974 and 1975 Immigrants, Numbers by Age (5 year segments)

A large part of the divergence between the Fijian Indian population distribution and that of new immigrants can be accounted for by the criteria of the immigration process itself, which of course selects for adult workers rather than normative population distributions and which sets a premium on being in the twenty-thirty year old age bracket.

Sex ratios of immigrants also diverge considerably from the normal even distribution exhibited by the Fijian Indian population (Department of Manpower and Immigration Annual Immigration Statistics 1974; 1975):



Figure 4. Sex Ratios of 1974 and 1975 Fijian Immigrants to Canada, by Age

This skewing, with males significantly outnumbering females in the middle age brackets, represents the combination of two factors; first, the preliminary immigration of male heads of households and the immigration of single men, and secondly, the delayed immigration of their wives and daughters.

Occupational Class and Education

It is difficult to discuss the occupational background of immigrant Fijians without simultaneously considering at least several correlated variables, notably class and education. The degree of urbanism, of Westernization, and of material success are also closely linked.

Many of these measures are most difficult to assess empirically in an immigrant community, because one's only method of confirmation available is constant cross-checking of background material among a number of informants. Accordingly, I have assembled a composite of the background of Fijian immigrants by building the foundations on statistical data, even though this may not necessarily be the most holistic approach possible.

It is reasonable to begin with occupation. Three sets of occupational data are of consequence, only one of which is collected by the immigration process: prior occupation in Fiji, intended occupation in Canada, and realized occupation in Canada. It is only the second of these for which there exists data covering all immigrants. Although there are numerous cases where the intended occupation of immigrants is not the occupation in which they were engaged immediately prior to immigration, nevertheless,

in a very high number of these cases they had extensive prior experience in these callings. One can take figures for intended occupation to match actual prior occupation, with some variation, very closely.

The following table summarizes the intended occupation of Fijian immigrants for 1972, 73, and 74:[12]

Occupation	Number
Entrepreneurial	44
Managerial	16
Professional	53
Clerical	270
Commerce & Sales	105
Service	81
Agricultural	42
Fabrication, Construction, & Transportation	517
Other	70

Table XII. Intended Occupation of Fijian Immigrants, 1972-1974

It is readily apparent that the immigration selection mechanisms have generated a population which is very much at variance with the Fijian Indian population as a whole. As mentioned, farming is still the primary occupation of some 65% of Fijian Indians, and yet agriculturalists do not figure highly in those pursuits which have gained Fijian immigrants access to Canada. This should not imply that these immigrants are some sort of urban elite, detached from the concerns of the countryside, for they are not. A majority of adult Fijian Indian immigrants were born on farms, most grew up on them, and a great many have continuing interest in them, either through ownership or through relatives who continue to live on the farm.

Nevertheless these are fairly special people by Fijian standards. To

see this more clearly, let us look at a job-specific list of occupations given by immigrants in 1975 (Heath 1976):

Occupation	Number	Occupation	Number
motor vehicle mechanics & repairmen	79	sales clerks, commodities	18
carpenters & related professions	60	service station attendants	18
general office clerks	58	truck drivers	15
category unavailable	43	secretaries & stenographers	14
bookkeepers & accounting clerks	42	chefs & cooks	13
salespersons, commodities, other	38	construction electricians	13
typists & clerk-typists	29	driver-salespersons	12
welding & flame cutting	20	cabinet & wood furniture makers	11
electrical equipment repair & installation	19	draughtsmen	10
		tailors & dressmakers	10
		others (frequency <10)	252
		Total workers	774

Table XIII. Intended Occupation of Fijian Immigrants, 1975, by Specific Categories.

If one keeps in mind the fact that 252, or about one-third, of these immigrants are in a wide range of occupational categories (obviously, more than twenty-five additional ones), one sees a distribution of occupations dominated by skilled white and blue collar jobs, only a handful of which do not require significant training and experience. When one considers the following distribution of Indians in the Fijian workforce, coupled with the very rough percentage of the Indian workforce each of these categories represents, the special nature of the immigrant population becomes apparent:

Occupational Sector	Number	Percentage of Working Indians
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing	1,046	.6
Mining	370	.2
Manufacturing	5,500	3.6
Electricity, Gas, and Water	450	.3
Construction	5,236	3.5
Trades and Tourism	5,158	3.4
Transport, Storage, Communication	2,551	1.7
Finance, Real Estate, and Business Services	940	.6
Service Industries	7,599	5.0
Total	28,850	18.9%

Table XIV. Fijian Indian Wage & Salaried Labour, 1972, by Sector[13]

The highly selective nature of the occupational spectrum of Fijian immigrants indicated by these charts may even underestimate the difference between it and the Fijian population. Figures for intended occupation are kept for independent and nominated immigrants, and not for their sponsored dependents. Thus, the occupational background of women dependents, most commonly wives and adolescent daughters, is largely ignored. In fact, not only do women immigrants represent a considerable percentage of the Fijian Canadian working population, but they also come with significant non-farm work histories. Conservatively, 30% of immigrant Fijian adult women have worked away from home while in Fiji.

Educationally, the immigrant Fijian Indian population is very heterogeneous, reflecting the fact that the impact of schooling in Fiji has changed radically over the past twenty years. Especially prior to the 1960's, education was a scarce resource among the Indian population, and this, coupled with traditional views of male leadership and male economic support, led to women getting very little schooling indeed. Many Fijian

Indian women above the age of forty have had no education, and this holds for immigrant women as well.[14] Indeed, the average English literacy rate among Fiji Indians over forty years old was about 15% in 1966 (Fiji 1973: 57), and is likely to be no greater than 30% now.

In Fiji, Indian education is costly, and children tended to receive education in proportion to their family's ability to pay for it and to support the children while they were in school. This still remains the case for secondary school education. There were traditional grades where one left school; before 1955, women often left after three grades, if they went at all, while there are significant losses among both sexes presently at the end of eight grades (which also marks the end of primary school) (Fiji 1973:51). Wastage in secondary school is very high at each level, and currently only 10% of Fiji's student population is finishing twelve years of education.

While the general pattern once was one of very limited education, with even less for women, this is under rapid flux, and a decade will likely see a very high rate of secondary school completion by both sexes. Already, males and females are equally represented in the first year of Fijian secondary schools.

In summary, then, one can generalize that all children of school age were in fact in school prior to immigrating, that for adults age inversely correlates with education, and that wives have had considerably less schooling than their men. Surprisingly, even though both school-age children and uneducated women and older people will bring down the averages

severely; Fijian immigrants to Canada show a very high level of primary and secondary education (Heath 1976):

Years of Education	Numbers	Years of Education	Numbers
0	575	14	24
1	37	15	15
2	56	16	14
3	59	17	8
4	69	18	3
5	79	21	1
6	94		
7	122		
8	347	Total	2,323
9	182		
10	257		
11	166		
12	170		
13	45		

Table XV. Educational Achievement of Fijian Immigrants, 1975.

Although disguised in the averages, one must conclude that male family heads will tend to have something above ten years of education.[15]

Another surprising thing is their high degree of English verbal ability. Department of Manpower and Immigration figures, even though they are certain to be overestimates, claim that 99% of Fijian immigrants in 1975 knew some English (Heath 1975). A very high proportion is confirmed by my own experience; Fijian Indians, used to a polyglot social context, rapidly develop English fluency.[16] As with occupational and educational measures, this certainly implies once more that Fijian immigrants are no cross-section of the Fijian population. In fact, this language capability is unusual among Canadian immigrants as a whole, 32% of whom in 1975 could speak neither

English nor French, as measured by the same set of criteria. (Department of Manpower and Immigration Quarterly, Immigration Statistics 1975 IV:13). The figure for British Columbia follows the national average.

Typical Immigrants and their Concerns

Something which cannot be derived simply from figures is a notion of what sort of person stands behind them. Without such a picture any arguments about the causes of immigration remain abstract ones. Accordingly, I have attempted to make up a set of typical immigrants, none of which exactly correspond to anyone, but which can certainly help to understand the process of immigration.[17]

Males are unarguably the heads of Fijian households, if one is careful to mean this only in the narrow sense that their say is usually dominant in family decisions which involve its interaction with the external world. While it can be convincingly argued that in fact women form the central core of many Fijian Canadian households, especially those which are larger than nuclear families, males are the vehicle through which vital decisions are channeled. Accordingly, their place in the immigration procedure is overt, and important. The place of women is equally vital, but a bit more delving is required to bring it forth.

There are, broadly speaking, four types of males among Fijian Indian immigrants to Canada, young and old dependents, and younger and older working males. Two of these categories, the dependent ones, can be dealt with fairly quickly. Younger relatives of both sexes, which is to say the

sons, daughters, and occasionally, the nieces, nephews, and "cousins" of male immigrants, who were in a dependent situation in Fiji rarely have much say in whether they will immigrate.[18] Thus, males below the age of seventeen and females who have not yet married (up to about the age of twenty-two) normally immigrate to Canada as part of a family, if the immigration laws allow them to do so. The family household forms the typical "quantum unit" of Fijian immigration.[19]

Older dependent men are relatively infrequent immigrants, as are older women, for several reasons. The first reason is primarily demographic; because immigrant families are fairly young, and because Fijian Indians once married at a young age, parents, uncles, aunts, and older in-laws are still well within their productive lives, and are typically in their forties. They, therefore, neither <u>are</u> dependents nor do they qualify as dependents by Canadian immigration regulations, which specify that old age dependents are to be over the ages of sixty-five for males and sixty for females. There are many parents who have come here, but they must come as nominated relatives, under the same criteria as other people in that category.

Another factor which limits the number of elderly dependents is their reluctance to break with ways of doing, with friends and with relatives which have stood the test of a lifetime. Old men and women have a functional and honoured place in Fijian households, and both their functionality and status is slighted in the Canadian context. Many older Fijian Indians view Canada as a place for the young, and many who come find life here very ambiguous.

Most of those who initiate the process of immigration are workingmen, some with families, others not. One can divide this broad group in two by age -- actually by degree of establishment in occupation and family -- for this has a significant bearing on the motivations and goals of immigration.

The immigration of the younger variant, because of his age and the consequent freedom from familial ties which it represents, is far more simple to explain than that of the more established immigrant. Descriptively, he could be from about seventeen to approximately twenty-five. He may be married, but if so, most of his children are probably below the age of eight. In Fiji, he and his family most likely did not live in a household where he was the dominant male; more commonly, he would be living with his parents or with an older patrilineal relative.

Although from a family which was well enough off to provide him with some education, it is likely that he had extreme difficulty in utilizing his training, and was employed at a number of jobs throughout his short work history, these jobs being separated by periods of unemployment or of part-time employment. Culturally, he is already fully of two worlds, for because of his age he knows little about Fiji as it was before 1955, nor was he raised altogether within the confines of family tradition. As an adolescent he likely as not was part of a peer group which aggressively sought the novel and the unusual in the changing and Westernizing Fiji. Perhaps a real example would be illuminative:

> Ram Chand (a pseudonym) is now twenty-six. He has been in Canada since 1973, when he was nominated by his immediately elder brother, who came in 1970. When he first arrived he had been married for a little less than three years, and had

at that time one daughter. Ram was born and raised on a tenancy cane farm about ten miles from Lautoka, which was run by his father. He was the third of three sons. He spent his early adolescence in school, in part because his father and elder brother were already underemployed on the farm, even though it gave them an adequate income. His first employment for wages was with his paternal uncle, who bought produce from local farmers and trucked it to market. While this began as part-time work, he soon learned to drive the truck, and eventually was working with fair regularity. He continued to live at home, even after his marriage to the daughter of a moderately successful mixed-crop farmer who was the neighbour of one of his relatives. His elder brother had become an accounting clerk in one of Lautoka's tourist hotels, and immigrated to Canada by virtue of being nominated by another paternal uncle. When fully established he was allowed to nominate his brother, who then came to Canada.

Our older male immigrant in fact is old more in tradition and establishment than in age. In fact, he may well be in his mid-twenties, although those above thirty would be closer to the ideal type. In all respects, he contrasts only in degree with his younger counterpart, but the summation of these small differences make him a considerably different person.

He will be married and have a family. Very few males above twenty-five are not married, and those who are not are clearly considered aberrant by their relatives. Although he may have pre-school children, as likely as not most of his offspring are in primary or early secondary school. He sees himself overtly as the head of this household, with all the responsibilities attendant to it. His family resides in a house in which he is the voice of authority; not infrequently he will own the house, and he will commonly also have a controlling or ownership interest in some income-producing property.

He is also well-rooted into a fairly stable social and economic context. It is likely that he will have been working at his present job for a considerable length of time, not infrequently over ten years. He may well be as senior in position as he is likely to be during his working career.

Within his family, he is beginning to play the part of a significant elder, helping to make marriages, to mitigate disputes, and to assist younger relatives in whatever ways his position makes available. He has been raised far more traditionally than his younger counterpart, and will tend to be more ambiguous about the prospect of a Westernized Fiji; what is largely coherent change he will likely see as a loosening of constraints and as a descent into relative anarchy.

> Ahmed Syed (a pseudonym) is now forty, and was thirty-six when he came to Canada. He was an independent immigrant, even though many of his close relatives were already here and could have nominated him. He was married, and had at that time one daughter of seventeen, another of eleven, and a seven year-old son. The younger two were attending school when they came. Ahmed was a skilled woodworker, who had followed the traditional pattern of apprenticeship and certification. He had worked for the same employer for almost twenty years. The Syeds lived in Suva, and owned their own home. Ahmed was the only son among five daughters, and had led the family since his father died when Ahmed was twenty-three. Ahmed and his wife were practicing and devout Muslims, although their children were rather less so. Ahmed's job placed him in continual contact with Europeans and both parents were fluently bilingual.

Immigration Determinants: the societal context

Chapter Two outlined the history of Fiji and Fijian Indians at a general

level. Within that history we have seen that the situation of Indians in Fiji has always been tinged with uncertainty, first in the confusion of indenture and then in the tenuous position of subordinate tenant farmers. That uncertainty persists today in the minds of many Fijian Indians, and is a primary, though not necessarily a direct impetus toward immigration. There are two related general areas in which the structure of Fijian society as presently constituted provides a source of concern to Fijian Indians: their place in the economy and their ability to use politics towards their collective ends. Each is discussed in turn.

Although Fijian Indians have been the largest ethnic group in Fiji since the 1940's, and in spite of being a numerical majority for a decade, they have been fighting unsuccessfully for proportional political representation since the 1930's. The cry for a common role was in fact one for proportional representation. At independence, it was agreed that in the interests of a smoother transition the first post-independence election (1972) would be organized along lines of elections in the 1960's. It therefore included both communal and common role voting, with total ethnic membership for each group still being limited. The result was a strong victory for the Alliance Party and the perpetuation of an Indian-dominated opposition party, the National Federation Party.

The consequences of this arrangement are dual, in the sense that both what the Government does and what it <u>appears</u> to do both affect the way in which people see their own position. In both respects, the post-independence Government has given Indians cause for collective worry. The formal polari-

zation of the Alliance and National Federation parties is neither accidental, arbitrary, nor overly philosophical. Rather, this polarization is directly one of interests which are in head-to-head conflict and it is based firmly upon pragmatic considerations. Alliance versus Federation symbolizes the duality which has persisted in Fiji for decades: Fijian natives and Europeans versus Indians, and with it, the primal division of views on land and economic policy.

This split along ethnic lines in a parliamentary system where the minority (Federation) party has no direct participation in government is a dangerous one, as was noted even before independence (Fisk 1970:48). For Indians, it means realistically that land policies cannot change greatly in their favour; the Alliance Party has the technical right, even though it would not likely be activated, to remove Indian leaseholders altogether. Moreover, the National Federation Party, because it has so long been identified with Indian interests, is unlikely to pick up enough native Fijian or general elector support to become the government without a radical revision of its program. Political scandals and charges of corruption have weakened the Alliance Party during the last two years, while the Federation Party has begun to actively solicit native support. Nevertheless, it is hard to see how the Federation Party can achieve a governing majority in the next election.

Being represented by a minority party has symbolic consequences as well. Why, ask Indians, do we have no say in government, when we are a numerical majority and we provide the basis for the economy? In state-

ments like these, governmental opposition brings out all the stereotypic feelings which Indians have for native Fijians. A strong 'Protestant' work ethic theme argues that Indians must do all the work in the society, in order to provide the basis for native Fijian "indolence and laziness", only to have those same Fijians dominate in government.

Indian views about the nature of native Fijian participation in the economy are seriously in error, as a comparison of incomes and standards of living in Chapter Two indicated. But this matters little to someone who is not in possession of the facts. Indians see Fijians and Europeans dominate the few high-status governmental and economic jobs, and fear parallels at less exalted levels. They are suspicious of the Fijian numerical domination of the military and the police.

The structure of the economy of Fiji also provides general grounds for worry, in this case for Fijian Indians and natives alike, even though the consequences which are seen are not the same for both groups. Objectively, the Fijian economy is likely to be very problematic in the future, especially to Indians.

As with so many ex-colonies, the Fijian economy is dominated by a very few major export products, the sale of which are necessary for the finance of government and a reasonable standard of living. All of these exports which are of any consequence are raw materials or basic foodstuffs, the price of which cannot be significantly controlled or developed by Fiji. The economy therefore is largely left unprotected against the price fluctuations of a dozen or so commodities on the world market.

At the same time, Fiji is a significant importer of most manufactured goods, fuel, and, shamefully, of much food.[21] Fiji has had a net negative balance of trade every year since independence (Fiji 1976a:61). Perhaps more important than the balance of trade, these large imports mean that the prices of many everyday commodities in Fiji are set by the ability of industrialized countries to pay for them. In many ways, Fiji suffers from Third World income, coupled to First World prices.

The job market in Fiji is currently expanding rapidly, paralleling the economy's explosive growth over the past decade. Wage employment has in fact gone up by about 50% in the last ten years (Fiji 1976a:83). In terms of percentages, native and Indian Fijians have shared in this growth in proportion to their numbers, for in 1972 native Fijians held 38.6% and Indians 49.4% of the wage and salaried jobs (Fiji 1972:63). In terms of higher paying, higher status jobs Indians have done a bit better than their numbers, especially in service industries and commerce. The top jobs are still almost exclusively European.

There are economic reasons why Fijian Indians might see immigration as a more viable option than native Fijians. First of all, jobs are hard to get, especially skilled ones, and despite the increasing number of people working, there is an even more quickly increasing number of people looking for them, native and Indian alike. The total potential working population is currently growing at between 3% and 4% per annum (Fiji 1973:20).

One of the prime differences between Indians and native Fijians is their relation to land, which is important to even the most urbanized. For

the farm population, the size of Indian holdings has essentially reached its maximum limits. Indian land therefore can sustain additional population only in proportion to increases in its cash productivity, and these increases recently have come only via increases in crop prices. Each Indian farmer must plan to place one or two of his children in wage labour (Fisk 1970:42). The Fijian farmer does not operate under this same ultimatum. If he is working mataqali land, his children can count on the possibility of doing the same, should other options fail. Most mataqali land is grossly under-utilized, and can stand considerable population increase, even if farming methods were to remain unchanged (Ward 1965:60-63).

Most urban Indians have the same lack of options for their children as their rural counterparts, compounded by the fact that unlike the cane farmer, they cannot count on certain employment for any of their offspring. Essentially, all urban Indian children must find wage employment or go unemployed. A similar situation obtains for urban native Fijians in terms of preference, but not in terms of necessity.

This means that a large number of the five to six thousand Indians who come into adulthood annually must aim at the no more than three thousand new jobs which are created each year in the whole economy. Things are not so drastic as they might seem from comparison of these two figures, for they do not include replacement of retiring personnel nor increasing underemployment on the farms, but they are serious enough, and are likely to get worse as the large pre-adult population matures.

Shifts in prices and incomes have also affected Indians more than

native Fijians, principally because they are more thoroughly involved in the cash economy. The (urban-based) consumer price index has increased 60% over 1968-74 and 40% from the beginning of 1974 to April, 1976 (Fiji 1976a:74). The two principle items of the index, food (40% of expenditure) and housing (23%) hit Indians differentially, because they are by far and away more likely to be paying for housing and buying most of their food rather than producing it.

Immigration Determinants: the individual context

The foregoing figures give one considerable insight into why Fijian Indians might want to immigrate or might at least look to non-traditional options, but it says very little about why certain people rather than others desire to leave Fiji nor why they have chosen to make the attempt. Fijian immigrants to Canada do not constitute a cross-section of the Fijian Indian population, but rather are a group pre-selected first by the decision to immigrate being made by certain type of people, and secondly by the mechanisms of the Canadian immigration process itself. The factors which are relevant to the former, to the choice of whether or not to immigrate must now be considered.

Initial Resources

In order to make such a choice, one must first know that it is available, and this knowledge must be sufficiently concrete to motivate people to action. Knowledge about Canadian immigration is far from universal in

Fiji. News stories about Fijians who have "made it" appear with some frequency, as do references to Canadian immigrants over the national radio station. But this sort of information is fairly ethereal. Almost without exception, immigrants are in possession of more personal knowledge than this when they attempt to immigrate, either through communication with a relative in Canada, through visiting Canada directly, or through discussing immigration with a visiting immigrant in Fiji or with his relatives. Only in the first years was anonymous information of very much consequence in initiating immigration. Like previous Asian immigration to British Columbia, chain migration is the dominant theme, and its first link is an informational one.

A prospective immigrant must also feel that the mechanical processes of applying for immigrant status are not insurmountable, and guidance from prior immigrants, plus a familiarity with bureaucratic organization are valuable prior assets. Both of these assets concentrate in the urban areas.

A final initial resource, and a crucial one, is adequate money to carry out the process, should the Canadian authorities assent. This is a complex consideration, but minimally, one must have the funds to complete the application process, pay for one's transportation to Canada, for one's expenses prior to getting a job, and for the support of one's family in Fiji. This means something in the order of $1,000, minimum.[22] Even this minimum can only be approached if one can count on lodging and other support by Canadian relatives during the initial stay before the immigration of one's family. Immigrating with one's family and without the support

of relatives requires resources in the order of three to five thousand dollars.[23] Even the one thousand dollar figure would eliminate most prospective immigrants, for this is about half the gross yearly salary of a reasonably skilled worker. The only option for those without sufficient savings are advances for plane fares by established Canadian relatives, which are common and which further magnify the resource value of Canadian kin.

Choice Considerations: younger immigrants

I have likened immigration to a gamble where the stakes are the immigrant's position in Fiji, and where the payoff is uncertain because not all the cards are known. Many people either throw in their hand before the bidding has ended or choose not to gamble at all. What largely determines if one will play are an actor's own perceptions of the field of choice and his forecast for the future, having once made the decision to immigrate.

For younger immigrants the gamble is often a small one, and the initial phase, that of the immigration of a male alone, is much like a magnified and slightly more complex version of the short-term labour migration which is so common among this generation of Fijian Indians. If a younger male immigrant is unmarried, his most pressing choice considerations involve the degree to which his temporary absence in Canada would affect his life chances in Fiji, should he choose to return home. For many young male immigrants the potential loss is slight, for a very high proportion have

had a work career comprised of a series of jobs of short duration. This consideration is more serious for those involved in the civil service or in their own entrepreneurial activities, the former because of the high demand for these jobs and the unlikelihood of regaining one once lost. Because Fijian Indian entrepreneurship is typically of small-scale, the potential immigrant might well be the business and this often makes immigration impossible. Among younger immigrants one finds very few of either.

For young married couples the liabilities are larger, but still not overwhelming. Again, the preliminary immigration being carried out by a single male cuts both the risks and the costs, and very often the younger couples are still resident with their in-laws in Fiji, which further reduces risks. Typically, these young families move from one context to another, from Fiji to Vancouver, by moving temporarily from one wing of the family to another.

The main impetus for immigration expressed by younger immigrants involves the hope for a higher material standard of living, coupled with a measure of dissatisfaction with economic prospects in Fiji and the knowledge that the risks of making the attempt are not overwhelming. Most have a fair idea of Canadian wage rates, a measure easily comparable with those at home, and know that their friends in Canada have secured (by Fijian standards) large houses, costly furnishings, and expensive cars. They might likely have seen these things indirectly in the many pictures which flow between Fiji and Vancouver. They would also have some notion

that success here was not necessarily dependent upon one's economic position in Fiji.

Other things they would know less clearly. They would know that it snows in Vancouver, but abstractly, without knowing its implications, and notions about social services, about the nature of community, or for that matter about life in a large city would be very fuzzy. Over the past year or so there would be some concern over discrimination and racial violence in Canada, but this too would be abstract.

Even younger Fijian immigrants are extremely nostalgic about many aspects of life in Fiji. Although it is difficult to say how much the loss of these things is actually considered before they are given up; intangibles like the possible loss of a defined feeling of place and of a secure self identity must be factors in immigration choice. A minority, but a goodly number of married women (especially older ones) do not want to leave Fiji for these very reasons -- because in Fiji they had built their life, and a large part of it was defined by dense relationships with both people and places.

Choice Considerations: older immigrants

For older immigrants the risks are more substantial, and it seems that the decision to leave is therefore much more closely scrutinized, and the reasons advanced for it are correspondingly more developed than those of their younger counterparts.

The risks for immigrants with established families and occupations are formidable and sometimes generate problems long after immigration.

Most had reasonably well-paying and secure jobs by Fijian standards, but they were well-paying because of demand, and were jobs which were not likely to be regained if given up. Of these, a number worked for themselves in some service capacity, such as in the building trades or in transportation and related services, and they risked the loss of whatever clientele they had through any absence.

Having established families with children of school age powerfully affects the decision-making process. Immigration creates a break with established school patterns, with one's place in the community and perhaps with a significant place in one's family as well. Moreover, it can not be a clean break, because concerns of property and kin will continue after immigration.[24]

What reasons, then, do these people give for leaving? Standard of living rises again in prominence, but in a more sophisticated manner. Most of these people, I believe, saw themselves faced with the possibility of stable wages and positions in an economy of inflating prices. To support this, they note particularly the high costs of food, housing, schooling, health services, and property taxes.

It is constantly stated that their primary motivation in immigrating was to further the life chances of their children, and I believe in fact this must have figured strongly in their decisions; many of these older immigrants have sacrificed much in terms of their own comfort to come to Canada. True, very few if any could boast of a higher material standard of living in Fiji, if measured by what commodities one had the ability to

buy. But in many other respects their standard of living must be judged to be inferior here. They have sacrificed status, ease of the pace of life, the security of a supportive network of friends and relatives, favourite foods and favourite spots.

The lack of ability to advance one's children was seen in both an immediate and a long range sense. Immediately, the complaint was that the cost of schooling of their offspring was becoming a significant and worrisome expense. By all indications the expense is considerable for most Fijians, and it seems to account for most school wastage. Schooling in Fiji is not "free", in the sense that it is paid for exclusively out of general governmental revenues. Rather, parents pay school fees at rates dependent upon the number of children they have in school as well as the nature and level of the school. The Fijian educational system still shows its origins, and is organized much like a set of private schools with an over-system of governmental control and assistance. Fees for primary school now run about $50 a term, while secondary school costs can run as high as $120 per student per term, in addition to the expense of supplies. Other social services of concern to an established family in Fiji, such as health care, also are paid for on the basis of use, assisted by governmental subsidies; they, too, are of limited access because of cost.

In the long term, many of the adults in these established families express deep concern over the future of people like themselves in Fiji; in this regard, they consider their possibilities more theoretically than

their younger counterparts, and go beyond assertions that "things are bad" to causal sequences for why they believe that things are this way. A common complaint was of the lack of potential means of personal advancement. Many saw their future in Fiji as at best one of retrenchment and a slow deterioration of previously made gains. For their children, they saw increasing job competition, especially with native Fijians, who were rather consistently seen as using their governmental power to open up jobs at the expense of Indians. Concern for the makeup of the national government is also great.

The decision to immigrate, rather than being the result of a strong "pull" from a materially rich Canada (as Canadian folk themes so often suggest) is rather the result of a complex weighting of relative uncertainties. Potential immigrants, save for those who have either visited Canada or lived extensively in an industrialized country, factually know very little about conditions here, save for a series of stereotypic oppositional pairs with parallels in Fiji:

	Canada	Fiji
material standard of living	high	low
wages	high	low
prices	high	high
education	"free"	expensive
health care	"free"	expensive
mobility	high	low
traditional amenities	few	normal
community	weak, but growing	normal

Table XVI. Folk Views Contrasting Fiji and Canada

Older immigrants know full well that there is more to a society than a few such indicators, and they also know that they know very little about

Canadian society, save for the parallels which it might have with urban Fiji. They know, or at least believe, there is a good likelihood that their standard of living will increase if they immigrate. They know also that there must be many unforeseen consequences which come with it, and this constitutes further uncertainty. So also does the fact that one plays for higher stakes when immigrating, with far fewer ideas as to the rules of the game than in the Fijian context. The decision to begin the process of immigration, something to which one cannot have access, of necessity constitutes that actor's vote for where either the greater yield or least uncertainty lies. With many of these established Fijian Indians the vote is cast for Canada.

Immigration Determinants: women

Although the Canadian immigration regulations are not overtly sex-biased, both the regulations' emphases upon skills and past Fijian Indian ideas about the place of women have combined to limit the amount of independent decision-making Fijian Indian women can carry out with regard to immigration. Women from Fiji could legally apply on their own volition to come to Canada as independent immigrants, but their relative lack of skills and the unusual independence this act implies limit the possibility. Very few women come as independent immigrants in the sense of making the decision to do so and carrying out the process independently. Of those women who come under the technical category of independent immigrants, most come as adult family members who could not gain entrance under

the nominated category.

Most women who immigrate do so in the context of family, either being sponsored by their husbands (a relatively automatic process) or being nominated by relatives, and even in the latter case the decision is only in part independent. An unmarried sister might have been part of her married sister's or brother's household in Fiji, and her nomination subsequent to the immigration of the rest of the household, though categorized as a separate action, is in fact simply the formal expression of the collective process of family immigration. Similar family factors enter when women come to Canada to marry, as most such marriages are arranged.[25]

The Ultimate Constraint: Canadian immigration regulations

So far, I have reviewed in a descriptive manner the makeup of the Fijian Indian population in Canada, and have outlined how sociological factors and individual circumstance have interacted to produce decisions to immigrate. The "output" of this decision process, if it could be so pictured, is a body of people who would like to come to Canada. These people are not identical with those who actually immigrate, for in the end Canadian immigration regulations select the latter group out of the former. I must therefore deal with this selection procedure briefly, as it, more than any other single factor, determines the demographic nature of Fijian Canadian immigration.

Since 1967, the Canadian immigration system has been very highly oriented towards the fulfillment of Canada's manpower needs. The point

system which now rates applicants for landed immigration status is almost totally rationalized. Education, age, and English and French language ability are given a numerical weighting; each of these factors is considered to contribute to the immigrant's adaptation to the Canadian economy.[26] Occupational skills are important and their valuation is well regularized.

There are currently three ways in which Fijian immigrants come to Canada. As an independent immigrant, one must normally have (in addition to the educational and age requisites), either a job with a high demand factor and an assured job, or a very high job demand factor. Virtually no Fijian immigrants have pre-arranged employment, and independent immigrants enter largely because they possess skills highly in demand at that point in time.[27] Lack of occupational demand severely limits the possibility of many Fijian Indians immigrating for, unlike the decade after the War, job demand is now largely restricted to skilled and semi-skilled workers, of which there are proportionally few in Fiji.[28]

Nominated immigrants are given points for the support of their Canadian relatives in lieu of high occupational demand, but skills are still a factor. Most Fijian immigrants are nominated by relatives, and this mechanism, because it selects relatives preferentially out of the total class of applicants, increases the coherency of the immigrant flow and the resultant community.

The weighting of occupational demand for both nominated and sponsored immigrants is clearly responsible for the class distribution of current Fijian immigrants, as the immigration requirements for education and lit-

eracy skew this distribution away from the Fijian averages. The applications of sponsored immigrants (who are direct dependents of an independent or nominated relative) are granted more or less automatically, and do not materially affect the general demographic distribution of the immigrant population.

The Processes & Motivations Behind East Indian Immigration, Past & Present

There exist striking parallels between the actual process of Fijian Indian immigration and that of Punjabi Sikhs, past and present. The parallels reflect the degree to which these groups of people enter a similar set of external constraints, have analogous motivations and possess common backgrounds and values.

The first East Indian immigrants to Canada were sojourners; at first, few had any intention of remaining in this country. It has been noted that they were relatively well off, but not so well off that temporary immigration lost its attractiveness. Immigrants came with goals which were limited, in a situation of relatively low risk. Save for the very first pioneers, each immigrant had a support group on either end of his journey -- his family at home and fellow immigrants in British Columbia. Only upon establishment here was there action taken to make the fundamental commitment of sending for one's family.[29]

Because of their limited objectives, the early East Indian immigrants minimized expenditure here and made few attempts to assimilate into their new social context. This left them open to the charge of lack of commit-

ment, and rationalized racist structures of belief, particularly in regard to the presumed intrinsic unassimilatability of Asians. The same goal limitation made East Indians relatively manipulatible in the workforce, although they were less so than other Asian immigrants.

Today, the 'sojourner' is gone. Both for Fijian and Sikh immigrants the closest parallel could be termed 'the tester', best represented by the younger, unmarried, male immigrant. The similarities between these two are very great, especially in regard to the degree of risk and to the structure of immigration. It also comes out in younger immigrants possessing a lesser degree of affiliation with Canadian society than have older immigrants.[30]

But the primary motivation for immigration is considerably different than that of the sojourner in one important regard; few young Fijian immigrants view coming to Canada as a temporary thing. I believe that this would hold also for most younger Sikh immigrants as well. This change in motivation largely stems from the lack of viability of the sojourner option in a world where once disparate economic systems are leveling, at least in terms of prices. Where once a sojourner could successfully gain from the enormous differential in value between the Canadian and home economies, much as does the ethnic middleman when he manipulates the difference between village and world economies (Barth 1966; 1967), this option is severely limited in the case of Fiji. It is no longer possible to return to Fiji with a "stake" which is large enough to make for a significantly higher standard of living in Fiji, especially

when one measures it against the alternative possibilities here. Moreover, it takes far longer for one to develop savings here which are significant at 'home' levels than it did in 1908; incorporation into the modern Canadian economic structure requires heavy initial expenditure, as we shall see. By the time an immigrant has amassed a large net worth he is very likely to be 'trapped' by the Canadian standard of living, and by the credit system which allows it.

The mature East Indian immigrant is a relatively new phenomenon in the Canadian context, for the immigration of whole East Indian families was not even allowed until after the War. Among these Fijian immigrants, coming to Canada requires a near immediate commitment to life here. Success is vital, and immigrant families will do everything they can, within the scope of their limited knowledge of the Canadian possibilities, to further their situation. Advanced Westernization, as well as the strong ideological influences which soon come to the family through the variety of experiences of its individuals in Canada, lead to rapid adjustment to Canadian society, first materially and then ideologically.

Among Fijian immigrants as a whole, there are no strong centripetal forces which might override incorporation into Canadian society. Unlike many Sikhs, there is no coherent demand for a separate but equal status, integrated into the economy but distinct elsewhere. Rather, the historical processes which have shaped the orientation of Fijian Indians to themselves and to economic action have made for many parallels between Fijians and Canadians. Inculcation of Western values and skills and to the English

language also decrease the potential for centripetal action. The consequence, as we shall see in subsequent chapters, has been a rapid adjustment to Canadian life, and a considerably different set of orientations to work, to expenditure, and to Canadian society generally than those held by earlier East Indian immigrants to Canada.

Chain migration and its consequences

Past and present, chain migration has been the rule among East Indian immigrants to British Columbia.[31] Not only does this process affect the nature of immigration, but also the structure of life here subsequent to it. As has been brought out, chain migration has been highly functional. It parallels Indian patterns of mutual aid and wide family support, and therefore does not require the development of altogether new mechanisms for immigration. It provides material support on both sides of the water, and lessens both the risks and costs of immigration. It also provides psychological security and a basis of information both for immigration and for beginning life here.

The consequences of chain migration are many. As long as this mechanism predominates, Fijian immigration will, in the absence of countervailing factors, tend toward exponential increase. It will also result in extreme geographical localization of immigrants in areas where their relatives have previously established themselves. Because relatedness and background often parallel each other, this mechanism will limit the range of types of immigrants, and to a degree, their source areas.[32]

Chain migration also creates the basis for dense social networks among resident Fijian Indians in Canada, which are in turn the building blocks of community. At the same time it assures a parallel density between Vancouver and Fiji, to the extent that they can be considered to be one social field. Most importantly, chain migration allows for the implementation of prior models of collective family orientation towards economic action, social organization, and social control which are considerably at variance with normative Canadian patterns, and yet are highly functional and are not antithetical to Canadian ideas about observable social behaviour.

Fijian Indians in the Canadian Context

Asians in British Columbia were once limited to the position of subordinate racial castes; in terms of occupations, economic access, rights, privileges and possibilities they were severely constrained. This caste subordination was maintained by formal legal restrictions and by normatively accepted informal custom. There was no premise of equality of races in British Columbia before the War.

What of the present? The place of Asians in today's British Columbia is largely unknown. There have been very few empirical studies of Asians in British Columbia, and this is particularly true of East Indians. The laws restricting Asians are gone. With them the advocation of such restriction or overt publically-observed racism is now passé. Rights of all minorities are now agressively affirmed by provincial human rights

legislation, which makes racial or ethnic discrimination illegal in the public sphere. Federally, Asians have become an integral part of present immigration policy, and their rights to ethnic difference have been brought out by the Federal Policy of Multiculturalism (Palmer 1975).

At the same time, this is no evidence that in fact Asians do possess equal access to opportunity in British Columbia, nor does it consider the many ways in which access can be utilized by immigrants or can be denied to them either by elements of the receiving society or by their own limitations. These are empirical questions.

Having sketched some of the factors which have determined the outline of Fijian immigration, we now have some idea of the backgrounds and motivations of these people who have chosen to break with an established and understandable situation and come to Canada. I must now attempt to illuminate the nature of Fijian Indian life in British Columbia which is the result of that choice. Primal to that understanding, and necessary to any evaluation of the place of the inter-relationship between their ethnicity and opportunity in Canada is a knowledge of their place in the economy, both as producers and consumers. I therefore begin in the next chapter with the former, with an inquiry into the question of work, moving to what considerations the structure of it has for Fijian people in Canada and for Asian Canadians generally.

Chapter Three: Notes

1. 4,919 Fijians officially immigrated before 1974. 3,853 came in 1974-5 (Heath 1976:1). Immigration for the first half of 1976 was over 1,000.

2. Many trips on holidays nevertheless have the alternative function of checking work possibilities.

3. The San Francisco Bay area "community" is now quite large, and there is a steady flow of Fijians visiting between San Francisco, Vancouver, and Fiji. In contrast to the residential distributions in Vancouver, those in the San Francisco area are spread out thinly over the triangle made by San Francisco, San Jose and Walnut Creek. I have no clear idea of the size of this population, but it is certainly over 500, and is probably several times this.

4. Sikh temples traditionally offer to take in visitors, and the British Columbian ones continue the practice.

5. For their first Canadian job, two of this group were sent to a Sikh-owned lumber mill where the foreman, claiming that they had the hands of women, refused to accept them. The same two, one of whom was a Muslim, were then sent to collect swill and ship it to the farms.

6. Linkages between immigrants are easy to establish, even if the immigrants had never met before in Fiji. Indian custom spread out the field of relatives widely, and almost everyone can "link" with another Fijian by tracing mutual relations, tracing a relation to a friend or village mate, by having lived in the same town or done the same things. Many of these links would be of little consequence in Fiji, but here they help to establish a common field of experience.

7. The plane fare from Fiji is expensive even by Canadian standards. A one-way tourist class ticket from Nandi to Vancouver currently runs $400-500. For a family of five, the total cost for transportation alone would be at least $2,000. This is well in excess of the annual income of an average Fijian Indian family.

8. Sources: Department of Citizenship and Immigration Annual Reports (1960-1966), Department of Manpower and Immigration Annual Reports (1967-1975), Department of Manpower and Immigration Quarterly Immigration Statistics, First Quarter, 1976. These figures, especially for the earlier years, should be considered approximate. Department of Manpower and Immigration statistics (1975d:37), for instance, give zero immigration from Fiji for the period prior to 1963, and yet several Fijians immigrated to Canada via India in the post-War years, and a handful of others seem to have been resident here before 1960.

9. The immigration of people over 50 now constitutes about 8% of the total flow from Fiji (1974 & 1975 figures), as contrasted with about 9.5% for all countries (Source: Department of Manpower & Immigration Annual Reports 1974; 1975).

10. Southern Hindus may be slightly under-represented in Canada, but I cannot substantiate this.

11. The national modal age of immigrants, which is also the mean, is about 25-26. The lower mean for Fijians reflects their higher number of dependent children. The national average of immigrants under 15 or over 59 is about 29%. Sources for the following figures are Fiji (1976a:1) and the Department of Manpower & Immigration Annual Immigration Statistics (1973; 1974).

12. The categories used by the Department of Manpower & Immigration were under continual flux during this time period, and these figures are therefore only approximate. (Source: Department of Manpower & Immigration Annual Immigration Statistics, 1972-4).

13. The figures for percentage of the working Indian population were arrived at by dividing by the number of Indians between 15 and 59 (151,487) years old in that year. The percentages are therefore likely to be low. (Source: Fiji 1973:63, 18).

14. To say that these women are illiterate is not to imply that in any way they are incapable, unintelligent, or inexperienced. By North American standards rather the opposite would be true.

15. Some, on the other hand, have very little education at all. As more Fijians pass through the school system to completion these figures will necessarily rise in coming years.

16. Many immigrants are initially limited in their English speaking ability, but tend to have no inhibitions whatever in using what little they have. In proportion to their interaction with Canadians, they advance remarkably in a short time.

17. The theoretical literature on migration is very large, and it is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss it directly. For a concise summary of recent theoretical arguments in this field see Garbett and Kapferer (1970:179-197), with thom I am largely in agreement. Nevertheless, even though they argue that network considerations, which are obviously variable, ought to be primal in explanation they give no means whereby this sort of variability may be expressed.

18. The combination of Indian ideas of family and the shifting pattern of life in Fiji has made for much flexibility in residence patterns and

for the recognition of relatives of very wide degree. Indian Fijians have developed their own internal "welfare program", which includes mechanisms for relatives bringing up children who are without support.

19. The Canadian immigration laws have been made with Western ideas of what constitutes a family firmly incorporated within them. Thus, a head of household could not sponsor a dependent non-related child without demonstrating formal adoption; a nephew who was raised as one's child may have to be nominated, rather than sponsored, which is a more difficult and less successful procedure.

20. Although the National Federation Party has prodded the government to reorganize the procedure for election to the House of Representatives, there has been no significant response, and the 1977 election is likely to be based on the same methods of election as that of 1972.

21. Indian farmers have shifted from mixed farming to exclusive cane farming due to the high price of cane. This has left a large vacuum. Foodstuffs for the tourist trade are also often imported. In 1974, Fiji spent $41,000,000 on imported food -- more than it did on fossil fuels.

22. A conservative breakdown would be:

transportation	$ 630.00
family support (variable)	240.00 (3 months)
expenses of application	50.00
Canadian initial expenses (minimum)	200.00
	$1,130.00

23.

transportation (2 adults, 3 children	$2,000.00
application expenses	50.00
initial expenses in Canada before income matched expenditure (2 months)	600.00
	$2,650.00

24. Immigrants tend to sell Fijian property or leaseholds only at that point where they have decided irrevocably to stay in Canada. Land and property are so dear in Fiji, and constitute such a symbol of security that it is kept even when it is grossly uneconomical to continue doing so. Family responsibilities do not end upon immigration, and are a constant concern.

25. Fijian Indian "arranged" marriages allow considerable freedom of choice. Normally, family matchmakers arrange for initial contacts between prospective mates only after the male has expressed an interest in marriage. Afterwards both parties have the option of

declining the match, although sometimes the consequences of declining, as it reflects negatively on both families, puts on considerable pressure for acceptance.

26. The point system distributes points in the following manner for independent immigrants:

	maximum points
education and training	20
personal assessment of interviewer	15
occupational demand	15
occupational skill	10
age	10
arranged employment	10
language: English	5
French	5
relatives in Canada	5
area demand	5
	100

Table XVII. The Canadian Immigration Point System

27. Demand factors shift from month to month. In 1975, only 3 of 2,323 Fijian immigrants had pre-arranged employment (Heath 1976).

28. About 22% of immigrants from Fiji in 1975 were independent immigrants, while 58% were nominated and 20% were sponsored (Heath 1976).

29. This increased risks in two ways. There was a large number of people to support at Canadian costs, while at the same time removal of one's family signified a decreased probability of a successful return, should things go badly in Canada.

30. This idea is a hard one to argue substantively, as younger people of whatever background, tend to be less integrated into the normative structure of things simply because of their age. They have not yet been tied down by family and by job responsibility. Nevertheless, younger male Fijian immigrants tend to see their immediate situation much more in terms of material gain and much less in regard to things like place in the society than do older immigrants.

31. This pattern seems to be weakening with regard to the large increase in Indian professionals who now immigrate, many of whom do so independently. A large percentage of these people choose to go to the East than to British Columbia.

32. Because of the lack of an earlier tradition of immigration to Canada and because of the skill-oriented requisites of the immigration regulations, most Fijian immigrants come from urban contexts, and a great majority come from Viti Levu. Sikh immigration is still quite localized, although it seems that because of the skill factors of the immigration selection apparatus more recent Punjabi immigrants are coming from the cities than previously.

Chapter Four: Making a Living

Incorporation

Both individually and collectively Fijian Indian immigrants are continually faced with the problem of initial incorporation into Canadian society. New immigrants have to find their way, learn the basic rudiments of acceptable behaviour here, find housing, and find a job. Established community members must repeatedly deal with relatives and friends who are in this state. As has been mentioned, the rate of incoming immigrants per year is currently a significant percentage of the total number of resident Fijians, and so almost without exception every Fijian Indian in Canada participates in this process frequently. Many do so more or less continuously. In the light of the current folk and governmental concern over the adjustment of immigrants to Canadian ways, it is useful to outline briefly how Fijian Indians solve this problem in its initial phase, and moreover how they successfully employ traditional methods to deal with this new phenomenon.

It must be definitively stated that Fijian Indians in British Columbia incorporate new members in a remarkably efficient and smooth manner. They do so primarily because of a heavy dependence upon familial support; underlying this are ideas of what family and individual action constitute which are considerably at variance with more individualistic North American patterns.[1]

This first phase of life in Canada is extremely important, because within it many decisions are made which will affect life for many subsequent years. For Fijians, it is a rather more crucial time than for,

say, an American immigrant, because while Fijians are excellent candidates for life here, they are by no means culturally identical to Canadians. Particularly, they lack explicit information both of the ways in which things are done here, and lack the knowledge of the methods which our society provides for dispensing information about such things. In fact, most of our information services are highly dependent upon having some prior insight into gaining access to them, and these routes to access must be learned by Fijians if they are not to be severely restricted in their life chances.[2]

The Trip and Initial Placement

Fijian immigrants to Canada now almost all come directly from Fiji, and do so by air. The trip itself is the first symbolic indicator of separation and of new beginnings, and it is tiring and brutal. Immigrants have usually been subject to a near continual round of visiting prior to embarking, in addition to a long drive by car to Nandi International Airport. Counting stops in Hawaii and in the continental United States, the plane trip itself takes almost a full day. For many it is their first plane trip and for most it is an anxious process, as they move from plane to plane without very much in the way of social support. There are often ten to fifteen immigrants on the same plane, but there is less communication between them than one might expect. The end point is Vancouver International Airport, where they must face the anonymity and confusion of Canadian customs and immigration checks.

As an almost unbroken rule, family members are waiting for the new arrivals at the airport -- a good thing, considering that otherwise entry to Canada could be extremely hard; initial immigrant aid more-or-less stops at the customs checkout.[3] Already the decision has been made as to where the new immigrant (or visitor, as the situations are parallel) is to stay during his or her initial period in Canada. That they will stay with relations is a rarely violated custom.[4] Who they will stay with depends upon several factors. Close relatives are generally expected to have more responsibility in this than more distant ones, while available space, age, and sex compatibility are also important considerations.[5]

Orientation

The new arrival is quickly and rather unceremoniously dropped into the thick of ongoing family life, and in this one immediately sees differences between Fijian Indian and North American ways of doing, especially with respect to what visiting and visitor status constitute. In Fiji, people are continually visiting each other, and as a result visiting has been incorporated into the daily cycle of life and does not displace it. Although the degree of effort and lavishness of food preparation may alter in due regard for guests, while simultaneously some other accommodations must be made to the existence of another household member, very little contributes to making visitors burdensome. In Canada, households do not expect that major patterns such as work, shopping, and the like should be fundamentally altered, and there is an expectation that the immigrant

arrival will be able to get along well enough under these constraints.

Immigrants and visitors obviously do not a priori know what constitute normative or proper patterns of behaviour in Canada, and accept their new household situation rather naturally. They do not make large demands upon other household members and, particularly if they are women, they are quickly incorporated into the order of household chores and responsibilities, even in those cases where their stay is only temporary. There is not very much time normally available to be devoted solely to the new immigrant, for Fijians work long and odd hours, and often all adult household members are employed, while most children spend their days in school.

The consequence is that new arrivals have a rather casual introduction to Canadian life, but it is one which has at the centre of it the security of kin and household. This introduction starts from the home, and moves outward from the relatively well known to the less familiar. Around the home, initial familiarization with Canadian material culture begins. They start their ideological adaptation through adjusting to the ways in which household members act differently than they did in Fiji, through learning of the exploits of other immigrants, and through television.[6]

Fijians are by no means experts in introducing these new arrivals to the world outside of the home. Sometimes their emphases seem odd, and occasionally one resident Fijian explaining things Canadian to another constitutes a case of the blind leading the blind. Nevertheless, the process is on the whole remarkably effective. Much of one's initial

experience 'outside' comes through a heavy schedule of visiting and telephoning other Fijians whom one knew prior to immigration. The impending arrival of an immigrant sets in motion a "network alert", which might quickly encompass several hundred people in the case of an older adult, followed upon his or her arrival with continual visiting.

The speed with which this sort of extra-familial acquaintance with Canada builds depends in large part on sex. Women are more likely to be bound to the household by lack of transportation and by a tendency for women to go visiting primarily in the company of others. The weaker English facility of many women also makes them reluctant to venture out alone in the first few months.

Immigration results in many changes in the material and social situation of those who do so, and these changes must also be taken into consideration in this initial period, as statuses readjust between the immigrant, his kin, and acquaintances. In this case, both knowledge and establishment are power, and for a while at least the immigrant must accept a position of relative subordination in many matters concerning his life, if for no reason other than the lack of alternative sources of information. Establishment gives considerable authority to one's new ways. Permanents, smoking, different food and dress, different modes of address, unorthodox marriage practices and other things both big and small are concrete social facts in Canada, and are quickly accepted by most incoming arrivals. Those whose Fijian statuses interfere with a minimal acquiescence to these new practices face possible ostracism.

One of the most important things which must be accomplished in short order is finding a job, especially for men. Working is both acceptable and desired of women here, at least in time, but for new immigrants the employment of males takes precedence. Surprisingly, the help of relatives is fairly abstract. For reasons which will be put forward shortly, few Fijian immigrants are in a position to either employ other Fijians or to directly secure employment for them. In suggesting possibilities for employment, the help forthcoming from relatives is variable. Expected wage scales, examples of desired types of occupations and opinions as to the sort of work involved in a given occupation are forthcoming, as may be a few hints as to where one might look. Fijian social networks are very sensitive to job openings, and occasionally Fijians find employment for new immigrants in this fashion. Fijians also cultivate employers to the long term end of placing more family members in the latter's employ. Both informational and social links are at the basis of most job searches in Fiji, and here they feel more comfortable following similar patterns. But ultimately most first jobs are achieved through the Manpower office and through individual initiative. Most immigrant males currently find work within about a month of arrival, although for the particular, the shy, and the despondent it may take several months. Throughout the time of job searching the immigrant rests on the security of his Canadian relatives' support.

The length of time during which an immigrant will stay with his or her relatives depends ultimately on personal considerations, but for male

immigrants with families it rarely extends beyond a few months except in those circumstances where space can be rented from one's relatives or where the decision has been made to form a limited joint household. Older people and unmarried women are normally incorporated into the household more-or-less permanently. For integral families, the decision to form an independent household follows finding a sufficient source of income and the subsequent immigration of the basic family core.

Finding a Job

One of the keys to the rapid incorporation of Fijian Indians to Canadian life is to be found in their orientation to work and income, which varies considerably from the Weberian ideal type exemplified by the Protestant Ethic. As supported both by discussion and practice, Fijian Indians have two sets of expectations of work, one set immediate, the other of longer term. Immediately, it is important to find a source of income. This is necessary, because most Fijian immigrants complete the process of immigration and begin that of establishment fueled by money earned in Canada. This is a direct consequence of the low wage rates in Fiji. They tend therefore to look at an initial occupation with almost total pragmatism. Income counts, little else. Ideally, the job ought to be in one's prior calling, and immigrants usually make an initial attempt to find a job in their line of work. But very few will stand on this point if the ideal job is not forthcoming. Within an extremely wide latitude they will take whatever is available. In the longer term,

once established less precariously, considerations of greater income or of returning to one's trade can and do arise.

Behind this stands a rather different idea of working than by all indications even exists in Fiji. In Canada there is very little in the way of comparative measurement of job status done in public. People are infrequently slighted for taking jobs below their Fijian station, and no one believes that Fijian status ought to impede Canadian prospects. The instrumentality of jobs seems to almost always have precedence over their status, and extrinsic job factors, particularly money, will in the end usually triumph over intrinsic ones.

This near total economic rationalization of Fijian orientations towards work can be seen in numerous examples of both first job choice and of the reasons for changing jobs. The likelihood that one's first Canadian job is exactly in one's prior line of work is very low, I would think not even twenty percent. The reason for this lies with problems of certification, qualifications and job availability, in addition to the need for immediate income. As a result there exists a striking uniformity among first Fijian jobs. For many, first jobs are in unskilled blue collar work in areas of low pay, odd hours and high turnover. Most of these are in light secondary industries. Initial pay is most frequently $3.50 to $4.50, with the lower figure predominating. While there is some paralleling of first Canadian jobs and prior Fijian ones, the rule in these cases is that status and expressed skills will decrease while pay increases. A mechanic may become a gas station attendant, a tailor a clothing worker,

or a carpenter a hardware store employee.

Normally these jobs are highly routinized, which the immigrant soon feels. But that routinization offers a measure of protection and breathing space which allows one to settle in. Because of the typically low wages, there is a good likelihood that many (sometimes all) of one's workmates are also immigrants, who often help one in gaining a sense of things. For a long while work will constitute one of the most significant sources of ideas about Canada that the new immigrant has.

Certification, Qualifications and Informational Access:

"What's your Canadian experience?"

Even in the longer term, Fijian Indian immigrants face almost insurmountable obstacles to returning to work in their prior occupations. So far, most have not achieved this end, and many have either never made the attempt or no longer try. It is clear that this situation has both policy and ethical implications, the former because the overt charter of Canadian immigration policy presumes to match immigrant flow to highly specific job demand, and the latter because on the face of things this might seem to constitute denial of access of opportunity to members of an ethnic group.

The causes of this under-utilization of skills are very complex, and comprise a set of statistical barriers to access. Some of them are external, in the sense of being outside of the control of the immigrant, while others are dependent in large part on his or her own unique personal

qualities. The prime external constraint, one which tends to affect Fijian job seekers whatever their background, is that of the demand for Canadian experience. Fijians are met with this question all along the occupational spectrum from professionals to baby-sitters. Initially they possess none of this valuable substance, and because of this lack are not likely to easily get any of it; paradoxically, in many cases it is necessary to have Canadian experience in order to get the job which would constitute that experience. Employers, save for some of those with jobs of low demand and little training, put the onus of proof of experience on the applicant, and do not make much of an attempt to 'translate' Fijian experience into Canadian terms. At the same time, immigrants, who are not altogether aware of the most effective methods of presentation of self in the Canadian context, do not know how to show off their job experience to the best advantage.

This demand for Canadian experience weighs heavily on many job seekers. Perhaps the hardest hit are 'older' women (which is to say those above thirty), who have had no prior occupational experience outside of either the home or a family-run business.[7] Almost all job applicants are willing to take positions which are in their line of work but which are inferior to their previous occupational statuses, with the hope that this might lead to Canadian experience and then to one's prior calling. To date, only a small number of immigrants have completed this sequence successfully, notably in automotive repair. Often it is the case that this sequence is broken or limited by a discontinuity in job

qualifications, as for instance arises between a person who works at carpentry and a union carpenter. This brings up the second limiting factor in achieving a skilled job, Canadian qualifications.

Here, the same problem arises as with Canadian experience, that is to say a problem of translation. For Fijian immigrants, as with many immigrants who come to Canada from non-western European or non-Anglo countries, there exists few mechanisms which can translate home country qualifications into Canadian ones. Only British-derived and American immigrants to English speaking Canada do not suffer something of this limitation.

This problem can be extremely serious for Fijians, for in many cases they <u>are</u> skilled workers but have come to that situation without any formal markers of doing so. One fellow might be a proficient welder, but might have moved into that position in a continuous process from less skilled work; his occupational record stands mute to such questions as where he went to welding school. Another translation problem concerns scale of responsibility. Canadian employers know little of what parallels they can make between Canadian and Fijian jobs; they are uncertain, for instance, as to what it <u>means</u> to be the manager of a store or a clerk in Fiji. While occasionally this has allowed a Fijian to gain access to a job beyond his previous level, the general trend is a strongly conservative one tending the other way.

This same problem surfaces even in those areas which require formal certification in Fiji, although in some cases Fijian certification has

been linked to New Zealand or Australian standards which are more easily translatable here.[8] But for many, especially those whose equivalent job in Canada is unionized, Fijian certification does not apply. The consequence is that twenty years of experience as a woodworker, including a full apprenticeship, by no means guarantees one access to the appropriate union, let alone a job. This same problem hits white collar workers and professionals, although the latter fields do have explicit means to determine qualifications and to suggest specific additional training if it is necessary.

The problem of gaining access to certified jobs is one which has faced immigrants from all source countries for almost a hundred years. But the increasing rationalization of job criteria, increasing unionization, and the higher levels of immigrant skills in the post-War years have increased the number of people affected by it. Up until five years ago, many immigrants (Fijians included) who faced this situation were able to find work in less skilled positions which are normally ones which lead to certified jobs; unable to be qualified as a union carpenter, an immigrant may have accepted the position of a unionized carpenter's assistant. Or he might have switched to a related building trade where certification and competition for jobs were weaker (Anderson 1974:73).

Because of the near-stagnant state of the present British Columbian economy, Fijian immigrants of 1974-1977 can rarely exercise this option. With a provincial unemployment rate of 9%, even these lower status jobs are in high demand. The result has been that immigrants found such work —

in 1970 while current immigrants with identical qualifications are being forced to look elsewhere.

Fijians who are faced with these problems of qualifications and certification are therefore often temporarily shut out of their line of work altogether, and consequently cannot exercise the option of working their way up to their previous level, and yet would like to work in the occupation they know. Their options at this point depend largely upon their access to information, and often this access is exceedingly limited. After making the rounds of prospective employers, visiting the appropriate union and regulative offices, the job seeker often is at a loss as to what should be his or her next move. It is likely that he or she has been given a set of fairly abstract suggestions about further training or education. Few take these suggestions seriously, and yet a smaller number find the means to act upon them.

Sometimes this, too, can be a bit ludicrous. A case in point is the photographer who, after twenty years of experience in his own business, now is using his precious non-working time to take basic photographic courses at the British Columbia Institute of Technology. But more likely, the skilled worker lacks the means to obtain concrete and reliable information on how he should proceed at this point, and ceases to persist in his endeavour. Lack of concrete information on this and other vital issues is often a principle determinant of Fijian behaviour and choice in Canada. It is compounded by Fijian reluctance to aggressively search out such information or to demand one's rights. Fijians are used to being

introduced to jobs through their social contacts and often feel alone and threatened when facing impersonal societal institutions.

Social Constraints

One other factor contributes to Fijians not returning to their former job. This concerns the standard of life which Fijian Indians typically achieve in Canada through manual labour, and has two aspects. The first is one of the necessity of working. As the immigrant family gains access to Canadian material standards of living they also become locked into the necessity of working to pay for it. Consequently, any attempt at re-establishment in one's prior occupation which seriously interferes with immediate income is not likely to be followed. This income consideration precludes extended periods of additional training or education unless they can be managed within a full-time work schedule.

Secondly, these unskilled and semi-skilled jobs can support a Fijian family in Canada at material levels which are far above those possible in Fiji. At the same time, hopes for one's children and concerns about social services are more-or-less automatically fulfilled, at least in the short term. There is therefore less motivation to persist in returning to one's prior occupation than there might be had things been worse here or better in Fiji.

Discrimination and Jobs

One possible explanation for Fijian Indian lack of access to skilled

jobs could be racial discrimination, pure and simple. While job discrimination is best discussed in the context of ethnic relations (Chapter Eight), it is appropriate that it be dealt with here insofar as it is restricted to the search for jobs.

For this discussion it is useful to make a distinction between ethnocentric, structural discrimination and racially-based discrimination:

> Ethnocentric, structural discrimination exists when an individual or group is denied access to desired things because their resources are incommensurate with the structure which determines that access.
>
> Racially-based discrimination exists when an individual or group is denied access to desired things, even though their resources are commensurate with the structure which determines that access, on the basis of presumed group characteristics.

The second of these is synonymous with the term discrimination as it is usually employed, and the first is the result of reflection on Rex's (1970:116-23) point that the term discrimination itself is often analytically meaningless because it is not often divorced from the question of class-based selection and skills. Under these definitions, Fijian Indians are most definitely the victims of ethnocentric discrimination in their job search, for they often possess the ability to do the jobs. Yet it is common that the incommensurate nature of their qualifications and the ethnocentric expectations of them held by employers and certifiers denies them work.

But it is something altogether different to ask whether these same individuals are being subjected to racially-based discrimination. That this does exist, I have no doubt. Nevertheless, the fact that racial discrimination can be concealed under the protection of the wide latitude

of job qualifications makes the factor difficult to sort out. Few Fijian males seem to complain of this sort of discrimination, but new immigrant victims of discrimination are often the least likely to perceive its existence, especially if that existence is a subtle one.

In a Montreal study, Chandra (1973) has shown that under empirically-controlled situations middle class East Indian job-seekers with identical qualifications to white participants suffered considerable discrimination, but no such tests have been conducted here. The British Columbia provincial Human Rights Branch has received more complaints from East Indian job seekers than from any other ethnic category, which is indicative of concrete discrimination, but an overall weighting is hard to come by.[9] I do not, however, have any evidence that overt, racially-oriented discrimination is a major factor in the job search, as compared with the other constraints which have already been put forward.

Work and The Family

The achievement of full-time employment allows the initial financing of the heavy expenses incurred by immigration of one's family. In addition to travel expenses and to the costs of tying up loose ends in Fiji, the first few months here are ones of high expenditure. The high cost of transportation from Fiji severely restricts what material possessions can be brought over, and therefore all household goods, new clothing and the inevitable car must all be procured here. Rent and rental deposits also are significant early expenses as the family switches from one economic

system to the other. Although these things are often procured on credit, paying for them puts heavy and increasing pressure on household members to work.

Ideally everyone in a household save for those in school and the very old ought to work, women included. This goal is very often reached, and it is not uncommon that everyone in a household is either working or in school. Males holding down two jobs are not infrequent, and I know of several instances where individuals have continued to do this for years.

The workforce participation of a given household is likely therefore to be very high by Canadian standards, and in total income this often mitigates the effect of very low wage rates. Of those families who are living in houses, the total number of working adults normally ranges upwards from three, and occasionally reaches five.[10]

Work, its rewards, and individual and familial destinies are linked together in Indo-Fijian Canadian households in ways which diverge considerably from Canadian patterns and which in some ways allow them a considerable economic advantage over Canadian households which might have the same incomes. In a very crude sense, this advantage obtains principally from a relative emphasis of collective over individual destinies and from a mitigation of the North American tendency towards familial nucleation.

But in order not to make a parody out of this opposition it is necessary to delve into it a bit more deeply, starting with what is at its core, the Fijian Indian family. The structure of Fijian Indian families has not lost its Indian roots, for in Fiji economic necessity reinforced

the functionality of extended households and of reciprocal mutual aid. Indians in Fiji have been required to provide the bulk of their own subsistence, social welfare, and social control up to very recently. There were very few intervening structures between the level of the family and that of the relatively distant Colonial Government, and the family took up most of the intervening slack. Even with increasing urbanization and a dependence upon wage labour the family has remained a coherent and important structure, and although the establishment of simple nuclear families is becoming more frequent in the towns, family ties are still very strong.

Because of the variable and diverse nature of present-day Fijian sources of employment, the economic cohesion of the family still has its advantages. We have seen that many Indians in Fiji are underemployed and this, combined with the low wage rates of Fiji, makes it difficult for all but the fortunate family to live adequately on the income of a single person. Considering the often erratic nature of employment of young Fijian Indians, they, too, would be in bad straits if it were not for occasional family support. Rather than follow an individualistic path towards collective hardship, Indian families in Fiji have adapted to an orientation of collective family survival from many small, uncertain incomes.

This pattern continues in the Canadian context, although in light of the greater possibilities for nuclear families to secure an income adequate to their goals, collective economic action is often a transitory rather

than a permanent state.

The degree to which the incomes of families are merged is highly variable, but the practice on the whole is very common. Obviously, the incomes of husband and wife are normally combined. Working dependents in the same household also tend to contribute to collective expenses, the degree varying with sex and closeness of relation. But what is of interest within the context of work is not so much where the incomes go, but rather how the labour of one individual is seen in the light of the family.

In this regard, one sees a continual measuring of the occupational success of individual family members on a twofold scale: in which ways does it help the individual and in which ways does it further the family's life chances? In the context of North American families, what is good for one is usually viewed as being good for the other, as reflects the reality of the weakness of collective family organization here. But in Fijian Indian homes these two can often work at cross-purposes; what is good for the family is not necessarily the best thing for the individual. In everyday economic decisions concerning work, family considerations outweigh individual ones with far greater frequency than they might in an Anglo-Canadian home. Adolescent children may be pulled out of school to work, even though all parties acknowledge that this may decrease the individual's life chances in the long run; adults may forego lower-paying jobs with high future potential for higher paying, low potential ones, even though they would have chosen otherwise in the absence of familial dictates. This is not to suggest that Fijian Indians are necessarily more

altruistic than Anglo-North Americans, but the structure of family organization often coerces them to act in ways which are functionally indistinguishable from the way they would if they were in fact more altruistic.

Protestant and Fijian Work Ethics

The work ethics of earlier Asian immigrants were shaped primarily by their limited objectives in coming to Canada. There was a near complete externalization of the goal of working; they worked in order to quickly accumulate funds with which they would seek their fortunes upon return home. This led to parsimony of expenditure, and to extreme conflict with white Canadian workers over acceptable wage rates, union organization, rates and hours of work, and safety.

In the light of this historical situation, it is of more than theoretical interest as to whether Asian Canadian orientations toward work offer any of the same contrasts today. There is no real possibility of a repetition of previous economically-derived race relations, for regardless of their place in the structure of work there is a lower proportion of Asian people in the British Columbian workforce, where they are diffused over a much wider range of occupations than previously. The easing of formal and informal racial barriers have also mitigated the possibility. Nevertheless, this does not eliminate the potentiality for more localized economically-related hostility resulting from work practice, or from changes in the job ecology brought on by Asian workers.

Additionally, work orientations have implications for economic

success, class position, status criteria, and social mobility. One therefore must consider the nature of Fijian work ethics, keeping in mind that they are of social consequence chiefly in relation to analogous Canadian patterns.

The Protestant Ethic and Canadian Workers

Weber's (1958a) ideal type of ascetic Protestantism was characterized by a salvation solution which drove the believer into the world, for it was through worldly action that one saw the indicators of salvation. Through the theory of signs one could use secular success in a calling as indicative of salvation. In contrast to Catholicism, ascetic Protestant theology did not provide any mechanism for the expiation of sins in this world, and Weber argued that the resultant work ethic was unbounded and for the most part unrelativized; the goal in working was in the action itself, and there were no clear criteria for what degree of secular success was sufficient to indicate the certainty of God's blessing.

Not only was the world the context for action leading to salvation, for it was also a place of the threats of the sensuous and the material (1958a:105); in attempting to order the world in accordance with God's dictates, the ascetic Protestant adopted a pattern of life ordered by severe asceticism, both sensually and materially. The rational calculus of God's will, coupled with the Protestant soteriological structure made its mark in the rationalization of legal codes, of time, and of the use of it.

Weber realized full well (1958a:182-3) that this ideal type was no longer of causal importance by his time, for the congruence between the structure of modern capitalism and the key elements of this ideology no longer required religious justification. Rather, the ethic had become secularized into the Weltanshauung of industrialized countries, where it was used by all strata to explain and justify their respective places in society. As a secular ideology one sees the Protestant ethic surface in community respect for the hard worker (He's a good worker.), in the prescription of work as a cure for indivdual or collective failings, in the perception of a strong relation between guilt and unemployment (Wadel 1973), and in the association of idleness with immorality and decay. In all, there is an assumption of the value of work for its intrinsic qualities, in work for work's sake.

One would think that the great increase in standards of living and in the back-up welfare systems which now stand between unemployment and economic disaster would have led to a considerable diminution of this sort of work ethic in Canada. In point of fact, a recent comprehensive government-sponsored survey (Canadian Work Values 1975) of this very subject suggests strongly otherwise.[11]

Not surprisingly, work was seen as central to Canadians' achievement of goals.[12] Although the need to work in order to provide material sustenance was duly noted, over 70% of the sample claimed that they preferred to work, all things being equal (CWV 1975:19), and those who claimed to derive satisfaction from hard work and high productivity exceeded 95% of

those questioned(CWV 1975:22). There is still a strong feeling in the Canadian workforce that work for its own sake has benefit.

Moreover Canadian workers seem, at least in opinion if not necessarily in practice, to rank intrinsic rather than extrinsic factors more highly in considering what constitutes job satisfaction. Among a list of thirty-four possibilities, the demand for interesting work topped the list, and the most often picked extrinsic consideration, that of good pay, was ranked 17th. Factoring these 34 categories into eight groups, financial considerations ranked in the middle range (CWV 1975:31).[13]

In an overall sense, this study shows a strong desire for non-alienating work, with overtones of the need for participation in work for its contribution to self identity and self worth. Although necessity often demands it, there is a strong reluctance to accept jobs only because of high pay. The study argues that this conflict between work ideals and work reality helps to account for the transitory nature of the Canadian workforce in highly anomic jobs, especially in those cases when wages are low.

The Fijian Work Ethic[14]

If only for historical reasons, one must return to Weber to begin a discussion of Fijian work orientations. Weber (1958b) attempted to argue that the divergence between the evolution of Indian and European economic systems could be explained in part by reference to the divergence of the respective dominant religious philosophies and their consequences in human

action. I have shown elsewhere (Buchignani 1976) that this argument is an exceedingly weak one, but that at the same time its method provides a means to structurally analyze the interrelationship between ideological and economic systems by the use of ideal types. I will try to follow such a method here.

As Weber noted, there was in Indian thought, particularly at the elite levels, an element of mystic ideology which pointed to retreat from the world, in giving it no significance; Weber erred seriously in suggesting that this ideology of escape from suffering dominated Indian structure of economic action, for it does not, nor did it ever. Among common people, as Weber indeed notes (1958b:291-343), the ideologies of the Hindu sects diverged considerably from this model, and were very often oriented towards orgiasticism and sensuality. It was Weber's rather weak (not to say Puritanical) opinion that these sort of sects could not provide the basis for rationalized economic action, for restraint in action could not come out of unrestraint in belief.

Some of the elements of folk Hinduism are indeed found at the base of both Fijian work ethics and ideas about consumption. Being careful to re-emphasize that I am constructing an ideal type, in the Fijian view of work there seems to be almost no praise of labour for its own sake. It is the result of work (or its lack) which counts. Praise of work is usually phrased in terms of its consequences, and consequences are more important than work. This is not to suggest that indolence deserves praise, for it, too, has implications for individual and family fortunes.

Laziness, rather than being a sufficient charge by itself, is linked to responsibility. Unlike the Protestant work ethic, there seems to be little guilt created by not working, by working slowly, or by getting something without having to work for it. In the Canadian context, one sees continual evidence of the high degree to which extrinsic considerations figure in job selection. For many, immigration constitutes an exchange of status for money and material security, a switch which is readily accepted.

Most of this Fijian orientation must be argued to be a result of the structure of their secular rather than their religious heritage. The Fijian Indian sugar farm was part of a highly rationalized economy where labour was turned into a crop, and the crop into cash. It was the total output of cane, not hours of labour which counted and unlike a subsistence farmer, the final cash objective was easily measurable, comparable, and translatable into material and social benefit. The system was further rationalized by stringent growing and harvesting controls and by the extensive use of credit.

For those who have entered the Fijian wage labour market, especially for the young, it has been noted that there exists a very high prevalence of erratic employment and horizontal mobility. This, too, has served to externalize job orientations and to break down status and satisfaction inhibitions against taking the available job when it is the only one, or the highest-paying one if there are more.

At least so far, Fijians in Canada see the job as a means to the end of family security. Like the early sojourners, there is not yet much job

affiliation resulting from the intrinsic qualities of the endeavour. In contrast to Canadians, Fijians rarely talk about work at social occasions (except when they are looking for it or have just found it), and it is not uncommon that two people can meet socially for the first time in Canada after a long acquaintance in Fiji, spend an evening at a social gathering, and yet leave ignorant of their respective Canadian occupations.

Work Ethics and Job Ecologies

Because they tend to see work through an alienated "I work to eat" model which has been only weakly tempered by criteria of intrinsic job satisfaction, Fijians do in fact possess a job orientation in some ways analogous to the sojourner. The divergence between the two ethics is largely a matter of the very much higher expectations for immediate standards of living which are held by Fijians, coupled to their far closer congruence in culture to Canadians.

Like the sojourner, they would prefer a job which presents the greatest probability of uninterrupted high pay, and will tend to stay with one which offers these advantages or will leave one that does not. Considerations of pay can override factors of low occupational status or of non-satisfying, routinized work.

Returning to the question of whether Fijian orientations to work possess the potential to generate economic conflict or a change in job conditions, the answer would seem to be: only in certain work situations of low status, high pay, and a large workforce. In these contexts where

there is a high turnover of personnel, Fijians will persist, and if there are no mechanisms to exclude them they have the potential to increase in numbers through the attrition of other workers.

This process has only been evident empirically in a limited number of cases, which will be brought forward shortly. But with respect to Sikh employment, especially in the lumber mills, it has been significant. I believe that the massive influx of Sikh workers into some mills has resulted in a definite change in the job ecology.[15] While it would be difficult to empirically support the contention that Sikhs work harder or more efficiently in the mills, it is certain that they are very conscientious about putting in their time, and do not tend to frequently change jobs. For the non-Sikh mill labourer, particularly in the more isolated Interior contexts, this means that mill work no longer constitutes a ready job, accessible when one choses to work, and that no longer will high absenteeism be tolerated.

Women and Work

In one respect Fijian orientations to work have shifted markedly due to immigration, and this is in the area of the place of women in the family workforce. A growing number of women in Fiji are entering the formal job market, but this trend runs against traditional Indian views of women in the family, and in any case offers little hope of employment to the older or the unskilled woman.

Here, work for women is available and is comparable in income to that

of Fijian males; this results largely from the minimum wage regulations creating an income floor for fully-employed women. A working woman can bring into the household no less than about $6,500 a year if she works full-time. The exception would be those women who work informally or in areas of the workforce unprotected by minimum wage legislation. Combining this income with that of one male's salary can make the difference between having a house and the attendant material basis of a satisfactory life and barely making ends meet; not surprisingly, women are very much willing to work for the minimum wage. Even though it normally produces less income than male work, Fijian women's labour is equally vital to Canadian success. It has come to be a normative expectation that in Canada Fijian women should seek an income, and this includes women into their forties. Occasionally, women in their fifties can be seen diligently looking for the first non-household job of their lives.

Fijians collectively are restricted in their possibilities of obtaining skilled employment, and these constraints press far more heavily upon women than men. Although many immigrant Fijian women possess saleable job skills, a large number nevertheless have little but industry to offer to a prospective Canadian employer, and find getting a job most difficult. It is not uncommon that older women may take the better part of a year to secure employment, and a few mature women have chosen to leave the Vancouver area for more promising places where they have relatives, notably in Alberta. Many try to break through the Canadian experience barrier through a variety of part-time jobs, notably as secretaries,

receptionists, janitorial workers, or baby-sitters -- a process which offers limited success in achieving full-time employment.

Although tangential to analysis of the situation of work itself and better covered in Chapter Six, the importance of the income of women to the Fijian Indian family in Canada has simultaneously increased their importance in the family. Whereas (reality aside) daughters traditionally have been considered to be less economically valuable than sons to the Fijian household, in Canada there is a tendency for the opposite to be the case. Rather than being seen as a burden lifted, the marriage of a daughter in Canada may well mean the loss of her income to her parent's household, even if she and her husband then reside matrilocally. The economic importance of women has also been reflected in an elevation of their household and community statuses.

Job Distributions: the working class

One must begin a discussion of the actual distribution of Fijian Indians in the Lower Mainland workforce with a major qualification, that because this is such a young community many of the things which hold presently are not likely to do so ten years from now. In particular, Indo-Fijians have not yet developed strong "ethnic speciality occupations" nor have they created any large-scale sources of self-employment. Few Fijians currently work for other Fijians, primarily because of the limitations and the current directions of Fijian entrepreneurial activity. The number who work for East Indians of other ethnic backgrounds cannot be over a few

hundred. Most work for Canadians, and virtually all work either for an hourly wage or for a fixed salary, with the exception of some who have moonlighting jobs based upon commission.

Many males are involved in blue collar work. More specifically, they tend to concentrate in the small-scale secondary industries where unions are either weak or absent; unionization is not so much a factor here as is the correlation between low status, relatively unrewarding, blue collar jobs, and the lack of unionization. But at the same time, unionization of skilled blue collar work generally results in more formalized entry criteria -- which Fijians have more difficulty in surmounting. Unlike the Punjabi Sikhs, who have historically tended to concentrate in the wood industries, the range of occupations and of employers of Fijians is quite large. While there is a good likelihood that where there is one Fijian employee one will find another, there are only a few places where Fijians predominate in a total workforce of more than twenty. A poultry processing plant east of Vancouver, a furniture factory in Richmond, a large retail store in downtown Vancouver, and the janitorial staff at the Vancouver International Airport are exceptions to the rule.

These exceptions tend to exist due to parallel sequences, beginning with a rather chance placement of a Fijian in that job. Thereafter, their steadiness in what was a highly transient job, combined with the practice of notifying friends, relatives, and out of work Fijians of possible job openings, resulted in a growing number of Fijian workers. Fijians have this capacity to take over those occupational niches which

are not directly defended by other workers or are not highly desired, because they are reasonably steady workers who do not tend to be absent, who will stay at the job longer than others (thus requiring proportionally less training time), who will not likely organize, and who can quickly supply new workers. Although this process has reached a developed stage in only a few places, on a much smaller-scale it is common, and determines many of the cases where more than one Fijian works for the same employer.

Neither their work habits nor this sort of informational patronage can overcome the constraints on achieving a skilled job; moreover, part of the Fijian workforce is not particularly skilled. Consequently, the Fijian workforce is largely consigned to relatively unskilled work and to work with little managerial responsibility. In blue collar work there is a concentration in light manufacturing, away from the Sikh-dominated wood industry.[16] Metal fabrication, furniture and clothing manufacture, and food processing are significant employers, especially where there are swing shifts. There has been some success in the building trades, especially at the lower ends of the scale where there is more job mobility, and in heavy machinery.

In blue collar service industries Fijians are well represented in automotive maintenance, equipment repair and service, janitorial work (very important), food services (including cooking and sale of prepared foods), warehouse work, and store help. Of these, janitorial work is the closest thing to a Fijian occupational specialty which exists, and because of its high pay relative to other Fijian job possibilities, its ready

employment of women, and its potential for enveloping the whole household workforce it is highly desired. Janitorial work is the exclusive source of income for more families than any other occupation, given that more than one family member works. Although most Fijians in this line of work are employees of one or another of the larger maintenance companies, quite a few families have now branched out into small-scale independent businesses employing family labour.

White collar workers are also concentrated at the lower end of the spectrum of possibilities. Many women are retail clerks or display clerks in lower paying situations, particularly in department stores and owner-operated stores; they are notably absent from unionized retail food clerking. Secretarial and receptionist positions are held by a number of the more trained women, while men with appropriate skills are placed in a wide range of jobs from accounting clerks to mail-room workers.

Options and Possibilities: skilled and entrepreneurial activities

The options available for getting a high-paying job or for entrepreneurial activity are relatively few for Fijians, and access to either is extremely limited, both with respect to who can make use of them and with respect to how successful is their use.

With a few exceptions, high-paying work in British Columbia is also relatively skilled work, but Fijians do not uniformly lack skills and experience. The problem, even in the long term, is to activate these skills. Faced with formidable constraints, there are three possibilities

available to the persistent: meeting 'the system' on its own terms, accepting a lower status position, or practice of one's occupation as a free agent. The first alternative is therefore an effort to achieve qualifications which are acceptable to Canadian employers, and notably in the automotive and building trades limited success has been achieved through recertification. Both in skilled blue collar occupations and in teaching, many individuals claim the intention to return to their professions via formal instructional retraining once they "settle in"; the number of those actually acting upon this intention are relatively few. Most of the latter are taking courses at the British Columbia Institute of Technology. It is still too early and the numbers of people involved are too small to say whether this is to become a viable option. The same goes for the attempt to enter one's occupation through related but lower-status work.

The third option, that of self-employment in one's prior occupation (or a related one) is rapidly developing. This is particularly so in the building trades, where a growing number of Fijians are taking on small-scale house alterations and repairs as a second, supplemental job. The success of this option rides largely upon the employment of these people by other Fijians, and this in turn is dependent upon Fijian preference for the use of their own people for such work and upon the nature of the typical houses bought by Fijians, which often need either alteration or repair.[17] Fijians move into self-owned houses as soon as it is financially rational to do so, and this has created a large need for such services in the last few years.

These arrangements are beneficial to both parties. For those who do this sort of work, it provides a (tax-free) source of income and offers the potential for future full-time employment, should sufficient volume materialize. Fijian home owners get the use of these services at less than one-half the labour cost of Canadian professionals, coupled with some greater measure of feeling that the 'rules of the game' will parallel those of Fiji.

In other areas, this sort of entrepreneurial activity is more restricted. A parallel situation obtains in automotive maintenance and repair, but it is limited by the extensive use of dealer and "professional" Fijian services; there seems to be something of a reluctance on the part of Fijians to trust automotive work to moonlighters.

The Fijian Entrepreneur[18]

Even if an entrepreneur is defined in the widest possible terms, as a person who has effective control over a commercial undertaking from which he or she gains benefit, one finds that very few Fijians in Canada fit the definition. But even so, experience elsewhere suggests that the nature of entrepreneurship in ethnic communities can have an important effect on the direction a community will develop. In particular, to the degree to which it provides a set of "parallel services" to those available in the larger society the entrepreneurial structure can be used as a rough measure of intergroup separation and, correspondingly, of assimilation.[19]

Two Kinds of Entrepreneur

In any situation of a minority ethnic group one can define two sorts of entrepreneurs, what could be termed value differential dependent (traditional, community-oriented) and value equivalent (rationalized, societally-oriented) entrepreneurs. As implied by the parenthetical adjectives, these ideal types involve two variables which normally tend to co-vary with the degree to which entrepreneurial activity is dependent upon an ethnic clientele and the degree to which such behaviour is economically rationalized.

As Barth (1958) argues, the presence of an ethnic boundary often implies that a value differential exists across it; in a few or in many dimensions worldview and perhaps the calculus which makes sense out of it are different. Economically, this can be expressed in a demand for ethnically-preferred goods and services not available in the larger society, as well as in different measures and standards for the procurement and production of these things. Entrepreneurial activity is possible at any juncture between community and societal value systems which admits of the possibility of gain, hence the category 'value differential dependent entrepreneurship'. Such activity may or may not be highly rationalized, depending on the actual situation, but usually is not, at least relative to societal norms.

The other entrepreneurial route is to become a generalist, providing goods or services to the society at large, simultaneously opening one's self up to whatever levels of competiton societally exist in that endea-

vour. This variety does not make use of extant value differentials between the ethnic community and the larger society (save in the reverse sense that his or her ethnic background [values] may be an aid in competing in a societal context), and does not depend upon that community for his livelihood. Hence the term 'value equivalent entrepreneurship'. Of these two, presence of the (value divergent) former is one indicator of parallel institution building and the latter, of assimilation.[20]

Entrepreneurial activity among Fijian Indians in Canada is rather weakly developed, especially in the light of the strong preference for it which is often expressed. There are both individually- and socially-derived reasons for this lack of development.

Personal Constraints: capital and knowledge

It is more or less the rule that Fijian Canadian workers are limited in their possibilities for job advancement by the necessity to have a relatively continuous income; immediate needs usually take precedence over long term goals. This holds to an even greater extent for potential entrepreneurs. Few are able to break completely away from wage labour and devote full time to entrepreneurship. To do so would be extremely disruptive to household life. Not only does this consideration cut down the number of potential entrepreneurs, it limits the effectiveness of those who make the attempt, for often effort is put into new entrepreneurial attempts only in proportion to their success, which is likely to be initially small. Most Fijian entrepreneurs are workers first; factory workers who sell real

estate or paint your house, guards who sell trips to Fiji, and the like.

For all but the very privileged, capital problems are the doom of many Fijian enterprises, particularly those which involve the formal establishment of a place of business. Lack of capital results in businesses starting off shakily and, relative to the competition, often inefficiently, for they lack both a reasonable volume and the means to develop it; here the factor of a lack, or rather, of different knowledge also enters, for too often such endeavours show all the signs of being created upon models of small-scale entrepreneurship in Fiji. Many of these businesses are doomed from the start, for they are economically unviable here, especially in the light of business costs and the availability of alternative sources for the things and services which they sell.

Knowledge constraints also operate to restrict the potential range of entrepreneurship which materializes. Because of the nature of the Fijian society, Indian business has tended to be of lower and middle range, where it did not compete with larger incorporated establishments. Many of these entrepreneurial niches disappear or severely diminish when one faces the Canadian context, for instance running a small rural bus company, a dry goods store, or a one-man garage. This, coupled with an extremely limiting set of social constraints, results in a minimal number of types of Fijian Canadian businesses, in each of which there is either fierce competition or an overpowering monopoly.

Societal and Community Constraints

As a new Canadian immigrant group, Fijian Indians have not developed an "ethnic hegemony" (Hannerz 1974:48) in any entrepreneurial activity, a situation which parallels work patterns. Unlike the Ugandan Ismailis, entrepreneurial acitivity itself is not an ethnic speciality.[21] Moreover, Fijians are not associated in Canada with expertise in any particular area, as are Japanese with gardening; in fact, most Canadians are oblivious to their existence as a distinct group, and do not regard them at all. On the whole, Fijian entrepreneurs must therefore do what they can with their own individual resources.

At the same time, because of the high degree of Westernization of Fijian Indians there are very few significant differentials which exist between their needs and the available range and quality of goods and services provided by non-Fijian entrepreneurs which are open to exploitation by differential-dependent entrepreneurs. It goes almost without saying that the present day lack of formal restrictions upon Asians in British Columbia, which had earlier tended to compartmentalize their buying while it did the same to their social and economic access, also diminishes this variety of entrepreneurship.

As outlined in Chapter Five, with respect to large purchases Fijians will tend to go in the direction of least cost, within their own limitations on knowing where the lowest cost lies. Because of this, the differential-dependent Fijian entrepreneur is restricted to providing a service not directly paralleled by his non-Fijian competitors. Because

of high overhead costs (part-time entrepreneurs excepted), he cannot normally provide a service cheaper than his Canadian competition, and because of an over-all lack of centripetal forces pushing Fijians in upon one another, he is not likely to be able to sell the same things at very much higher prices, except by manipulating his customers' ignorance.

Considering the wide variety of things offered for sale in the Canadian market place, the above generalization would seem to give almost no opportunity for differential-dependent entrepreneurship among Fijian Indians. But while the options are indeed few, they are not this bleak. One must take into consideration that such a fellow must provide 'different' goods and services rather widely. If, for instance, I am the only seller of coconut graters or of Fijian Kava in all of British Columbia, I have a differential to manipulate, clearly. But less absolute differences can offer equal potential. For instance, there are hundreds of people in the Lower Mainland, many of them integrated into large corporations, who make a living selling houses to the rest of the population. Presumably a very large proportion of them, because of their experience and resources, can in fact offer services which are materially better than those offered by any of the score of Fijian real estate salesmen. Nevertheless, many of these same Fijian businessmen do quite nicely selling houses to other Fijians. Part of their success is dependent upon the use of kin and ethnic network ties, but at the same time they know the needs, the problems, and the resources of the Fijian family, and therefore can do a reasonably efficient job of matching house,

people, and financing. In a more subjective light, his use provides a measure of psychological 'safety', especially in the initial time when the Fijian confronts the complicated business of buying a first Canadian house.

This safety factor is not an overwhelming one among Fijians, for they are a people used to interacting with a wide variety of people and situations. It nevertheless does interject a measure of temperance into what might otherwise appear to be a pattern of strict economic rationalization. For instance, the lone Fijian barber's success must be attributed largely to non-economic factors, particularly to his establishment's function as a meeting place for other Fijians. If there were two Fijian barbers, or if the one was to raise his prices above his Canadian competition, it is probable that economic factors would become activated.

Value differentials are not utilized only as devices which protect the ethnic entrepreneur's hold over his ethnic community-clientele. Canadian or other East Indian entrepreneurs can and do manipulate similar differentials in order to gain a Fijian clientele, thus the need for such a wordy term as value differential-dependent entrepreneurship. It also serves as a caution against suggesting that it is simply ethnocentrism which sends Fijians to Fijian entrepreneurs.

The relatively small number of Fijians in the Lower Mainland also limits entrepreneurial development, for they constitute a very small clientele unless they are purchasing large things (houses, cars, airline tickets) or small things many times (food, haircuts). The relative lack

of a Fijian ethnic-based opportunity structure internal to the community is the result of both numbers and their brief residence in Canada.

Competition, obviously a function of all the factors just mentioned, is often very severe because of the diminutive size of the Fijian population, the specialty areas available, and the competition with established Canadian businesses. In order to bring this out we must move to a more detailed description of the ecology of Fijian entrepreneurial activity.

Value Differential-Dependent Entrepreneurs

The most significant differential-dependent, full-time Fijian businesses are in food, car services, housing, real estate and travel. Fijian dietary customs have not changed radically with immigration, save for the loss of some items through expense or lack of availability, and although they are not identical with Continental Indian foods, Fijian Indian ones are very similar. It is only natural, especially in that small food and dry goods stores are an Indian specialty in Fiji, that several people have attempted to get into this business in the Lower Mainland.

One of these, or more accurately, one of these families has been eminently successful at this endeavour, and currently runs the largest Indian food store in the area. Not surprisingly, they are Gujaratis, following their ethnic tradition in yet another context.

Because this store is an established fact, its very existence decreases the possibility of someone else following the same sequence to

near zero, even though attempts continue. Even a Fijian Muslim store begun in fairly respectable size, located within the geographical centre of the Fijian "neighbourhood", and presumably with the ability to attract other than Fijian Muslims recently failed after less than a year. Many East Indians of other backgrounds patronize the successful store, and so it does not provide an ideal type for a Fijian ethnic entrepreneurship, but it does for "East Indians". There are a considerable number of smaller Punjabi-run, Punjabi-frequented stores in the Lower Mainland which also cut down the possibilities for a new Fijian entry into the food business. The few other Fijian food stores which are currently open limp on, but with the one exception seem to offer little hope of success.

In this area, another entrepreneurial logical possibility exists, that of the corner grocery stores, which are to be found scattered throughout the Lower Mainland, with particular concentrations in older areas. But in fact this niche is not available, for it has long been the domain of the Chinese, as noted in Chapter One. Although viability of these stores has decreased greatly with the rise of supermarket chains (remember, they once could sell things cheaper than their competitors), they persist, relying on family labour and the low overhead which is the consequence of long establishment and little maintenance. Even though a number of Fijian Canadians have had experience with this sort of store, it is unlikely that many will attempt to open one here. The one which to my knowledge presently exists has opened across the street from a larger, established, Chinese-run store. They seem to do very little business.

There are very few other types of differential-dependent stores which are run by Fijians. Most of the non-food ethnic speciality areas have been flooded with Punjabi or Ugandan East Indian businessmen, especially the former, for the latter tend toward value-equivalent endeavours. Clothing and cloth, Indian curio and 'import' shops, stereo and tape stores and the like have been done to death, and further expansion in these areas would be economically suicidal.[22] They are essentially closed niches.

Automotive repair by Fijians, for other Fijians, is a well-established practice. There are two sorts of repairmen, those who work out of a garage and those who work at home, and the latter are almost totally dependent upon Fijian customers, while the former are so only in part. While this promises to become a very secure niche for some of those who can establish themselves in it, the niche is definitely a bounded one for three reasons. First, the number of incoming car maintenance people (79 in 1975) far exceeds the reasonable needs of a community of less than 7,000 and most have had to find work servicing the general population. Secondly, as with house repair and alterations, Fijians will tend to select an automotive repairman on the basis of kin, all things being equal, and this limits the ability of these people to build up their clientele. And finally, in this area the value differential between Fijian and non-Fijian services is not great, and many Fijians will go to Canadian establishments for service, especially if they bought their car through a dealership with a service department. Nevertheless, there are

several Lower Mainland service stations now run by Fijians, who depend on both an assured Fijian clientele and a statistically probable Canadian one.

Because housing and the search for it are so important, and because the rapidly increasing number of resident Fijians puts constant pressure on this search, it is not surprising that real estate is one of the more developed Fijian entrepreneurial options. Most Fijians involved in the sale of real estate are affiliated with a company, either as a partner in a small one or as an agent with one of the large Canadian real estate sales corporations. These latter institutions have for several years been very much aware of East Indian housing needs, advertise widely in East Indian periodicals, and are keen to employ competent East Indian sales people.

In the light of the prior discussion, it is understandable that Fijian agents are more often used to buying housing than to selling it; price is solely important in the sale, while buying involves a complex set of considerations involving family needs, ability to finance the fulfillment of that need, and the degree of knowledge the prospective buyer has of the overall situation. It is especially the family which is buying its first Canadian home which will tend to use a Fijian agent, particularly when it lacks the help of a knowledgeable relative with the time to guide them through the process.

While at first sight it could be argued that the Fijian real estate agent constitutes an ideal type for the entrepreneur who preys on his own

community, upon closer inspection this assertion would be hard to support. To be sure, these people are about as unscrupulous as is normal in their trade -- no more, no less -- and there are many reports of disreputable activity on their part. But at the same time they have provided the means to the end of an appropriate house for many Fijians who would not likely have found the means elsewhere. Such agents know what their clientele want, what they will put up with, and complementarily, what they do not want. They also know how the Fijian family operates, and have some idea of the ability of any one family to fund such a purchase. They know also that this ability to pay often exceeds the needs even when the rules which mortgage sellers use for judging ability to pay show no chance of success. They are brokers, cultural translators, and entrepreneurs, all in one package, where success in the last is dependent upon the former two.

Beyond these few notable areas, full-time differential-dependent entrepreneurship is for the most part restricted to what are often one-person niches, as in the conspicuous case of the barber previously mentioned. There are a considerable number of skilled part-time entrepreneurs of this sort engaged in house repair and the like. There are also others who gain fairly marginal incomes from entrepreneurship; weddings and other important social events provide a few such options, as for those who take wedding pictures or who provide the music at the reception.

Value-Equivalent Entrepreneurship

Sorting out these two categories empirically cannot be a clear-cut thing, for the possession of Fijian ethnicity itself is an expression of a value differential which will be utilized if nothing countervails it; Fijians will tend to go to other Fijians, even when there is no evident material gain to be had in doing so. While this tendency is not sufficient to offer very much protection to differential-dependent entrepreneurs, it does assure value-equivalent ones a small measure of security. For instance, a Fijian travel agent is in no position to legally offer lower prices for air fares than his competition. But at the same time, the fact that he can hope to bring in a portion of the Fijian business means that he is not altogether at the mercy of his competition or the whims of the general public.

With the exception of the janitorial business, most value-equivalent Fijian entrepreneurs tend to be partially dependent upon a Fijian clientele at least initially; their intentions are to reach the largest possible market, rather than to obtain an overwhelming dominance over a small one. This seems to be a more viable option, and it is becoming the more common one.

This option means, at least insofar as the entrepreneur interfaces with the public, that Canadian-North American-Western European economic dictates must be closely followed, for success with a Canadian clientele is dependent upon playing the game more-or-less by Canadian rules.[23] Not only must his economic behaviour be highly rationalized, but it also must

address the question of selling something to Canadians, and this requires considerable insight into Canadian ways. In short, value-equivalent entrepreneurship both depends upon and creates forces for assimilation.

There is a near total lack of anything which could be called entrepreneurial activity in the area of manufacturing. This void is understandable, considering that in Fiji most industrial businesses were run by Europeans and that Fijian immigrants lack sufficient capital to start anything of this sort here.

Rather, most value-equivalent entrepreneurship is in the service industries, and is of small-scale. Family-run janitorial companies are becoming common, and there is a good likelihood that this trend will continue to increase. The necessary experience is often gained through employment by the larger janitorial companies. A Fijian family concern can easily offer a lower price for a given contract than the large companies and still increase net family income over what it would be if the same job was done by the same people working as employees.

In this occupation Fijians seem to have found themselves a niche with much in common to that of the Chinese laundry of earlier times; for smaller jobs, those manageable by such a family company, they are likely to prevail, while the larger janitorial jobs, just like the early hotel laundry trade, will continue to go to the bigger Canadian companies. In short, their advantage is low overhead and family labour, but it is a selective advantage, dependent upon scale.

Fijians make a heavy <u>per capita</u> use of travel services, for both

immigration and visiting. Fijians are there, ready to provide such services. In this, they participate in another niche abounding with both other East Indian and other Canadian competitors. To the best of my knowledge virtually all Fijians involved in this business presently are working for non-Fijian owners under commission arrangements. Considering that the Fijian trade alone constitutes a multi-million dollar yearly business, there is likely to be increasing attempts by Fijians to capture this trade.[24]

Beyond these areas value-equivalent entrepreneurship is severely limited. There are a few small independent businessmen, for example, in printing and upholstery, and a few professionals, notably lawyers and architects. Two small construction and excavation companies have also been created.

Fijians in the Economy: another subordinate caste?

With some knowledge of the means by which Fijians in Canada make a living, having outlined the social and individual constraints which have determined those means, I must return to some of the questions posed at the beginning of this chapter. In very broad terms this is: to what extent do Fijians have equal economic access as other Canadians? The answer is complex, although it might not seem so at first glance.

Fijian economic access is most certainly not the same as other Canadians. They have far fewer, far less rewarding economic possibilities than would a cross-section of the British Columbian population. Access

to skilled and entrepreneurial occupations is severely limited. Most work at manual, unskilled jobs. Few make much above $5.00 an hour, and many make $3.50. In the work situation they hold the lower positions, and are rarely managers. They work odd hours; they are commonly night people, working swing and graveyard shifts. They are, in short, collectively disadvantaged with respect to Canadian labour.

There are many parallels to be made between the economic situation of Fijian immigrants and those Asian sojourners who came before them. Because of the industrial and extractive nature of the British Columbian economy, and also because of its settler society origins, race relations in British Columbia have never had a paternalistic (van den Berghe 1967: 18) phase, where subordinate Asians had a 'natural' or traditionally-defined place. They were in direct initial competition for economic resources, and the resultant form of subordination created a near ideal type "Herrenvolk democracy" with access to opportunity in the dominant group being determined by merit and class, and access in the subordinate group being constrained by race. Asian groups constituted racial castes, kept in this position by overt, formal restrictions.

There are no such formal restrictions now, and yet Fijians are economically at the lower end of the British Columbia opportunity spectrum. The reasons for this are clear. What were once primarily racial determinants have become class determinants. For Fijians it is not access itself which has been limited, but rather the means to access. Their restrictions are statistical ones; because of the nature of the incongruence

between Fijian backgrounds and Canadian demands they hold lower economic life chances individually. Because they share this problem among themselves they are relatively disadvantaged collectively. Informational gaps, the lack of skill-translation mechanisms and the absence of suitable experience are all-class, and not ethnic restrictions, even though they are ethnically-based.

Unlike those formal restrictions which limited Asian economic access in earlier British Columbia, the ways in which Fijians are similarly restricted in access stem (racialism aside) from their liabilities of background and from being immigrants. Unlike their predecessors, their children face few such handicaps, except insofar as the same processes affect them, and this is likely to be slight. The ideal state of equality of immigrant economic access, given the stratified nature of Canadian society, would be that of achieving identical life chances as any other Canadian who possessed the same skills and background. For Fijians this largely holds.[25]

Moreover, Fijians themselves are not on the whole dissatisfied with their lot, even though they realize the nature of their position in the economy. Used to working in a Fijian society which was highly stratified by race, class, age, and kin, their ideas about equality and access are fairly congruent with the reality of the Canadian stratification system.

Economic Subordination, Statistics, and Immigrant Flow

If there exist no racial restrictions which divide British Columbians

into racial castes as once was so classically done, and yet if Fijians (and I believe most other Asian immigrant groups as well) are still economically in similar structural places as their immigrant predecessors, how can such a situation be maintained? As has been alluded, in the next ten years it is almost certain that personnel will be flowing out of the category "Fijian Indian-Canadian" in great numbers. There are no racial and few social barriers to keep them in, and powerful assimilative forces are pushing them out, the children in particular. Whereas the previous formal racial barriers created situations of racial endogamy and cultural separation, neither can be maintained in the face of today's statistical barriers.

Such a situation would soon result in the collapse of ethnic stratification except for one contravening variable -- continued immigration. Immigration provides new personnel for these subordinate positions, replacing those who flow out of them through achievement of a greater degree of economic access. The restriction of Fijian immigration will lead to the continued reduction of economic liabilities among the resident population.

Job, Family, Place and Things

To this point, I have addressed the ways in which Fijian Canadians earn a living in some detail, albeit abstracted from the everyday context of which it is a part. We must now turn to that context, to material expenditure, social organization, worldview and inter-ethnic relations.

Because of the newness of this community, because it is a settling, rather than a settled, community, these factors are currently in rapid flux, as they are likely to be for the foreseeable future. In the hope of presenting something more than a transient, historically-particular view of this process, I shall continue to focus on those core problems and their tentative solutions which are likely to have more universal applicability, beginning with the material problems of settlement and their consequences.

Chapter Four: Notes

1. British and American immigration is vastly more individualistic, and is typified by the immigrant family rarely relying on the resources of anyone external to the family itself at any stage of the process. This implies an enormous duplication of services, high cost, and initial separation from the rest of Canadian society; two thousand Fijians coming to Canada means the community grows by two thousand, while two thousand British arriving simply implies that many more independent families have come, each left to its own resources.

2. This same problem obtains within an indigenous population. I currently have no need for welfare services, nor have I any prior experience with them. But I know how to begin inquiries which would make such services available if they were necessary, while many people in more desperate circumstances might not.

3. In many such meetings, the only times I have not seen immigrants met by relatives are cases where something had gone wrong with plans.

4. There are indeed a few 'loners' and families for which rental accommodation has been previously arranged, but both are rare.

5. Parents will tend to stay with their children and vice-versa, and adult siblings with each other. Nephews, nieces and younger 'cousins' will most likely move in with their elder collateral kin. Young males may more likely move in with other males.

6. There is no television service in Fiji, and consequently Fijians have not built up the same defenses against it as have we. Television's effects will be discussed further in Chapter Six.

7. Some ludicrous situations arise in this way. One older woman comes to mind who had run a series of small retail stores in Fiji over twenty years. She could not find work of any sort here for almost a year.

8. Architecture, draughting, accountancy, and skilled blue collar work requiring New Zealand training usually results in achievement of a New Zealand certification. Fijian teaching experience is convertible into Canadian terms.

9. Personal communication. In the course of investigating complaints the Human Rights Branch collects case histories, many of which show unambiguous discrimination.

10. In twenty such families, selected in such a way that the central pair had been here for over four years (coming before 1972), there were 64 people working, 35 of which were women. The higher female participation reflects the cancellation of a lower probability that

women can secure employment by the higher number of young, unmarried working daughters in these households.

11. This study will be abbreviated in reference to (CWV 1975). It was a national opinion survey of approximately 2,000 Canadians representing close to a cross-section of Canadian society. It makes no attempt, however, to relate collected attitudes to work to behaviour on the job.

12. 57% of men and 40% of women listed work as the most important means towards achievement of life goals (CWV 1975:18).

13. In the same vein, 67% of the sample responded in disagreement to the statement that "If I could earn $7 an hour, I would take any job." (CWV 1975:23).

14. I have no intention of generalizing from the situation of Fijian Indians in this regard to all Asian Canadians, or for that matter to all Indo-Canadians. However, inasmuch as there are definite parallels between Fijian Indian and other East Indian cultures and familial organizations, there ought to be parallels in work orientation.

15. This observation is based upon secondary information, received from Department of Manpower and Immigration employees who have long been involved with the Interior lumber industry and from a number of Interior residents.

16. In Prince George there are a number of Fijian Indians working in the wood industry, but in the Lower Mainland this is not a large employer.

17. I will be discussing the constraints upon the type of housing selected by Fijians in the next chapter. At this point it suffices to say that Fijian houses tend to be large, old, and in need of repair.

18. Because there are very few Fijian entrepreneurs, certain parts of this discussion have been left purposely ambiguous in order to preserve a measure of anonymity.

19. This idea of parallel services is linked to van den Berghe's (1967: 12-21) use of the concept 'parallel institutions' to denote duplication of institutions across an ethnic boundary.

20. I have no great desire to be caught up in a flood of analytical definitions, few of which ever seem to be subsequently utilized in their defined form. By assimilation, though, I do not mean to imply integration, which can obviously occur even in those extreme cases of ethnic or racial separation, as with the Chinese in Malaya or for that matter, with Indians and native people in Fiji. See Schermerhorn (1970:23-41) on this point.

21. According to knowledgeable bankers in Vancouver, the Ugandans in Canada are vitally returning to their entrepreneurial pursuits, and are investing heavily in moderate-scale businesses which are beyond the resources of most Fijians.

22. I know of one block (not street) alone in Vancouver upon which there are three sari stores and an East Indian cloth store, not to mention two other East Indian stores selling hi-fi and television sets. The following inventory of advertisements taken from three East Indian-oriented publications (The Indo-Canadian, April, 1976; Diwali Souvenir, 1975; Telephone Directory of the East Indian Community, 1976) is indicative of the strong concentration of entrepreneurial activity in a very few areas:

food & spice stores	21
real estate & mortgage	17
travel	12
television & hi-fi sales	11
furniture, appliances & hardware	9
cloth & clothing	9
building & renovation	6
photography	4
entertainment	4
gifts	3
automotive repair	3
printing	2
jewelery	2
others (frequency = 1)	11

Table XVIII. Distribution of East Indian Entrepreneurial Advertising.

23. I am not suggesting simply that in this case demand shapes supply. I mean, rather, that when a Fijian businessman interfaces with a rationalized economy he necessarily must internalize its structure, including the subtleties of social interaction and values.

24. The dollar volume of Fijian travel brings up an interesting parenthetical point. In the earlier history of British Columbia the steamship companies made lucrative profits on the Asian immigrant trade, and therefore were loath to see it stopped. Today the airlines, particularly CP Air, obtain similar benefits from Pacific immigration. Air fare costs for Fijians going to and from Canada last year must have been in excess of $2,000,000, and the Fijian traffic is nothing compared to that from Hong Kong and India.

25. There is one exception, but it is more apparent than real. One could argue (indeed, I have) that in many cases the restrictions on access

to opportunity among Fijians is dependent upon criteria which are irrelevant to their capacity to do the work. But the same argument holds vis-a-vis other Canadians. Such extraneous criteria are often used by occupational groups to restrict access to their number, even if they do not necessarily realize that they are doing so. Along such lines, unions have long used limited apprenticeship systems to indirectly restrict their membership. The three-year longitudinal study (Three Years in Canada) of 1969's immigrants carried out by the Department of Manpower and Immigration (1976d) showed that almost 50% of economically-active immigrants not only felt it necessary to return to educational or skill training, but actually had done so.

Interest groups also affect the flow of immigrants into their occupational areas. As a blatant example of professional groups controlling access via immigration policy, even though one must wait months for a dental appointment in the Lower Mainland (it ranges to a year in the Interior of British Columbia) the current (September, 1976) demand factor for immigrant dentists is zero. A prospective independent immigrant with a zero demand factor is not admitted, even if he or she gains the normally requisite number of points. For doctors it is also zero.

Chapter Five: A House, a Car, a Chair; Expenditure and Models for It.

Objectives

Fijians work in order to earn money; this chapter is concerned with how they spend it. Within this theme there are several objectives, one of which is the description of Fijian patterns of buying with particular reference to housing and those other large-scale purchases involved in their establishment in Canada. With such a short history of immigration, the manner in which Fijians deal with material factors is of paramount importance to an understanding of their assimilation, community organi zation, and self identity. Because some of these immigrants came ten years ago while others step off the plane weekly, one has unique access to a diachronic sequence of Fijian housing development as well as to changes in other areas of expenditure which will be illustrated here.

As with many other aspects of Fijian Canadian life touched upon in this work, this sphere has stood in an empirical vacuum until now. No other recent inquiries of Asian-Canadian "material culture" currently exist. This void is not only one of scholastic importance, for major themes of British Columbian anti-East Indian racism involve supposed patterns of East Indian housing, settlement, and buying. The second objective of this exploration is to bring to light the contrast between Fijian expenditure as reality and as it is perceived by other Canadians, for the contrast is indeed great.

As has been a consistent practice throughout this thesis, I am not interested in material development of the Fijian community for its own

sake alone. Again, the object of inquiry is argued to be the result of culturally constrained individual choice, tempered by the constraints of Canadian society. Seeking the formative elements of these decisions in Fijian tradition and family necessity, the implications of material things for self identity must also be addressed.

A third, interlinked objective is to follow the discussion of Fijian work ethics of the previous chapter with an inquiry into Fijian methods of paying for purchases -- into economic rationalization, cash, and credit. Behind the way in which these elements are structured stands a Fijian orientation to purchasing which, like its work counterpart, diverges from Canadian practice.

Finally, the diachronic structure of Fijian purchasing, especially when combined with the choice models which underlie it, has implications for aspects of Fijian social organization and for the future development of this community as a whole, and both of these will be briefly explored.

This inquiry begins by outlining factors which Fijians consider when looking for housing, and then moves to how these factors are actually employed in the resultant purchase of houses. From this, it shifts to geographical settlement patterns, which largely result from housing choice, and ends with a discussion of other patterns of purchasing. Throughout, important foci are ideal goals, the financial constraints put upon them, questions of mutual aid, and the structures of expenditure which result from their combination.

Housing: from visitor to king

As with anyone in Canadian society, for Fijians housing is a basic necessity, one which must be met almost by definition. But Fijians are unsure, self-conscious immigrants. They are also a people who place great importance upon the residential family unit, and are individuals who have grown up to the theme that land equals security; the significance of housing to Fijians cannot be overemphasized. The purchase of a house is a central objective, and once acquired, it is at the core of their every-day lives. Accordingly, the means to its acquisition have been well developed, even in the short time during which Fijian immigration has been of any consequence, and we must look at this structure with some detail.

As both an ideal pattern and a normatively-defined empirical one, there is a definite sequence which Fijians follow towards home ownership. It has been noted that upon arrival Fijians will initially stay with relatives while a job is secured. Unless a decision has been made for the newcomers to join the household of their host (or that of another family), the next step is to secure rental accommodation. Some pre-1972 immigrants were able to skip this step because of the greater ease of financially securing a house, and a few newer immigrants move directly to houses because of cash reserves brought over from Fiji, but both are exceptions to the rule.

In contrast to the folk-critique that Asians are coming to British Columbia with enormous savings and are using this money to buy up Lower Mainland property, Fijians earn the financial rights of access to a house

in Canada, working in the same job market as other Canadians. The type of rental accommodation preferred by Fijians already shows something of the model of desirability which they apply to houses. Space, especially bedroom space, is the most important criterion. Save for young families, Fijian households are large. A nuclear family with an eldest child of seventeen would typically have three or more children; and in due consideration for Fijian personal privacy, two bedrooms are usually deemed necessary for a mature family.

Cost is the prime limitation on the form which rental housing will take, although it is not the only one. Because all but a few who have been blessed with extremely low rents plan to eventually buy a house, there is a general reluctance to pay more for rental housing than is absolutely necessary. The higher the rent, the longer it will take to accumulate the financial resources to buy a first house. And rents in the Lower Mainland are very high, as reflects the inflated local prices of real estate and of mortgages. Two-bedroom apartments in the Vancouver area currently run about $310 a month.[1]

The type of rental housing preferred by Fijian families is locally referred to as a basement suite, and is an apartment constructed in the basement level of a private house, where it usually takes up all or most of the available square footage. Fijians are loath to rent in apartment buildings, except when families are small. These basement suites usually have two or one bedrooms (the former predominating), a kitchen and eating area, a washroom, and a living room, with all dimensions a bit reduced

from that of the house above. There is always a private entrance, usually at the back of the house, and often there is a connecting set of stairs to the main floor above.

Why Fijians prefer these basement suites involves several factors. They are certainly a good value in terms of their cost relative to space; a two-bedroom basement suite typically rents in the range of $230 a month, and one-bedroom ones go for somewhat less, around $190. Utility costs will depend upon whether the suite is a 'legal' one (see page 243) or not, in the latter case they are usually zero, thereby further increasing their value to prospective tenants.

But cost aside, there are other ways in which these suites are advantageous. First of all, they are very commonly rented from other East Indians, often from other Fijians, who reside on the main floor. This provides for greater freedom of use than would obtain in an apartment building. An East Indian tenant understands Fijian family organization and the social demands put upon the family by immigration; he or she would find the large and variable number of resident family members acceptable, where an apartment house manager, to say nothing of the other tenants, might be quick to complain.[2] The same goes for cooking traditional foods, to the smell of which apartment house tenants also object.[3] Additionally, basement suites provide a measure of overall autonomy and security unparalleled in other rental accommodations, and may well have the additional benefit of having kinfolk upstairs.[4]

As with the earlier stage in this progression to home ownership, the

time during which Fijians stay in rental accommodation is variable, depending upon individual, social, and historical factors. Because of the increase in rents and the cost of houses over the past four years, this time period is now longer than it was, and will likely tend to continue to increase significantly over the next few years, all things being equal. Today, the time spent in rental housing averages about a year, with much variability in individual cases. In the future it is likely that for many Fijians renting will become a long-term or a permanent condition, although it is not so now. The sequence is now complete only with the next step, the purchase of a house.

As a normative Fijian Canadian culture pattern this sequence from visitor to house owner is still developing, as reflects ongoing Fijian immigration. It has created within the rising Fijian community a structure which interfaces with that of chain migration:



Figure 5. The Sequence of Fijian-Canadian Housing

Although relatively few Fijians will actually participate in every element of this sequence, virtually all will activate parts of it, thereby benefiting from the multiple aspects of mutual aid involved and at the same time positively reinforcing the sequence itself.

A House: the unrestricted ideal type

Powerful forces of tradition orient Fijian desires to have a house of one's own. In Fiji, the single family house is the norm, and while the number of people living in apartments is rising this is a new and uncommon pattern, especially for developed families. The limited extended family is also common, which also constrains housing types with respect to size, sleeping arrangements, and the like.

In strong contrast to traditional Indian patterns, while Fijian Indians have considerable affiliation and fondness for their houses, houses are definitely seen as a commodity, a thing to be bought and sold, acquired and lost.[5] This is not to suggest that an extreme value is not placed on houses, for it is. The dearness and scarcity of Fijian freehold land, coupled with the uncertainty of native leases make the ownership of a house a real prize, and a house constitutes a place of security for its inhabitants.

No precise equivalent of a Fijian house exists in Canada. But, at the same time, Fijian ideal expectations of their first Canadian house are far from what might have constituted an ideal Fijian type, and there is no attempt to reduplicate in Canada what they had in Fiji. Rather -- and this is a most important point in relation to the prevalent Canadian

critiques of East Indian housing practice -- the ideal Fijian Canadian house type is a synthesis of Fijian ideals, family needs and Canadian expectations of proper behaviour, as seen through the eyes of Fijians. This cannot be overstressed; while attempting to find housing which suits their own needs, these people make a concerted effort to adapt to Canadian housing patterns, especially when those patterns do not seriously interfere with family needs.

If unrestricted by financial considerations, an ideal Fijian house must first of all have adequate sleeping space for all present and potential family members. Ideally, there should be a bedroom for each adult couple and enough additional ones so that each other adult might have their own; sexual segregation of unmarried adults is the rule, and must be reflected in house facilities. Children should not have to be placed more than two to a bedroom, and there ought to be available room for potential guests. Considering the size of Fijian families, this means that three bedrooms are normally the minimum acceptable number.

A second important consideration is that a house ideally have adequate public areas to deal with the heavy influx of visitors with whom one is certain to have to contend. This constraint requires in particular a living room sufficient to seat at least ten people. Kitchen and other facilities to meet this same need (as well as family requirements) are normally amply supplied by any Canadian house, and are not important determinants of housing choice.

Although Fijians exhibit all the characteristics of English "house

pride", in buying a house there is no overriding initial concern with lot sizes, shrubbery, paint colours, and the like, or with the neighbourhood locality, except in regard to how the latter affects access to transportation. It is what is inside the walls of a house which ultimately counts.

The ideal house must be relatively close to sources of employment, a factor which has resulted in quite a number of Fijians moving closer to work after buying a first house further away. This is of particular importance when women household members work, for they often must rely upon public transportation (bus) to get to and from the job, and both distance and an odd-hour work schedule can easily make travel most difficult.

Consideration of the nearness of other Fijians is relatively weak, but is not altogether absent. Fijians follow the Sikh (Mayer 1959:4-6) pattern rather than the Chinese one (Cho 1970) in this, and select houses primarily for their own qualities and not so much in regard to the proximity of other Fijians. As will be developed shortly, geographical concentration of Fijians results primarily from considerations of housing types and job availability.

Financial Constraints

While there is much variability among the various sources of mortgage money in regard to qualifying conditions, interest rates, and monthly payments, an approximate norm can be found, and from it one must conclude that at the present time buying a house in the Vancouver area is a dif-

ficult objective to financially achieve. Although their means to meet this obstacle are different from those of many Canadians, Fijians must nevertheless contend with the same set of societal financial constraints as other Canadians -- constraints which limit their complete realization of an ideal house.

Housing of any sort in the Lower Mainland is currently at least as expensive as it is anywhere in urban North America, if cost is measured against value. The average selling price of a house in the city of Vancouver is presently in excess of $60,000.[6] This price is tied to the extraordinary value of land, for few serviced lots in Vancouver sell for less than $40,000, which in turn sets the minimum price for a Vancouver house.

Housing prices of this order are a new phenomenon in Vancouver -- so new that those Fijian immigrants who came before 1972 obtained houses under far less difficult conditions. This has created something of a 'class' discontinuity between earlier and more recent immigrants. But these higher prices have constituted a constraint under which most Fijians have obtained houses, and such prices are likely to continue.[7]

Mortgage conditions are extremely restrictive, as reflects the near-monopolistic control of the Canadian chartered banks. Bank interest rates on first mortgages are currently running 10¼% (March, 1977), while the local credit unions and trust companies charge ¼ to ½% more for their more liberal qualifying conditions. Both banks and credit unions require a large down-payment, which normally ranges between twenty and twenty-five

percent; considering that the average Vancouver house costs $60,000, this implies a down-payment of from twelve to fifteen thousand dollars. The National Housing Authority of the CMHC offers potential home-owners a means of putting down only 5% on new or nearly new houses, but this program would not apply to most Fijian houses; they are too old to qualify.

While this large down-payment alone is a significant impediment, others follow. Monthly payments are normally of the order of 1% a month, or in the case of our average house, $410. Banks require that the household income, only the husband and wife included, must be almost four times the monthly mortgage payment, or $1,400 a month for a $60,000 house. This implies an annual family income of minimally $17,000, varying in each case because in mortgage qualifications a wife's income is only considered at 50% of its actual value.

The Compromise

These financial constraints weigh heavily upon Fijian families, especially because they are designed with a Canadian nuclear family in mind. Banks do not allow the income of children to be counted in the family's gross income, for by Canadian standards children are not to be trusted when family and individual interests diverge. The income of adult brothers and sisters does not count because they are not 'really' part of the family. In point of fact, because of the high number of working family members who are willing to collectively support the purchase, it is not all that difficult for larger Fijian families to financially afford a

house. But to be able to afford one and to qualify for a mortgage for one are quite a bit different; the latter sometimes requires some behind-the-scenes manipulation.

The type of housing actually sought by Fijians is a rational compromise between these financial restrictions and needs. Few Fijians bring home a single salary in the $20,000 range, and therefore it is almost always requisite that two or more adult family members work if they are to secure a house; this income requirement is at least partially responsible for the high prevalence of working Fijian wives. If both husband and wife work, and if one is fortunate enough to earn a reasonably good wage, then they are usually able to buy a house, given that their expectations are to find a house somewhat below the average $60,000 price.

The compromise type maintains the demand for living space, especially for real or potential bedrooms. This unwavering demand makes consideration of rock-bottom priced houses out of the question, for they are mainly one- and two-bedroom, basementless cottages. Fijians must instead look to houses in the price range of fifty-two to fifty-eight thousand dollars. For a first house cheapness is the primary consideration, and therefore anything superfluous to basic needs will tend to temporarily be dispensed with, including niceties like dishwashers, and the general age and condition of the house; these things can be rectified later.

One other factor directly affects the real price of potential Fijian housing and is an important determinant of what sort of homes are actually purchased, and this is the house's rental possibilities. Fijians them-

selves normally demand a large measure of privacy in the home. But at the same time, if it is possible to arrange the house in such a way that a separate rental unit is created, this is entirely acceptable. Because of the nature of Vancouver houses and of Fijian financial restrictions, there is usually only one such possibility available -- a basement suite. Such a suite requires minimally that there be a basement, and this has become a near absolute demand in Fijian housing.

The cost benefits of a basement suite are very clear. For every dollar of monthly rent collected from one it is possible to pay off one-hundred additional dollars of mortgage. Thus, the existence of a typical basement suite at present day rental rates is equivalent to taking $20,000 off the effective price and 40% off the monthly payments of a typical house.

Other considerations also enter secondarily. A downstairs suite gives a family the potential for nucleation without separation, or for bringing in other more distant kin. Development of a basement suite, a practice carried out by many Fijians in their first homes, also raises the resale value of the home.

Most of these existing suites are, strictly speaking, illegal. This is the result of zoning restrictions which have classed many areas of Vancouver as suitable only for single-family housing. But due to the high demand for housing in the Lower Mainland, they are only formally illegal -- no agency of government normally enforces this aspect of the zoning code. The 'illegality' of these suites is reflected solely in

their invisibility in mortgage qualifications (they are not considered) and in the fact that they cannot possess independent utility servicing. Beyond this, they are de facto legal. The only marked exception has been in the suburb of Richmond, where during the fall of 1976 there was a crack-down on illegal suites. Ninety percent of those charged (Vancouver Sun, Nov. 4:33) were East Indian.

Buy a House, Form a Community: Fijian settlement patterns in the Lower Mainland

This compromise house type is not just an abstract model. Fijians do buy the sort of homes which fit this model with relentless uniformity. They never buy houses without basements, except in a few special cases.[9] More than one-half of Fijian homes have functional basement suites, and their lack in the others I believe to be mainly attributable to the short time during which the houses have been owned.[10] Because of cost considerations most first Fijian homes in Canada are relatively old, typically in excess of twenty years, and often double this.[11] Costs currently range from $50,000 to $60,000, again referring only to initial purchases. There are typically four or more bedrooms, and there are never less than three.[12]

Houses possessing all of these features are severely localized in the Lower Mainland, especially those which are low priced. As indicated on the first following map (Figure 6), certain areas can be quickly eliminated. Kitsilano and Kerrisdale have this type of house, but at prohibitive prices. Shaugnessy and its environs, Point Grey, and the



Figure 6. The Geographical Boundaries of Preferred Fijian House Types[13]



Figure 7. Fijian East Indian Residential Distributions in the Lower Mainland



Figure 8. Sikh Residential Distributions in the Lower Mainland, 1959



Figure 9. Sikh Residential Distributions in the Lower Mainland, 1976

whole North Shore are completely irrelevant, for in none of them is anything available below $70,000. Richmond possesses some promise, but on the whole is too new and this is reflected in prices. The focal point of the highest density of these houses is in older South Vancouver, or more accurately in south-east Vancouver. The logical boundaries of Fijian settlement are relatively sharp. These boundaries are sharpest along Main Street in the west, and in the east, and are weakest in the north.

Empirical boundaries are quite close to these logical ones, as demonstrated by the distribution of households in Figure 7.[14] As is strikingly evident, the bulk of Fijians have chosen to live in East Vancouver. There are small localizations in Richmond, Port Coquitlam, and Surrey, but these are diminutive in comparison with that of East Vancouver. Beyond these outposts, very few concentrations of Fijians exist in British Columbia, with the notable exception of Prince George. There are, for instance, very few in either Victoria or Kamloops. This strong concentration is reflected in the intended destination of 1975's Fijian immigrants, who almost uniformly were going to places where other relatives already resided (Heath 1976):

Vancouver	1,505)		Toronto	160)	
Victoria	9)	1,896	Hamilton	13)	222
Other B.C.	382)		Guelph	15)	
			Other Ontario	34)	
Edmonton	126)				
Calgary	41)	185	Other Provinces	20)	20
Other Alberta	18)				

Table IXX. Intended Destination of Fijian Immigrants, 1975.

Of those 382 who are placed in the 'other B.C.' category, a great number will have headed for cities adjacent to Vancouver.

House Choice or Community Choice?

This extreme localization of Fijian settlement is indeed primarily the result of two factors: Fijian demands for affordable housing of a particular type, and chain migration. It is difficult to separate these two, for they are but two aspects of the diachronic sequence of the establishment of these people in Canada. I believe that house choice predominates in this localization, for the reasons which have just been outlined. Fijians are fundamentally a new community, and most are either in their first Canadian house or are aiming for this situation; they must buy where they can, and East Vancouver is the logical place. But other factors are also of consequence.

Perhaps the most important is that one's home be reasonably accessible to public transportation. This is vital to the development of the family's female workforce, and in any case Fijians are loath to spend long periods of time commuting to the job.[15] And most of the potential jobs are in Vancouver or close to it. Houses are cheaper in outlying areas for just this reason but everything else being equal, Fijians will not opt for a twenty-mile daily transit to the job.[16]

Statistical and social factors which result from chain migration also reinforce this concentrated settlement pattern. Because new immigrants normally reside temporarily with their relatives, they are likely to

search for rental accommodation and ultimately for a house in adjacent areas; the tendency for Fijians to rent to other Fijians reinforces this trend. At the same time, community access is not altogether dropped from view, especially with more established residents. Thus, the latter often select houses in this same area when they move up to their second Canadian house.

Part of this concentration results from informational constraints. To date, Fijians have been very reluctant to pioneer new geographical areas in Canada, and settlement outside of the Vancouver area is very spotty. Moreover, with the exception of those in Ontario, all other Canadian Fijian communities started with initial 'colonization' from the Vancouver area and were built up by the secondary chain migration of relatives who came chiefly from Vancouver. Thus, the communities in Edmonton and Calgary are growing quickly at present, as the word spreads back that jobs are available in Alberta, while to the best of my knowledge there could not be more than forty Fijians resident in the rest of Alberta.[17] Moreover, these communities would have been economically viable had they begun to grow five years ago, but the informational inputs were then insufficent to promote migration.

Fijian and Sikh Settlement Patterns Compared

As indicated by the distribution in Figure 9, Sikh settlement in the Vancouver area currently parallels that of Fijians, but exhibits greater dispersion from the centre.[18] As Mayer (1959:4-6) has indicated, Sikh

settlement in the late 1950's was largely dependent upon the same criteria as that of the present day Fijians -- ability to afford a house and its distance from work. As illustrated by Mayer's (1959:35) map (Figure 8), concentrations existed along False Creek and in East Vancouver, the former resulting from an earlier day when lumber mills in that area were a significant source of employment. Also paralleling the Fijian situation, Mayer (1959:6) saw very little connection between this geographical localization and links to kin and friends, for as with Fijians the car mitigated the distance between community members.

As illustrated by these settlement patterns, while there is no "India town" where East Indian residents predominate, there is a very high East Indian presence in East Vancouver. As developed in the last two chapters, while this concentration facilitates the growth of community it also contributes to the growth of anti-East Indian racism.

The Collective Advantage

Many people in the Lower Mainland have seen their house-buying potential evaporate in the last five years as price increases far outstrip those of wages. Without considerable collateral, the costs are far too high for many of those of moderate (even median) income. Rents have increased as well.[19] Unless an unlikely change occurs in the future, the next generation of Vancouverites will either inherit houses or rent. It may well be that the day of the single family dwelling is largely over in the urban core of Vancouver.

This high cost of housing has hurt Fijians too, but it has done so selectively. Before 1972, houses ~~were far~~ cheaper than they are now, even relative to wages, and it was not difficult for the enterprising Fijian family to buy a house; virtually all did so, and some bought several. Recent increases in the price of houses have increased the value of these earlier immigrants' investments greatly, often doubling them. This in turn allowed these same people to place very large down-payments on far superior houses and yet not have to deal with overly onerous payments; many of them have done this as well. The result is that earlier immigrants possess unambiguously fancier homes, while recent immigrants have found the means to any sort of house whatever difficult to achieve.

While changing conditions through time have differentiated Fijian housing, it has also been variable among the Fijian population at any one time, for families do not all possess equivalent resources. Those with low individual incomes or where few family members work labour under a considerable liability, and either of these situations slows down the sequence to home ownership markedly.

Nevertheless, Fijians will continue to buy houses, and will do so above their class and occupational station. Mutual aid, and a larger productive family workforce are the keys to this success. Because they are willing to live in larger domestic units than many other Canadians their housing cost per person goes down sharply, as do the cost of services which are related to the household. Larger households also allow better utilization of time devoted to daily chores, with the result that Fijian

households release consistently more personnel to the labour market.

Even though Fijians on the whole do not earn large individual incomes, the total income of a household can nevertheless be impressive if more than two family members work, as is so common. While it is relatively rare that adult incomes are totally merged, agreements (sometimes formal ones) are normally worked out so that house payments can be met without constituting too much of a burden on those who nominally own the house; these agreements can range from formal and binding joint ownership of the house to what essentially constitute rental arrangements.[20]

Because obtaining a house is more often dependent upon qualifying for a mortgage than it is upon the Fijian family's ability to pay, mutual aid systems have developed to deal with this problem. Quite a number of Fijians are able to either obtain part of their down-payment as a loan from Canadian relatives or to talk relatives into putting up their own property as collateral; the latter is more risky as it could potentially lead to the loss of one's house, and is therefore rare.

Beyond these financial benefits which Fijians enjoy because of their reliance upon kin are other advantages which stem from their orientation towards purchasing in general. Initially at least, Fijian immigrants are not heavily committed to patterns of high consumption; it is not so much that they are intrinsically parsimonious, but rather that their material needs are rather limited in extent and that they have not yet been taught by the North American media and by Canadian life patterned after it that they should need more. The result is that for a while immigrants' expen-

diture on quickly consumable things is limited, and savings which can be applied to a house accumulate.

Moreover, Fijians do not have excessive expectations about what would constitute an ideal house. They will accept old age and bad condition in order to quickly secure a house. Because this limitation of expectation is reflected in lower cost it increases the Fijian likelihood of obtaining a house. Few Fijians will wait until they can afford a $67,000 house if they can afford a $57,000 one.

Finally, Fijians are not so privatized that they are above having renters living in their house. Many of their Canadian neighbours are, or else they would have long ago followed suit and developed the latent potential of their basements. These basement suites are often the difference between just making it as a house owner and a comfortable existence.

Perhaps an example of these systems of mutual aid in operation would be in order:



A Fijian-Canadian Household

The modest house in which these people live was bought a year ago for $53,000. 1 works in a furniture factory where he makes about $10,000 a year, gross. His wife (2) adds another $6,500 for her work in a clothing factory, making the couple's total income $16,500. Neither (3), 6, nor (7) work at present. 1 and (2) qualified for a $40,000 mortgage and their monthly payments are approximately $420. Towards this payment 4 and (5) pay $190 a month as rent for their "two-bedroom" basement suite, utilities included.

The upstairs couple therefore only need to pay $230 a month on a gross monthly income of $1,400. Taxes, utilities, and a small payback of a down-payment loan to 1 's father bring the total monthly cost to about $350. It is likely that both (3) and (7) will soon be in the workforce, further lessening the family's proportion of wages paid into housing.

This same house, if bought by a nuclear family who refused to rent out the basement, would be an enormous financial burden on a family with even a $20,000 income, who could be paying out almost 40% of their income in monthly payments. And it should be added that in terms of size and the actual number of people working, the family in the above example is, if anything, the <u>minimal</u> case.

<u>Nucleation, Assimilation, and Financial Instability</u>

In order to do justice to reality it must be said that these financial systems of collective assistance are not without their intrinsic weak points. Such 'systems' indeed exhibit a considerable degree of instability, for which there are several reasons. Some uncertainty is unavoidable, for individual incomes and the possibility for earning them are dependent upon the job market and the situation of the individual concerned. Occasionally, the loss of one or two family members from the workforce can have dire consequences for family financing. In this Fijians do not differ from other Canadians, except insofar as Fijians are often protected from com-

plete disaster by other individual incomes or by family loans.

But there are more fundamental reasons for financial instability, especially as it concerns housing. Nucleation, because it separates family members and therefore earning power from the original household, is a threat to the latter's financial security. Moreover, it is an intrinsic and common occurrence, rising especially through the marriage of one's children. By way of example, if one's daughter married in Fiji then certainly that labour was lost to the family of origin. But at the same time the (sexist) evaluation of wage labour as being superior to household work decreased the subjective perception of the loss. In Canada, the fact that that same daughter is visibly and concretely adding to family income cannot be overlooked.

There is little which can be done to prevent nucleation, and occasionally it can lead to financial disaster, as in the following example:



△1 and ○2 are in their forties. They are the heads of the above household. A year and a half ago they bought a house, qualifying for it because they both worked, albeit at fairly low wages. In doing so, they entered into an agreement with their married son 6 and daughter-in-law to collectively own and pay for the house. The latter have only recently married, and have a young son, △8. Of this nuclear family only the husband now works.

Recently, the married son and his wife have announced their intention to leave the household and to find rental accommodation. They cite the lack of privacy and autonomy as the reasons; this house is not physically divided. If they in fact do so, as seems

certain, the $500 payments will fall upon the elder couple and (3), who can only work erratically. (4) and △5 are still in school. They have other monthly payments which are also very high, and fear they may lose their house.

The rate of nucleation of Fijian households is likely to increase, as assimilation to Canadian norms and values progresses. Indeed, the eventual end point of the housing sequence outlined earlier will eventually be a household configuration no different than that of other Canadians, and this tendency is already becoming evident among earlier immigrants. While it is certain that because of the financial advantages they enjoyed in coming to Vancouver when house prices were still low they do not need to depend so heavily upon the income power of an extended family, at the same time their children, raised for a significant part of their lives in Canada are tending towards living in smaller households after marriage.[21]

The House as a Home

As should be by now obvious, the house stands at the core of Fijian life. This will become even more evident in Chapter Six, where the social and community aspects of Fijian establishment in Canada are outlined. For now, if suffices to say that house-buying constitutes a landmark in Fijian life. Fijians centre strongly upon the home and family, to the extent that the two are inseparable. The house becomes a focus for identity and a place of ease and security. In many respects its walls encapsulate Fijian ways of doing which are not expressed in the public world. Language, values, and customs often shift at the portal of the front door.

The home is also the prime focus of Fijian community; it would be

fair to say that Fijian community is as much a network of houses interconnected by lines of communications as it is a network of individuals.

Expenditure and Models For It

It must be reiterated that buying reflects the buyer. To a discon-certing extent, you are what you buy. Although the question of self identity and buying must be deferred to Chapter Eight, purchasing and expenditure have other implications for the purchaser which directly affect Fijian establishment in Canada. Here the concern is with the pattern of expenditure itself and with the equation of thrift which stands behind it.

It would indeed be convenient if Fijian patterns of expenditure could be nicely packaged into one of those ready-made models of thrift and deferment of gratification which abound in the literature of economic development, but they cannot be. Empirical Fijian structures of purchasing are fairly coherent, but do not collectively fit into any such simple category. Rather, their consumption patterns and their orientations to them depend very largely upon what specifically is being bought, and so I will attempt a division of this sphere in order to illustrate the themes which stand behind it. I begin with what constitutes a large initial capital outlay in Fijian establishment in Canada, house furnishings.

House Furnishings, Public and Private

Home furnishings can be divided into two spheres, the public and the

private, with respect to the likelihood that these things will be seen or used by people outside of the family household. Perhaps it might be more accurate to say that there are areas of the home which are deemed to be of one or another of these categories and that things for them are bought with this in mind. Either way, patterns of purchasing are divisible in this manner. Public spheres include the living room in particular, as well as entrance ways, halls and stairs. The most private areas are bedrooms (which are mostly kept with their doors closed), while the kitchen, washrooms, and everyday eating areas are in a grey zone.

While it would be difficult to argue that either sphere is seen as being more important, far more effort is put forward to bring public areas up to very high standards of appearance. In this, the standard reflects a culture pattern which has evolved in Canada, one from which Fijians do not greatly deviate.[22] As with ideal house types, in furnishing the public sphere this culture pattern mixes Fijian practice with Canadian expectations and Canadian material means to satisfy them.

Public areas ought to be clean, bright, and comfortable. There is no doubt about the status implications of the way these areas are furnished; it is almost as if the total family house-pride is concentrated in this endeavour. As mentioned, there ought to be facilities for seating upwards of ten people, but this places few constraints upon what sort of ways this might be accomplished. Status criteria, as culturally determined, do. Furniture, including chairs, sofas, rugs, tables -- indeed, everything visible in the living room -- ought to be purchased new and should look

like it.[23] Sofas and chairs are tightly constrained as to type; they are almost uniformly overstuffed, modern, and brightly coloured. Lamps, tables, and the like exhibit a thin, gaudy, veneer of pop elegance. Never will one see older styles of furniture.[24]

Other things are more-or-less requisite in the way of public furniture and decorations. One is the ubiquitous stereo system, which usually displays a striking uniformity of appearance, make, and placement. Another set of public furnishings are "Fijian markers", which either announce Fijian identity or link the present to individual pasts.[25] They are of very little expense. Houses are usually carpeted throughout, but particular attention is placed upon the living room. Last, but not least, among public area purchases is a television set, which seems to be present in every Fijian living room without exception.

Private spheres exhibit much more latitude in their furnishings, and at the same time show a higher degree of traditional influence, particularly in the kitchen. Because Fijian dietary practice has not changed radically with immigration, it is understandable that utensils for preparing and serving food have not changed significantly either. These are relatively inexpensive and few. The lack of development of the use of Canadian foods has resulted in but a meagre Fijian contribution to gadget consumerism; there are few superfluous electrical applicances, save for an occasional dishwasher.

The same sparseness is evident in bedrooms and washrooms, but to a lesser degree, for here, too, Canadian material and cultural norms prevail.

There is, however, considerable latitude in the newness, uniformity, and quality of furnishings, these all depending much upon household finances.

Status, Conformity Pressure, and Tradition

Stereo systems and their presence or absence might seem to be fairly trivial things to consider, as might the type of furnishings used by Fijians generally. Perhaps on the face of things this is true. But as material indicators of patterns of buying, of 'cultural evolution' and of self identity they are not, for these are closely linked.

Furnishing the public sphere is clearly not only a question of functional need and of the finances requisite to fulfill it. Because of the strong networks of social interaction which arise between Fijian households there is much visiting between them, to say nothing of the perpetual stream of visitors who come and go from points overseas. Because of this alone there are many comparisons made between the visible areas of respective houses -- made with the assumption that overall household fortune is somehow linked to these appearances. People are therefore keen to put the best appearances as possible forward.

But this display rises in importance when one considers the generally lower standard of living experienced by most in Fiji. More importantly, relative statuses are shifting from what they were in Fiji and material success here is the most significant way of increasing one's status within community networks. In the light of the importance of 'public' (that is to say, other Fijian) opinion, it is understandable that considerable

pains are taken to furnish household areas which are most open to comparison.

But this leaves open the question of what will then constitute positive markers of material success. Some of these have been transported from Fiji and were traditional objectives; rugs were rare in Fiji, and so one must have rugs in Canada. The same goes for stereos, as modified from an earlier demand for radios.

But more interesting is the large degree to which public area furnishings are chosen, again with an eye to status significance, on the basis of ideals which have evolved in Canada. Although I do not have direct access to the historical development of this status calculus, its evolution is fairly clear. For house furnishings Fijians usually buy through large 'furniture warehouses'. These establishments specialize in mass-produced, modern furniture of remarkable unsophistication. In large measure, earlier immigrants buying through these places set the standards of excellence for the community at large. Once established as a statistical trend, these standards have been sharpened by enormous conformity pressure. Because Fijians visit primarily with other Fijians, their sources of alternative models are severely restricted. At the same time, effective social status largely obtains from Fijian rather than Canadian sources, and to deviate from the model into other acceptable Canadian patterns, say French Provincial, would be courting social disaster.[26]

Private areas are to a far greater extent furnished in an economically rational manner, based at least in part on traditional expectations. Be-

cause these areas are by-and-large used only by household members and visiting women they are far less directly a product of status considerations.[27]

Cars

An automobile is the other important purchase effected soon after immigration. Cars are relatively rare in Fiji, as reflects their very high cost. There, owning a car was an important marker of middle class success, made even more so because it was not a necessary adjunct to life.

Here cars are quickly realized to be a family necessity due to the long distances between home, work, and shopping. Uncertain public transportation and the odd hours which many Fijians work make buying an automobile unavoidable. It is however an extremely costly necessity. Monthly car installments are aimed at repayment of the loan in a few years, and therefore payments are very high; the payments and insurance on a $5,000 car can occasionally match family rent; and in restricting available monthly funds the purchase of a car can seriously reduce the family's ability to buy other things and to save. Nevertheless, Fijians do accept the inevitable, and virtually all families have at least one car.[28] They are very hesitant to have two.

Several more-or-less rational factors increase the price of cars to Fijians. Perhaps because of their general unfamiliarity with automobiles they prefer to buy one which is either new or nearly so; they are concerned that if they do not they will be plagued with expensive repairs. Because

Fijian families are large, it is the preferable course to buy a bigger car, which is correspondingly more costly. While the status potential of cars is carried over from Fiji in some degree and results in a measure of conspicuous consumption, particularly among young males, this is not nearly so marked as with home furnishings. Fijians also pay more for cars because of their purchasing naivete, a point to be further discussed shortly.

Food and Smaller Expenditures

I have already said something of Fijian eating practices and of the entrepreneurial possibilities open in this area because of the demand for Indian specialty foods. The expenditure patterns which surround this area must now be considered. Because Fijians eat customary foods in the customary manner their overall food costs are very much lower than for those who follow North American dietary habits. Indian food after all evolved in due regard for efficiency in situations of want. The relatively better-off conditions of Fiji have considerably modified the Fijian Indian diet, especially toward the inclusion of seafoods and greater use of meat and fowl, but none of these predominates. For Fijians basic foods are therefore far cheaper than for their high protein-consuming neighbours. While Fijian dishes are often labour-intensive this is in a way money saved, for few Fijian foodstuffs are bought in any prepared state.

Fijians do not scrimp over food, but at the same time are not overly

extravagant, except at important functions. They allow themselves a significantly higher standard of everyday food than most had in Fiji, with the notable exception of the wide range of traditional foods which are not available here, and with the qualification that a few immigrant Fijians were able to employ servants in Fiji to do much of the attendant work.

For food, Fijians mix both rationalized and traditional sources. For most, the (Fijian) Gujarti-run East Indian specialty store is the main source of Fijian specialty items and of basic dry goods like rice, oil, lentils, and sharps (coarsely-ground flour). Many of these items are either unobtainable at the large supermarkets or are more expensive there, due to low turnover and small packaging. Nevertheless, there is an element of traditionalism in this relationship, for a Ugandan-run store but a half-a-dozen blocks away on the same street often has significantly lower prices and better specialty produce, and yet few Fijians frequent the place.

For meat, chicken, and fish items, there is very little shopping around done for competitive prices on single items, and not very much comparison is made of the overall price levels of different establishments. Rather, it is common to develop personalized relationships with those who work in the small butcher and fish shops which still persist in competition with the chain stores; this situation parallels many buying relationships in Fiji.

For those other items which other Canadians use, especially produce, canned, and paper goods, Fijians head for the chain stores, where these

things do tend to be cheaper. They do not do much comparison shopping between stores, and tend to settle into a pattern of shopping at one or another of these stores in particular. In this, the hope of a chance meeting with other Fijians and the adjacent availability of other stores are both important factors.[29]

Beyond home, furniture, food, and car, Fijian expenditure is severely limited, primarily because needs in other areas have not yet been created. Clothing costs are low, the cheaper department stores are frequented almost exclusively, and there is still some home clothes-making going on. Only house-modification costs are collectively high, but this could be considered to be an investment rather than expenditure.

Fijian recreational costs are very low as well, for visiting constitutes a primary ingredient of it, and one's cost output in attending to visitors is largely reciprocated.[30] The significant exceptions are trips either to Fiji, which usually mix business and pleasure, or to California, where many have relatives; neither is an annual occurrence, by any means. With respect to immigration, some funds are remitted to Fiji, mostly to one's family or towards the maintenance of property there, but this does not appear to be an important factor; also related to immigration, phone bills are often large, but this is highly variable. Beyond these things there is very little else.

Patterns of Expenditure: Hindu Protestantism or limited demand?

Fijians on the whole are far more controlled in their expenditure

than is normal in the middle class North American society to which they aspire. It is reasonable to ask whether this parsimony is linked to an analogous ideology of the place of goods and services which might serve to limit and control the nature of expenditure. In short, does there exist among Fijian immigrants anything to parallel the Protestant Ethic's orientation to material things? The answer must be made very tentatively, for I have access chiefly to behaviour and to rationalizations for it, and ideological commitments are difficult things to root out. So qualified, it has already been suggested in Chapter Four that Canadian work ethics have a number of parallels with that of the Protestant Ethic, and that Fijian work ethics diverge from these considerably. With respect to purchasing ethics, differences between Fijian and Canadian practice are far fewer, while both diverge markedly from the ideal type characterized by Weber. To illuminate this parallel one must return to the Protestant Ethic itself.

The ascetic Protestant view towards the acquisition of goods supposedly was one of detachment, for extreme involvement with worldly goods threatened salvation. Although required to find salvation within the context of society, the Calvanistic Protestant was to be "in the world, but not of it". Expenditure was justified by utility and functionality, as defined by how these things contributed to orderly life in a calling and not in regard to how they eased or gave pleasure to life. Indeed, the easy life was intrinsically dangerous to one's salvation.

Fijian orientations towards material things are not framed in such a

narrow calculus of bare functionality and guilt. Rather, at least as an ideal type, goods are intrinsically good, for they give pleasure to the owner. It would be nice to have anything one desired, and there would be no shame in it if such a thing should occur. But it will not, for in this world one is constrained by both individual and social limitations. Pleasure and useful things come from access to money, and conversely, money should be spent to get these things. Hard work, judiciously applied, begets money, which in turn allows access to desired goods.

This is not an ideology very reminiscent of that of the Protestant Ethic. On the other hand, neither is it very <u>different</u> from present-day high-consumption North American ideologies of buying; this raises several questions. The more fundamental one is in truth outside the scope of this thesis: why is it that in North America the Protestant Work Ethic has persisted, while the associated orientation to goods has not? That such a thing has happened is certainly reasonable, for modern industrial economies require two things of their populations -- that they work steadily and that they <u>consume</u> the products of their work. The existence of a Protestant-like parsimonious ideology of expenditure would be disastrous to the structure of Western economies as presently constituted. It is not surprising that the whole weight of the media and of criteria for high social status have been long oriented towards high consumption.

The smaller question is more amenable to investigation here: if Fijian ideologies of expenditure are fundamentally no different than those of other Canadians, what causes Fijians to exhibit lower levels of expendi-

ture, even taking into consideration the obvious factor of lower income? There are really only three logical options. Relative to other Canadians, Fijians might exhibit a higher efficiency in purchasing either (1) because they are more careful to buy based upon criteria of functionality, or (2) because they are more careful to rationalize the process of buying as regards price, alternative possibilities, and the like. They might also exhibit lower levels of expenditure simply (3) because of a lack of development of need. The actual pattern is a complex amalgam of all three of these possibilities, but crudely put, one could claim that the general pattern is that lack of need, augmented by functional buying, has offset deficiences in finding where the cheapest price lies.

Functionality and Purchasing

On the whole, Fijian expenditure is reasonably utilitarian, especially in large purchases like housing. In the latter case, first house choice is very clearly oriented towards the functional needs of the family. In other instances, the degree of functionality is more variable. Second house choice, for instance, is just as clearly motivated by the desire to have a new house as it is by its higher use-value. We have seen also that status criteria are important in public area house furnishings. But on the whole, Fijian expenditure in the areas of private household furnishings, cars, food and clothing are very well matched to need and very little conspicuous consumption occurs. Fijians tend to concentrate their buying on basics and upon items which are not quickly consumable. Much of this

high functionality of Fijian expenditure does not come from any particular inhibitions in spending on frivolous things, but rather from lack of models for so doing, a point to be discussed shortly.

The main other way in which the cost of Fijians' use of goods and services is reduced is through collective use, and this naturally does not restrict itself to housing costs alone, but transfers to all household items which are not of a strictly individual nature; for example, a family will require a refrigerator regardless of the number of individuals within the household. Wherever Fijians can make households which contain more than the number of people in other Canadian homes they have an edge in functional use which eventually comes out in lower familial maintenance costs.

Rationality and Purchasing

The achievement of a pattern of low expenditure is most seriously restricted in the area of finding desired goods and services at the cheapest price, with the significant exception of housing. There are several reasons for this. As with finding work in one's field, newer Fijian immigrants suffer from severe informational restrictions; they quite simply do not know where to go to get the best prices, nor do they know much about alternative financial routes to the same end.

This initial information vacuum is perpetuated by a second consideration which mitigates against the most efficient patterns of purchase, that of the routinization of sources. It is typical that a Fijian family

buys many of the things it needs from a very limited number of establishments, few of which offer any competition with each other. It has been suggested that part of this routinization may stem from patterns of buying in Fiji, and from the security which comes from shopping in a place where one "knows the rules", but these are very tentative solutions. One aspect of Fijian buying practice most certainly is a factor here and constitutes another source of gross inefficiency in Fijian expenditure, and that is the constant use of credit.

Cash and Credit

While it has long been a maxim that paying cash for purchases kept one living within one's means, few people today do either, and Fijians are no exception. Especially for large purchases and for many smaller ones credit buying predominates.[31] One must keep in mind that Fijians come from a background where credit was vital to even the most isolated cane farmer, and their Third World status ought not cloud this fact. Fijian Indians have been firmly into a cash and credit economy for three-quarters of a century. Crops brought in cash, and credit from stores and money-lenders supported life between harvests. These patterns have been carried over into the cities.

Ease of credit often determines the source from which Fijians in Cañada will buy, which introduces a two-fold inefficiency. First of all, these places are not necessarily those with the cheapest prices; uniformly, a car on a dealer's lot will cost more than the same car sold privately,

but the former provides financing, while the latter seller usually requires cash. Fijians, often with very low cash reserves, will opt for the car on the dealer's lot.

The same situation holds between businesses which are in competition. Cars, furniture, houses (naturally), clothing, gasoline, and car servicing are very often bought on credit from those who offer it. That the same thing might be offered at a lower price elsewhere on a cash-and-carry basis does not override the perceived advantages of credit.

Secondly, Fijians rarely consider the cost of the exorbitant interest rates on their loans, some of which reach 25% per annum. Interest is almost like a natural condition of life, not a factor to be manipulated among expenses. Rather, it is very common for purchasing costs to be judged chiefly upon one criterion alone: how much a month will it cost? It is almost as if one's standard of living was dependent upon the number of "so much a month's" one can obtain, these in turn being dependent upon monthly income. It is not rare that over 50% of Fijian Canadian family expenditure goes out in the form of monthly payments.[32] Consumption is often limited by Fijian lines of credit.

Credit buying also has two other effects which depress the efficiency of Fijian expenditure. The use of credit allows one to purchase in the light of an immediately perceived need, thereby decreasing the potential for planning purchases and for seeking out the cheapest price. More importantly, extensive credit buying severely decreases cash reserves, which can have the effect of absolutely requiring a steady, uninterrupted income.

People with high monthly payments are therefore often locked to a particular job because it provides the necessary financial rewards, and can be faced with disaster if family income is interrupted or lessened even slightly.

An Economy of Needs

From where then does Fijian parsimony arise? It comes mainly from a general lack of development of needs relative to other Canadians, a lack which is not based on ethical principles, but rather upon their limited assimilation of Canadian norms. In short, they have not yet learned that they need electric blankets, dishwashers, or diaper services.

Because it is only in the home that Fijian cultural patterns can be preserved to any significant degree, it is there that this economy of needs is most strongly evident. There are obviously some attempts made at reduplication of elements of Fijian family life in Canada, and this endeavour does reduce costs. Because material things were limited in Fiji, so were needs, not in the sense that Fijians lack ambition or the quest for more, but rather because of the formation of ways of doing which were parsimonious reactions to economic limitations. In Canada, one sees this carried over in a concentration upon basic purchases and upon non-consumable goods, and in an emphasis on goods over services. 'Additive' purchasing prevails; there is, for instance, little money spent upon entertainment and recreation. Because Fijians have not yet reached the state where children are viewed as being unnatural or burdensome, they are far

less of an economic liability than in other Canadian homes. Children are part of the family in more than a definitional sense, and need not be bought off with expensive toys or with their own high-sugar diet.

Assimilation and the Economy of Needs

Because Fijian parsimony of expenditure does not stem from any direct ideological commitment to be so, there is very little which will in the long run keep Fijian patterns from quickly merging with normative Canadian ones under the influence of assimilative pressures. Unlike the Sikhs, Fijians do not have a history of an aggressively defensive minority united by religion and blood, with its strongly centripetal tendencies. Unlike all early Asian immigrants to British Columbia, they do not labour under the restrictions of a racial caste -- restrictions which affect buying as much as they do access to work and social esteem. Rather, their unique heritage, with its heterogeneous origins, its strong forces towards economic rationalization and its many Western influences make them susceptible to rapid economic assimilation. Only the primal importance of the family, and of collective action based upon it -- that one facet of Fijian life which has survived undiminished into the initial phases of immigration -- will slow down this process. It is to the family and the social networks which surrounds it to which we must now turn.

Chapter Five: Notes

1. This figure is an average of apartments advertised for rent in the weekend, Vancouver Sun editions of September, 1976. Many of these ads are "come-ons" which are aimed at luring prospective renters to a particular real estate agent, and the effective average is likely to be even higher.

2. Complaints by other tenants are reported to be very common in apartment buildings, where tenant families are normally stable and numerically small. Fijians in these situations often do not know their rights as tenants and do not stand on them; they are unused to situations where non-relatives try to dictate their familial customs.

3. In a few cases I have encountered, Fijian families who live in apartment buildings have for the most part dispensed with cooking Indian foods. I cannot say how much of this marked change can be attributed to modification of eating habits due to complaints.

4. Having kin upstairs obviously can be either a benefit or a hindrance, depending on personal factors. Regardless, it does provide an ongoing information to those downstairs over a wide range of areas.

5. Many Sikhs with whom I have talked argue that for them a house is an integral part of the family. Houses in the Punjab rarely go out of family possession, but this is not so in Fiji.

6. This is a near universally quoted figure among both real estate salesmen and local bank loan officers.

7. Because of the present difficulty expressed by many people in qualifying for mortgages, this price spiraling has currently abated. Prices are not likely to decrease in the near future.

8. Credit unions are more liberal about interpreting sources of income and the like, but rarely allow more than 20% deviation from these figures.

9. These cases include side-by-side duplexes with limited basement areas and large ranch-style houses in Richmond built without basements because of the cost of dealing with sub-surface water.

10. It is not atypical that a basement suite will be constructed within a year of the purchase of a house without one.

11. This is not to say that Fijians have any love of old houses. Those who have been able to buy a second house usually have selected modern ones.

12. In many instances, rooms have been modified or used to new purposes in order to create more bedrooms.

13. By logical boundaries I am referring to those determined by the distribution of housing of the type and cost range sought by Fijians. These were determined by block-by-block touring of the area and with the aid of two local real estate agents.

14. This map results from 132 verified addresses of Fijian houses out of those which I collected during this study. Those resident south of Vancouver in Richmond and Surrey may be under-represented, as were those in Port Coquitlam..

15. Fijians immediately recognize the need for a car in Canada. Men are not so quick to accept that women might also need them, and many women are in this way significantly handicapped.

16. Although this is a highly speculative assertion, it seems that the lower proportion of Sikh women who work allow Sikhs more flexibility in selecting houses. Many more Sikhs do in fact live in outlying areas, but some of this spread definitely is the result of historical settlement patterns (see Button 1964).

17. By all evidence, those who move to Alberta presently do so mainly because they cannot find work here rather than because of the attractions of Alberta.

18. Figure 9 was constructed by selecting all the addresses of four Sikh names -- Bains, Dhaliwal, Sidhu, and Gill -- out of the Telephone Directory of [the] East-Indian Community (Singh Publications 1976). The Sidhu names were plotted by Alan Mabin, Department of Geography, Simon Fraser University.

19. Rents have not risen as fast as house prices because of the provincial restriction of annual rent increases to 10.6%. This has cooled speculation considerably, as houses can now rarely be financed and paid for through rent.

20. As these contracts are normally dependent upon the agreement of all parties concerned, they are occasionally broken, sometimes with disastrous results; the nominal owners are occasionally left with the total load of monthly payments after other parties have left.

21. This is not to say that Fijian household patterns are currently under radical flux. It is still far too early to predict the normative structure of second-generation Fijian-Canadian society.

22. The marked exception occurs in highly assimilated households, particularly those which had been under strong Anglo influence in Fiji, e.g. the upper middle class.

23. The exception would be momentos of Fiji.

24. On the few occasions when I have seen Fijians visit Canadian houses decorated with expensive period furniture they have been distinctly nonplussed.

25. These Fijian markers are very important in regard to Fijian self identity and will be dealt with in detail in Chapter Eight.

26. At times, the uniformity of Fijian public areas reaches wonderous proportions, especially in cases where the item involved was not common in Fiji. Stereos are a case in point. Not only do they tend to have the same general appearance, but also they are placed in a uniform manner.

27. This brings up an interesting point for which I have no ready answer. When visiting it is common that women move to the kitchen while the men sit in the living room, especially if the visitors are close friends or relatives. But this means that while visiting, women have access to both public and private areas while men are restricted to the public one. Does this therefore imply that public status standards are largely male creations?

28. It should be added that it is strictly speaking inexact to say that Fijian families have cars. Rather, by-and-large, Fijian males have them. Women are often left to take public transportation to work, and often do not learn to drive. In part, this deficiency could be argued to stem from practical considerations -- Fijians are reluctant to buy old cars and newer ones cost money -- but this seems insufficient to explain the differential. Lack of access to cars severely restricts some women's access to friends and relatives, and isolates them at home.

29. One must keep in mind that with so many people working, Fijians have very little time left for shopping. For many families, Saturday is the only convenient time. Going to large shopping centres eases the time problem considerably. Two are frequented in particular, one at Kingsway and Main Street, the other at the intersection of Brentwood Avenue and the Lougheed Highway.

30. It is interesting to note that pets are very rare here, for they are not uncommon in Fiji. Expenditure on outdoor recreation is also low, in spite of its importance in Fiji.

31. Although I have very little empirical support for it, two of those rare bank loan officers who can tell the difference suggest that Sikhs are far more oriented towards cash purchasing than are Fijians. This brings up the possibility that differences in their respective backgrounds are primarily responsible.

32. This would include housing and utility costs. Some Fijians claim that for them the figure reaches 70%. Indicative that monthly payments are a larger consideration than overall price, the answer to the question, "how much is that?" is uniformly answered by the response, "(so much) a month".

Chapter Six: Within These Walls: Fijian Canadian Household Life

A grasp of Fijian Indian household organization is central to understanding the present and future situations of these new Canadian immigrants. This is especially so of community social structure and of the ideological and material factors which are every day modifying that structure. This Chapter develops this area, with particular reference to factors which result in household organization and to the respective set of roles around which that structure is formed. In so doing, the range of household members, their concerns, and some of the ways they resolve them are also introduced.

Up to this point discussion of family organization has been consciously deferred. This has been done largely in order to mitigate the problem of analyzing a structure which expresses a very high degree of variability on the ground; there is no one normative Fijian Indian family type. Keeping this problem very much in mind, those sections of this work which have preceeded this one have concentrated on those things necessary to an understanding of Fijian Indians in Canada in which relative constants abound. In particular, the concern has been with those situations where Fijians interface with roughly similar social and material constraints.

Analysis of Fijian Canadian household life is a much more difficult endeavour.[1] What occurs within the walls of a Fijian home is far more autonomous, far more likely to follow traditional Fijian patterns than anything which transpires outside. The home is a reservoir of difference

and of relative encapsulation, largely protected from the social and economic forces for conformity which lie outside. For this reason, there exists a very high degree of internal variability between one household and another as well as within any one of them over time.

Ongoing immigration is a major factor in this heterogeneity, although it is not alone by any means. Immigration is responsible for household members varying considerably in the depth of their Canadian experience and it brings them together from a wide range of age, class, and occupational backgrounds. All Fijians must work, and must do so under roughly the same constraints. When they form their households their own personal idiosyncracies have far greater sway. At the same time, Fijian Canadian households have been in existence here for widely varying periods, with the result that assimilative forces have entered families very differentially indeed. Household size, too, is hardly constant, and the life chances of a household of three are not those of a household of eight.

Generalization and Reality

Upon reflection, many of the theoretical options available to urban studies seem inadequate to the task of defining this situation. Statistically-oriented methods show all of their weak points here, for additive generalization in this case would produce normatively-verifiable nonsense: Fijians rarely have 3.4 children, nor do they ever choose to live with their uncles 17% of the time. An anthropological method of one sort or other is prescribed.

However, the more traditional anthropological approaches are not all that useful either. The structural-functionalist assertion that many empirical situations are sufficiently synchronous and well-ordered to justify a concentration upon normative ideology is hardly applicable here, if it ever was anywhere. Neither is its more modern variant in urban anthropology, the procedure of "bringing the village to the city" -- where the hope is that ghettos, barrios, ethnic neighbourhoods and the like are sufficiently bounded that such a technique is still valid.[2] Allowing a measure of individual choice in a polar set of ideologies and attendant behaviours, as in P. Mayer's (1971) study of "red" and "school" Xhosa is not all that much better, while Leach's (1965) analysis of Kachin social organization as stemming from the use of ideologies as strategies towards individual advancement is more promising but is still too constrained. Alternatively, the dramatic elucidation of the crucial event, done with such sophistication by both Mitchell (1956) and Turner (1957) is also insufficient, for familial organization is primarily a result of everyday adjustment and management. This in itself suggests a viable method.

I choose once more to focus on the degree to which interconnected, tactical decision-making by role-linked household members results in patterns of household life, residence in particular.[3] Toward the understanding of household composition and internal relations, I will concentrate upon the nature of relationships between different familial roles. The focus will be upon the situations and fields of choice available to the total range of possible personnel with regard to personal benefit and

advancement.

While this constitutes an obvious simplification, I believe it to be a justifiable one. Especially when one regards the immediacy of interpersonal relations within the family, it seems clear that the ongoing structure of household relations results from a moving synthesis of actions and attitudes of the participating individuals, each trying to gain maximal advantage for themselves and for those with whom they affiliate. I would suggest that the four major elements which are relevant in actor considerations of advantage are economic benefit, power, status, and a catch-all which can be termed personal comfort.

It should be noted that these advantages must be related to role-linked individuals; all are measures based upon individual and household contexts. Moreover, power is the only one of these factors which ever operates in such a way that one person's gain is another's loss. The others can in fact be advantages which in interaction with other household members can be mutually increased -- thus providing the necessary requirement for relatively independent individuals living together and collectively benefiting.

Because of this very real possibility that managed interrelationships between household individuals are not necessarily restricted to "I win, you lose" competition over scarce resources, I do not choose to cast these relations in a competitive framework. Rather, analysis will centre on dyadic relations between role-defined household members, where each tries to maximize his or her advantage, not necessarily at the disadvantage

of the other individual. A set of such strategies will be generated in this manner to cover the relevant possibilities. Subsequently, the discussion must move on to questions of sexual stratification, assimilation, and stress which exist within this structure.

The Extended Family Household and Its Internal Relations:

status, power, security, and the couple of authority

The very large majority of Fijians who live in their own homes in Canada currently live in some form of extended household. Within nearly all of those households there exists a crucial structural element which will here be termed the couple of authority. The couple of authority refers to that married pair who are at least the nominal owners of the house and controllers of household destiny. It is from this couple that most relations within the household radiate.

A couple, rather than, say, a male of authority has been chosen because married pairs form a discrete decision-making, economic, and social unit within Fijian Indian families. While males may often be the vehicle of externalizing decisions and of the overt exercise of power, it is not at all clear that they therefore are more powerful than their mates. Moreover; the married pair's social and economic destinies are closely linked, the first by tradition and community custom and the second because of the fact that a single income is usually insufficient to support a household -- a point of much significance to household relations. These same considerations also hold for other household members; their marital status

is crucial to their respective position within the family, to their degree of economic independence, and to the flexibility of their strategies for advancement. Couples therefore constitute a concrete unit of inter-relational analysis.

To return to the couple of authority, while their home ownership status and household control which it implies allow them considerable power and status, in no way are their resources sufficient to monopolize these things. Couples of authority would indeed like to see their household as indubitably and inarguably theirs; they clearly have in mind an ideal whereby power and esteem grade hierarchically down from their own exalted position, where they alone mediate between the family and the external world. Moreover, they will constantly strive for this goal and will usually act as if it has already been achieved even if it has not. But realistically, even though their real powers are considerable, the couple of authority must continually negotiate their respective positions with other household members. This is an ongoing process.

In accord with their ideal model of household organization, the couple of authority benefits from two processes, (1) the placing of other household members in positions of subordinance, thus providing positive advantage to the couple of authority, and (2) gaining the maximal number of household members without thereby threatening either the position of the couple of authority of their benefits derived from others. In microcosm, these constitute the same perpetually-evident organizational problems of the feudal lord and the corporate lineage head.

By placing other household members in positions of at least provisional dependency, the couple of authority can derive considerable benefit, far more than can anyone so subordinated. Economic advantages are obvious, as indicated in the previous Chapter; dependents often enable the couple of authority to afford a house and its furnishings, they provide labour for household chores, and constitute economic protection against the caprice of fate. Because of the economy of scale, they also lessen domestic *per capita* costs. At the same time, each dependent increases the status of the couple of authority *vis a vis* other Fijians and that couple's authority and ability to maintain the dependency of others. A large number of dependents in the household of a couple of authority increases their community-based prestige because it allows that couple to claim the role of secure familial heads, patriarchically leading their households through life.

This all seems to provide a rather poor deal for dependent household members, and the question arises as to why any of them would accept such a position. Some household members are of course literal dependents, for they are children. The more interesting cases by far are those adults who could at least in theory separate from the household. The answer is at the highest order twofold, and rather simple: the dependency is not overly burdensome and at the same time produces tangible advantages for the dependent.

One must always keep in mind that couples of authority have no formal (legal) power over other household members, except for young dependents,

and this, too, is rather limited. Couples of authority cannot compel family members to do very much. Moreover, because Fijians by-and-large find their incomes independently of the family, the heads of the household cannot mediate this process. This naturally restricts their power in comparison with what it might be otherwise. Neither does the 'Fijian community' have very much of an effect on the economic destiny of its members (entrepreneurs excepted), and the only coercive power which a couple of authority can indirectly derive from community members is the threat of shame in the eyes of that community. This, too, is weak, for possible community sanctions are near non-existent. Whatever coercive power the couple of authority has over other individuals stems largely from literal dependency, from the expedient acquiescence of others, or from the normative status positions which these two hold as kin and elders. These factors vary widely among the dyadic relations between the couple of authority and other members of the same household.

Significant Competitors for Status and Power

Of all the structural elements of such an extended family, the position of other couples is by far the most unstable and is the source of the most conflict between the couple of authority and others. The reasons for this are fairly straightforward. The married couple is first of all the natural unit of nucleation; the income of a couple is normally requisite to establish a new household. It also is an ideal that each Fijian couple ought to strive to eventually become a couple of authority with their own

household; because the Canadian economic constraints against the realization of this goal are not severe, this ideal is constantly being realized. For these two reasons alone, the residence of a couple within the sphere of authority of another couple is very often viewed by the subordinate couple as provisional.

This centripetal tendency is very often further increased by conflicts over the respective statuses and rights of the two or more couples involved. Any claim of equal status is an anathema to the couple of authority's hierarchical model of authority. Moreover, it is often difficult for subordinate couples, imbued with the conflicting idea that marriage equals autonomy, to tolerate very much in the way of subordination. These conflicts and considerations are not uniform across all potential couples.

Primary Generation Couples

Primary generation couples are here defined to be those who are considered by the actors involved to be of the same generation as the couple of authority. These are usually people of literally the same generation, for instance, the married couples which include siblings of either the husband or wife of the couple of authority, or couples, one of whom is a "cousin" of either.[4] But because of the commonly large age spread of Fijian children, nephews, nieces, uncles or aunts can effectively be of the same age as the couple of authority and are normally accorded about the same behaviour as "real" primary generation kin, modified according to their literal relation. They are therefore included for definitional

purposes (when married) among primary generation couples.

Couples of this sort possess the highest potential for conflict and centrifugal action of any isolatable unit of Fijian Canadian households. In those empirical situations where such couples are indeed living with a couple of authority of the same generation, the people involved are normally young; this is especially so of the subordinate couple, and the arrangements are typically of quite short term, usually less than two years.

There are fundamental practical problems which mitigate against such situations persisting. Status conflicts can be extremely sharp, for in many ways the two couples are commensurate in situation and resources, and yet one couple, riding upon what is usually an economic advantage, demands the position of authority and pre-eminence. Because these other primary generation couples normally possess sufficient or near-sufficient manpower to make a go of it on their own, the degree to which the couple of authority can demand advantages of them is severely limited, and this limitation in turn can call into question the latter's authority over other household members.

In those cases where primary generation couples are in residence, an unstable peace usually obtains where considerable benefits accrue to both sides. The couple of authority in particular gains income, which they can apply to their high monthly payments and to raising their standard of living.

The primary generation couple, who typically are in the early stages

of sequencing toward home ownership and who therefore are likely to be recent immigrants, gain numerous advantages. First of all, their effective 'rent' is very low, both absolutely and relative to what they would have to pay for equivalent services elsewhere; moving out implies sharply increased costs, except where the move is to another household. This constitutes a significant constraint. Staying on, while members of the primary generation couple develop their economic potential, allows for the rapid accumulation of savings which will then be applied to their first house.[5] At least temporarily, living within someone else's household also allows for a rapid adjustment to Canadian life by virtue of normalizing many things which would be problematic to immigrants on their own; for instance, they do not have to immediately learn of the sources of food and services, discover where to pay their utility bill, or face the potentially traumatic process of finding rental accommodation. The whole sphere of home life becomes, if not non-problematic, at least understandable, and this constitutes a very tangible short-term advantage.

But in order for the respective two couples to come to such a mutually-beneficial arrangement, it must be done in such a way that all statuses can be maintained. This is extremely problematic where kin, age, and marriage-based status are so nearly equivalent; to put it another way, there is no traditional "premise of inequality" sufficient to allow easy hierarchization. This is especially so when members of the primary couple have higher Fijian-based statuses than those of the couple of authority.

Predictably, couples related through the husband are often placed in a very difficult position, particularly if the male is an elder brother or an older patrilineal cousin; cases of these sorts of individuals living for any length of time together are rare, young people excepted. Couples where the relation is to the husband's side but is female, or even more so those which are on the wife's side seem a bit more stable. Both these relations would traditionally be subordinate in the couple of authority's house, following the Fijian ideological accentuation of the patriline.

Age, too, is a primary consideration. Older primary generation couples have very likely been the heads of households in Fiji, and in Canada they are extremely loath to accept a more lowly household status. Considering the relative maturity of their families, these older couples will normally not affiliate with extended households at all, unless of course the household so formed is their own.

Ascendant Generation Couples

Much the same situation holds for couples in the generation ascendant to the couple of authority, to parents, uncles, aunts, and 'cousins' on either side. Because of their greater age and higher kin-based status, couples of this generation are unlikely to affiliate with their family juniors except in rather specific circumstances where their higher status and kin resources are counterbalanced by constraints of old age, weak earning power, or limited initial finances.

If young enough -- and many of the ascendant generation are only in

their forties -- these couples will normally try to establish their own household in conjunction with a body of kin who are willing to live with them; for the latter, they can draw on both Vancouver and Fijian relatives, especially their children.

Especially if ascendant generation couples have but marginal earning power, it is possible to regularize their position as dependents in the family, for this pattern would follow normal Fijian Indian progression of the generations whereby ageing adults slowly give up effective control over their households to younger family members. To date, ascendant generation couples who have achieved stable situations of relative dependency have done so chiefly upon initial immigration, rather than through divestiture of control.[6]

Again, relative stability obtains through the achievement of some measure of mutual benefit for all concerned, be they potentially independent or not. For newly-immigrated ascendant generation couples, the considerations are the same as for primary generation couples, save for the fact that the relative status differences between, say, parent and child make for a more stable <u>temporary</u> relationship, given that it is managed properly by the couple of authority.[7] For older dependent couples, there are all the benefits of security in old age. For old couples and single adults both, Fijians will not normally avoid what they feel as their responsibility to kin. There are no older Fijian Canadians living alone or resident in old-age homes. Within the household, these dependent old folk are still functionally useful, especially the women, who perform a

variety of less-strenuous household tasks. For the most part, they are granted high status positions and a considerable leeway in their personal idiosyncracies, to the extent that neither of these considerations seriously affects household policy.

Sources of Power

If the above instances each tend to include problems in the stabilization of situations which are advantageous to the couple of authority, from where do their advantages come? Moreover, from what basis does the economic benefits of the extended family spring? First of all, to say that the residence of primary and ascendant generation couples is unstable is not to say that these situations are subject to instantaneous fission. Rather, they show a degree of stability, during which the relationships contribute markedly to the general structure of Fijian Canadian households. While personnel could be said to flow continuously through these situations, the structure itself remains.

Nevertheless, the crucial basis of household organization does not in the main stem from reliance upon these categories of family members. Three others (the latter two in particular) provide this foundation: temporary visitors and new transient immigrants, dependent individuals, and couples of the descending generation.

Visitors

Resident visitors and new immigrants are essentially a residual class,

for they come and go from the household quickly. They are nevertheless numerically important and they are also important because they can be used to transmit and realign statuses both within the household and between it and other households in Canada and Fiji.[8] Visitors from Fiji come as guests, a condition under which they readily acquiesce to a situation of relative dependency.

Overseas visitors tend often to be older people of high status relative to that of the couple of authority, and consequently the latter tend to expend some considerable energy to impress upon their guests their success in Canada; and guests seem duly impressed. This show is as much for consumption in Fiji as it is for the visitor involved, for hosts know full well that upon return their guests will be quick to circulate news of their condition throughout their network of family and friends.[9]

While the economic potential of visitors and new immigrants is not great, they do provide some direct advantages to the couple of authority. For one thing, visitors now may well be household members later, and it behoves one to cement potential relationships in advance. At the same time, these individuals enhance the prestige of the couple of authority through their acceptance of the latter's household authority and occasionally by chastising "wayward" household members.

Dependency

Dependent household members can be further divided into five categories:

a. (literally) dependent children
b. potentially independent single children
c. potentially independent other single adults
d. descending generation married couples
e. (literally) dependent adults

Individuals in these categories constitute the prime material out of which couples of authority construct family households, largely because in each case and normally for a limited period of time, these people are without the resources to easily make a break with the household. They are true dependents, in the sense that they either cannot leave or chose to stay because the transition to independent life at that time would impose severe social, psychological, or economic penalties, especially relative to the rewards of remaining.

Dependent Children

Children below the age when they have any realistic probabilities of employment can be considered not only to be subordinate to their parents but also to strongly support their parents in any ways that their very limited resources allow. Traditional Fijian Indian norms dictate that children indeed ought to be always considered to be participating family members, with their degree of subordination to adults being largely (inversely) dependent upon the degree to which they can participate in family responsibilities as functional adults. Children raised in Fiji are not nearly so much pidgeon-holed into the category "children", as are North American children; there are not two sets of rules of conduct, one for adults and one for children, and the excuse for undesirable behaviour

that "he's only a child" does not carry very much weight. By-and-large, Fijian children are quiet, orderly, controlled, and helpful to the household in what ways they can be, and when they follow this pattern they are intensely loved. Fijian children, again in rather strong contrast to their modern North American counterparts, have a definite, bounded, yet valued place in the family.

As in Fiji, children here are a definite potential resource, for children can be expected to help in supporting the household as they mature; this is an acknowledged asset. Considering that Fijians value children and that there exists a Fijian tradition of having very high numbers of children, one might expect that the same pattern of having many would be followed here. Because of the early stage of establishment of most Fijian families, it is perhaps too soon to make a definite answer, although there seems to be a decrease in the number of children per family. Many younger families seem to be definitely controlling their number of children, but in consideration of their age it might be too soon to suggest that they will have fewer children in the long run. It is still the overwhelming custom to marry and have children, and it is unlikely that a significant population of either single adults or childless parents will soon arise.[10] Having many children is still a source of pride among older Fijian Indians, and to the degree that younger immigrants participate in a Fijian field of values they are likely to feel the same. Very few mature families now have fewer than three children.

Potentially Independent Children

While both the couple of authority and other household members benefit from the contributions of children to housework (especially from female children), children inevitably become adults, and it is near certain that they will eventually be lost to the household. It is certain that through marriage their parents will lose most direct control over their children whether they leave the household or not. Nevertheless, in this period of transition from adolescence to maturity and independence children can be of great benefit to their parents.

As has been stressed at several points, marriage is the minimal requisite for fission from the extended household. While this is not an absolute -- and some young Fijian males do choose to go it alone -- to do so incurs heavy financial and social penalties. Because Fijian jobs are relatively low-paying, renting an apartment at $180 a month can be a real burden for a single person and constitutes a severe loss of usable personal income. Moreover, on one's own all the household duties which were done more-or-less automatically (from a male point of view) now have to be carried out, and at the same time the society of the household is also lost.[11] These considerations hold for all single adults, a point which will be returned to shortly.

While mature children are unmarried they are in a situation of relative dependency upon their parents, who are likely to be a couple of authority. This situation allows for a relatively stable period during which both parent and adult child can mutually benefit. The couple of

authority gain the advantages of economic assistance, of (usually) strong status support, and of more household manpower. Advantages to adult children are quite similar to those of the more temporary household residents which have already been discussed.

If this analysis seems to be relatively cold-blooded, the empirical situations which follow this pattern are so only rarely. The traditional roles of parents and children are still very strong, and because they do not conflict with a fairly rational scheme for individual and household advancement, these roles help to mitigate potential conflicts between parents and children while they provide an emotional and affiliative framework which allows for a large degree of mutual accommodation; by-and-large, Fijian parents and children really do <u>like</u> each other and would like to act in ways which provide the least collective hurt.

At the same time, parents have limited means whereby they could coerce their adult children even if they wanted to, with certain sexist exceptions. If a resident, working, son decided that he did not want to contribute to household expenses, his parents' only effective resort would be to argument and shame, both of which would be limited. To evict him would be unthinkable.

Coercion can and does weigh more heavily on daughters, for they have far more to lose if they were to defy their parents. This especially concerns marriage. To date, many Fijian marriages are still arranged between prospective parents-in-law, based upon assent by the couple involved. Women in particular are dependent upon their parents' good graces and the

latter's ability to find a suitable mate. Men, on the other hand, are allowed (and demand) more freedom to contract "love marriages" on their own. Women are further restricted in their own search for a husband by a relative lack of network contacts which are independent of their parents. Tradition also places unmarried women in a position of parental subordination until they are married. While this is a relatively functional ideology for Fiji, where women traditionally passed from adolescence directly into marriage, here it maintains a large degree of control over women who are already adults and yet are not married. This control is strengthened by the typically low earning power of a single Fijian Canadian woman, so low that making a go of it alone is most difficult.

It is therefore easier for parents to gain temporary advantages from adult female children than from male ones. Here female children can be real prizes. Not only can they contribute to family income, they can also be more closely managed in terms of life direction. There is a large degree of sexism apparent in regard to female education and household duties. Marriage of one's children is therefore one point where Canadian and Fijian patterns still diverge quite sharply. For both, marriage is a normal and desirable thing. But for Canadian parents marriage of their children constitutes the end of a burden, while for Fijians it can mean a real loss.[12]

Married Children

The marriage of one's children is inevitable, and with it comes a

severe weakening of parental control. There still exists one means whereby the prior relationship can continue. This is possible if the newly-married couple can be convinced to remain members of the parent's household, thus creating a vertically-extended resident unit.

From the point of view of the parents, this can be an ideologically-based status goal as well as an economic one, for seeing one's children married and yet not lost, and achieving grandparenthood in one's own household are traditional goals.[13] This objective is very often realized.

Such households are far more common and are far more stable when the resident couple is that of a married son rather than a married daughter, which follows the general pattern of patrilineal extended families around the world. In the former case, the "foreign element" is a woman, who is expected to be relatively subordinate to the decisions of both her husband and her parents-in-law. Given that the relationship between the son and his parents or between the wife and her new in-laws are not overly strained, such a residence situation may persist for a number of years, normally ending with the couple moving directly out to buy their own home and start their own household.[14] Because of the low domestic expenses of the son's family during its residence with his parents, it is often possible to acquire savings at a very rapid rate in spite of low individual incomes. Parallel to the sequence by which new immigrants move from visitor to renter to home owner, this transition from father's household to home ownership is likely to become common as the Fijian population matures.

Holding onto married daughters is understandably more difficult. If

the newly married son at all can, he will try to reside with his own kin, and this already decreases the possibility of matrilocal residence. Those who stay in the homes of their wife's parents tend to be in rather specific circumstances, the most common which is that where the young husband has no close kin in the Lower Mainland -- a situation which is going to continue to decrease in probability as the years go on. The present paradigm case for this pattern stems from the daughter's parents finding her a husband in Fiji; there are several familial advantages in this. For one thing, success in Canada has raised the status of many families very considerably in the eyes of their acquaintences in Fiji, and this alone would allow them to select a son-in-law of much higher status than would have been possible before they immigrated. Through such a marriage the social standing of the family could be much increased.

At the same time, many young, relatively well-to-do Fijian males wish to come to Canada. They have heard that success is easier to achieve in Canada than in Fiji, and yet have neither the skills which would allow independent immigration nor close relatives in this country who could nominate them. These considerations make a match with a Fijian-Canadian woman even more attractive.

Another situation which often brings about matrilocal residence is where the couple of authority lack sons altogether, or have sons who are either already parted from the family or are still very young. In these cases (especially the former) the residence of married daughters is very much desired, and often occurs.

But these matrilocally-based relationships can be exceedingly unstable, following the pattern where there are primary generation couples related to the wife of the couple of authority living in the same household. The son-in-law typically has little affiliation with his in-laws, and is likely to get into fundamental conflicts with them over the questions of rights, duties, and responsibilities around the household. In particular, there always exists the potential that conflicts over the affiliation of his wife will surface. Such couples usually try to establish their own household as quickly as possible.

Other Descending Generation Couples

Descending generation married couples who are not in the line of direct descent from the couple of authority share a very similar set of concerns, interests, and expectations with married children. These interests are modified by the more distant kin relation between themselves and the couple of authority, and they are less likely to establish residence with their uncles and aunts than they are with their own parents, given that their parents reside in Canada. Even though traditional roles would still suggest that these people defer to their elder relatives in much the same manner as would those relative's own children, such an ideal relation rarely obtains, and both parties recognize the greater separateness of their interests than those between parent and child. Such couples tend to establish this sort of residence only when they lack more closely related kin, when such kin relations exist but there is antagonism

between the parties involved, or occasionally when the relation, say between uncle and nephew, was very strong.

Potentially Independent Adults

One of the largest categories of individuals which are found as a structural element in Fijian Canadian households are single adults, who conceivably could become independent of the household. This category would include single, widowed, or divorced adult children, nieces, nephews, "cousins", brothers, sisters, fathers, mothers, uncles, aunts, and family friends of the couple of authority.[15]

With these people one can see the rather distinct collective orientation of Fijians working most clearly. In Fiji there developed among Indian people an internal welfare system in which individuals who were detached from family units might become re-attached to other family households. Before the last decade, very few Fijian Indian adults lived alone save through choice, and both the elderly and the young usually found a place in one or another of their relative's homes.

Here things are currently quite the same. Few who do not choose to do so need live alone. Indeed, few so choose.[16] Most tend to live within a Fijian household. I believe it could be generally said that Fijians do not at all like to live in social isolation; they do not have this tradition, nor do they exercise this option even when it is feasible.

On this acceptance of familial residence ride other factors, the most important of which are economic. Even more than for a couple it is

economically irrational for a single Fijian adult to strike out on his or her own. The differences in household expenses alone would be onerous, and this does not take into account the great increase in household-related labour which would spring from this total duplication and individualization of household routines. Moreover, for many single Fijians who either do not work outside of the home or who do so irregularly or at low rates of pay, residential independence is quite impossible. These people are true household dependents, even though they may work full-time.

Remember, too, the earlier argument; the Fijian couple is the fundamental, smallest, viable independent economic unit, and even it occasionally finds itself economically marginal. To be single means essentially that one is without the resources to reach the objective of home ownership, even if it is the case that, once achieved, that home could be peopled and paid for by a mustering of relatives. To be single means to be at least partially dependent upon relatives.

Even potential independence is rather abstract when it comes to the situation of single, widowed, or divorced women. Strong traditional custom binds these individuals to households, and it is thought that they ought not be left "unprotected", alone in the outside world. Few women take this norm-violating step, and even family disputes will normally see women moving to another household rather than to independent status. Because of this role expectation and the heavy weight of opinion which surrounds it, adult single women are far more manipulatible by the couple of authority than are their male counterparts.[17]

These single people are often vital to the couple of authority's

economic and social position. Because they are relatively dependent and are likely to remain so until marriage (or forever, if marriage has passed them by) their position in the household is relatively stable, and is something which the couple of authority can count on for some time. Economic assistance and its utilization can therefore be planned with some certainty. At the same time, because these individuals are both single and dependent, they do not present the same status threat which they might given their same relation, but married; unmarried adults have lower household statuses than married ones, all things being equal. In the long run, they tend to defer to and to support the couple of authority in household matters, which strengthens the latter's apparent power.

Household Residential Structure in the Overview

These dyadic relations which have been drawn between various possible household members all centre upon the couple of authority. Moreover, they are relations created and defined largely in terms of the question of residence. In both dimensions and numbers they cannot hope to cover the total of possible household interpersonal relations, nor were they meant to do so. They are indeed the most significant considerations in understanding residence patterns. But beyond these are the multiplicity of other one-to-one relations which obtain between all of these types of people and each other, radiating outward to other households, community and society.

As for household membership, this analysis summarizes the general

elements of structure and the concerns related to it, but does not attempt to suggest that real patterns are monolithically identical with the model. They are not. But whatever the composition of actual families, these same considerations must be dealt with by households of three or thirteen.

Extended households of one sort or another do in fact predominate in owned housing. This is not so much the case for rental accommodation, where available space severely constrains the possibility. The number of personnel is quite variable, ranging evenly up from a nuclear family plus one to a few with three lineal generations of married couples or to those with three dependent couples of the second generation.

Even in houses, physical space ultimately limits the number of people in an extended household. In strong contrast to the common British Columbian charge that East Indians live "83 in a room", Fijian ideas of personal space are quite similar to those of Canadians, and they will not tolerate arrangements where people sleep in odd places or in overcrowded conditions, except very temporarily. Unlike the pattern of early British Columbian Sikh residence, where necessity forced many males to inhabit the smallest of accommodations, and unlike similar patterns which have arisen both here and in Britain upon the initiation of the recent phase of Sikh immigration, Fijians are not open to a charge of overcrowding.[18]

Female and Male Roles

Male and female roles in the Fijian household are quite distinct, as one might expect considering these people's Indian heritage. By-and-large,

if the ideology of male and female roles is separated from the behaviour which supposedly is patterned after it, that ideology is very much one of male domination, of the positive evaluation of male-related things, and of the intrinsic superiority of men. But then, so also has the parallel ideology in our own society been until very recently, and so this statement does not carry one very far towards an understanding of Fijian social relations.

Although based upon continental Hindu and Moslem precepts about the respective places of men and women, Fijian Indian views of such things have suffered a considerable moderation while in Fiji -- a moderation which continues with an increasing rate here. One must keep in mind the unique history of Fijian Indians, the strong current of Westernization within it, and the far greater apparent economic participation of Fijian women than their Indian counterparts.[20] In some cases, women in highly Westernized Fijian Indian families live under very similar constraints as do North American women.

Ideologies of Superiority and Inferiority: the view from the top

But for most Fijian women in Canada this is not so. Their ideologically defined position is far more severely constrained than is typical in North America. From the male point of view, women ought to defer to men in all those areas worthy of male consideration. Males should make family decisions and announce them, males should mediate between families and between the family and the outside world, and males should be the

disciplinarians in the family. Males, too, are the only 'natural' family heads, and are the only 'real' line through which the family survives; consequently patrilineal relatives ought to be more important and more powerful than matrilineal ones.

Such an ideology quite naturally arranges and evaluates economic activities in a congruent manner. Men's work is real work, for it supports the family. Women's work around the house is beyond the pale, from the point of view of men, and is not so much negatively evaluated as it is unevaluated; it does not count.

The View from Below

As it stands, this white-and-black ideology is rapidly fuzzing in Canada, especially in the light of the extreme importance of formal wage labour by women. Women are still left with all the normal household chores, in addition to working outside of the home. But at the same time, outside work has been a significant source of information for women who in Fiji would have been more isolated from new ideas than would their men. Working has brought vastly increased English proficiency, public and individual confidence, and alternative models for the place of women.[21] These will in the long run effect marked change in the position of Fijian women in their own households.

But for the time being, it is more usual that women in large measure acquiesce to the expectations of males. One should not from this be led to the idea that therefore the everyday situation of women in Fijian households is one of constant subordinance and frustration. Elements of

both of those exist, but again, reality is much more complicated.

Paradoxically, it is the very definitiveness of male and female roles which allow the latter considerable freedom. Perhaps an analogy might make this more clear. Feudal organization in pre-industrial Europe was firmly based on a premise of inequality. There were different kinds of people, notably peasants and nobles, and they were decidedly, intrinsically, seen as unequal. Nobles dominated peasants and at least ideally, that was that. But the very nature of the enormous gulf between these two roles allowed for considerable latitude of action for the peasant. The noble wanted his taxes and his access to labour, and beyond this cared very little about what was going on in the village.

Fijian women are in an analogous, albeit far better position than those peasants. Because certain areas are so definitively supposed to be areas of male supremacy, other areas allow for an understandable place for women. Because housework "does not count", household activities of all sorts are the legitimate domain of women -- a domain where men often have only the foggiest idea of what is going on.

Male and Female Realities

Because of these sharp sex-based role distinctions, male and female Fijians have constructed quite different views of reality which, like those of the noble and the peasant, exist side-by-side. The male version of reality has already been touched upon. Understanding the female one requires the introduction of a bit more of the behaviour linked to it.

Looking in from the outside, I believe that there is little doubt

that one can argue that at their fundamental centre Fijian households are underpined by a core of women. Women have been left with household work (and a large degree of household control) by males; but once ceded, this area has become a source of strength. In each household, women's concerns are very close to each other. Their activities are parallel and are often done collectively. Because of role expectations and this constant interaction between household women, they largely direct the course of everyday household affairs.

Men, on the other hand, not only go out to work at different jobs than each other (women do this also), but have developed status conventions whereby it is considered unmanly to divulge too much of one's concerns to other men. Consequently, even when they are at home together, very little personal conversation obtains between men, for egos intervene. Fijian women have not developed this defensive posture to the same degree, and between themselves readily converse about things which are to them both personal and real; while men often use conversation as a vehicle for status protection and elevation, women really converse.[22] There exists in each Fijian household a female community of discourse and a relative anarchy of male views.

Sharp separation of women's and men's everyday activities also supports this division of reality. Many types of household work are outside of normal male participation -- so far outside as to render them almost invisible. In particular, women do all the work surrounding the preparation and serving of food, including cleaning up afterwards. If the number of people is large, they may also eat after the men, although

this is not the rule. From the male point of view, it is almost as if food magically appeared and disappeared at the appropriate times. They come to the table, eat, and leave. Although they often wax eloquent about Fijian delicacies, very few men have any knowledge whatever about cooking. This whole area is not only "women's work", it is a daily cycle which is strictly defined and organized by women.

Role etiquette also assigns men to the living room and women to the kitchen area during visiting where, following the same pattern as within the household itself, rather different sorts of information flow.[23] Men talk of essentially abstract things -- of house prices, of types of jobs, and secondarily of individuals who are mutually known by host and visitor. Women not only transmit their own different concerns, but again are much more oriented towards personal information and the realistic situation of people -- mostly other women. Again, a significantly different view of the world comes out.

Etiquette constrains the merging of these two realities, because (as in our own social context) control over mixed conversation is supposed to be, and in fact usually is in the hands of men. Women are not expected to be sharply critical of men in these contexts, and tend to restrain themselves; in the kitchen the same women may be making great fun over the idiocy of their men's conversation ten minutes later. It would be disturbing indeed to Fijian men to know how commonly their women view them as if they were boys who never quite grew up, but they shall never know, largely because of the information barriers between the collectivity of women and their men. The same barriers unfortunately allow men

to believe that they are really in control of the situation when often they are not, and allow them to be convinced that women and their male-oriented view of them are in well accord.

All this suggests that while Fijian women are undeniably subordinate to their men, and indeed are more so than is typical in North America, at the same time this should not suggest that the situation of Fijian women is to that same degree more oppressive than in other Canadian families; because of the dominant ideology of male control it <u>can</u> be, but it usually is not, at least in any way that is easy to pin down. Again, the "premise of inequality", accepted at least superficially by both sexes, allows for generally agreeable, orderly, and most of all, understandable relations between the sexes.

<u>Male and Female Conflict</u>

But things are not always tranquil between the sexes, and in particular this is so of young married couples. For these younger couples, already imbued with new and sometimes contradictory ideas about the nature of marriage and family before they leave Fiji, immigration and establishment in Canada can strain marital relations very severely indeed.

Although unique personal factors enter in every case, for several structural reasons it is usually the male in these conflicts who is the source of "the problem", and they are certainly the most active participants in these dramas. Most problems stem in one way or another from divergent expectations of marital roles which cannot be mutually resolved or complementarily ordered.

This divergence in marital expectations is already becoming frequent in Fiji, where massive social change has increased the heterogeneity of Fijian Indian backgrounds and with them, the heterogeneity of marriage partners. Because of the tightly organized, almost castelike stratification system of "pre-industrial" Fijian Indian society, marriage partners -- usually selected by status-conscious parents -- were likely to be of very similar backgrounds. Conflicts were possible because of personal incompatability, but they were less likely to be about the 'rules of the game' -- about the nature of marriage and the family, or husband and wife roles. Established Fijian marriages are remarkably stable, even in Canada.[24]

Today this homogeneity is fast disappearing. Marriages are still made with about the same eye towards status and material position, but the number of routes towards status and wealth have vastly increased, and with this increase have come divergences in world view. Nevertheless, those young couples who have married in Fiji and who later jointly participated in the process of immigration are more stable than those which have been joined here, and in all cases there seems to be more marital conflict evident in Canada.[25] Why this is so involves several factors, not the least of which involves a relative lack of community pressure. Traditionally, marital conflict in Fiji seems to follow a slightly different pattern than it does among North Americans. Because young husbands often believe quite firmly in their dominant position in the family they will not be above supporting that position by force; arguments can become violent quickly, and in a literal sense. But one could argue that part

of these performances are not meant only for the immediate participants, for both husband and wife know full well that the episode will be rapidly communicated to respective parents and kin. Marriage problems quickly become family problems and intermediaries on both sides will make their appearance, restrain conflict, and attempt reconciliation. The married couple normally feel duty bound to follow family dictates at least in degree, and because at least initially a marriage is more between families than between individuals, marriage conflicts bring up fundamental questions of family status honour. Regardless of fault, it would reflect badly upon both families if the couple separated or if the marriage remained turbulent, and family members will therefore place as much pressure to bear as they are able in order to try to settle the dispute.

Here it is very common that key family personnel who in Fiji might have had sufficient status to successfully intervene are not present in Canada. This can lead to very sorry situations where couples begin their traditional, exponentially-increasing explosion without access to the kinfolk who would normally step in to limit the confrontation without the sacrifice of either person's individual status honour. Real bodily harm to women sometimes results.[27] This problem of the lack of intermediaries is the greatest when the husband's close relatives are not in Canada. As has been stressed many times, Fijians show remarkable adaptability to Canadian values, and the area of marriage is no exception. As an extreme example, those raised primarily in Canada are likely to exhibit marital patterns very little different from other Canadians. But often this rapid assimilation can lead to marriage problems when the two partners have dif-

ferentially adapted to Western ways. This can happen when it is either the woman or the man who is more familiar with Canadian standards.

The most clear example of the latter case occurs when a woman brought up through adolescence in Canada is married to a male who comes directly from Fiji. Here, both the woman's greater informational capability in all areas (which violates role stereotypes) and the likelihood that she will not stand for the domination which he expects produces conflict, as the husband tries to "subdue" his wife. It is very likely that none of his close kin are here, while by definition many of hers are, and he is likely also to resent their meddling.[28]

The opposite problem is not so much one of a more Westernized husband but of a partially Westernized one. Many young Fijian men have discovered a type of personal freedom and lack of restraint in Canada which did not exist in Fiji. While it could be argued that individual behaviour is in fact constrained about equally in either place, in Fiji community and social controls are more important than they are here, while in Canada 'transcendant' and impersonal societal constraints prevail. It is common for young Fijian males to notice the lifting of social controls but to be less aware of the weight of societal ones. Heavy drinking with each other, and involvement with all the other stereotypic concerns of the young Canadian male of ten years ago are consequently very prevalent.[29]

These same patterns are brought home, where they clash with expectations about family responsibility and the wife's role in them. There, divergent expectations coupled with different communities of discourse

make for what seems to be fundamental instability. Whether this sort of behaviour becomes routinized into a stage of life or whether it will persist as the individuals mature cannot be answered at this time.

It should be stressed that this discussion of conflict in marriage should not suggest that Fijian marriages in general are unstable. While husband and wife may have many disagreements, their marriages are well-ordered enough that divorce or separation is unthinkable, and it does not tend to occur after there are children in the family. Even within the constraints of their roles, there is usually a very high level of mutual respect shown between husband and wife, which seems to grow with the years.

Children: people of two worlds

This work has concerned itself primarily with those who are adults or who are nearly so. Little mention has been made of children so far, primarily because in most of these contexts adults and adult decision-making have been fundamental determinants of the situation. But children's roles within the family itself and within the pattern of Fijian accommodation to Canadian expectations cannot be ignored.

Fijian children in some respects have significant advantages over their parents in making sense out of what is to be their new home. They will almost uniformly have been in school in Fiji, and will have been taught many of the same ideas and values as their age-mates in Canada. Importantly, instruction in Fijian schools is in English, and they are therefore likely to be fluent in it. Moreover, Fijian children are in

the vanguard of new ideas -- which for Fiji will mean primarily Western ideas.

Upon arrival, children benefit from the same protection in initially residing with kin as do their parents, but face qualitatively different challenges in school than their parents do at work. While work is often a relatively protected environment where the new immigrant's major activity is routinized labour, school is a far less protected place, for the name of the game is intense, constant interaction. Children are placed under enormous pressure to accept their peer group's norms and to succeed in terms of them. From the point of view of the immigrant child, this presents an essential challenge, his or her response to which will in large measure determine the child's attitude to Canada. The challenge is clear. While it is not framed as such, it essentially charges: be Canadian and be accepted; be different and suffer the consequences. Immigrant children have several options at this point.[30] Will they seek to meet peer expectations, or will they isolate themselves within their ethnicity? Either way, will they be accepted or isolated?

Several variables are relevant, including language facility, the presence or absence of cultural or biological markers, and the ethnic group's view of others. Newly-immigrating traditional Sikh children, for instance, may be limited by impediments in all four of these areas and may suffer severe isolation. Fijian children are potentially impeded only by colour -- a restriction true enough -- but one which in the British Columbian context tends to weaken after favourable interaction. Fijian children speak English. They almost instantaneously adapt to peer con-

ventions with respect to appearance, dress and behaviour, areas where behaviour is very similar in any case.[31] They also hold no ethnic or religious barriers to freely participating in most of the activities of their school mates. The result is a very high rate of assimilation to the expectations of their peers, and with them, to Canadian norms.[32] Fijian children are fast becoming Canadian children, except perhaps in terms of ethnic identity.

Television and Children of all Ages

In the sociological literature, positions on the effect of the media upon its audience vary from the suggestion that they are the classic "neutral vehicles" of ideas and events to that of representing already-held social values, to claiming that they are a powerful force in the formation of values. In the case of Fijian Canadians, the place of television is unarguably the latter.

As culturally close to Canadians as are Fijians in so many respects, they are hardly identical. Fiji is clearly not Canada. Consequently Fijians, like most immigrants, come to Canada with a massive ignorance of the nature of the fine points of North American life, its history and conventions. Initially that ignorance must be carried along for awhile, during the time when finding a job and a place to stay predominate. For quite some time, save for rather formalized relations at work, they will not know many Canadians first-hand. In many respects, television becomes their protected, one-way window into Canadian and American homes and cities, and into the beliefs, values, and concerns of their inhabitants.

In that I know that I write to an audience jaded and well-defended against twenty-odd years of television bombardment, it must be stressed that Fijians have no such defenses. First of all, there is no television in Fiji, although it is now in the planning stage. For all, it is novel and exciting, and because they lack a prior experience with the medium, they lack also that measure of detachment which is crucial to separating out world reality from television fantasy. For some time Fijians do not have the factual basis for such detachment to arise; and what appears on television, save for the most obvious impossibilities, is presumed to be real until proven otherwise.

And Fijians watch a lot of television -- more or less than in a Canadian house I cannot say for lack of experience in the latter. Certainly every Fijian household has a television, and in the evening or when children are home it is usually on.[33]

This would be a trivial observation, if it were not for the fact that both young and old Fijians constantly cite television as the authority for statements about the nature of the world.[34] In some cases this is a benign process, as for instance whenever Fiji or India-related news stories or special events are shown; to take a recent example, during the Montreal Olympics it is likely that few people in the general viewing audience knew that Fiji participated or that Pakistan and India did badly at field hockey, but Fijians in Vancouver knew, and they watched for these events.

Televised movies and dramatic shows, even if they are unrealistic portrayals, serve to present North American values part and parcel with

any understanding of the plot. While these values are in so many ways unrealistic ones, they tend to be unrealistic largely in the directions of being idealizations and simplifications of values-in-action, and thus are potential material for a first-level comprehension of North American life. This must hold especially true for children, of whom more than a first-level comprehension is not asked in any case.

But in other cases where Fijians have no alternate sources of information the influence of television is a disturbing one. It is not surprising that these people show concern over the levels of crime and violence in Canada, even though neither has had much direct effect upon them. In the realm of facts -- where television really moves into never-never-land -- the medium again stands for reality.. Even in news presentations, if one were to say nothing whatever about the degree of factuality of presentations, what constitutes newsworthy events are but a minute spectrum of human behaviour and are insufficient and "uncertain mirrors" of the world.[35]

Children and Adults

The position of children in the Fijian family is rapidly changing because of their ready acceptance of Canadian ways. The traditional Fijian ideal for child behaviour is very much similar to Indian ones. The ideal child should be quiet, courteous and deferential in public, should obey and assist his parents, and should not place demands upon them. Parents and adults come first in the Fijian family, not in the sense that children are denigrated or are disregarded, but rather by virtue of the

latter being of lower status to the degree that they do not act like and perform the functions of adults. For those raised in Fiji this ideal is closely realized, at least for younger children. When children are very young they become an integral part of the family, where they are showered with affection. Four week old children are already making the rounds of households with their parents. But that affection is not in conflict with a very early statement of the rules of the game; behaviour which imposes upon adults will not be acceptable. Even two and three-year olds are expected to be quiet, courteous, and undemanding. Those who are six and seven are expected to watch out for their younger brothers and sisters. As has been mentioned, there is no separate set of rules for children. Neither is there a discrete time when a child becomes an adult, but rather the child does so smoothly and imperceptably, as he or she takes on more familial responsibilities and household chores.[36]

I believe that the fact that this ideal has come so far to being realized in Fiji must be dependent in large part on the centrality of the family in so many institutional spheres, combined with a relatively coherent, interactionally-defined community of values. Here, that community of values is disturbed fundamentally enough to cause marked changes in childhood socialization in just a few years. Children no longer are subject to a consistent set of values, for through peer pressure and school instruction they are quickly learning different values and contradictory ways of behaving. School creates a series of segmented, stratified child worlds, each with its own mores, in contrast to the uniform familial set of expectations. Coherence of values is further weakened

by the lack of a community which supports parental values. Television also pulls the child towards North American patterns of behaviour.[37]

Work schedules further separate the child from the family. While in Fiji it could be expected that one parent and several other family members would be home at any one time, here this is much more rare. When both parents work they are unavailable to the child for much of the time. Nuclear families are often forced to use baby-sitters continually, thereby further separating parents from children; children from families where both parents work are growing up to be virtually indistinguishable from other Canadian children, much to the distress of their parents. It is not so much that parents do not want their children to be Canadian, for indeed they want this very much. Rather, they would like them to maintain some of the behavioural elements of the traditional model while still becoming Canadian. This is a difficult objective for children to reach, and only those who were raised for some time in Fiji effectively approach it.[38]

Because parents are anxious that their children fit in with other children, they tend to almost immediately allow them considerable leeway in behaviour, which is crucial to children's status among their peers. Dress and hairstyle move to North American norms. Children eat with utensils, in some cases even when they are the only ones in the household to do so. Rock-and-roll records appear next to the Indian stand-bys, and children are allowed the freedom to visit their friends and, later, to date.[39] Both boys and girls tend to mix freely with their school mates and very often affiliate strongly with them.

Some conflict between parents and children is inevitable, especially as children move into adolescence and young adulthood. Many are the classic conflicts of people who are largely of different worlds, and consequently many are irresolvable. Questions of residence have already been discussed, but it should be added that an increasing number of sons are likely to be striking out on their own as greater numbers of them are reared in Canada. Marriage is also more problematic for all involved. Children raised largely in Canada are very different than those who grew up in Fiji, and their marriage expectations, including considerations of parental wishes, vary accordingly. Those who have reached marriageable age and have lived significant parts of their lives in Canada are relatively few, but among them one sees a frequent number of unions between Fijians and Canadians. Those raised in Fiji tend to marry Fijians, and because of parental pressure women will continue to marry Fijians more often than do men.

Chapter Six: Notes

1. Because the household, i.e. those in residence together, is such an important and obvious unit of analysis, this Chapter concentrates on it rather than upon family. Most of the relations dealt with here are only in part dependent upon kinship. When the focus moves to community, family will become a primal factor. Naturally, most household members are related to each other.

2. A classic instance of this approach is Wilmott & Young's (1957) Family & Kinship in East London.

3. In some ways this approach parallels that of Turner's (1957) analysis of Ndembu village fission and residence patterns, well mixed with obvious Weberian elements.

4. Fijians reckon kin as having some measure of effective kinship as far as any link can be established on either side of the family, far beyond the already wide range of their kinship terminology. "Cousin" therefore includes people from literal first cousins to others of roughly the same age with the most nebulous of genealogical relations. Some of these latter people, because of their proximity, etc., can easily become functionally indistinguishable from close kin.

5. There is a dialectical relationship here which more-or-less predetermines that such couples will eventually move out on their own; by staying they produce the necessary financial resources to leave.

6. This latter situation has not occurred with any great frequency in Vancouver, chiefly because couples of authority on the whole have not yet reached the age of retirement. Divestitures of control upon the death of one member of the couple of authority are common.

7. Occasionally, the self-pride of children with their success in Canada makes them rather blind to the status considerations demanded by their elders, and relationships are often strained by things as avoidable as lack of proper etiquette.

8. Here the term visitor only refers to those coming from out of the Vancouver area and not to relations between households here.

9. Some of these displays are rather badly managed, particularly when successful Fijian Canadians try too hard to suggest that they now possess equivalent stature to those who were by far their senior in Fiji. Caste in Fiji may be largely gone, but strong notions of rank have not followed suit.

10. The number of single adults seems higher among Canadian Fijians than among these in Fiji, but it is very unlikely that many of them will stay unmarried. Likewise, childless couples do exist, but they are largely still young and are uniformly either very Westernized or Fijian-Canadian marriages.

11. Strained relations with other household members or the feeling that the household is too constraining seem to be key reasons for leaving.

12. This brings up the question of whether the realization of the potential of unmarried children has increased the age at which children marry. There does not seem to be any clear pattern developed at this time.

13. These are familial objectives which go back millenia. As early as the writing of Kautilya's Arthasastra (1960), one could only seek (by law) to become a sannyasi after one's children's children were on the earth.

14. This relationship is not always a cordial one. As with younger children, adult sons in particular tend to operate in terms of values which can diverge very sharply from those of his parents. This can lead to severe conflicts and to premature separation of the son from his parent's household.

15. Because of the extreme range of kinship relations acknowledged by Fijians and the relatively small overall Fijian Indian population, almost everyone is "related" to everyone else, given that one stretches the idea of relation a bit. Consequently, those who reasonably could only be called close friends are in fact seen as "cousins".

16. Those who have chosen to live alone are mainly young adult males, and a few independent-minded "elites" of both sexes.

17. This is not to suggest that Machiavellian manipulation is at all common, but rather that it is much more likely that advantages will flow to the couple of authority more easily from dependent women than dependent men.

18. Aurora (1967) notes that in the late 1950's influx of Sikhs to Britain the scarcity of available housing forced many of these initial sojourners to live in very overcrowded conditions. A similar situation obtained here during the same period with respect to single male Sikhs.

19. With the question of sex-based roles must enter consideration of the marked divergence between one Fijian and another on the basis of ethnicity. Moslem families tend to follow very similar patterns to Hindu ones in this regard, but they are in many cases more markedly male-biased.

20. By "apparent" greater economic participation I mean to point out that while it would be difficult to argue that Fijian Indian women contribute more economically than do continental Indian women, the former increasingly do so in ways which are so obvious that they

have been acknowledged even by their mates. They are increasingly participating in the wage economy of Fiji.

21. It is common for Fijian women to be far better at English than their husbands, a situation which often stems from work situations where fluency is quickly developed.

22. Husband and wife do discuss personal matters. At the risk of sounding overly psychological, one could argue that the male assumption that women are intrinsically of lower status allows them to tell women what they could not tell to other males.

23. This pattern of women splitting off from men during visiting is not universal, but nonetheless is very common. It shows definite signs of weakening.

24. Here I mean those typified by the 'older' ideal type immigrant, whose family includes older children and who was the head of his houshold in Fiji.

25. I have no way of verifying this personally, although it is generally attested to, and the histories of families in conflict here shows that many were not nearly so problematical in Fiji.

26. Occasionally the reverse is true, where marriage troubles in Fiji are left without intermediaries because potential intervenors are here in Vancouver.

27. This lack of kin intervenors is in part responsible for inter-personal violence occurring in the Sikh community as well. Among Fijians I do not know personally of many cases where personal injury was such that police intervention has been directly sought, although in divorce proceedings the courts have frequently acted to restrict access of husbands to their wives because of these occurrences. One woman has died directly as a result of marital conflict, and another has been murdered under what might have been a situation of marital unrest.

28. This same problem obtained among Sikh Canadians as early as 1959 (Mayer 1959). Sikh men from India were very reluctant to marry Canadianized women for quite the same reasons.

29. Cars and drink are high on the agenda, and two Fijians have already died in their combination. Motor vehicle accidents in an impaired state seem very common. Drinking is very quickly becoming a problem in Fiji, where arrests stemming from impairment have increased 300% from 1963 to 1971 (Fiji 1973:70). Incidentally, few women drink heavily, although a large number do drink socially.

30. Mary Ashworth's (1975) sensitive study of immigrant education brings these ideas out in far greater detail.

31. Even long, styled hair on adolescent males is getting popular in Fiji.

32. This adaptation, perhaps because it is happening so quickly, does not appear to be uniform across all areas. Although I have only the opinion of a few teachers to base it upon, it seems that for males in particular the sway of peer conventions may be to the detriment of learning. Adolescent women seem the most resistant to this assimilative pressure.

33. In fact, televisions are often left on straight through people visiting, sometimes with the sound turned down all the way. While visiting the whole course of things will sometimes focus on television for awhile, shifting onto other things in due time.

34. Incidentally, very few Fijian households have taken the newpaper until very recently.

35. Fijian newspapers, although holding to a very modern format, are far more personalized and cover a much greater range of life experiences than do ours. Small town football games, a farmer buying a big truck, or a local women's society meeting could easily make the newspaper.

36. This treatment of children as somewhat incompetent adults is discussed in depth by Aries (1962).

37. Remember that in both school and television we treat children almost as another subordinate species, who must be addressed as children and allowed the leeway of children.

38. Female children succeed in establishing an effective balance more often than do males, perhaps because of the stronger subordinance of the traditional female role and the fact that many more traditional Fijian elements parallel North American models for girls than they do for boys.

39. Dating on the part of their daughters is a bit hard for many parents to stomach, but the pressure for them to give assent is very strong. Many parents have remained firm and denied this latitude of freedom to their daughters.

Chapter Seven: Community: Fijian Social Relations in the Urban Context

The nature of community can profoundly affect the collective response of an immigrant group to its new environs. As outlined, although the internal organization of Japanese, Chinese and Sikh families in British Columbia's past were similar, their respective communities were quite different. The Sikh community was united in strong religious conviction, while nationalism provided an underpinning for the Japanese. The Chinese developed a distinct two-class system while the Sikhs did not. These differences were extensive, and found their expression in divergent political and social responses to racial subordination. In the light of these past patterns, Fijian community relations can be expected to have implications for the place of these people in Canadian society.

Kinship Networks: the structural basis of community

Among Fijian Indians in British Columbia, kinship is the fundamental stuff out of which community is constructed. All other bases for community organization pale in comparison. As a consequence, it is difficult to assert that there empirically is a Fijian community. Rather, it would be more realistic to view inter-household relations as series of overlapping networks of kin and friend ties which give the overall appearance of community because of their collective density.

At the onset it should be pointed out that while kinship provides the basis for Fijian community this is not to say that these two follow each other uniformly. Because of the small total population of Indians in Fiji, because they figure and apply kinship very widely, and because

of the class and kinship biases of the immigration process, most Fijians in the Lower Mainland can recognize a great number of Canadian kin; for older, high status individuals the number can easily be over five hundred. Considering their severe time constraints, it is typical that an individual will have more kin in the Vancouver area than he or she could ever effectively keep in contact with directly. Thus, kinship relations often provide a potential for a totally kin-bounded set of community relations, should one so choose. Most do not so choose.

Rather, while kinship does indeed provide the direction, friendship helps to maintain the connection. Those kin who become members of one's active network must also be friends, for there is little in the way of compulsion or gain which necessitates that one have very much to do with kin outside of the household. Consequently, while it would be unusual if a Fijian rarely visited his brother, any bad feeling between them or between their families would make the situation a real enough possibility.

Inversely, friends who are not biological kin usually tend to become social ones.[1] Unrelated friends can in fact be literally addressed as "my younger brother", "my nephew" and the like. Quite similarly, while the density of relations between kin tend to follow closeness of relation, there are many exceptions where more distant kin are favoured relatives.

Kinship Networks as Ethnic Networks: three Fijian communities

To claim that kinship is the basis of Fijian community is in fact to say that there is more than one Fijian community, for Fijian Indian kin-

ship follows ethnic lines. If one were to imagine a diagram upon which all Fijian ego-based social networks were projected with all their overlaps, one would see a severe weakening of network densities at the intersections between northern Hindus, southern Hindus, and Moslems. Interlinks between members of the groups so formed do exist, especially among the young, but the cleavages are definite.

As in Fiji (Mayer 1973:147-159), northern Hindus and Moslems are quite closely associated, as follows from their northern cultural heritage. In Fiji, marriages between these two groups are uncommon but do exist, and in Vancouver these populations are interconnected by a few crucial marriages which occurred sometime in the past.[2] Many of those in either group who strongly interact with members of the other group do so in part because they have kin on both sides of the ethnic line. Connections based on kinship between northerners of both sorts and southerners are also rare.[3]

It is clear that the relative separation between these three subcommunities is based upon kin and friendship. There exists no ethnic animosity between members of the three groups even though it is acknowledged that ethnicity was often a political factor at home. While there is a perception that there are cultural differences between them in practices of marriage, food, "temperament" and in degree, of language, none of these is judged to be overwhelmingly negative.[4] Rather, prior kinship associations, maintained by present day ethnically-exclusive marriage practices, have tended to keep kinship relations fairly separate, and with them the respective three communities. That they are kinship

rather than ethnically based is also evident in the almost total lack of formal organization in these communities, Moslems being a notable exception.

Fijian nationalism provides a variable basis for Fijian community. The relatively few Chinese and native Fijians in the Lower Mainland tend, for instance, to form their own networks which are largely exclusive of Fijian Indians, and very few Indians have any social contacts whatsoever with native Fijian people.[5] Nationality and ethnicity are, however, of consequence in interactions between Fijian Indians and other East Indians; these interethnic relations are few, and are often limited to religious practice; the marked exceptions to this rule are the small Fijian Sikh and Gujarati communities, who affiliate rather strongly with others of the same Indian backgrounds.

Kinship Networks as Class Networks

As with any group with relatively clear norms of behaviour, there is a propensity for Fijians to associate with those who share their same views and situations. For those of mature age, there is also a tendency to want to affiliate with "better" and more successful individuals. Fijian Indian wealth and prestige have tended to concentrate in certain families, and it is understandable that many of the same status criteria are applied here, albeit fuzzily, for many people of rather meagre social and economic resources in Fiji have done very well for themselves in Canada. The consequence has been the rise of an incipient class system among Fijian Canadians which, like the major ethnic divisions, tends to follow

kinship. While much of the structure of community relations which stems from status considerations is based upon relations established in Fiji, these are being continuously undercut by at least three processes. First, the economic success of those with relatively low Fijian status is being incorporated into the effective Canadian criteria of rank. Secondly, younger people are not nearly so particular about the status position of their friends' families as were their parents, who no longer have the means to enforce their status expectations on their children. And perhaps most importantly, Fijians are adjusting very quickly to the Canadian class structure with which they will eventually merge and as such are beginning to develop class-determined relations with other Canadians based on non-ethnic criteria. As it stands today there are distinct differentials in the density of relations of Fijians of different statuses -- class and ethnicity being the clearest lines of demarcation.

The Structure of Social Relations: the empirical pattern

Kin and quasi-kin do more than provide the basis for Fijian community. Because these networks are so dense as to be virtually continuous, they are important elements of Fijian Canadian life which function to accomplish much which for other Canadians is left to other institutions. I must therefore outline them in some detail.

To say that these networks are very dense is in fact to say three things: that normally each ego-based network is very widely extended; that there is a great deal of overlap between the many individual networks; and that the dyadic relations between ego and each of the individ-

uals in his or her network are frequently activated. For Fijians all of these are so. To say that Fijians base their social relations on kin is already to affirm the former two, but the latter must be dealt with more specifically. There are two mechanisms through which these relations are maintained -- social visiting and telephoning. Although religious, economic, and recreational contacts are of some consequence, they are not paramount.

Telephoning is free from many of the constraints of visiting, and as such has become important as a means of passing along information and as a way of at least stabilizing dyadic relationships in lieu of visiting; in the reciprocal calculus which orders much visiting, telephoning is not equivalent to visiting, but it at least shows that the other party is keeping one in mind.[6] Women depend very much on the telephone to maintain network contacts, largely because they tend to lack an independent means of transportation and have developed its use to the point where an important event, say a death in the family, can be quickly and informally spread to several hundred people.[7] For a household to make upwards of thirty telephone contacts with other Fijian households in a week is not unusual.

But visiting is nevertheless of great importance, and much of it is done. Because Fijians tend to have such a variety of work schedules, visiting is largely constrained to the weekends. Given that visitor and host have similar schedules it is rather common during the week as well. Because of the distances involved, most visiting is done by car, and is usually preceeded by a telephone call to see if the parties involved are actually going to be home.[8]

Because the distances between a given household and all others in the East Vancouver area are not large, it is common that rather than going to one household for an extended period of time, those traveling together will make a circuit of perhaps four or five households in a single day, staying no more than an hour at any one of them. Operating much like community buses, those who are driving often pick up kin and friends along the route, occasionally transfering them to other routes, sometimes keeping them on board for the whole circuit. Women in particular develop a greater freedom of movement by use of this technique than they otherwise might, considering their lack of ready transportation.

Visiting itself is normally very informal unless the relation between visitor and host is not a familiar one. Unless the number of guests is large or a particular event is being planned, the normal household routine is not much disrupted. If they are reasonably close relations of the hosts, women will often help out in the kitchen.

What gets discussed during visiting is quite variable. Perhaps the most frequent subject of discourse could be termed general household updating. Events, changes in the situations of household members, material additions to the family, and the like which have occurred since the last contact between the respective households are quickly filled in. By this means information about other people, marriages, birth and death, and the arrival of new immigrants or visitors from Fiji are rapidly spread across kin networks, constantly generalizing information across many, many individuals. For instance, it is not unusual to hear that a certain person has arrived from Fiji from seven or eight sources in quick

succession.

Fiji and Vancouver as One Community

Constant topics of conversation are events in Fiji and to a lesser extent those in California. It is very costly to call Fiji, and mail service is such that it requires well over two weeks for a reply. Visitors and new immigrants are therefore a prime source of information on things at home. They are, however, much more important than this, for the steady stream of people coming and going from Fiji forms a bridge over which values and social relations are closely connected. They make the activities, beliefs, and futures of people in both places dependent on each other, and in this very real respect Fiji and Vancouver form one community. In a network sense, the Fijian and the Vancouver Fijian Indian populations are far more interconnected with each other than are Fijians and Canadian Sikhs. This connection may currently be of the same order as that between Fijians and Anglo-Canadians.

The structure and genesis of this relation follows quite the same pattern as did those of prior Asian immigrants to British Columbia. Chain migration assures that there are interdependent relatives on both sides of the Pacific; if only for economic reasons these people must maintain contact. Strong kin links in source and host countries assure that there are multiple lines of communication between the two. Moreover, as with earlier immigration patterns, there are a great number of individuals flowing in both directions between the two points. The consequence is to merge Fijian and Fijian Canadian social relations into a single field,

much like what occurred in every prior Asian sequence of immigration to Canada.[9]

The actual density of Vancouver-Fiji communication has already been elucidated. New immigrants in recent years have come to Canada in such numbers as to annually equal a significant proportion of the total Fijian population of British Columbia, and each immigrant will be the vehicle of information about events in Fiji, of Fijian values, and of the expectations of relatives to a great number of already established Fijians. Letter and telephone communication is also very frequent, although their impact is not comparable with personal contacts. Visitors move constantly between these two points, and are extremely instrumental in leveling value systems and distributing information in both directions. In 1975, for instance, 3,595 Fijian residents left Fiji for Canada (Fiji 1976a:105). Approximately 2,300 of these would be new immigrants, but of the other 1,300 most would be visitors who would eventually return to Fiji.[10] Others would be included in the 2,303 who departed Fiji heading for the United States, for many visitors to one are also visitors to the other. The number of Canadian Fijians who return to Fiji on visits is more difficult to estimate, but must certainly number more than 500 per year.

Visitors come for a multiplicity of reasons, not the least of which is the simple ability to do so; Canadian kin are often willing to put up either part or all of the visitor's plane fare. The most general considerations are twofold, being the desire to see kin and to see for one's self their condition, while at the same time perhaps judging conditions here with an eye towards future immigration. In many cases, one or the

other of these two predominates. The other motivation which is often found is that of a significant event among one's Vancouver kin. Births, deaths, marriages and familial troubles can quickly bring people to Canada, bad news more readily doing so than good.

An example of the ways in which this single social field operates is in order, for it is important to stress how much this is a significant element of the social relations, aspirations and beliefs in most Asian Canadian communities. This example illustrates the mechanisms whereby a community of values is partially maintained between Vancouver and Fiji:

> Ravi and Rishma, husband and wife, have been married only nine months. Their marriage occurred here in Vancouver. Most of Ravi's important father's side relatives, including his parents, were not able to attend because they still reside in Fiji and lacked the funds to fly here for the wedding. The groom's party's chief representative was an elderly and respected cousin of Ravi's father (Ravi's fafabrs). In contrast, most of Rishma's close relatives live in Vancouver.
>
> Almost immediately the marriage became problematical. At first, they stayed with Rishma's parents, but Ravi and his parents-in-law did not get along well, especially after Rishma began making charges that Ravi's drinking sorties with his male compatriots involved other women. For his part, Ravi claimed that Rishma was not accepting his dominant place in the family. They soon moved out at Ravi's instigation, and in their rental accommodations things grew worse. Rishma was in constant contact with her kin, especially by the telephone.
>
> Because their own efforts had been unsuccessful, Rishma's parents urged Ravi's Vancouver-based kin to intercede and they responded, only to find that they lacked sufficient coercive power to affect Ravi's behaviour, which only worsened in response to the interference. At this point, both Rishma, Ravi's cousin, and Rishma's parents began to telephone Ravi's parents in Fiji, claiming that the marriage was in jeopardy, a fact which they already knew full well from letters from both these parties and from the reports of visitors from Vancouver. They had already been in communication with Ravi by phone, but escalated their response by delegating an elderly family friend, who was going to Vancouver to visit her youngest son, to see whether she could mediate the dispute. She, too, was unsuccessful.

> Ravi's mother then flew to Vancouver and moved in with the warring couple. During the three months of her stay, she effected a considerable de-escalation of the hostilities, while at the same time she developed the connections between the two families through constant visiting. When she finally returned to Fiji there was a reasonable chance that the marriage would persevere.

This marriage continues to be a troubled one marked by continued communication between all interested parties in Fiji and Vancouver, and this massive intervention has not been entirely successful. Nevertheless, the episode shows how significant the connection between Fiji and Vancouver can be, especially in affecting extraordinary events of all sorts. Ravi and Rishma were from the onset brought into a social field including friends and relatives in Vancouver, to whose expectations they at least partially had to adjust. The insufficiency of this response, which had already been strengthened by communication between both families in Fiji, brought personal intervention as the families tried to save the marriage and with it, their familial status honours. Fijian values were transported to Vancouver and reintroduced to a marital situation which was at that point tending to follow mock-Canadian ones, particularly in the vehicle of Ravi's mother.

While in most respects it operates in ways which are far less overt than those expressed in this example, the dense communication between Fiji and Vancouver necessitates that immigrant Fijians must often labour under a dual set of other's expectations. One set finds its locus in relatives and friends here, while the other derives from an analogous set of individuals in Fiji. Reconciling these two while at the same time attempting to act in terms of one's individual interests can be a

difficult business. At the same time, the continual flow of values from Fiji to Vancouver could be argued to be largely non-coercive and desired. From a sociological point of view, I would suggest that this relatively continual input moderates the acceptance of Canadian values and activities to such a rate that they do not produce severe social disruption in Fijian Canadian families. This flow from Fiji to Canada consequently allows for a relatively coherent Fijian adjustment to Canadian life, despite the fact that Fijians have no dogmatic system of beliefs or practices which allow for a strong sense of identity and place in their initial period of establishment and disorganization.

Visitors bring with them more than just values and behavioural mandates, they also bring facts and things. Little which escapes the notice of one kin network is not soon communicated across to the other network. Through these means, Fijian Canadians are kept constantly informed of personal, social, economic, and political events in Fiji. News of strikes, graft and corruption in politics, the average tonnage of the last cane harvest fast become common knowledge in Vancouver. Events among residents here are transmitted back less successfully, in the main because most events here are kin-based and the news of them moves back to kin. Startling events, like the murder of a Fijian woman in Vancouver last year (1976), have become national news in Fiji.

Vancouver and Outlying Communities

Not all Fijian Indians in North America live in the Lower Mainland area of Vancouver. A large number reside in California, while small

communities have formed in Prince George, Edmonton, Calgary, and Toronto. Connections between Vancouver and these outlying communities are rather weak, with the notable exception of California. Even though this latter population is rather dispersed, with concentrations in the metropolitan San Francisco and Los Angeles areas, there is much visiting done between there and Vancouver. This seems to stem more from entertainment and cost considerations than anything else.

It has become a common practice for Vancouver residents to visit their California kin during the summer, turning the event into a family holiday -- Disneyland, or more recently, Tijuana, Mexico have become final objectives. San Francisco is only one thousand miles by car from Vancouver, and from San Francisco to Los Angeles is less than three hundred and fifty more. Driving straight through (the normal Fijian practice), it is possible to arrive in San Francisco in twenty-four hours. Transit costs are only those for gas and food. Once in the San Francisco area, the family will stay with relatives, who will in turn show them the sights. Traveling on to Los Angeles, the process is repeated, as it is upon return. This same practice of mixing visiting and vacation is now occurring in the reverse direction, paralleling a constant flow of individuals who come by air.

Visits between Vancouver residents and those who do not live on this Vancouver to Los Angeles axis are much more rare. Most often those visits which occur happen through individuals from these outlying communities coming to Vancouver and not vice versa, or through the intermediary of visitors from Fiji who stop in Vancouver on their way to and from these

other places.[11]

The Uses of Social Networks

Returning to discussion of the whole spectrum of Fijian social relations, it is obvious that Fijian community-oriented social relations, much like those within the family, simultaneously involve a wide set of actor concerns.

Much of the yield and the impetus for intra-community social relations is clearly recreational. Fijian Indians are a social people, a group in. whose backgrounds people and the relations between them largely structure the world. They enjoy socializing with each other, and do so easily and with grace. The impact of the rationalized world economy has not yet individualized Fijians to anything near the degree common in the industrialized countries of the world, nor have the fruits of that industry given them the means to act individualistically, either economically or socially. To reverse this argument, the density of Fijian Canadian community relations is largely dependent upon the degree to which those same societal forces are successfully resisted here.

But the desire for society is not all there is to social relations from either an actor's or from a sociological point of view. From the actor's viewpoint, the maintenance of many of their relations with other Fijians constitute a definite responsibility, the ignoring of which will be met with social sanctions. And Fijian relations are largely measured by the density of contact, given that other mitigating considerations such as lack of time or of distance do not interfere. There is an informal

system of visiting reciprocity at work here, where a visit deserves a visit in return, and not visiting or at least phoning can be interpreted as the denial of a relationship. The necessarily ongoing renewal of relationships can prove to be an overwhelming burden on one's time, and is so recognized. Canadian life's interference with patterns of Fijian sociability is a constant topic of conversation.

Visiting can also be used to develop advantages, especially in relative statuses among one's Fijian Canadian network. This aspect, too, is consciously recognized, as it is in the measures to which Fijians will go to give a good appearance to the public areas of their houses. In this way, visiting can be used to align and announce statuses. For instance, one way in which this is done is through inviting several high status individuals to one's home (say, for dinner) at the same time. If this endeavour is successful one profits by the assumption on the part of one's guests of a measure of status equality all around; it is very likely that each of those guests will reciprocate, each in turn working the same calculus and in so doing, introducing the initial host to other high status individuals on a basis of equality.

Social relations also serve to spread information and to create a community of values. The former of these has been much discussed, as has the latter in part, but the effects of a Fijian-based community of values must be explored a bit more fully.

Because initially immigrants are uncertain as to what constitutes approved behaviour in Canada and yet are extremely anxious to follow these

societal dictates, they devote considerable attention to finding out what these practises are. Television is one source, as is the extended household, given that the individual resides in one. But the most powerful force in this direction is what has developed to be normative, community-based behaviour, as validated by one's own status group. Essentially, Fijians will tend to assume that if esteemed members of their own peer group in Canada do something, then it is at the very least not improper to do so as well:

> Jane Prasad is twenty and single, and has come to Vancouver with her parents just six months ago. Her family came from the outskirts of Ba town and are quite traditional. Recently, Jane went to her first Fijian Canadian wedding reception. For many other people there it was also their first large social event in Canada. Women, including those of her own age, were dancing with young men to a Fijian band and drinking alcoholic beverages served from a catered bar. She did not participate in the dancing, although her peers urged her to. She now sees nothing wrong with either practice, both of which are relatively rare in Fiji, and might experiment a bit on the next occasion.

In the same fashion, community norms, often at least superficially similar to Canadian ones, are rapidly passed on to new immigrants and the resistance to their acceptance is not great, for they are validated by Fijian Canadian practice.

Economically, social relations are of much more marginal importance, as reflects the lack of dependence of Fijians upon each other for jobs. It is of obvious importance to those entrepreneurs and salesmen who are dependent upon their Fijian clientele, and these individuals do everything in their power to expand their networks. For wage-earning Fijians, the only economic benefits which obtain from social relations are either infor-

mational ("Go there to look for a job") or those which lead to the provision of services ("My brother fixes cars"). Neither are fundamental.

Religious Communities

Overlaid upon social networks based upon kin and friends are several others which in some ways cross-cut and interconnect the former. Of these other networks, one of the most evident is that of religion, and in discussing the structure of these relations I am presented with the opportunity to finally give Fijian religiosity more than a passing glance.[12]

Fijians and Hinduism

Most Fijian Indian immigrants are at least nominally Hindus, which follows the religious distribution of Fiji itself. About eighty percent of immigrants are Hindu, although a number of these do not practice their religion. Hinduism has been profoundly affected by its transfer to British Columbia, not so much because of any particular aspect of life in the Lower Mainland, but rather because it has been transplanted into a minority situation in a modern industrial context. It is a community and kin-based religion attempting survival in a societal situation, a religion dependent upon a community of values submerged in a sea of other ideas. Most particularly, the transition has debilitated the community-based aspect of this religion as practiced in Fiji and here provides only a weak support for community itself. To see how this has occurred requires a bit more empirical specificity.

The Personnel

Fijian Hindus can be further divided by practice and belief into orthodox Hindus (Sanatan Dharm) and Arya Samajists. The latter is a nineteenth-century reformist sect which goes back to the Vedas for doctrinal authority, and which has severely reduced both ritual and dogmatic beliefs. Arya Samajists from Fiji are almost exclusively northerners and tend slightly towards being a more middle class group than their orthodox counterparts. Fijian Sanatanis (the orthodox) are derived from both northern and southern stock, with the consequence that to this day their systems of beliefs and practices are quite different from each other. These belief systems are not so much in opposition to each other as they are divergent in emphases, which correspondingly implies that there is much common ground between them. Nevertheless, to a large degree the two groups tended to go their own separate religious ways in Fiji (Mayer 1973:60-97).

Life-Cycle Rituals[13]

Life-cycle rituals have always been important events in Fijian Hinduism and some of them are community occasions par excellence. All of them have been profoundly affected by the move to Vancouver.

At birth, horoscopic selection of names is still common. A knowledgeable person or a Fijian lay priest will cast the child's horoscope to determine an auspicious first syllable and a given name will be constructed out of it. In Canada, the practice of giving both a Hindu and a Christian name is much on the increase, as in (Vi)nod Peter Parikh.

For those who have established themselves successfully in Canada, a ceremony (Chatthi) is occasionally carried out on the sixth day after birth in order to protect the child against an early death at the hands of this goddess. It is difficult to judge either the frequency of this practice or the degree of conviction involved in it, but when it does occur Chatthi is an occasion for a women's social event. No men are traditionally allowed in the house, where as many as twenty-five women will gather to sing songs to deter Chatthi's evil intentions. According to Mayer (1973:60), it was at one time the custom that the husband was not allowed to see the child before this sixth night, but this practice has passed away with the introduction of hospital births, baby viewing hours, and the like.

Traditionally it was also common that a rite of purification be carried out sometime during the first year of a child's life, where the child's hair was ceremonially shaved. This still occurs with some regularity, often with the lone (Moslem) Fijian barber acting in his occupational capacity. In Vancouver as in Fiji, this is a family-based ceremony of a very minor sort.

To the best of my knowledge the investiture of the sacred thread, an adolescence ceremony of the twice-born Hindu castes, does not occur among Fijian Hindus in Vancouver, with the possible exception of within the small Gujarati-Fijian minority. Mayer (1973:61) noted that as early as 1951 no more than ten percent of the population in the rural areas performed this ceremony, and even then did so in conjunction with the marriage rite.

Marriage

Marriage and death are the two life-cycle events which stand out by consistently bringing together Fijian-Canadians at a community level. Both are considered to be extremely important, and both serve to create and revive social relationships between people who otherwise would have had little contact with each other. Although the practice of matchmaking is fairly uniform across both Hindus and Moslems, the range of the potential marital class in fact is distinct between the groups. As regards kinship and incest considerations, for north Indian Hindus the potential pair ought to be in no way whatsoever related to each other; in practice, this is sometimes impossible, and the marriage of people who are distantly related, especially if that relation is not a "blood" relation, is acceptable. Southern Hindus diverge from this pattern in theoretically allowing parallel cousin marriage, but in practice this does not tend to occur with any great frequency and I do not have any examples of it happening in Canadian marriages.

Class is an important criterion of marriageability, but ethnicity is even more so. Even in Canada, Fijians tend (when they marry other Fijians) to hold very strongly to a pattern of marrying within their ethnic group and religion. Northern Hindus consistently marry northerners, the exception being the occasional marriage of a northern man to a southern woman. Intermarriage between orthodox northerners and (northern) Arya Samajists, is not enough to destroy the general tendency for them, too, to marry within their religious communities.

The actual process of carrying out a marriage in Canada is extremely

variable, and depends in large part upon the resources of the parents and their willingness to expend those resources. Some marriages are very quiet, almost household affairs, while others rival the best traditions of North American over-consumption and status display.

Arya Samaj weddings themselves are normally held in a private home with a very small number of invited guests, most of whom are either close friends or immediate relatives. While horoscopic prediction of the date and hour of the marriage once was common practice for all Fijian Hindus, work schedules here more or less demand that a marriage ceremony occur on Friday night or Saturday, and it seems that most Arya Samaj weddings occur on Friday. Orthodox weddings are performed either in the local Hindu Temple (of which more will be said shortly) or at home, and tend to be more public affairs.

Orthodox Hindu weddings in particular used to be fundamentally community events in Fiji, but here they are no longer. Whether they were northern or southern weddings, marriage in rural Fiji involved not only the couple and their relatives but also the whole community in the event (Mayer 1973:68-77). The process was carried out within the community, usually at the groom's parent's household, where it was in large measure an outside, public event. Community participated in its preparation and in the ritual itself, which built up slowly over three or four days. There were no geographical disjunctions within the process and few unknown individuals. Horoscopes tied the event to cosmology.

Here most of these things are gone. People do not live in community

in the same sense as many of them did in Fiji. Many aspects of marriage which were personalized in Fiji are rationalized here. Weddings in the home are essentially private affairs, separated from both the social and material elements of community. Weddings at the temple involve a geographical separation of the event from both of the most important households and cede control over the event to others. In many respects, Fijian Hindu weddings are taking on the overt structure of Christian ones.

Even so, marriages are still a time of assembly and of getting together, even if only for a short period of time. In more elaborate cases, relatives are flown from Fiji for the event.[14] Societal and temporal constraints do not allow for the usual orthodox pattern of a three-to-four day preparation culminating in a large-scale community event, and Fijians here have adopted the Christian convention of following the wedding itself with a reception. These receptions can vary from small-scale household celebrations to catered events for two hundred in rented halls with dinner, a band, and a bar. These latter events do not occur with any great regularity, but are a source of many initial contacts between Fijians in Canada.

Death

Deaths are easily equal to marriages in their community impact. A death in a family produces an instant mobilization of kin and friends, and it is not uncommon that people come from Fiji and California to console the living if they cannot arrive in time to honour the dead.[15] Funerals

are quickly performed after death, very often on the Monday afterwards; this contrasts to the rural Fijian pattern of burial the same day as death occurs (Mayer 1973:80).

As with marriages, many of the ritual community aspects of death have been summarily eliminated by the move to Canada. Funeral services are held in a local mortuary, which exercises the same control over the process as it does in Christian funerals. While many people turn out for those services, only a few speakers participate in them actively. In contrast to Fiji where it was prohibitively expensive, here most Hindus are cremated (by modern means) rather than buried.[16] Propitiatory rites are subsequently carried out within the household.

Again, the informal structure of community response to death has been maintained largely intact. As the word quickly travels through Vancouver to Fiji, where deaths in Canada are frequently announced over the national radio station, a mounting flood of personal condolences begin to stream in to the affected family. Relatives may temporarily move in with them, provide them with food, and assist them with their affairs. Involvement is great, as is the contribution which friends and kin offer in time, effort, and lost work. The young median age of the present Fijian Canadian population has determined that deaths are relatively few, perhaps no more than thirty a year, but even so, it is likely that a given adult will either attend a funeral or give their personal condolences several times each year.

Hindu Household and 'Public' Observances

Although it is beyond the scope of this work to discuss the nature of Fijian religious belief itself or even to detail the practice related to it, this area must be dealt with briefly insofar as it affects household and community organization. Within the household, one immediately observes that while immigration has placed significant barriers to any hope that Fijian children in Canada will incorporate the religions of their forefathers, it does not seem to have diminished the religiosity of those who have brought their beliefs with them. Many Fijian adults, both male and female, are very devout Hindus.[17] In Vancouver their religiosity has become largely a privatized and personal matter. It is very common for men and women both to have small household shrines where they pray daily. To whom they pray varies quite widely, and depends upon need, family, and ethnic background.

As is reasonable to expect of people whose great-grandparents went through the disruptive effects of indenture, Fijian Hindus hold to very few consistent ritualistic taboos. Many eat beef occasionally (often explaining that they are "from the cannibal isles"), although all other meats are preferred and chicken is more commonly served than meat. Some Hindu women are complete vegetarians, if one excepts seafood, as are a few Moslem ones, and shoes are not normally worn within houses except by children. Beyond this there are very few specifically religious prohibitions. There are no indications whatsoever that religious considerations per se in any way affect social relations.

In contrast to the rather high levels of religious participation

within households, religious activities which involve more than the members of the immediate family are now very rare for most Fijian Hindus. The traditional yearly celebrations are often held within households, and over the past four or five years the major ones have also resulted in organized services and public celebrations; these are religiously-based affairs and not Fijian-based ones, and they are participated in by a rather small number of Fijians.

Since 1972, there has existed in the Vancouver area (in Burnaby, actually) an organization devoted to the development of Hindu religiosity called the Vishva Hindu Parishad. A small group of southern Fijians has been important in its genesis. In consideration of the wide variations in Hindu religious practice among the heterogeneous Hindu population of the Lower Mainland, these organizers chose to aim at the creation of a facility which was to be used by individuals of all persuasions. For the past two years, the Vishva Hindu Parishad has successfully operated a self-owned Hindu temple, which is fast becoming a focal point for extra-familial religious practice in Vancouver.[18] Although the temple now has only about 250 households enlisted as paid members, a far greater number than this occasionally make use of the temple in one fashion or another.

Services are regularly carried out at the temple in a multiple-use fashion. Each Sunday morning chanting of the Amrit Vani, Sankirtan, and discourses on Hindu philosophy are carried out, and these are addressed to a general audience. At other times during the weekday evenings, more specifically ethnic-based groups carry out their own services. Among

these is the Sanatan Dharam Prem Ramayan Mandli, the core of which is a group of orthodox southern Indian Fijians who are very much concerned that their religion will be lost to their children. The Fijians of this same group have endeavoured to chant the Ramayana part by part in a circuit from one of their homes to another; this happens irregularly, about once every month to month and a half. They have intentions to formalize this process and to coordinate it with instruction to children on the Ramayana, although this now is only in its initial phase. It should be noted that while this small organization (of perhaps thirty households) cross-cuts kin lines it does not transcend the ethnic line. At the same time, many of the participating individuals are in fact related.

The temple itself presents a theoretical possibility for being a basis for Fijian community organization. It is very likely that Fijians constitute the largest single ethnically-delimited Hindu group in the Lower Mainland, and were they to become highly involved with temple organization and management they could easily come to dominate it or at least strongly influence it towards Fijian community solidarity. To date, this has not occurred, nor does it seem likely in the future. At present the board of directors is dominated by continental Indians, mostly northerners and mostly professionals. This is not to suggest that these people have come to these positions through non-democratic means, but rather that Fijians have not been as organizationally involved, nor have equivalent status Fijian individuals come forward to contend these positions.[19] The recentness of the main flux of Fijian immigration, the development of

patterns of home-based religiosity, the lack of a high degree of ethnic solidarity, and the relatively rare Fijian use of religious practice for status purposes must also be factors in this low Fijian participation in temple activities.[20]

Beyond those centering in one way or the other on the temple, Fijian participation in Hindu religious practice outside of the household milieu is rare. A small Kali sect has been formed by a woman who has participated in the famous fire-walking ceremony near Suva, and is oriented very strongly towards the achievement of spiritual assistance in coping with the problems of everyday life; these people have set up a small temple in the priestess' house and they have weekly services. A few people also reputably have the ability to cure through non-medical means, and are occasionally consulted.

Annual Hindu Celebrations

The annual Hindu celebrations of Diwali and Holi are now carried out in homes and are paralleled in temple-organized services and entertainment presentations. Diwali, the Hindu new year's celebration, occurs in October to November, and religiously celebrates the return of Rama to Ayodhya after his victory over Ravan.[21] In Fijian homes, this Festival of Lights is normally celebrated by a simple ceremony accompanied by offerings of parsad. The temple has not only had services but in the last two years has put on celebrations of increasing sophistication, in 1975 at the PNE grounds, and this year at Vancouver's prestigious Queen Elizabeth Theatre. Both were well attended, but in each case the number of recog-

nizably Fijian people in the audience was not large, in the latter case being no more than five percent.[22] It should be noted that this event is of sufficient magnitude to bring out a sprinkling of local and provincial politicians.

Holi, the Hindu celebration of spring, is also celebrated in much the same fashion as Diwali -- which is to say that there is a near complete absence of the community aspects of the event which are evident both in India and in Fiji. There is no collecting together for the singing of chautals, no ceremonial bonfire, no cavorting with the traditional red-dyed water, as is still common in Fiji (Mayer 1973:87). Again, the Hindu Temple organized a presentation similar to that of Diwali but of smaller-scale. Neither Ramlila nor the southern Marriamma festival are publically celebrated in Canada.

Hinduism and Community

It must reiterated that because Fijian Hinduism is a community-oriented religion which has been transferred to a context without the geographical and social requisities for community it cannot act in such a way as to build on what is not there. Because Hinduism has always existed in community, the religion itself, at least when it is separated from the social stratification system, lacks ritualistic or coercive means to develop community. Understandably, the religion will be transmitted to children only with great difficulty; as more of a philosophy than a dogmatic code of ethical behaviour, it is unlikely to be susceptible to alternatives such as catechismic instruction. I believe it to be a

certainty that most of the Canadian-born will not become Hindus.

At the level of community, this suggests that Hinduism is not to be expected to become a strong unifying ethnic factor in Vancouver, either within the communities of northerners and southerners, among all Fijian Hindus, or between all the Hindus in Vancouver. Because neither Fijian geographical group nor both of them together are societally-defined or defined by each other as being relevant groups for action or defence (as for instance they once were with respect to their respective cane unions, to schools and the like), Hinduism is unlikely to become a fundamental ethnic marker among Fijians in the Canadian context.

In terms of the religion's possible effects on Fijian orientation towards affiliation with other peoples and practices, two connected inferences can be made. At least tentatively, it seems that Hinduism will not tend to develop a fundamental basis of networks of social relations between Fijians and other East Indians. Moreover, because it is <u>not</u> tied to a large range of ethical prohibitions which conflict with Canadian demands for public performance, Hinduism does not seem to be an impediment to the acceptance of Canadians or Canadian ways.

<u>Moslems</u>[23]

The proportion of Fijians in Canada who are Moslem is quite low, somewhere around fifteen percent. They are nevertheless of interest in this discussion of Fijian community organization, for in contrast to the Hindu population, Fijian Moslem religiosity does indeed operate to modify and

augment interhousehold social relations, with the result that network links between Moslems in Canada are more dense and that religion offers the possibility of future formal organization.

The reasons why this is so would seem to be separable into three inter-related factors, the first of which is straightforward. Being members of a minority religion in Fiji -- one which was often the basis of political organization -- Moslems come from a far more sharply bounded, finite-numbered population. If only for this reason, Moslem social relations would likely be denser. Secondly, religious and ethnic preferences for marriage partners assures not only that Moslems normally marry within their own community but also that there will be a very high degree of relatedness between families; Moslems are not proscribed from marrying either parallel or cross-cousins. The third reason centres around the nature of Moslem religious belief and practice and requires a more detailed explication, one which must be deferred while the general outlines of Fijian Moslem religious participation are put forward.

Life-Cycle Rituals

Moslem life-cycle events closely parallel their Hindu equivalents. Traditionally, Fijian Moslems performed a ritual purification of children on the fortieth day after birth, which in the case of males was followed some time afterwards by circumcision. Here, medical practice has determined that male babies are usually circumcised in the first few days after birth (upon parental permission), and ~~this~~ has been accepted by Fijian

Moslems. To the best of my knowledge the child purificatory rite has been largely dropped.

As mentioned, marriage custom allows for the union of both parallel and cross-cousins, and although both seem relatively common in the past they are now quite rare. As in Hindu marriages, status, wealth, and the appropriateness of the ages of the prospective couple largely determine eligibility. Because of the lack of demanding restrictions against the marriage of related individuals and of the much smaller Fijian Moslem marriage pool, the degree of relatedness among Fijian Moslems in Canada is very high.

While marriage for Moslems was traditionally a much smaller affair than for Hindus (Mayer 1973:76), here it often merits a large reception, the bringing of people from Fiji, and considerable expense. Like Hindu weddings, Moslem ones have the effect of bringing together people who have not previously met in Canada and, because virtually all who attend are Moslem, they have the effect also of increasing that group's community solidarity. Death, too, provokes a similar response, and as with the death of a Hindu Fijian the concern spreads easily across the religio-ethnic line. Moslems are not cremated, but rather are buried in a manner which is generally in accord with Quranic dictates.

Household and Public Observances

As with life-cycle rituals, there is very little within Moslem household observances which could be argued to make for a different extra-

familial pattern of social relations than that which exists among Hindu Fijians. Again, it is common that many people are quite devout. A good number of families obey the stricture against the use of non-halal meat, and some go to the farms to do their own slaughtering. Pork is, to my knowledge, never eaten and, although I see no real difference in the strong tendencies of Moslem and Hindu men to drink, the use of alcoholic beverages is considered to be sinful.

Many adults read from the Quran and pray daily, although very few are able to follow the traditional Moslem pattern of daily prayer. In contrast to Hindu practice, there has been considerable effort made in attempting to instill Moslem beliefs in children. The relative success of this endeavour brings out one difference between Moslem and Hindu religious practice which is likely in the long run to considerably affect community organization.

In contrast to Hindu efforts along the same lines, the transmission of Moslem beliefs to children has been rather conscientiously attempted, and seems to have been far more successful. This in turn seems to reflect the nature of the religion, for Islam, as a religion like Christianity based upon dogmatic precepts and explicit rules for ethical behaviour, lends itself to simplification and transmission. To put it crudely, Islam begins with ethical dictates and moves to philosophy, while Hinduism derives its ethical code out of the merger of philosophical, spiritual, and material problems.

Islam therefore tends to define a community of believers, based upon

socially-perceived adequate performance, while Hinduism does this only weakly. Socially, this has the effect of affiliating Moslems of similar beliefs across ethnic lines, while Hinduism presents no necessity to do so; one, in fact, finds this pattern in microcosm among Fijian Hindus and Moslems in Vancouver.

While Fijian Hindus have tended to abandon public and community-based religious observances, Fijian Moslems have not.[24] In contrast, Fijians have joined with other orthodox Moslems to form a Moslem association. The other members come from a very wide spectrum of ethnic backgrounds, including Moslems from the Near East, India, and Africa. They currently rent space for a small temporary mosque, and have purchased land in rural Richmond on which they intend to build a permanent mosque and a Moslem community centre; zoning problems are currently impeding further progress. Should this project come to fruition, its effect upon Moslem Fijian social relations should be to further unify and consolidate a sense of community and to perpetuate the attendant religious beliefs.

As it is, religion does serve to maintain contact between Fijian Moslems who would not tend to do so solely upon the bases of kinship or prior acquaintance. Meetings at the mosque are common, and beyond their religious functions these contacts also have the effect of spreading information in much the same manner as visiting.

Ramadan, the traditional month-long period of religious fasting observed by Moslems the world over, is observed here although it is done so in unorthodox fashion. Orthodox dictates require that believers refrain from eating between dawn and sunset, and quite a number of adult

Fijian Moslems follow this pattern in a partial manner, either by fasting on particular days of the week or by restricting the amount of food taken during the daylight hours. The final breaking of the fast is an occasion for a day of continual visiting of one Fijian Moslem with others, and in each home he or she will be given a small serving of food and sweets traditional for this event.[25] That morning a large religious service is held among all orthodox Moslems, the one in 1976 being held in a University of British Columbia auditorium.

Moslem Fijians as a Community

Moslems, then, have the latent potential to use religion, and through it ethnicity to the effect of producing formal community organization, and already have developed a sense of ethnic solidarity and identity. Like Hindu Fijians, their religious connections with non-Fijians are largely marriages of convenience and do not carry over into patterns of visiting or to strong feelings of common identity; unlike Hinduism, the orientation of Islam towards specific church-based ritual practice makes it necessary that such a joining of interests occur.

But, at the same time, Fijian Moslems do not affect a defensive position with respect to their religion, nor do they exhibit any strong centripetal tendencies based upon religious considerations, and they in fact interact freely with other Fijians. This lack of polarization between Hindu and Moslem Fijians not only allows for a considerable amount of inter-communication between the two, but also makes it difficult for the Moslem aspect of their identity to override the Fijian one.

Fijian Religious Communities, Establishment, and Direction

In overview, the quickly changing nature of Fijian immigration and establishment in Canada gives one considerable insight into the ways in which religious organization will likely affect Fijian community organization and the adaptation of this community to the Canadian context.

Large numbers of adults, both Hindu and Moslem, will continue to believe in and to practice their religions. In each case the centre of both will be the home, and religion per se will not in itself lead to community solidarity, or to strong affiliation with those of the same religion but of different ethnic backgrounds.

In both cases, there is nothing in the panorama of beliefs or in practices ordered upon them which conflicts with the ready acceptance of Canadian practices. In any case, as the Fijian community matures this will become almost an irrelevant question as children grow up and a diminishing proportion of the population practice either religion.

Religious differences between one Fijian and another have become less important to the structure of community organization than the ethnic distinctions which have arisen upon this religious basis. In particular, patterns of marriage have been heavily influenced by consideration of common ethnic and religious backgrounds, and today one could argue that the fact that the kinship networks, which have arisen as a result of these marriages rather than any ethnic animosity, largely determine that Fijian Indian ethnic sub-communities will continue to exist.[26]

Secular Associations and Community Events

Beyond the very dense social networks which tie one Fijian household to another, with its weak overlay of religious organization, Fijian community structure is almost totally undeveloped. There is essentially no political organization whatever, and economically, culturally, and socially, formal and informal structures which transcend interpersonal relations are very few.

There are at present two Fijian cultural associations, which I will call the Pan-Fijian Association and the Fijian Indian Association (both pseudonyms). Neither has a large membership nor a regular and ongoing program of events. The Pan-Fijian Association is at present a fledgling organization, which hopes to unite all Fijian Canadians of whatever ethnic background, native Fijians included, to the purpose of promoting Fijian culture, and it is not clear whether it will transcend its organizing drive and become a functioning institution. The Fijian Indian Association is far more established. Claiming to have been founded in 1967, as its name implies it has attempted to create an association which deals with the needs of the Fijian East Indian community of British Columbia. As such it is purely secular, and has made a conscious attempt to include all ethnic segments of the Fijian Indian population.[27]

While the Fijian Indian Association's active membership is quite small, its effects are out of proportion to its size. It has been included in the formal structure of organizations which are presumed to speak for Vancouver ethnic communities to the Federal Government (through the Sec-

retary of State and the Department of Manpower and Immigration) and as such sends a member to the East Indian Citizens' Welfare Committee, the regional pan-ethnic East Indian council. While it could be argued that politically this organization will tend to approximately represent Fijian Indian interests, at the same time it is evident that most Fijians are quite oblivious of this organization's function, and as such in no way participate in it. The Fijian Indian Association has also put on a series of successful dances, where the main attendance has been young Fijians. Along similar lines, Fijian entrepreneurs have brought entertainers and movies from India to Vancouver, obviously aiming at a larger audience than just Fijians.

In the formal political sphere Fijians have been almost totally inactive. To the best of my knowledge no Fijian has run for political office, either municipal, provincial or federal. Neither are there any liaisons between the Fijian community and any political party, although in terms of preference there seems to be a strong orientation towards the NDP (as opposed to Social Credit) provincially.

Economic Bases for Community

Economic considerations are obviously at the core of household organization and of immigration patterns. But at the level of community, economic bases for social relations are almost non-existent. As has been suggested, this is largely the consequence of the very limited degree to which community and kin mediate fundamental economic processes for individuals. By-and-large, access to jobs does not depend upon Fijian patron-

age. Neither does expenditure, for the range of Fijian-specific goods and services is small. Community does assist in gaining access to services such as car maintenance, house repair and baby sitting, and to the degree to which this practice is followed, economic considerations create another network of social relations over those of kin and acquaintances. Unlike early Chinese and Japanese immigrants who were forced to concentrate in large numbers in a few specific industries, Fijians are distributed through a range of occupations and there are no Fijian occupationally- or economically-oriented protective associations.

Community is naturally of great consequence to those entrepreneurs who are dependent upon it, and in order to succeed they must do everything in their power to keep and expand their clientele. Increasing one's personal network is the most significant way in which this can be done, and this in turn involves a large concentration of energy in visiting and phoning, with an eye towards future clientele. It would not be unusual for a travel agent to phone every one of his Moslem contacts to "wish them well at the end of Ramadan" or to do the same with Hindus at Diwali. In addition, these entrepreneurs flood the Fijian population with advertisements and mailings, take care to be at key events, and endlessly distribute business cards.

Although these entrepreneurial activities are not economically vital to any one Fijian Canadian customer, they nevertheless do contribute to community in an institutional sense. Having Fijian-run food stores, jewelry makers, travel agents, and the like seems to provide a measure of

substance to Fijian establishment in Canada and would appear to stand symbolically for community. On a more concrete level, to the degree to which these establishments succeed in attracting Fijian clientele they do in fact generate another level of social and institutional relations between one Fijian and another.

Fijian Community and Its Future: centrifugal and centripetal tendencies

This chapter was begun by suggesting that historically the variations in community orientation and structure of Asian ethnic groups in Canada led to divergent responses to their collectively similar milieus. Fijian Indians are no exception to this pattern, and it is now time, having presented an outline of Fijian community organization, to address this subject in overview. Specifically, I suggest the answers to three questions are relevant: how stable is the basis of Fijian community, what are the prospects for its future, and what effects does the presence or absence of aspects of community have for the place of Fijians in Canadian society?

One can address all three of these questions by first placing Fijian community into a dichotomous framework. First, what are the bases of community, or rather, what centripetal tendencies do Fijians express in their Canadian context which result in divergent patterns of social relations from that of other Canadians? Centripetal tendencies at the group level can be manifest in two ways (Schermerhorn 1970). The most complete, that of a total rejection of the host society, is quite irrelevant here. More common and more realistic is the attempt to achieve a situation

whereby members of the group are integrated into the society in the sense of participating in it economically and in certain other culturally-specific spheres, while at the same time keeping other spheres distinct from normative societal patterns; the extreme case of this choice would be that of being "separate but equal" -- integrated into the economy and strictly separate elsewhere.[28] Milder cases are nevertheless the basis for ethnic community organization.

In which ways do Fijians express centripetal tendencies? The most fundamental way is in developing networks of social relations in which the great majority of personnel are other Fijians. I argue that this is the fundamental basis for Vancouver Fijian society. In turn, why they choose to generate social relations with other Fijian Canadians can go far towards understanding the future viability of Fijian community. The reasons are quite unproblematical. Kinship and prior friendship underlie social relations in Fiji as does the culturally-derived expectation that one should maintain these contacts. The collective experience of being Fijian and of participating in immigration could also be argued to have some effect in turning Fijians in on each other, but this is by no means sufficient to explain Fijian social relations. Uncertainty about Canadian ways and the shyness which it provokes limits the aggressiveness with which Fijians develop relations with other Canadians and is also a factor of consequence.

It should be well noted that none of these considerations involve a strong ethnocentric or defensive ethnic stance, nor do Fijians form a

community or reject Canadian relations because of anti-Canadian feelings. Indeed, these relations are not so much centripetal as they are simply non-centrifugal. Neither is Fijian community a planned response to the Canadian context nor to Canadians. One could argue that this community results quite unconsciously out of the combination of prior experience and Canadian constraints; remember, too, that until recently a majority of Fijian Indians lived within communities without formal municipal government and as such are quite unknowingly experts at community engineering. Even in the face of urban industrial society they have considerable resources for the organization of community.[29]

Neither does religion seem to offer much potential for centripetal action. Indeed, even between one Fijian and another religion's effects upon social relations comes out not in first-hand, religiously-based rejection or acceptance, but rather in the ways in which religion and its attendant cultural practices have shaped the patterns of kinship and marriage. Between Fijians and Canadian society religion should play an altogether insignificant role, save again its effect upon marriage preferences. Fijian religious practice does not define non-believers as people to be avoided. Neither does it require that believers exhibit religious markers in public which might serve to provoke hostile or suspicious reactions on the part of other Canadians. Because community-based religious practice is weak this, too, lessens centripetal potential. Finally, transmission of religious belief to the next generation is almost certainly going to be a largely unsuccessful endeavour, and as such with

the years will make the religious factor in community organization largely irrelevant to a growing proportion of the population.

This latter process is but one aspect of a larger one in which Fijians are selectively replacing prior cultural beliefs and practices with others selected out of their impressions of Canadian society, a process which is of massive proportions. Cultural difference can be the basis for centripetal action in many ways, ranging simply from the divergence of minority behaviourial patterns to mutual hostility between minority and majority groups. Save for a very few instances which would not likely be recognized by other Canadians, virtually all Fijian examples of culturally-divergent behaviour are expressed in the private sphere. Moreover, even there they have been reduced primarily to the areas of personal relations and ideology. Neither are these domains proof against the entrée of Canadian values, for young Fijian Canadian children have accepted these Fijian patterns only to the degree to which they are dependent upon the teaching and behaviour of their elders.

Economically, Fijians are already fully integrated into the Canadian wage labour market and as such are subject to all of its constraints. In the reverse sense, although one could argue that income from this source allows for the economic foundation of community, income is independent of Fijian social relations, and therefore does not directly support community organization.

This brings up a most important determinant of the place of ethnic minorities with respect to the larger society, one which is the subject

of the next chapter. Because Fijians are a minority, they do not set the rules under which they must operate in the public arena. These are largely determined by the formal and informal sets of normative and ethnic-specific expectations of the society in which they now reside. And Anglo Canadians no longer draw a racial caste line between themselves and Asian Canadians, at least not one of the sort typified by racially-restrictive laws and by normatively-acceptable, overt, discriminatory practice. The consequence for Fijian community is that, overtly undefined and unrestricted by Canadian society, their own community definition is to that degree weakened.

It is obvious that community results not only from factors which develop it but also from those which restrict that development. Because of the lack of formal restrictions and the massive forces of assimilation facing these people one must conclude that Fijian community is likely to be dependent largely upon continued immigration, and within this upon the first generation of immigrant adults. Those born and raised to maturity in Fiji are likely to continue to live within a social community of other Fijians for the rest of their lives, even while their non-Fijian networks continue to expand.[30] Adolescent individuals, younger children and those born in Canada, are going to participate increasingly more in Canadian ways of doing and less in Fijian ones. Given no marked changes in the attitude of other British Columbians to their Fijian compatriots, everything points to a further integration of Fijians into Canadian society and to the path of that integration being predominantly one of

assimilation, first culturally and then biologically.

But this prediction is indeed predicated on the one important question relating to the immigration, establishment, and place of Fijian Indians in Canada which I have yet to substantively discuss -- that of the nature of the interaction between Fijians and other Canadians and the beliefs about self and others which surround, affect, and in turn are affected by that interaction. In the subsequent and last chapter I come full circle to reflect upon these interactional structures of ethnicity which in the past weighed so heavily upon Asians in British Columbia. In the light of these historical patterns, I will outline the place of East Indians in the Western Canada of today. With this comes an understanding of the place of Fijian Indians in the same context.

Chapter Seven: Notes

1. At least this holds for older people and established relations. There are clear signs that younger people will not tend to use a kinship calculus to define friends.

2. It seems that the most common match was a Moslem husband to a northern Hindu wife, with the wife converting to Islam. Forty years ago this sometimes resulted in the total ostracism of the woman by her kin, but this response is weaker today. Nevertheless, arranged marriages across this ethnic line are rare; most matches are "love" marriages.

3. Marriages of a northern male to a southern female are by far more common, as Mayer (1973:145) has noted.

4. Many of the real cultural differences between northern and southern Hindus noted by Mayer (1973) in 1951 have since then largely disappeared at the expense of the southern group. Language and food, in particular, have shifted towards northern practices.

5. Contacts between Indian and Chinese Fijians are more frequent.

6. When one remembers that most Fijians did not have telephones in their Fijian homes, their quick integration of them into the structure of social relations is perhaps a bit more surprising.

7. This network, inasmuch as it is private, tends also to be a vehicle for the communication of women's opinions to other women, thereby maintaining the different world view of women. Incidentally, Fijian telephone and address books routinely will contain a hundred other Fijian households.

8. This is not a Fijian custom, but it is rendered necessary by the very high likelihood that those whom one might visit are out; remember that most shopping is also done on weekends.

9. The possible exception would be present day Ugandan immigration, where forced emigration has destroyed the source community.

10. A number of Canadian Fijians who still hold residency in Fiji are likely to also be included in these figures.

11. It should be added that the frequency with which Fijians visit places where they do not have kin is very low, with the exception of the area within an hour's drive of Vancouver.

12. Discussion of religious belief itself is outside of the scope of this thesis. Rather, I am concerned with how Fijian religion affects the central areas of interest, in this case in how it modifies community.

13. For clarity's sake, I will concentrate upon orthodox northerner practice, as they are the largest of these three Hindu groups.

14. One northern Hindu father claims to have paid for the return trips of thirteen individuals to attend his son's wedding in 1975. This alone would have cost between seven and nine thousand dollars.

15. Because of communications difficulties it is often too late for a Fijian relative to arrive before the funeral itself.

16. Traditional Indian cremation practices have been discouraged in British Columbia since at least 1920.

17. Although I have no way of substantiating it empirically for lack of direct information on their backgrounds in Fiji, by the reports of others some individuals have become much more attentive to their observances since they have come to Canada.

18. The temple itself is being financed through donations and through organized events aimed at bringing in revenue.

19. Remember that in contrast to non-Punjabi continental Indian immigration there are relatively few professionals among the Fijian immigrant population.

20. Beyond services, the temple is rather frequently being used by Fijians for weddings.

21. The date varies because it is determined by a lunar rather than a solar calendar.

22. Ethnic and religious solidarity is clearly a relevant factor here. Earlier this year the local Ismaili community, which is very tightly organized, was able to fill this same theatre to capacity using only their own community personnel. The event was purely cultural and had no religious significance.

23. Fijian immigrants who follow Islam are almost exclusively orthodox Sunni Moslems. They should not be lumped together with the Ugandan Ismaili Moslems, who the former view as heretical.

24. As with the Hindu population, there are a good number of Moslem Fijians who have either abandoned religious practice altogether or have restricted it to private prayer.

25. One sees ethnic boundaries in operation here as well, for Fijians will on this day visit only other Fijian Moslems.

26. It should be added that the place of religion in community organization among present day Fijian immigrants stands in the sharpest contrast to either Sikh immigrant religiosity (past and present) or that of Ismaili Ugandans. Both of the latter could be termed "religions of defensive minorities" and are fundamentally oriented towards community. Earlier Sikh internal community cohesion, in large part religiously based, gave Sikhs an avenue of political pressure far out of proportion to their numbers.

27. Its current president is Hindu and its vice-president is Moslem.

28. This has been a pattern characteristic of Sikh communities both in British Columbia and in Britain. Separate but equal status is most easily achieved where there exists a strong sense of ethnic solidarity, coupled with formal-legal equality and rejection by the larger society.

29. This reflection upon community organization in Fiji has other explanatory uses as well. When one considers the very weak degree of Fijian community organization above the level of interpersonal social relations it is not surprising to see a parallel absence of such organization here.

30. Because of the Fijian practice of protecting and supporting their elderly kin after they have retired from active life these present day adult immigrants may return in old age to an almost exclusively Fijian network as they become dependent upon their younger kin.

Chapter Eight: Fijian Indians in Canadian Society: Social Constraints, Social and Self Identities

Up to this point this thesis has moved from situations where Fijian immigrants face roughly similar historical and institutional constraints to those more complex ones where these same individuals interact with each other. It ends in the middle ground, with an investigation of the interaction structures between Fijians and others and the beliefs about self and social identities which have arisen around them. This conclusion is appropriate, because of any sphere, this is the one in which very human evaluations of societal and individual place predominate, and in the flurry of statistics and facts one must not lose sight of the fact that neither Fijians nor Canadians are abstract units, but rather are people.

This final chapter has three main objectives, the first of which is to develop an understanding of the nature of interaction between Fijians and Canadians of other ethnic backgrounds, cast in such a manner as to further explicate my central concern with the processes whereby these people have come to occupy their particular place in Canadian society. It will also briefly contrast and compare this position with that of earlier Asian immigrants to British Columbia; an understanding of this history is requisite to understanding the interactional and ideological patterns of today. The third objective is more ambitious, for I would also like to suggest explanatory reasons for why these self and social identities are as they are, in so doing offering a number of modifications of the theoretical means which are commonly used to analyze folk beliefs about ethnicity.

The Social and Self Identities of Fijian Indians in Vancouver

As with the belief systems of present concern, the sociological concepts which one employs largely determine the structure of understanding developed upon them, and in this case they merit careful advance consideration. In overview, both sociological and anthropological approaches to the study of ethnic relations have tended to concentrate upon the structural relationships of power and privilege which exist between ethnically-defined groups (Rex 1970; van den Berghe 1967; Porter 1965), the internal social organization of ethnic minorities (Whyte 1943; Mayer 1974) or the nature of interaction between individuals of divergent ethnicities (Barth 1969; Paine 1971). Regardless of orientation and of attendant terminology, each of these has dealt with the ideological aspects of ethnic relations by making a dual separation of dominant views of others (termed stereotypes, racism, prejudice, social identities) from minority views of self (self identity, ethnic social identity, dependent personality). Nevertheless, each of these orientations has fundamentally neglected the mechanisms by which minority individuals come to receive an idea of how others view them. With few exceptions, the transmission of dominant views of minority ethnic worth has been seen as non-problematical. Considering the narrower class of situations where dominant views of minorities are stigmatic, there exists a very general implicit assumption that stigmatized individuals in fact internalize and act upon fairly precise notions of the nature of their stigma, an assumption well illustrated by the earlier work of Goffman (1959; 1963).

This stance is logically, not to mention empirically unacceptable, for it implies that within ethnic relations, as routinized and limited as interaction often is, perfect communication is somehow achieved; Blacks, Chinese, Hutu, or Batak -- each is presumed to understand their social identity in unproblematic fashion, even if they do not necessarily accept it as valid. This unwarranted assumption about the transmittability and receptibility of ideas of ethnic worth implies a degree of value system uniformity which rarely exists about the ethnic boundary. Especially in situations of initial contact or of wide divergences in Weltanschauung it is reasonable to expect that the social identity of ethnic groups constructed by those of other ethnicities and the perceptions of it by those so labeled will diverge considerably, and therefore the two must be analytically separated. This is especially so, because as in any sphere of knowledge it is upon perceptions and not upon "objective reality" that one bases future behaviour, and to ignore these perceptions in favour of the dominant views themselves is of necessity to distort the motivational bases of ethnically-relevant action.

To neglect the separation of ethnic social identity from perceived social identity is also to neglect the whole question of how individuals receive information out of which such perceptions are created. Failure to make this separation would also divorce this system of beliefs from other folk spheres of understanding, particularly ideas of self and others, those involving the perceived nature of the social context, and basic ethical values.

Attempts at incorporating the notion of perceived social identity have been of two sorts, one being as simple as the other is complex. The former merely calls for the incorporation of the qualification that information is lost in the communication of ethnic stigma, and suggests that to this degree perceived social identity is something of fewer dimensions than the original social identity after which it is constructed. The latter, that of symbolic-interactionism (Braroe 1975; Mead 1934), sees self identity and views of others as systemically interconnected by the demand for the maintenance of positive personal self worth and by the need to adjust ideas of self to the demands which others place upon manifestations of self. Although I have considerable respect for this approach, I do not feel that it is general enough, for it does not extend its own ideas to their logical conclusion: that one's ideas of self and others must be adjusted to folk-cognitive demands just as they are to psychological ones.

I would argue that a more fruitful approach is to look for ways in which individuals demand that social identities, like any other spheres of knowledge, exhibit a measure of internal consistency such that they are explainable without semantically contradicting the fundamental beliefs of individuals. In short, I suggest looking to the processes whereby ethnic minorities incorporate their social identity as a rational endeavour, where an ideological system is assembled out of accessible information such that it allows for a coherent understanding of the aspect of ethnicity in that specific social context. I obviously do not mean to use the concept of rationality in a culturally-transcendant, but rather in

a culturally-specific manner. Rationality is that activity which "the systemic thinker performs on the image of the world; an increasing theoretical mastery of reality by increasingly precise and abstract concepts (Weber 1974:293)."[1] Framed in this manner, the empirical questions are these: given Fijian Indian Weltanschauung and social situation, what inputs exist for Fijians to know of their social identity, how do cultural values and channel constraints affect its communication, and how do Fijians assemble the information so received in a manner which is consistent with their own views of the world?

I would like to stress at the onset that this process of social definition is a symetrical one about the ethnic boundary. While the concern here is almost exclusively with Fijian perceptions of and responses to their own social identity, it is clear that Canadians, too, are participating in the same process, and like Fijians are in part defining and explaining themselves as they attempt to do the same of others. What in other methodological parlance would be termed "anti-East Indian racism" is also the product of a very human process of attempted understanding, and as such has its own structure, its own logic, and its own requirements for self-consistency.

The Selective Communication and Distortion of Social Identity

It is beyond the bounds of this thesis to address the internal structure and logic of British Columbian views of East Indians in any depth. I will instead concentrate upon what Fijian Indians perceive to be their

social identity, upon the sources from which this perception of social worth is derived, and upon Fijian Indian reactions to it. As previously put forward, such a separation between the social identity of East Indians and their perception of this identity is in any case both empirically and logically necessary -- empirically because these two views are not identical by any means, and logically because, like the communication of any other message, there must occur loss and distortion in the process of transmission of social identity from sender to receiver. It is to the forms and limitations of this communication which we must now turn.

The nature of the communications channels through which Fijians derive ideas about Canadian evaluations of East Indian ethnicity in themselves determine to a large degree which elements of a basically stigmatized social identity are perceived, which are rendered invisible, and which are contextually countered by other, more positive, information. These sources are of three types: notions derived from interaction across the ethnic boundary, ideas communicated by other Fijians, and input from the media.

Interactional Channels

As a dispersed minority in an urban industrial context, Fijians must of necessity interact a great deal with other Canadians. But the forms of this interaction have been such as to provide to Fijians a set of expressions of their social worth which are extremely contradictory. Because of the short time period during which they have been resident in Canada and perhaps also reflecting the high social distance between Indians

and Europeans in Fiji, Fijians have developed few personalized relationships with Euro-Canadians (with the massive exception of children). By personalized relationships, I mean those which are dependent upon the individuals involved rather than their respective roles, which express a multi-dimensional set of ideas and activities, and which are of low social distance. In contrast, a good number of Fijians have neither been in a Euro-Canadian house, nor have socialized with Euro-Canadians outside of relatively formalized settings.

These Canadian-Fijian social contacts seem to be greatly increasing at present. Relations between Fijians and their neighbours are often good and, depending upon individual circumstances, a number of these acquaintances have led to frequent visiting. Younger Fijian adults in particular have been quite successful at attracting European friends. The world of Fijian Indian children is dominated by non-Fijian compatriots, while for adolescents the interactional customs of the particular school and the child's sex are important determinants; some high schools have developed sharp network cleavages along ethnic lines while others have not, and in any case adolescent Fijian females are likely to remain more separate than males.

While these Canadian-Fijian relationships are but few, those which do exist have contributed to the development of the idea that basically Canadians are a friendly, fair, socially and ethically acceptable people, who are willing to accept Fijians into their society, given that Fijians acquiesce to Canadian ways of doing. But while multi-dimensional, these

relationships are at the same time severely restricted by norms of interaction away from direct discussion of the status of East Indians in Canada; it is too sensitive an issue to be broached among friends.[2] Feelings of positive self-worth must thus be derived not from declaration but from the nature of the relationships themselves.

This basic assessment of Canadians as "good" people stands at the centre of Fijian ideas of self, for as they attempt to explain other less than friendly interaction with Canadians they have not yet chosen to change this assessment. This stance has led to the generation of an alternative, logically consistent means of explaining these two sets of observations which at first glance seem contradictory.

Most social relationships between Fijians and other Canadians are rather highly institutionalized, which is to say that they are routinized and are largely role dependent. Most of these in turn involve contact at work or in the acquisition of goods and services, and the former is particularly important in reinforcing an essentially positive view of Canadians. In contrast to earlier Asian immigration to British Columbia, Fijians have not concentrated in any one occupational context valued by Canadians to such an extent as to provoke a response of perceived economic or social threat. The result is that workplace relations are normally unstrained and relatively open, even if there exists little interaction between these same individuals outside of the work situation.

But it is within this general class of institutionalized relations, based more upon the respective roles of the people involved than on their

individual personalities, that much of the content of a stigmatic East Indian social identity is also transmitted, and the formidable constraints which exist against its perfect transmission must be outlined in detail. Ideas from sociolinguistics will be used (Hymes 1968; 1972) to arrange the discussion.

The first significant constraint is one against the transmission of an essentially structured, multidimensional set of assertions about East Indians along channels (speech, physical signs, and discriminatory behaviour) which normally allow few dimensions to be expressed at any one time. Even more than with personalized relationships, institutionalized ones limit the option of conversational discussion of "East Indianness", with the result that most effective transmission must be through 'shorthand' behavioural signs of disapproval or via culturally-derived, routinized statements standing for a constellation of interlinked meanings, for example, "Punjab, go home". Vehicles for the simultaneous transmission of why "Punjabs" should go anywhere do not exist.

Along these lines, many parts of this East Indian social identity do not even have such readily dispensible symbolic packaging as, for instance, concern over the presumed effect of East Indians upon the price of housing in the Vancouver area. Even such direct critiques as those aimed at perceived East Indian overcrowded living conditions cannot easily be transmitted along this channel. For this reason alone, much of this view of East Indians never crosses the ethnic boundary.

Constraints of the social setting and the norms of interaction limit

the transmission even of these semantically few-dimensioned statements, for it is no longer normally acceptable to air specifically racist statements in most British Columbian public contexts. Routinized settings also limit the transmission of these ideas simply because of semantic incongruity between the central theme of the interaction and feelings about East Indians. It would be extremely unlikely to hear a shopkeeper say anything like, "...and here's your dozen eggs. Oh, and by the way, why do you people wear those dumb pointy shoes?"

Nevertheless, stigmatic messages are indeed transmitted, reading their ideal type in what could be termed extraordinary incidents -- those in which the anti-East Indian critique is overt and is central to the event. Incidents of this variety might range from a harangue delivered to a Fijian slow about his business in the teller's line "sending all his money to India", to Fijian women being subjected to the taunt of "dirty raghead" while out shopping, to the vandalism of one's home and actual interethnic violence.

These extraordinary incidents are in fact quite rare, and most Fijians have not as yet directly participated in one. They nevertheless have great impact, for when they do occur news of these incidents is rapidly telegraphed across dense Fijian social networks to a great number of individuals. In this way, events of this sort appear to be far more common than they actually are. When, for instance, a Fijian woman was mysteriously murdered in Vancouver last year (1976), information about the event flashed across the community in about two days and quickly made the

national news in Fiji, after which for the first time returning visitors to Fiji were being asked about the level of racism in Canada.

Intraethnic Channels

Another source of ideas about Canadian attitudes toward East Indians is this second-hand one -- information received from other Fijians. The personal communication of extraordinary incidents from individual to individual is without a doubt an important mechanism in the general perception of such attitudes, for, as has been noted, few Fijians have personally experienced any number of these incidents. But the actual communication of these events, person-to-person, additionally functions to abstract culturally relevant material out of what began as personalized stories and to integrate them into that more general framework which is the social identity of East Indians as perceived by Fijian Indians. Such stories then serve to reinforce, as well as to structure and alter beliefs about the place of Fijians in Canadian society.

Media Channels

The media play their part in conveying an image of East Indian social identity to these people. While Fijians are not active newspaper readers, they watch television a great deal. Lacking both the defences against television which North Americans have presumed to have developed over the last twenty years and at the same time lacking countervailing personal experience about many of the things so presented, to Fijians television must for some time stand for many aspects of the reality of North American life. It is

unfortunately their initial window into the private world of Euro-Canadians.

East Indian ethnicity's presentation on television suffers from many of the same weaknesses as does the portrayal of many other aspects of society; the media, especially the news, records that which is unique and different and neglects everyday life. 'Ram Singh', the nice guy who has a happy family life and a steady job is not news, while 'Mohammed Khan', the wife-beater, is. Coverage of East Indians on television and especially in the newspapers centres around immigration questions, East Indians as criminals, or East Indians as the victims of crime (Indra 1977a). Although the effect of this portrayal upon Canadian views of East Indians cannot be easily assessed, it cannot but reinforce generally held stereotypes, especially in consideration of the low information flow to Canadians in those same situations of ethnic interaction to which we have already referred. To discuss the consequences of this and other informational sources for East Indian social identity, we must now consider the question of perception, and with it, the meanings which Fijians give to these perceptions.

Reception and Integration

Moving to the Fijian side of the ethnic boundary, the effective communication of these transmitted ideas about East Indian social identity is clearly dependent upon two separable processes, those concerning reception of the message and those which involve the incorporation of the received message into a system of meaning. Reception will be dealt with first.

It must be stated at once that at least to the degree to which transmission of these messages is constrained, so also is reception. The first barrier to be overcome is to notice that such a message is indeed being transmitted, and this is not an automatic process. It is not uncommon that Fijians simply will not realize that an evaluation of their social worth is being conveyed because of a lack of familiarity with the nuances of Canadian linguistic usage or behavioural signals. Curtness can be interpreted as measured civility or sarcasm as fact; Fijians are often 'had' by salesmen manipulating their reluctance or ignorance of their rights as buyers without this being realized. In general, Fijians are far more often the small-scale victims of their ethnicity than they ever notice. This same cultural value differential occasionally results in situations where Fijians read what is either another message altogether or just 'static' as an indicator of negative Canadian ideas about themselves.

This culturally-specific sensitivity to some signals and not others results in the most significant barrier to the perfect reception by Fijians of Canadian-held views of East Indians. Because Fijians and Canadians do not entirely participate in the same universe of meaning, and because neither has a mitigating sociological view of the other, the same transmitted signal need not (indeed, does not usually) convey the same meaning on both sides of the ethnic boundary.[3] This process of incorporation of received messages into a coherent system of meaning and self identity is most complex, and in order to illustrate some of its aspects it is now necessary to briefly introduce some of these messages, their intent, and their cultural translations.

Let us begin with the general category itself -- "East Indian" -- or, alternatively, "Punjab" or "Hindu". On the Canadian side, it is evident that these are not meant to be abstract covering terms for all those people in Canada of continental Indian descent. Rather, they are a reflection of the fact that British Columbians do not recognize any significant differences between the several ethnic groups placed under these labels.

From the range of inputs which other Canadians might have of East Indians, this is a reasonable conclusion to make, even though it is a fallacious one. As has been put forward in Chapter One, this mechanism of ideologically reducing the real variability of Asian ethnic groups while at the same time stereotyping their attendant "racial" attributes goes back to the earliest days of British Columbia.

As in those pioneer times, most British Columbians do not heavily interact with "East Indians" or do so in highly routinized situations, in this establishing a social context symmetrical in its few-dimensioned communication. The media produce supportive inputs to this homogeneous social identity, for ethnic differences below the level of "East Indian" are rarely reported.

The relative parsimony of sources of information which British Columbians have about their neighbours of continental Indian extraction not only determine that there will be such a general category as "East Indian", but also to a large degree produce the semantic configuration which goes with it. At the highest semantic level, the East of "East Indian" is necessary to differentiate "turban" from "feather" Indians, but as a term it implies more than this.

Save for a token recognition that there are Ugandan Asians in British Columbia, this social identity has been assembled around a historically-based notion of Punjabi Sikhs. As for Fijian East Indians, they are quite invisible in this social identity, and few British Columbians know that they are here at all. Fijians, Sikh and Hindu Punjabis, Ismailis and other Ugandans, Kenyans, Pakistani Moslems, Indian people from South Africa and the West Indies, Ceylonese and others must all labour under this same social identity.

On the other hand, Fijians do not affiliate in any way with either the label 'East Indian' or with the social identity which they perceive to go with it. Indeed, few 'East Indians' find either applicable. At the highest level of abstraction, Fijians have therefore begun their assembly of this social identity by displacing the stigma elsewhere: "We're not East Indians, we're Fijians."

This process is easily accomplished because of prior usage and available alternative self identities. In both Canada and Fiji, "East Indian", with "East" stressed ("He's an East Indian") means to convey that the person referred to is a continental Indian. That Fijian Indian relations with the latter have historically been ambiguous has maintained the distinction. At the same time, Fijians have recourse to a set of definite, taxonomically arranged ideas of self. To be Fijian is a complex thing, one which the earlier part of this thesis hopefully conveys some notion. Below this national affiliation are the concrete, self-ascribed social identities of northern and southern Hindu and Moslem, ones which are continually activated

both in Fiji and Canada.

The messages which have been received by Fijians about the content which lies under this "East Indian" category are very direct. The most clear one is that of negative social worth, of such intensity as to suggest that East Indians are unequivocally unwelcome in Canada. This idea is expressed both by generally disapproving attitudes which are clearly based upon ethnic status and by direct expression, as in "Punjab, go home", "We don't need <u>your</u> kind here", and the like. Vandalism and what is perceived to be excessive concern in the media with non-European immigration reinforce this theme.

Reasons for this hostility which make their way through the many channel constraints are few-dimensional critiques of East Indian cultural behaviour. This is so either from the point of view of the transmitter or the receiver. But at the same time the <u>meanings</u> attached to these messages differ quite widely on either side of the ethnic boundary. Unlike Goffman's (1959) ideal type situations, where sender and receiver are joined in near-identical systems of meaning, in this narrow sphere of ethnic identity Canadians and Fijians definitely operate with different semantic languages. This differential allows Fijians to construct for themselves a version of this East Indian social identity which allows them to escape the attendant stigma ideologically if they cannot do so socially. Because each perceived element of this social identity is immersed in the meanings of the whole we must briefly deal with which Canadian messages are acknowledged to have been sent, moving afterwards to their Fijian interpretation.

Critiques of Material Culture

Many of the criticisms of presumed East Indian behaviour which are noted by Fijians concern differences in material culture, as suggested by the phrases "dirty Hindu" and "raghead". It is beyond the bounds of this work to argue whether when in use these critiques are actually used with their semantic implications of uncleanliness and dress difference, respectively, but as with other such statements these are the literal interpretations to which Fijians will affix meaning. Those which have had particular impact concern dress (turbans, saris, "pointy shoes", beards, odd colour combinations), personal hygiene (cleanliness, smell), and household practices (condition of houses, use of curried food).

Critiques of Social and Interactional Practice

Among these messages perceived by Fijians are a series which criticize presumed East Indian social customs and "modal personality". East Indians as an 'ethnic group' are claimed to be clanish (they keep together, live together, and have their own social rules), violent (both with each other and with other Canadians), unfriendly, and argumentative (they bargain on prices, are loud about their "rights"), and generally do not meet Canadians on their own terms (with respect to language use, social custom, and the like).

Interpretation and Ideological Defense

In what ways do Fijians generate meaning from these charges? The first

reaction is one of total rejection. Even though Fijians lack that sort of strong ethnic solidarity typified by the Sikhs, they possess a well developed sense of self worth and of high personal morality, and their behaviour in Canada, as seen through their own eyes, is viewed as relatively without fault. They believe themselves to be acting in ways which are for the most part acceptable both to their own ethical code and to Canadian ones; the thinking is that if only Canadians knew what they actually did they would have to agree.

If they are firmly convinced that they do none of these things and at the same time believe Canadians to be a basically fair, knowledgeable, and good people, how are these to be reconciled with the overt critique of East Indians which they often must face? The means are twofold, yet interconnected. First of all, the critique itself is displaced onto the backs of the Sikhs. This process constitutes a clear case of scapegoating; but while psychological theories of scapegoating are necessary to explain the empirical situation they are by no means sufficient, for they say very little about the direction the process will take or the semantic content of the folk explanations which underlie it. In addition to psychological motivation I would argue that there are clearly very strong semantic demands for order and internal ideological consistency which structure Fijian responses to stigmatization.

This ideological accomplishment is non-problematical and straightforward simply because the social identity itself has been one largely constructed around vague notions of Sikhs, down to the categorical terms

"Punjab" and "raghead". In this regard, Fijians have either taken the taunts quite literally or have chosen to note and overstress some while patiently ignoring those others for which there is no ideological escape. A few examples are in order. Of the former, they have taken messages like, "Punjab, go home", to mean just that -- Punjabs (i.e., not Fijians) go home. "Raghead", which for Canadians would read "East Indian", for Fijians reads "Sikh".

In terms of the selective acknowledgement of messages, Fijians have made use of a priori Fijian and continental Indian stereotypic ideas about Sikhs to confirm their belief that Sikhs are acting likewise here.[4] To Fijians, Canadian Sikhs are dirty and unkempt, don't keep up their houses, and tend to be socially distant unless they "really trust you"; they are mechanically inclined, but are a bit oxen-like and unimaginative with "nothing much under the turban". Those Canadian charges which 'fit' this Sikh social identity are duly noted as being basically valid observations of Sikh practice. For example, all those aspects of the East Indian social identity which concern personal or familial cleanliness have become central to Fijians, as in "dirty Hindu" and "East Indians don't keep up their houses", which Fijians translate "dirty (i.e. Sikh) Hindu" and "Sikhs don't keep up their houses", respectively. From the point of view of Fijians, Sikhs are a violent, argumentative, and militaristic people, and so these aspects of the made-in-Canada social identity of East Indians are also transferred over to the Sikhs.[5] That Canadians are good people can still be maintained, for the impetus for their hostility is perceived to be improper Sikh behavior.

Media presentations about East Indians are not the same to Fijians and Canadians, and the particular form of these presentations assures additional reinforcement to this process of transference. While to Canadians all East Indians so portrayed are just that -- East Indians -- to Fijians, they are individuals of one or another specific 'real' ethnic group, say the Sikhs or Ismailis, and actions of those portrayed as a result reflect only upon their own group. For historical, social, and demographic reasons a very large proportion of those who make the news are Sikh. Fijians make the unjustified association between Sikh ethnicity and the sorts of extraordinary things for which they are noted by the media, as must Canadians at the more abstract level of "East Indians".

This ideological transfer of stigma is also aided by the very high social distance currently existing between Fijians and Punjabi Sikhs in Canada, which allows Fijians less of an insight into Sikh everyday life than they have into its Canadian counterpart. Neither group seem to see much in common with the other, and both possess essentially negative evaluations of the other's social worth.

As important as those elements are of the East Indian social identity which are activated to support the charge that it is the Sikhs who are at fault are those which do <u>not</u> become activated. In the main, they are those where Fijians must acknowledge that they, too, do something which resembles the charge. They are elements which cannot so easily be transferred, for the polarization between Fijian self identity and East Indian social identity does not exist. Fijians are clean and industrious house

owners, perhaps to the extreme, and this acknowledged practice can therefore easily do battle with the accusation that they are not. But what of the charges that they "live 83 in a house", have "forced" arranged marriages, or eat different foods? While they do none of these things in anything like the way the social identity charges, within their understandable everyday world Fijians do things which correspond to them. They also act in ways which parallel "bringing all their relatives over" and "sending all their money to India", although again to say parallel is not to imply equivalence.

These things are directly confronted by feelings of the essential correctness of the activities which stand behind them whenever to compromise would result in high social or economic costs. Thus, extended households, the use of Indian food, the nomination of relatives to come to Canada, the remittance of money to dependents in Fiji, the use of Hindi in homes, the private practice of non-Christian religion, and the arrangement of marriage continue to be major themes in first-generation Fijian Canadian life.

The Presentation of Self: announcing Fijian identity

The transference of some of these stigmatic inputs to Sikhs and the avoidance of others certainly constitute a remarkable accomplishment; they have maintained ideological consistency among feelings of positive self identity and the equally positive evaluations of Canadians in the face of anti-East Indian hostility. But in itself this is hardly sufficient, for Fijians must daily interact with people who only see them as East Indians,

and as such they are socially stigmatized until their identity is proven otherwise by that closer interaction which rarely comes. At the same time, it would be inaccurate to infer that Fijian convictions of their own essentially proper behaviour are so seamless as to make them incapable of any accommodation to the behavioural demands which they perceive that other Canadians put upon them. It should not be unexpected that Fijians have responded with a large-scale presentation of self as Fijians and with an even more massive acceptance of Canadian ways of doing in the public sphere.

Although it is difficult to assess the degree to which they are consciously motivated to such purposes, several of the things which Fijians do can be argued to be attempts at providing other Canadians with positive diacritica of their Fijian identity. In conversation, they actively overcommunicate their Fijianness and a positive and idyllic assessment of life in Fiji. Fijian males often dress in a particularly Fijian style which is notable in the predominance of South-Sea island and Hawaiian shirts, while adolescents of both sexes are more direct, and often wear shirts emblazoned with the word "Fiji". With increasing frequency, Fijian cars are similarly labelled with decals and bumper stickers. At home, the public areas of Fijian homes are inevitably filled with explicitly marked momentos of Fiji ranging from wall posters to chairs to Fijian mats.

In these ways, Fijians are using non-physical markers to differentiate what is to Canadians a biologically and culturally homogeneous population of East Indians in much the same ways as other societies have used totemic animals (Levi-Strauss 1963) and, save for intent, in an equivalent fashion

to the Nazi requirement that Jews wear diacritical armbands. Unfortunately, most of this effort has been in vain, for the Canadian perceptual grid is not yet fine enough to have yet sorted out Fijians on <u>any</u> basis, let alone on the basis of their own presentations of self.

Another significant response comes at the level of the place Fijians see for themselves in Canadian society. Were they a group which has been historically united by adversity and minority status, one might expect that they would express "separate but equal" tendencies in the face of social stigmatization. Historically, Sikhs in British Columbia once reacted in this manner (Dodd 1972; Lal 1976), as have the Ismailis in part. But they have not. Rather, while firmly holding to a definitive self-ascribed Fijian identity, they have opted for a far more massive acceptance of Canadian values and practices than I believe have occurred among any of Canada's other Asian ethnic groups.

In virtually all respects, Fijians conform to their ideas of proper Canadian behaviour in public. Save for their own volunteered ethnic diacritica, they are largely indistinguishable in dress from other Canadians, and even saris are rarely worn in public except by older women or during the course of visiting other Fijians. Women's hair and makeup styles are also rapidly adjusting to Canadian practice. Equipped with some considerable prior experience with English, their interethnic linguistic ettiquette has been quickly sharpened to the point where the use of Indian languages in public is very constrained. At home, Fijian family structure largely remains intact, but a massive potential for its radical change is

building in the almost totally Canadianized second generation. But in terms of decor, personal privacy, and the like, Canadian patterns have largely won out.

It is difficult to assess to what overall degree this process of assimilation is either internally motivated or structurally necessary, as opposed to that which results from an accommodation to what are perceived to be demands for 'Canadian' behaviour on their part. Some aspects clearly derive from each. But it can be argued that the relatively complete acceptance of Canadian ways in public, in contrast to the far greater prevalence of Fijian customs activated at home, argues for the latter having considerable force, especially when one considers that very short time most of them have been in Canada.

East Indians as "Hindus": attempts at folk understanding

This outline of Fijian-Canadian ethnic relations would be left incomplete without a more systemic analysis of the beliefs which many British Columbians have about East Indians. These beliefs result primarily from an ethnocentric folk analysis of perceived East Indian behaviour -- ethnocentric in the sense that they are framed with respect to Euro-Canadian cultural knowledge and ideal values. This ethnocentrism is an unavoidable component of the interaction of peoples of divergent ethnicities, for it is self-evident that individuals can only understand things in the light of what they hold as true, and most truths derive from one's cultural heritage. This sort of ethnocentrism is readily apparent in Fijian folk analyses of

their perceived social identity.

Much of the antipathy against British Columbian East Indians and a great deal of the attendant social identity of these people derive from a perception that East Indians diverge from Canadian cultural ideals. East Indians are measured by such ideals (rather than normative Euro-Canadian behaviour) and are seen to fall short of acceptable standards. As such, it is not a racist ideology, strictly defined, for there is very little in the way of a biological component to it, but it does result in definite anti-East Indian prejudice which is activated by biological criteria; "East Indians" who "act like other Canadians" are all right, but someone who looks East Indian will be judged to be one of those who diverge from Canadian norms until it is proven otherwise.

Canadian Ideals and Ethnic Stigma

I have noted (Chapter Four) the strong persistence of a secularized Protestant Work Ethic in Canada. As cultural values, work is good, per se, work advances one in the world, one rightfully gets ahead on one's own steam. In this light, what explanations can be culturally and semantically consistent with members of stigmatized groups being perceived to achieve similar goals to hardworking Canadians? They must somehow cheat.

This logic can be seen in several facets of the East Indian social identity, perhaps most clearly in housing. In British Columbia, owning a house is a valued cultural ideal, to be achieved by years of hard work. Increasingly, the ideal is becoming more difficult to achieve. How can it

be that those East Indians who have been here only a year are moving into the house next door? How could they possibly afford to move into my sister-in-law's exclusive neighbourhood? Something is wrong, they must not be playing by the rules. The alternative explanation, that they are playing by the rules and are doing Canadians one better constitutes a massive status threat. Such a status threat obviously depends upon an a priori belief that East Indians ought to intrinsically be less successful at Canadian endeavours than 'real' Canadians.

While it has been shown that East Indians (at least if Fijians are representative) are able to buy houses because of the high priority to which they give it and because of the collective pooling of resources towards that end, these things are invisible to an East Indian's fellow worker or his next door neighbour. Folk explanations for East Indian house-buying ride on a number of ways, all of them consistent with what can be seen, in which East Indians are presumed to diverge from Canadian custom. They presumably make the rent by packing their whole 'village' into a single house, exploiting them through high rents; they defraud the government for housing aid for which they are economically unqualified or alternatively, have brought money from their country of origin (which is also assumed to have inflated the price of Vancouver homes).

Similar charges of perceived lack of East Indian conformity to Canadian cultural and ethical ideals occur in many other areas. In each, the stronger claim that they will not conform to Canadian standards is made; not only do they act differently -- they continue to do so almost out of

spite, rather than because they have not yet grasped the Canadian behavioural conventions.

In this way, East Indians have come to be in potentially stigmatic situations in almost anything they do. At work, they are becoming stereotyped as lacking commitment to the job and as being lazy; while I have argued that Fijians have a much more means-ends orientation to work than is typical among North Americans, to conclude that this results in less satisfactory performance is unjustifiable. There also exists a common complaint that East Indians are jealous of the boundaries of their occupational roles and defend their rights to perform those roles and to refrain from others of lower status; this may indeed have some factual basis, for virtually all individuals categorized under the covering term "East Indian" come from source societies where occupational and status roles are far more sharply defined than they are here.

In interaction with other Canadians, the charge is made that East Indians are impossibly argumentative and irrational, both in the logical and economic senses of the words. They are perceived to continually dicker about the prices of goods, to always attempt to wheedle additional services out of their providers, and to attempt negotiation on things which in Canada are non-negotiable, for instance, speeding tickets. These things are indeed often done, for again, many come from societies which are both legally and economically less rationalized than here, where bargaining is a normal cultural convention. That this presumed argumentative trait frequently leads to violence is commonly believed, and is consistent with the

selective media portrayal of East Indians in Vancouver (Indra 1977a). Nevertheless, this belief is not supported by police statistics (Scanlon 1975; Dave Singh 1975).

East Indians are also seen to be a drain on the state and society; they are continually charged with milking government services and with taking away Canadian jobs. In terms of the former, they are presumed to always be on welfare (a situation deeply humiliating to most East Indians), to take unemployment benefits rather than work, and to breed children in order to qualify for additional family allotment money. As the thinking goes, they must 'certainly' defraud the immigration system, and most of them must be here illegally.[6] All of these beliefs are in turn tied to a firm belief that East Indians constitute a very large proportion of all immigrants. Because of their relative geographical dispersal and their high visibility, East Indians in Vancouver appear to be far more numerous than they actually are, and few British Columbians would accept the fact that they constitute no more than 3% of the total provincial population.

Moreover, immigration and <u>coloured</u> immigration have been rendered more or less synonymous in the eyes of both press and public. Again, the fact that at least 91% of all current immigrants are <u>not</u> East Indian is not one accessible to folk perceptions, and is sadly not publicized by the Federal Government. White immigrants merge into the general population, with the result that it is not unreasonable that British Columbians often feel that they are experiencing a second wave of overwhelmingly Asian immigration.

Stigmatization of East Indian household practices results from the selective perception by Canadians of small and superficial elements of coherent and understandable East Indian home life. That they live in over-crowded conditions, an element of the East Indian social identity which goes back to 1907-8, is a complaint commonly voiced. As before, the implications are ones of unsanitary conditions, dirt and immorality. While it has been noted that Fijian extended households show none of these things, these are parts of the private world within the walls of Fijians houses and as such are inaccessible to Canadian view. Canadians can only infer what goes on inside by mixing external observations of the numbers of cars and people coming and going, noise levels, smells, and the outside condition of houses with Canadian conventions of proper and improper behaviour. By such standards, too many people are there, they are far too loud, the whole place "smells of curry" and is left in a perpetual state of disrepair.[7]

Perhaps the most general critique of East Indians is the charge that they are refusing to assimilate socially in addition to not doing so culturally; they keep to themselves and refuse offers of Canadian cordiality. In part, this is an accurate descriptive appraisal of the situation, but the attendant explanation that this large measure of social distance is consciously affected by East Indians is altogether insufficient. Much of this social distance is the result of the lack of prior models for dealing with Europeans in other than formalized settings. They are often uncertain of the necessary social ettiquette demanded by Canadian guests and are equally uneasy as to the degree of latitude their potential guests will have

about non-Canadian household practices. Moreover, prior patterns of social relations which follow kin, ethnicity, and equivalent status offer the least line of resistance, and mitigate against the easy establishment of Canadian contacts.

Social Identity and Structure

One must conclude that most of the elements of the social identity of East Indians are incorrect conclusions based upon faulty and selective information which uncritically mix ethical and factual criteria. They reflect neither a sociological nor an 'ethnic' understanding of the same phenomena with much success. Nevertheless, from the point of view of those who hold them, such beliefs are fundamentally rational in the light of available informational inputs and their cultural evaluations. As an explanatory vehicle for East Indian behaviour and as a necessary defender of self worth, these beliefs as a whole possess a semantic structure and consistency, well developed in the following poem which had wide distribution in Western Canada from 1974 to 1976:

BLESS B.C. - I SAY

I come for visit -- I'm treated regal
So I stay...who cares ILLEGAL?
I come to B.C. poor and broke
Get on bus, see Manpower bloke
Kind man treat me really swell there
Send me down to see the welfare
Welfare say "Come down no more,
We send the cash out to your door".
Norman Levi make you wealthy,
Medical Plan will keep you healthy.
Six months on dole -- get plenty money
Thanks to working man -- the dummy.
Write to friends in Pakistan
Tell them come as fast as can.

They all come -- in rugs and turbans
I buy big house in suburbans.
They come with me...We live together,
Only one thing bad -- the weather...
Fourteen families living in
Neighbours patience wearing thin.
Finally whites must move away
I buy their house, too...I say
Find more Paki's...house I rent
More in garden, live in tent...

Send for family -- they all trash
They all draw more welfare cash.
Everything is going good --
Soon we own the neighbourhood.
Now on quiet summer nights
Go to Temple -- watch the fights.
We have hobby, it called breeding
"Baby Bonus" keeps us feeding.

Two years later, big bank roll,
Still go Manpower, still draw dole.
Kids need dentists? Wife need pills?
We get free, we get no bills.
White man good, he pay all year
They keep the Welfare running here.
Bless all white men, big and small
For paying tax to keep us all.

We thank B.C. -- damn good place
Too damn good for white man race.
If they no like coloured man
PLENTY ROOM IN PAKISTAN...

Discrimination and the Constraints of Ethnicity

The concept of discrimination has a wide currency both in folk and sociological usages, but it has been unambiguously defined in neither. This is doubly unfortunate because its empirical referent is of great concern. Clearly, the following United Nations definition is naive:

> ...discrimination refers to the act or practice of granting or denying members of particular ethnic categories or groups access to life-chances (opportunities or rewards) because of their assumed physical, cultural, and/or behavioral characteristics. (Hughes & Kallen 1974:105).

Such a definition implies that 'legitimate' social stratification systems are somehow based on other criteria, when in fact they are not. Group membership (class) makes a difference, as do those physical, cultural and behavioural characteristics which fit under the rubric of individual ability. Few people would countenance calling it discrimination if a well qualified Fijian carpenter failed to gain an executive position in a major Canadian corporation, or if a Fijian woman who knew little English could not find work as a secretary, yet both fit under this humanist definition. A more realistic definition would be that:

> ethnic discrimination exists when members of ethnic groups are denied access to life chances on the basis of evaluations of their ethnicity; it is a situation where members of an ethnic group with resources equal to other individuals in that societal context do not receive equal rewards.

Here I use resources to refer widely to those economic, social, educational, and informational qualities which determine class access in a given societal context. By this definition, discrimination may be either positive or negative, with the situation of either concurrently producing its opposite: anti-coloured discrimination, for instance, obviously generates pro-white discrimination.

Under this definition, Fijian East Indians are infrequently the victims of negative discrimination in Canada. At the same time, the first generation among them has suffered massive constraints on their life

chances because of ethnicity. While these two statements may at first seem contradictory, in fact they are not.

To deal first with negative discrimination, it bears repeating that there exist no legal constraints upon Fijians either in British Columbia or in the rest of Canada which discriminate against them specifically on the basis of ethnicity. As landed immigrants (for the great majority have not taken out citizenship) they suffer a few liabilities which they share with other more recent immigrants; an exception would be access to the Federal civil service, where preference is given to Canadian citizens. Neither is the provision of governmental services formally based upon ethnicity, except in the special cases of native peoples and French Canadians. In strong contrast to early British Columbia, where discriminatory provincial legislation against Asians created a society of stratified racial castes, all forms of present day discrimination are specifically illegal, and as such can legally occur in those 'grey', informal areas where criteria for selection or approval are subjective and ambiguous.

Because these restricted areas involve vague criteria and human choice, their impact is difficult to evaluate. One example is, however, fairly clear. Fijians <u>are</u> unambiguously discriminated against as East Indians in their search for rental accommodation. It is hardly 'genetic affinity' which has determined that Fijians will most often rent basement suites from other East Indians. Many potential landlords fear that to rent to East Indians would be to invite disaster -- too many people, too much noise, too frequently the smell of garlic and curry. They therefore rent

selectively to Euro-Canadians, thereby violating the law. Whether this constitutes discrimination by the above definition is ambiguous, for by Canadian folk criteria to pick the Euro-Canadian is to pick the potential tenant with better (culturally-biased) credentials.

But in all other aspects of life where Fijians are only potentially the victims of negative discrimination, they are concretely the victims of their ethnicity, for to the degree that there is a systemic incongruity between Fijian resources and Canadian-centric requisites for access and success Fijians are ethnically constrained. For example, in Chapter Four, the constraints upon finding work in one's field were outlined in detail. Many Fijians in Canada have not achieved their prior occupational roles, in the main because their qualifications are based upon Fijian criteria rather than Canadian ones and because many lack either the informational or temporal resources to find a way to remedy this deficiency.

This same argument holds for access to social and medical services, which come to Fijian Canadians rightfully, but often are not fully utilized. Again, information about such programs may be faulty or, once rebuffed, the self assuredness to persist in the face of uncertainty may vanish. No clearer example of this could exist than that of a very young Fijian Moslem father who, out of work for four months, did not know that he qualified for unemployment insurance benefits and when so informed, did not know how to go about collecting them. The number who have permanently abandoned their prior skilled occupations after one attempt at gaining entry to them in Canada is disturbingly high.

This value differential between Fiji and Canada also penalizes Fijian in the marketplace, as their initial lack of familiarity with Canadian cultural conventions makes them easy prey to salesmen and promoters. At the same time, it in part determines that Fijians will only with difficulty develop networks of Canadian acquaintances with their attendant informational, economic, and social resources.

Fijians, Caste, and Class

Their predecessors, the East Indian immigrants of the turn of the century, were locked into a racial caste of a near ideal type. Caste membership was ascribed, mobility was extremely low, as was status. Negative, ascribed, social status led to occupation restriction, endogamy, and social segregation. It is useful to ask how the passage of so many years has affected changes in the place of Canada's Asian immigrants, as represented by today's Fijian East Indians. At first glance, there is an overall similarity between the structure of things then and now. Gone are the formal barriers to Asian Canadian mobility and with them, the means to constrain Asians through the generations to a subordinate caste. Nevertheless, the first generation of Fijian East Indian Canadians is by occupation overwhelmingly concentrated in the lower ranks of the British Columbian working class, despite being able to use their positive ethnic resources to maintain a solidly middle class style of life. The typical Fijian Canadian job is manual, semi-skilled, and relatively low paying. While occupational restriction was once consciously achieved through law and custom, today resource differentials based upon ethnic difference

effects similar results.

Like their predecessors, they are ascribed a stigmatized status, though one which in no way limits life chances to the degree earlier ones did. They must, however, labour under the knowledge that they are seen as different. High levels of endogamy and social segregation exist, but they are no longer the results of attempted domination.

Unlike the past situation, today's Fijian Canadians of the second generation are likely to receive from their parents' labours very similar life chances as other working class children in British Columbia. Without continued immigration and perhaps in spite of it, the bulk of the Fijian-Canadian population will eventually flow out of the poorly rewarding jobs which so many of them now hold. Even with continued immigration, the Fijian community of Vancouver will increase dramatically in heterogeneity and will become more diffuse about its periphery as the second generation matures. As a structurally important level of social organization, the community itself must look to an uncertain future in the face of this potential variability and increasing cultural assimilation.

Chapter Eight: Notes

1. It is particularly in this Weberian sense, as utilized in his inquiries into the connections between religious belief systems and economic action (1951; 1958a; 1958b), that I use the concept of rationality. This usage is one which stresses the logical self-consistency of related beliefs both with themselves and with observations of the world made through them, as evinced by religious solutions to the "problem of theodicy" (Weber 1963:138-165; Buchignani 1976). Save for distinctions arising from their concentration upon goal-directed (magical) action and beliefs, this is very close to the positions of Jarvie and Agassi (1967), and Lukes (1970).

2. I have been told by several second-generation Sikhs that they grew to maturity in British Columbia without this topic even being mentioned by their Euro-Canadian acquaintances.

3. See Horton (1966) for a discussion of what implications different ethnic world views might have for macrosociological theory. The problem of competing political Weltanschauung which defined the world in a non-complementary way was, of course, central to Mannheim (1936), and at a lower empirical level I am dealing with a very similar social situation.

4. The social distance between the descendants of indenture and Fijian Sikhs is not nearly so great as it is between the former and the Gujaratis. There is considerable continuity between Sikhs and northern Hindus as well as appreciable intermarriage. Nevertheless, Sikhs in Fiji have remained a distinct group.

5. On their side, Fijians make a distinction between "their" Sikhs and those who come from India itself. There is almost no social interaction between non-Sikh Fijians and British Columbia Sikhs, and this has in part caused and in part has been caused by a negative view of Fijians by Sikhs; Fijians are seen to be a community of petty shopkeepers.

6. The number of illegal Fijian immigrants seems to be negligible, if one counts as illegal those who are in Canada without valid visas and neglects the question of fraud on applications.

7. It is of note that many British Columbians have an almost hysterical reaction to curried food and will not touch it, even though the same individuals might explore equally hot Mexican food with curiosity.

Conclusion

This thesis has concerned itself with the immigration of Fijian East Indians to Canada and with their adaptation to life in the Lower Mainland of British Columbia. In neither Canadian society nor Canadian immigration policy do these people figure very strongly. They are but 7,000 individuals in a provincial population of over 2,000,000, and they constitute only one percent of the immigrant flow to Canada in recent years. Nevertheless, one can derive considerable insight about more general things from the immigration of these Fijian East Indians, especially about the adaptation of Asian people to the Canadian milieu. The simple extension of knowledge gained from the Fijian Canadian situation to those of the many other Asian groups in Canada can never stand for concerted empirical research. But at the very least, the information in this thesis bolsters the meagre data base in this area and should serve as a foil for comparisons and for subsequent research on other groups.

The awareness that this inquiry was breaking new ground also shaped the nature of the investigation in the hope that in its final form it would be easily comparable with other investigations. Because of British Columbia's long history of Asian immigration, I felt it necessary to connect the present and the past in such a way as to draw future research away from the premature bounding in space and time of inquiry into other Canadian Asian communities; in some ways the Fijians of today reap the harvest of the past, while in other respects they repeat the sequences of an earlier era of immigration.

This same caution against the premature closure of inquiry also led me to stress the need for an understanding of the individual and collective backgrounds of these people. The history of Indians in Fiji shows the development of a unique style of life and type of social organization which has been built upon the dual foundations of Indian cultural forms and Fijian necessity. It has been shown that this background profoundly affects the type of solutions which are applied to the many problems involved with the immigration and subsequent life in British Columbia of Fijian Indians.

By background I obviously do not mean simply their inventory of skills, education, and financial resources. Fijian Indian cultural values and goals enter every decision they make in this saga, and they are the bases for many of the evident similarities which exist between Fijian Indian immigration and that of other Asian immigrants, both past and present. Many of the differences between their responses to Canadian society and those of other Asian groups seem open to explanation by reference to divergent values and familial organization. I believe that comparisons of this sort between ethnic value systems and the adaptations of immigrants to Canada to be one of the most fruitful ones for future research.

The parallels between Fijian immigration and earlier Asian immigration are indeed strong, as have been outlined in Chapter Three. There are several important conclusions which can be derived from these parallels. First of all, Fijian immigration is dominated by chain migration; so also was immigration of the earlier period, as are present day Sikh and Ismaili

immigration. The consequences of this are clear. First of all, immigrants who follow this pattern will tend to locate geographically in those areas where the vanguard of immigrants have gone, and will only slowly disperse from this centre. The high prevalence of Fijians, Sikhs, Ismailis, and Chinese in the Vancouver area is not dictated by economic considerations as much as by geography and the chance placement of immigrants here.

Secondly, we have seen that a system of mutual aid among kin in both Vancouver and Fiji is an integral part of the process of chain migration. In many respects this extensive familial assistance allows new immigrants to find a place in their new setting with a minimum of confusion and with far fewer economic resources than would be required of an immigrant who came to Canada independently; the price of this mutual aid is exacted in the correspondingly greater family obligations which are imposed upon these immigrants and in the penalties attendant to a slower assimilation of Canadian values and practices.

Thirdly, it has been shown that this system of chain migration has not overridden the determinants of the Canadian immigration selection procedure, for demographically, Fijian immigrants do not reflect a cross section of Indians in Fiji. Rather, they are by-and-large young, skilled and semi-skilled workers, who are among the most educated, Westernized, and skilled of the Fijian population. But we have also seen that they have extreme difficulty in activating those skills in Canada. In this respect the economic rationality implied by the formal Canadian immigration

regulations is not well reflected in reality. The immigration selection procedure has allowed reasonably skilled Fijians to come to Canada, but has not provided the mechanisms by which they are to match their skills with a comparable job. Fijians have had great difficulty in finding the available routes to jobs, and if this holds for a large number of Canadian immigrants it would make the whole process of immigration questionable in the light of Canada's unemployment rate of 8%.

I have argued that these impediments to access which Fijians have faced place them predominantly in the lower ranks of the working class. Even though the constraints are now those of class rather than caste, they are in an occupational situation which is in some ways analogous to that of earlier Asians to British Columbia. They are primarily blue collar, semi-skilled workers. Most are likely to continue in these capacities for the rest of their working lives. There are few entrepreneurs, largely because of the small size of the Fijian population, lack of capital, and because of the stiff competition of others.

Occupationally, then, Fijians are concretely the victims of their ethnically-based backgrounds. Because their resources are in some ways incommensurate with the criteria of access in Canadian society, they are markedly constrained. But the fact that these are largely class, rather than racially-based limitations means that they are liabilities which will only be weakly felt by the second generation.

The functionality of Fijian familial aid makes itself most strongly felt in the area of material establishment and household-related expendi-

ture. While the place of Indians in Fiji did not lend itself to the growth of strong community solidarity, it continued to make the family household an important unit of social and economic organization. Both this weak sense of community and a strong emphasis on family have been brought over to Canada; we have seen that through the use of large households they have been able to buy houses well above their occupational statuses. It has been put forward that the strong localization which Fijian settlement shows is largely the result of their demand for large, low cost houses.

Most of the benefits of mutual aid which these people enjoy derive from the organization of Fijian Canadian households and the roles associated with them. We have seen that the larger workforce of these households has partially overridden the limitations of low or uncertain wages and has allowed for a pattern of expenditure which is more parsimonious than that of a nuclear family. But I have argued that this basis is one which is susceptible to radical modification in the future, for it is dependent upon two changeable factors: the degree to which mutual assistance is in fact mutually beneficial, and the strength of traditional familial roles. Relatively stable household arrangements come out of a moving equilibrium of these factors.

Reflection upon the situation of other Asian immigrants brings up another comparison which future research might fruitfully consider; how differing household roles and patterns are reflected in the responses which different groups have to Canadian life; without continued Fijian

immigration I cannot see extended households being prevalent among the second generation, but I would be reluctant to say this about the Sikhs.

We have seen that at the community level kin links are primary, and dominate all other bases of extra-familial organization. Again, I have argued that the undeveloped state of formal Indian community organization in Fiji is primarily responsible for this. In this respect, Fijian community organization diverges sharply from that of either the Sikhs or the Ismailis, who both have transported stances of religious and ethnic solidarity to Canada with them. Among the Fijian Indian ethnic sub-communities of Vancouver, the Moslem minority is clearly the one which is likely to develop the strongest community organization.

One other point about the nature of Fijian Indian community should be stressed; that the density of communication between Fiji and Canada make it difficult to consider the British Columbian community as autonomous and separate. Chain migration and constant visiting demand that the Fijians of Vancouver and those of Fiji be considered together. This should hold for all other Asian groups as well.

In conclusion, I must return to what is at once the most general and the most important point of this thesis. Any acquaintance with the opinions which other British Columbians have of their East Indian neighbours leads one to the obvious conclusion that they know very little indeed about these new Canadians. This fundamental ignorance has not deterred either the press, public, or politicians from pronouncing on the pros and cons of people of "widely differing cultures" coming to Canada. Advocates

of neither polar position have been able to base their discussions on much more than guesswork, logical consistency, and a priori conviction. I hope that in describing the immigration of one of these groups of new Canadians this work will inject a greater measure of reality into this discussion. Moreover, I hope that my presentation will help to bring home the realization that Asian immigration to Canada is not an abstract structure. Rather, it is a human and personal process of choice and indecision, establishment and uncertainty, carried out by individuals who, for better or worse, have chosen to make a new life for themselves in Canada.

List of References

Printed Material

Andersen, A.G.
1969 Duality in Indo-Fijian Small Farming. In Pacific Peasantry: Case Studies of Rural Societies. I.G. Bassett, ed. Palmerston North: New Zealand Geographical Society.

Anderson, Grace M.
1974 Networks of Contact: the Portuguese and Toronto. Waterloo: WLU, Publications.

Andracki, Stanislaw
1958 The Immigration of Orientals into Canada with Special Reference to Chinese. Ph.D. Dissertation, History Department, McGill University.

Andrews, C.F., and W.W. Pearson
1916 Indentured Labour in Fiji: An Independent Inquiry. Madras, 74pp.

Angus, H.F.
1937 The Legal Status in British Columbia of Residents of Oriental Races and their Descendants. In The Legal Status of Aliens in Pacific Countries. N.A.M. Mackenzie, ed. pp. 77-87. London: Oxford University Press.

Aries, Phillippe
1962 Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life. Trans. R. Baldick. New York: Knopf.

Ashworth, Mary
1975 Immigrant Children and Canadian Schools. Toronto: McClelland.

Aurora, Gurdip Singh
1967 The New Frontiersmen: a Sociological Study of Indian Immigrants in the U.K. Bombay: Popular Prakashan.

Bannerjee, Kalyan Kumar
1964 East Indians Immigration into America: Beginnings of Indian Revolutionary Activity. Modern Review 116:355-356.

Banton, Michael
1967 Race Relations. London: Tavistock Publications Ltd.

Barth, Fredrik
1966 Models of Social Organization. Royal Anthropological Institute Occasional Paper 23. London.

Barth, Fredrik (cont'd.)
1967 Economic Spheres in Darfur. In E. Leach, ed. Themes in Economic Anthropology. ASA Monograph 6. London: Tavistock Publishers.

1969 Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. Boston: Little, Brown, and Co.

Belshaw, Cyril S.
1964 Under the Ivi Tree: Society and Economic Growth in Rural Fiji. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Berreman, G.
1972 Race, Caste, and Other Invidious Distinctions in Social Stratification. Race 13(4):385-413.

Bonacich, Edna
1972 A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism: The Split Labour Market. American Sociological Review, 37(Oct):547-59.

Bradfield, Helen H.
1970 The East Indians of Yuba City: a Study of Acculturation. M.A. Dissertation, California State University, Sacramento.

Braroe, Niels W.
1975 Indian and White: Self Image and Interaction in a Canadian Plains Community. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

British Columbia. Department of Labour.
1917-1946 Annual Report. Victoria: Queen's Printer.

British Columbia. Department of Trade & Commerce.
1972 British Columbia Summary of Economic Activity-1972. Victoria.

1975 British Columbia Summary of Economic Activity-1975. Victoria.

British Columbia. Legislative Assembly.
1927 Report on Oriental Activities within the Province. Victoria: Charles Banfield.

British Columbia Economic Council, Research Department.
1935 Statistics of Industry in British Columbia, 1871 to 1934. Victoria: Government Printer.

British Columbia Security Commission.
1942 Report [to the] Government of the Dominion of Canada, Department of Labour, March 4, 1942 to October 31, 1942. Victoria. 28 pp.

Brown, Emily C.
1975 Har Dayal: Hindu Revolutionary and Rationalist. Tucson: Arizona University Press.

Brown, Giles T.
1941 The Hindu Conspiracy and the Neutrality of the United States. M.A. Dissertation, History Department, University of California, Berkeley.

1948 The Hindu Conspiracy, 1914-1917. Pacific Historical Review 17:299-300.

Buchignani, Norman L.
1976 The Weberian Thesis in India. Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions 42:10-25.

Button, R.A.
1964 Sikh Settlement in the Lower Mainland of British Columbia. B.A. Essay. Geography Department, University of British Columbia.

Canada. Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Statistics Division.
-1965 Annual Report. Ottawa. (changed to Manpower & Immigration 1966-date).

Canada. Department of Labour.
1945 Report of the Department of Labour on the Administration of Japanese Affairs in Canada, 1942-1944. Ottawa: 53 pp.

Canada. Department of Manpower and Immigration.
1974a Immigration Policy Perspectives. Ottawa: Information Canada.

1974b The Immigration Program. Ottawa: Information Canada.

1974c Immigration and Population Statistics. Ottawa: Information Canada.

1974d Three Years in Canada. Ottawa: Information Canada.

1975 Canadian Work Values. Ottawa: Information Canada. 104 pp.

Canada. Federal Board of Review [Immigration] on Charges Concerning Illegal Entry of Aliens into Canada.
1938 Report, October 1938. Ottawa: King's Printer.

Canada. Parliament.
1885 Royal Commission on Chinese Immigration. Sessional Paper #54a. Ottawa. 486 pp.

1902 Report of the Royal Commission on Chinese and Japanese Immigration. Sessional Paper 36(2 Edward VII). Ottawa: S.E. Dawson. 430 pp.

Canada. Parliament. (cont'd.)
1905 Royal Commission on Italian Immigration. Sessional Paper 36b, (4-5 Edward VII). Ottawa.

Canada and India
1915-1916 Kartar Singh, ed. Toronto (biweekly).

Canada India Committee
1915a A Call for Canadian Justice. Toronto.

1915b The Hindu Case. Toronto.

1916 India's Appeal to Canada or: An Account of Hindu Immigration to the Dominion. Toronto.

Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs
1908 Toronto: Annual Review Publishers Co. pp. 119-120.

Canadian Trades & Labour Council
1941 57th Annual Meeting Proceedings. Toronto.

Chandra, K.U.
1973 Racial Discrimination in Canada. San Francisco: R & E Research Associates.

Chauhan, I.S.
1970 Race in Fiji Politics: A Note on the Indian Community. Economic and Political Weekly 5:42-5.

Cheng, Tien Fang
1931 Oriental Immigration in Canada. Shanghai: Commercial Press.

Cho, George C.
1970 Residential Patterns of the Chinese in Vancouver, British Columbia. M.A. Dissertation, Geography Department, University of British Columbia.

Corbett, David C.
1957 Canada's Immigration Policy: a Critique. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Coulter, J.W.
1942 Fiji: Little India of the Pacific. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Cross, Ira B.
1935 A History of the Labour Movement in California. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Dadabhay, Yusuf
1954 Circuitous Assimilation among rural Hindustanis in California. Social Forces 33:138-141.

Darlings, Malcolm Lyall
1928 The Punjab Peasant in Prosperity and Debt. London: Oxford University Press.

Das, Rajani Kant
1923 Hindustanee Workers on the Pacific Coast. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

Dhami, Sadhu Singh
1943 The Sikhs and their Religion: a Struggle for Democracy. Vancouver: Khalsa Diwan Society.

1969 Discovering the New World. Queen's Quarterly 76:200-212.

Dodd, Balbinder S.
1972 Social Change in two overseas Sikh Communities. B.A. Honours Essay, Department of Sociology, University of British Columbia.

Dodd, W.D.
1907 The Hindu in the Northwest. World To-day 13:1157-1160.

Dyck, Isabel J.
1975 An Examination of Inter-ethnic Relations in Fiji, with Particular Reference to the Distribution of Land. M.A. Dissertation, Department of Anthropology, University of Manchester.

Ferguson, Ted
1975 A White Man's Country: An Exercise in Canadian Prejudice. Toronto: Doubleday.

Fiji
1973 Social Indicators for Fiji. Suva: Bureau of Statistics.

Fiji. Ministry of Information
1976a Current Economic Statistics. Suva: Bureau of Statistics.

1976b Fiji Today. Suva: Fiji Times.

Fisk, Ernest K.
1970 The Political Economy of Independent Fiji. Canberra: Australian National University Press.

France, Peter
1969 The Charter of the Land: Custom and Colonialism in Fiji. Melbourne: Oxford University Press.

Free Hindustan
1907-1910 Taraknas Das, ed. Vancouver, Seattle.

Garbett, T. & B. Kapferer
1970 Theoretical Orientations in the Study of Labour Migration. New Atlantis 2(1):179-197.

Geddes, W.R.
1959 Fijian Social Structure in a Period of Transition. In Anthropology in the South Seas, ed. J.D. Freeman and W.R. Geddes. Plymouth, New Zealand, pp. 210-20.

Gillion, K.L.
1962 Fiji's Indian Migrants: A History to the End of Indenture in 1920. Melbourne: Oxford University Press.

Goffman, Erving
1959 The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

1963 Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Grant, Kenneth J.
1915 Among the Hindus of British Columbia. Missionary Messenger, pp. 106-109.

1923 My Missionary Memories. Halifax: Imperial Publishing Co., Ltd.

Great Britain. Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
-1970 Fiji: Report for the Year. London: HMSO.

Groves, M.
1963 The Nature of Fijian Society. J. Polynesia Society 72(3): 272-91.

Hannerz, Ulf
1974 Ethnicity & Opportunity in Urban America. In A. Cohen, ed. Urban Ethnicity. ASA Monograph 12. London: Tavistock Publications Co.

Harken, J.B.
1909 The East Indians of British Columbia: A Report regarding the Proposal to provide Work in British Honduras for the Indigent Unemployed among Them. Ottawa: Minister of the Interior.

Hawkins, Freda
1972 Canada and Immigration: Public Policy and Public Concern. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Hess, Gary Ray
1974 The Forgotten Asian Americans: the East Indian Community in the United States. Pacific Historical Review 43:576-96.

The Hindustanee
1914-1915 H. Rahim (Chagan K. Varma), ed. Vancouver (monthly).

Horton, John
1966 Order and Conflict Theories of Social Problems as Competing Ideologies. American Journal of Sociology 71:101-13.

Howay, F.W.
1914 British Columbia: From the Earliest Times to the Present (Vol. II). Vancouver: J.S. Clarke Publishing Co.

Hughes, David and Evelyn Kallen
1974 The Anatomy of Racism: Canadian Dimensions. Montreal: Harvest House.

Hurd, Archibald
1913 The Racial War in the Pacific. Fortnightly Review (June 1913). Toronto.

Hymes, Dell
1968 The Ethnography of Speaking. In Readings in the Sociology of Language. J. Fishman, ed. The Hague: Mouton. pp. 99-138.

1972 Models of the Interaction of Language and Social Life. In Directions in Sociolinguistics. D. Hymes and J. Gumperz, ed. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. pp. 35-71

Indo-Canadian
1976 Richmond, British Columbia. (monthly).

Indra, D.
1977a The Production and Legitimation of East Indian Stereotypes in the Vancouver Press. In Canadian Ethnicity, G.S. Singh, ed. The Hague: Mouton. (in press).

1977b Ethnic Portrayal in the Vancouver Press, 1903-1976. Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Simon Fraser University.

Jain, Sushil Kumar
1971 East Indians in Canada. Research Groups for European Migration Problems. The Hague: Mouton.

Jarvie, I.C., and Joseph Agassi
1967 The Problem of the Rationality of Magic. British Journal of Anthropology 18:55-74.

Jayawardena, C.
1971 The Disintegration of Caste in Fijian Indian Rural Society. In Anthropology in Oceania. L.R. Hyatt and C. Jayawardena, ed. San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co.

Kautalya
1960 Kautalya's Arthasastra. trans. R. Shamasastry. Mysore: Mysore Printing and Publishing House.

Kessinger, Tom G.
1974 Vilyatpur, 1848-1968: Social and Economic Change in a North Indian Village. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Khush, Harwant K.
1965 The Social Participation and Attitudes of the Children of East Indian Immigrants. M.A. Dissertation, California State University, Sacramento.

King, William L. Mackenzie
1908a Report of the Royal Commission appointed to inquire into the Method by which Oriental Labourers have been induced to come to Canada. Ottawa: King's Printer.

1908b Report by W.L. Mackenzie King on his Mission to England to confer with the British Authorities on the Subject of: Immigration to Canada from the Orient and Immigration from India in Particular. (sessional paper No. 36a, A 1908 Edward VII). Ottawa: King's Printer.

Lal, Brij
1976 East Indians in British Columbia, 1904-1914: A Historical Study in Growth and Integration. M.A. Dissertation, History Department, University of British Columbia.

Langley, A.J.
1862 A. Glance at British Columbia and Vancouver's Island. London: Robert Hardwicke.

La Violette, Forest E.
1948 The Canadian Japanese and World War II: A Sociological and Psychological Account. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Leach, Edmund
1965 Political Systems of Highland Burma. Boston: Beacon Press.

Levi-Strauss, C.
1963 Totemism. R. Neeham, trans. Boston: Beacon Press.

Lockley, Fred
1907 The Hindu Invasion. Pacific Monthly:584-95.

Lukes, Steven
1970 Some Problems about Rationality In Rationality, Bryan Wilson, ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. pp. 194-213.

McCrae, Lee
1916 Self-Exiled in America: Something about the Hindus in California. Missionary Review 34:525-526.

1918 Birds of Passage in California. Missionary Review 41:910.

MacInnes, Tom
1927 Oriental Occupation of B.C. Vancouver: Sun Publishing Co.

Mackay, Principal L.
1914 Problems of Immigration, VII: Komagata Maru. Westminster Hall Magazine 5(6):5-9.

Mannheim, Karl
1936 Ideology and Utopia. Louis Wirth & Edward Shills, trans. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.

Mathews, Basil
1924 The Clash of Colour: A Study in the Problems of Race. London: League of Nations.

Mathur, Laxman Prasad
1970 Indian Revolutionary Movements in the United States, 1922-. Delhi: S. Chand.

Mayer, Adrian C.
1959 A Report on the East Indian Community in Vancouver. University of British Columbia, mimeo.

1963 Indians in Fiji. London: Oxford University Press.

1973 Peasants of the Pacific. 2nd edition. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Mayer, Phillip
1971 Townsmen or Tribesmen. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mead, George H.
1934 Mind, Self, and Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Mitchell, J.C.
1956 The Kalela Dance. Rhodes-Livingstone Papers No. 28. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Morah, Benson C.
1974 The Assimilation of Ugandan Asians in Calgary. M.A. Dissertation, Department of Sociology, University of Calgary.

Morris, H.S.
1968 The Indians in Uganda. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Morse, Eric W.
1935 Immigration and Status of British East Indians in Canada: A Problem in Imperial Relations. M.A. Dissertation, History Department, Queens University.

Muthanna, I.M.
1971 East Indians in British Columbia (till 1910). Indo-Canadian 7(3-4):3-17.

Nayacakalcu, R.
1963 The Urban Fijians of Suva. In Pacific Port Cities and Towns.. A. Spoehr, ed. Honolulu: Bishops Museum Press.

Neame, L.E.
1907 The Asiatic Danger in the Colonies. London: George Routledge & Sons, Ltd.

Nelson, John
1921 Will Canada Go Yellow? Macleans Magazine. October 21: 15-17, 40-3; November 1:11-12, 45-47.

1924 The Canadian Provinces. Toronto: Musson.

Nieboer, Herman J.
1910 Slavery as an Industrial System: Ethnological Researches. reprint, 1971, New York: B. Franklin.

O'Loughlin, C.
1956 The Pattern of the Fiji Economy. Legislative Council Paper 44, 1956.

Osterhout, S.S.
1929 Orientals in Canada: The Story of the United Church of Canada with Asiatics in Canada. Toronto: Ryerson Press.

Paine, Robert, ed.
1971 Patrons & Brokers in the East Arctic. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Palmer, Howard, ed.
1975 Immigration and the Rise of Multiculturalism. Toronto: Copp Clark.

Patel, Hasu H.
1973 Indians in Uganda and Rhodesia: some comparative perspectives on a minority in Africa. Denver: University of Denver.

Pemberton, J.D.
1860 Facts and Figures Relating to Vancouver Island and British Columbia. London: Longmen, Green, Longmen and Roberts.

Phillips, Paul A.
1967 No Power Greater: A Century of Labour in B.C. Vancouver: Broadway Printers Ltd.

Pidgeon, G.C., and E.D. McLaren
1912 East Indian Immigration. Westminster Hall Magazine 1(8):23-28.

Porter, John
1965 The Vertical Mosaic. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Rex, John
1970 Race Relations in Sociological Theory. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Roth, G.R.
1951 Native Administration in Fiji during the Past 75 Years: A Successful Experiment in Indirect Rule. Royal Anthropological Institute Occasional Paper #10. London.

Roy, Patricia E.
1973 B.C.'s Campaign for a "white Canada": the Oriental Question in the Interwar Years. mimeo.

Roy, W.T.
1965 Fijian Elections, 1966. Contemporary Review (April):193-5.

Sahlins, M.
1962 Moala: Culture and Nature on a Fijian Island. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Saxton, Alexander
1971 The Indispensible Enemy: Labour and the Anti-Chinese Movement in California. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Schermerhorn, R.A.
1970 Comparative Ethnic Relations: A Framework for Theory and Research. New York: Random House.

Shankhar, Richard A.
1971 Integration and Goal Definition of the East Indian Student in the Sutter County Area. M.A. Dissertation, California State University, Chico.

Singh, Kushwant
1966 A History of the Sikhs. 2 Vol. Princeton: University of Princeton Press.

Singh Publications
1976 Telephone Directory of [the] East Indian Community. Vancouver.

Singh, Saint Nihal
1907 The Sikhs in Canada or, Grievances of East Indians. Canadian Magazine 30(November):57-60.

1908a Indians in America, I. Modern Review 3:204-7.

1908b Indians in America, II - Educated Indians in America. Modern Review 3:311-314.

1909 The Picturesque Immigrant from India's Coral Strand. Out West 30(1):43-54.

1912 The Position of the Hindu in Canada. British Columbia Magazine 8:664-668.

Singh, Sundar, and L.W.H.
1911a A Summary of the Hindu Question and its Results in B.C. Victoria: Victoria Society of Friends of the Hindu.

1911b Sikhs in Canada. Empire Club of Canada Addresses, pp. 112-116.

1911c The Sikhs in Canada. Canadian Club of Toronto Address, December 28, 1911.

Sirha, Nand Singh
1913a Indians in Canada: A Pitiable Account of Their Hardships by One who Comes from the Place and Knows Them. Modern Review 14:140-9.

1913b Indians in Canada. Indian Review 14:453-456.

Siu, Paul C.
1952 The Sojourner. American Journal of Sociology. 58:33-44.

Smith, Marian W.
1944 Sikh Settlers in Canada. Asia and the Americas 44(8):359-364.

Spate, O.H.K.
1959 The Fijian People: Economic Problems and Prospects. Legislative Council Paper 13, 1959. Suva.

1961 Under Two Laws: the Fijian Dilemma. Meanjin XIX(2):166-81.

Srinivas, M.N.
1966 Social Change in Modern India. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Stanner, W.E.H.
1953 The South Seas in Transition. Melbourne: Oxford University Press.

Stevens, Henry H.
1911 The Oriental Problem, Dealing with Canada as Affected by the Immigration of Japanese Hindus and Chinese. Vancouver.

Stoddard, Theodore L.
1920 The Rising Tide of Colour against White World-Supremacy. New York: Scribner.

Sugimoto, Howard H.
1966 Japanese Immigration, the Vancouver Riots, and Canadian Diplomacy. M.A. Dissertation, Department of History, University of Washington.

Sumida, Rigenda
1935 The Japanese in British Columbia. M.A. Dissertation, University of British Columbia.

Tinker, Hugh
1974 A New System of Slavery: the Export of Indian Labour Overseas, 1830-1920. London: Oxford University Press.

Turner, Victor W.
1957 Schism and Continuity in an African Society: A Study of Ndembu Village Life. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Vancouver Sun
1976 Racial Discrimination 'Probable' . November 4:33. Vancouver.

van den Berghe, P.
1967 Race and Racism. New York: Wiley and Sons.

Vishva Hindu Parishad
1975 Diwali Souvenir, Burnaby, B.C.

Wadel, Cato
1973 Now, Whose Fault is That?: The Struggle for Self-Esteem in the Face of Chronic Unemployment. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Ward, N.L.
1925 Oriental Missions in British Columbia. Westminster: Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts.

Ward, Ralph G.
1961 Internal Migration in Fiji. J. Polynesia Society 70(3):257-71.

1965 Land Use and Population in Fiji: A Geographical Study. London: HMSO.

Ward, William Peter
1973 White Canada Forever: British Columbia's Response to Orientals, 1858-1914. Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of History, Queens University.

1974 The Oriental Immigrant and Canada's Protestant Clergy. B.C. Studies 22:9-19.

Watters, Raymond F.
1969 Koro: Economic Development and Social Change in Fiji. London: Oxford University Press.

Weber, Max
1958a The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. trans. T. Parsons. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

1958b The Religion of India: The Sociology of Hinduism and Buddhism. trans. H. Gerth & D. Martindale. Glencoe: Free Press.

1963 The Sociology of Religion. trans. E. Fischoff. Boston: Beacon Press.

1964 The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. New York: Free Press.

1974 From Max Weber. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, trans. New York: Oxford University Press.

Wenzel, Lawrence A.
1966 The Identification and Analysis of Certain Value Orientations of Two Generations of East Indians in California. Ed.D., University of the Pacific.

1969 The Rural Punjabis of California: A Religio-Ethnic Group. Phylon 29:245-56.

Whyte, William
1943 Street Corner Society: The Social Structure of an Italian Slum. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Willmott, Peter and Michael Young
1957 Family and Kinship in East London. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Wynne, Robert E.
1964 Reaction to the Chinese in the Northwest and British Columbia. Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of History, University of Washington.

Young, Charles and Helen Reid
1938 The Japanese Canadians. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Archival Sources

Colonel Falk Warren to Laurier
January 2, 1907, Laurier Papers No. 117771-4.

Laurier to Colonel Falk Warren
January 27, 1907, Laurier Papers No. 117775.

Laurier to Grey
September 16, 1907, Grey Papers, MG 27#B2, Vol. 21, No. 000490-5.

British Government to Grey
February 12, 1908, Governor General's Office Records, RG7, G21, Vol. 199.

Appendix I: A Bibliography of East Indians in Canada

Each of the items in this bibliography contains information of relevance to the subject of East Indians in Canada, as judged by a reading of the material. Most, with the notable exception of student papers, are available through normal library sources. Development of this bibliography was carried out by first consulting the prior bibliographies (G. Singh 1970; Basran 1976: B.C. Provincial Library 1957; Department of Citizenship & Immigration 1961; 1962; 1965; 1970; Gregorovich 1972; Ong 1974; U.B.C. 1966; Jain 1961). It then built upon references included in the items from these bibliographies. The card catalogues of the University of British Columbia, Simon Fraser University, the University of California, Berkeley, and the Provincial Library and Archives were also consulted. With the exception of archival materials, which are not dealt with here, this bibliography should stand as essentially complete for the period prior to 1965.

The following bibliographic items are coded with reference to their most significant types of content. The basic categories are:

S = sociological
H = historical
Hc = folk historical commentary
B = bibliographical
E = educational
Q = quantitative information

These categories are occasionally modified by:

C = comparative
M = secondary (marginal) reference

as in HC (comparative history) or SM (marginal sociologically relevant).

Ames, Michael M., and Joy Inglis
1968 Indian Immigrants in Canada. Indo-Canadian 3-4:2-6. S.

1973 Conflict and Change in British Columbia Sikh Family Life. B.C. Studies 20(Winter):15-49. S.

Angus, H.F.
1931 Under-Privileged Canadians. Queens Quarterly 38:445-460. H.

1937 The Legal Status in British Columbia of Residents of Oriental Races and their Descendants. In The Legal Status of Aliens in Pacific Countries. N.A.M. Mackenzie, ed. pp. 77-87. London: Oxford University Press. H.

1941 The Effect of the War on Oriental Minorities in Canada. Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 7(4): 506-516. H.

1946 Asiatics in Canada. Pacific Affairs 19(4):402-408. H.

1947 East Indians in Canada. International Journal 2(1):47-50. HM.

1953a Asian Minorities in Canada. United Asia 5(5):281-285. HM.

1953b Canada and the Far East. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. H.

1970 People of East Indian Origin. Encyclopedia Canadiana, Vol. 3, pp. 331-2. HM.

Anonymous
1907 Race Riots on the Pacific Coast. Outlook 87:89. Hc.

1908 The Hindu in America. American Review of Reviews 37:604-605. Hc.

1912 The Position of Hindus in Canada. British Columbia Magazine 8:664-668. H, Hc.

1913 Hindu Grievances in Canada. Open Court 27:703-704. Hc.

1914a Canada's Rejection of the Hindu. The Literary Digest 49(August 8th):226. HcM.

1914b Sikhs Besieging Canada. The Literary Digest 49(July 18th): 95-96. Hc.

1914c Veto of Canada. Living Age 282:310-312. Hc.

1923a Asiatic Immigration into Canada. Round Table (March):398-404. H.

Anonymous (cont'd.)
1923b Indian Rights in the United States. Nation 117:447. HM.

1934 Strange Gods come to Canada. Macleans Magazine 47:11, 44-45. Hc.

Andracki, Stanislaw
1958 The Immigration of Orientals into Canada with Special Reference to Chinese. Ph.D. Dissertation, History Department, McGill University. H, Hc, B.

The Aryan
1911-1912 Vol. 1(1) to Vol. 2(9). Sunder Singh, ed. Vancouver. H, S.

Ashworth, Mary
1975 Immigrant Children and Canadian Schools. Toronto: McClelland. E.

Aurora, Gurdip Singh
1960 Indian Workers in England: a Socio-historical Survey of Indian Workers in England. M.Sc. Dissertation, Economics, London University. SC.

1967 The New Frontiersmen: a Sociological Study of Indian Immigrants in the U.K. Bombay: Popular Prakashan. SC.

Bagai, Leona B.
1967 The East Indians and Pakistanis in America. Minneapolis: Lerner Publishing Co. Hc.

Bains, Nina
1974 A Brief Study of the East Indian (Sikh) Community of Victoria. Victoria: mimeo. 30pp. H, S.

Bannerjee, Kalyan Kumar
1964 East Indians Immigration into America: Beginnings of Indian Revolutionary Activity. Modern Review 116:355-356. HM.

Basran, Gurcharn S.
1976 University Research on East-Indian-Canadians: A Preliminary Checklist. Canadian Ethnic Studies 5(1-2):41-46. B.

Bhatti, F.M.
1974 East Indian Immigration into Canada, 1905-1973. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Surrey. H, S, B.

Bogardus, Emory S.
1928 Immigration and Race Attitudes. New York: D.C. Heath & Co. SM.

Boggs, T.H.
1926 The Orientals on the Pacific Coast. Queens Quarterly 33:311-324. Hc, H.

Bopp, Franz, defendant: U.S. Vs. F. Bopp et al.
1917 District Court of the U.S., Southern Division of the Northern District of California before Hon. Wm. C. Van Fleet. (the Ghadr Trial). microfilm (seven reels). H.

Bose, Arun Coomer
1965 Indian Nationalist Agitations in the United States and Canada till the Arrival of Hardayal in 1911. Journal of Indian History 43:227-239. H, HC.

1971 Indian Revolutionaries Abroad, 1905-1922. Patna: Bharati Bhawan. H, HC.

Bose, Subhindra
1914 Exclusion of the Indians from America. Modern Review 15:624. HM.

1915 American Impressions of a Hindu Student. Forum 53:251-257. Hc.

1919 Asian Immigration into the United States. Modern Review 25:521-526. H.

Bradfield, Helen H.
1970 The East Indians of Yuba City: a Study of Acculturation. M.A. Dissertation, California State University, Sacramento. SC.

British Columbia. Department of Labour.
1917-1946 Annual Report. Victoria: Queen's Printer. Q.

British Columbia. Legislative Assembly.
1927 Report on Oriental Activities within the Province. Victoria: Charles Banfield. Q, S.

British Columbia. Provincial Library & Archives.
1957 Ethnic Groups in B.C.: a Selected Bibliography based on a Check List of Material in the Provincial Library and Archives. Victoria: mimeo. B.

British Columbia Public Service Bulletin
1928 East Indian Population... (April-May):3. Victoria: Queen's Printer. QM.

Broad, Isabella Ross
1913 An Appeal for Fair Play for the Sikhs in Canada. Victoria: Victoria Society of Friends of the Hindu. Hc.

Brown, Emily C.
1975 Har Dayal: Hindu Revolutionary and Rationalist. Tucson: Arizona University Press. HC, H.

Brown, Giles T.
1941 The Hindu Conspiracy and the Neutrality of the United States. M.A. Dissertation, History Department, University of California, Berkeley. HC, H.

1948 The Hindu Conspiracy, 1914-1917. Pacific Historical Review 17:299-300. H.

Buchanan, R.F.
1908 The West and the Hindu Invasion. Overland Monthly 51:308-313. H, Hc.

Buchignani, Norman L.
1976 Fijians as 'Punjabs': the Social and Self Identities of Fijian East Indians in Vancouver. presentation, WASA annual meeting, Calgary. S.

1977 Immigration, Adaptation, and the Management of Ethnic Identity: An Examination of Fijian East Indians in British Columbia. Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Simon Fraser University. S.

Button, R.A.
1964 Sikh Settlement in the Lower Mainland of British Columbia. B.A. Essay. Geography Department, University of British Columbia. H, S.

California. Government
1953 Report of the Senate Fact-Finding Committee of the Un-American Activities to the 1953 Regular California Legislature. Sacramento: California State Printing Office. pp. 213-246. HC, SC.

California. Government. State Board of Control.
1922 California and the Oriental: Japanese, Chinese, and Hindus. Sacramento: California State Printing Office. HC, Q.

Canada. Board of Review (Immigration) on Charges Concerning Illegal Entry of Aliens into Canada.
1938a Interim Report and Supplement. Vancouver: typescript. S.

1938b Report, October 1938, Ottawa: King's Printer. S, H.

Canada. Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Economic and Social Research Branch.
1961 Citizenship, Immigration and Ethnic Groups in Canada: a Bibliography of Research Published and Unpublished, 1920-58. Ottawa: Controller of the Stationary. B.

Canada. Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Economic and Social Research Branch. (cont'd.)
1962 same title, 1959-61.

1965 same title, 1962-64.

Canada. Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Statistics Division.
-1965 Annual Report. Ottawa. (changed to Manpower & Immigration 1966-date). Q.

Canada. Department of the Interior.
1908 The East Indians in British Columbia: a Proposal to send some to British Honduras. Dominion Archives, pamphlet 3413, 1908. H, S.

Canada. Department of Manpower and Immigration.
1970 Immigration, Migration, and Ethnic Groups in Canada: A Bibliography of Research 1964-1968. Ottawa: Information Canada. B.

Canada. Department of the Secretary of State.
1967 The Canadian Family Tree. Ottawa: Queen's Printer. HM, E.

Canada. Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Census Division.
1934 Orientals, 10 Years of Age or Over, Gainfully Employed in the Province of British Columbia, Census 1931 (7th Census of Canada), Bulletin 41. Q.

Canada and India
1915-1916 Kartar Singh, ed., Toronto (biweekly). HM, Hc.

Canada India Committee.
1915a A Call for Canadian Justice. Toronto. Hc, H

1915b The Hindu Case. Toronto. Hc.

1916 India's Appeal to Canada or: An Account of Hindu Immigration to the Dominion. Toronto. H, Hc.

Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs HM, Hc.
1906 Toronto: Annual Review Publishing Co. pp. 285, 295-296.
1907 pp. 284-286, 289, 294-296.
1908 pp. 119-120.
1914 pp. 116-119.
1922 pp. 198-203.
1941 pp. 115-119.

Canadian India Times
1968- Islington, Ontario (biweekly). previously India Times (1967-8). S.

Canadian Institute of International Affairs
1943 Minorities of Oriental Races in Canada. Eighth Conference of the Institute, Paper No. 1, Mount Tremblant, P.Q. QM.

The Canadian Sikh
1961-3 Vol. 1, No. 1, to Vol. 3, No. 1. Richmond, British Columbia. Gian Singh, ed. H.

Carrothers, William A.
1938 Oriental Standards of Living in British Columbia. In The Japanese Canadians. Charles Young and Helen Reid. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp. 201-292. Q, S.

Carter, Don
1951 Our Sikh Neighbors. Vancouver Sun, September 22nd, Magazine Section:6-7. Hc.

Chandra, K.U.
1973 Racial Discrimination in Canada. San Francisco: R & E Research Associates. S.

Chandra, Ram (ed. Hindustanee Ghadr)
1916 Exclusion of Hindus from America due to British Influence. San Francisco: Ghadr Publishing Co. Hc, HC.

Chandresekhar, S.
1944 Indian Immigration in America. Far East Survey 13:138-143. HCM.

1945a The Indian Community in the United States. Far East Survey 14:147-149. HCM.

1945b Indian Emigration to America. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. H, HC.

Cheng, Tien Fang
1931 Oriental Immigration in Canada. Shanghai: Commercial Press. H, HC.

Chirol, Valentine
1910 Indian Unrest. London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd. H, HcM.

Corbett, David C.
1957 Canada's Immigration Policy: a Critique. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. H.

Dadabhay, Yusuf
1954 Circuitous Assimilation among rural Hindustanis in California. Social Forces 33:138-141. SC.

Daniels, Roger
1974 American Historians and East Asian Immigrants. Pacific Historical Review 43:449-472. SC, HC.

Darlings, Malcolm Lyall
1928 The Punjab Peasant in Prosperity and Debt. London: Oxford University Press. HC.

Das, Rajani Kant
1923 Hindustanee Workers on the Pacific Coast. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. S, H.

Dayal, Har
1911 India in America. The Modern Review 10(July):1-11. HM.

Deol, G.S.
1966 Voyage of the Komagata Maru and the Ghadr Movement. People's Path 2(8):7-19. H.

1969 The Role of the Ghadr Party in the Indian National Movement. Jullundur: Sterling Publishers. H.

Desai, Rashmi
1963 Indian Immigrants in Britain. London: Oxford University Press. SC, HC.

Dhami, Sadhu Singh
1943 The Sikhs and their Religion: a Struggle for Democracy. Vancouver: Khalsa Diwan Society. H.

1969 Discovering the New World. Queen's Quarterly 76:200-212. H, S.

Dignan, D.K.
1971 Hindu Conspiracy in Anglo-Indian Relations. Pacific Historical Review 40:57-77. H.

Dodd, Balbinder Singh
1972 Social Change in two overseas Sikh Communities. B.A. Honours Essay, Sociology Department, University of British Columbia. S.

Dodd, W.D.
1907 The Hindu in the Northwest. World To-day 13:1157-1160. H.

The East Indian Lumber Worker
1950-1953 Vancouver (monthly). H.

Ferguson, Ted
1975 A White Man's Country: An Exercise in Canadian Prejudice.

Francis, R.A.
1952 B.C.'s Turbaned Tribe. Canadian Business 25 (February): 44-45. Hc.

Gardner, Ray
1958 When Vancouver turned its Back on the Sikhs. Macleans (November 8th):63-68. H.

Ghose, S.N.
1919 Deportation of Hindu Politicals. Dial 67:145-147. HCM.

Gill, Nash
1971 The East Indian People of B.C. Vancouver Human Rights Council. H, S.

Grace, Elizabeth Ross
1908 East Indian Immigration. Westminster Hall Magazine 3(3): 10-12. Hc.

Grant, Kenneth James
1915 Among the Hindus of British Columbia. Missionary Messenger pp. 106-109. H.

1923 My Missionary Memories. Halifax: Imperial Publishing Co., Ltd. H.

Gregorovich, Andrew
1972 Canadian Ethnic Groups Bibliography. Toronto: Department of the Provincial Secretary and Citizenship of Ontario. B.

Hallet, Mary E.
1972 A Governor-General's View on Oriental Immigration to B.C., 1904-1911. B.C. Studies 14:51-72. H.

Hamilton, James H. (pseud. Captain Kettle)
1933 Western Shores. Vancouver: Progress Publishing Co. Hc.

Hardas, Balshastri
1958 Armed Struggle for Freedom: Ninety Years to Independence, 1857 to Subhash. S. Apte, trans. Poona: Kal Prakashan. HM.

Hardwick, Francis C., ed.
1974 From beyond the Western Horizon: Canadians from the Sub-continent of India. Vancouver: Tantalus Research. E, H, S.

Harkin, J.B.
1909 The East Indians of British Columbia: A Report regarding the Proposal to provide Work in British Honduras for the Indigent Unemployed among Them. Ottawa: Minister of the Interior. H.

Harrington, Lyn
1948 The Proud Sikhs of British Columbia. Saturday Night 64 (November 20th):26-27. H

Hawkins, Freda
1972 Canada and Immigration: Public Policy and Public Concern. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press. H.

Hedin, Elmer L.
1965 Hindu Americans In Our Racial and National Minorities. Francis J. Brown and Joseph S. Roucek, ed. New York: Prentice Hall. HC.

Hess, Gary Ray
1969 The "Hindu" in America: Immigration and Naturalization Policies and India, 1917-46. Pacific Historical Review 38(1):59-79. H, HC.

1971 America Encounters India, 1941-7. Baltimore. HC, Hc.

1974 The Forgotten Asian Americans: the East Indian Community in the United States. Pacific Historical Review 43:576-96. H.

The Hindustanee
1914-5 H. Rahim (Chagan K. Varma), ed. Vancouver (monthly). H.

Holland, Sir Robert
1943 Indian Immigration into Canada: the Question of Franchise. Asiatic Review 39:167-171. H.

India. Government.
1914 Report of the Komagata Maru Committee of Inquiry. Calcutta: King's Printer. H.

India. Government, India Sedition Committee.
1918 Rowlett Commission Report (Cd. 9190, 1918). H.

India and Canada
1929-30 Kartar Singh, ed. Vancouver (monthly). H.

India News and Views
1960?-date Malkit S. Parhar, ed. Vancouver: S.

Indian Immigrant Aid Services
1974 Submission to the Hon. R. Andras, Minister of Manpower & Immigration on: Canadian Immigration Policy and the Treatment of Visitors to Canada. Toronto: mimeo. 15 pp. HM.

The Indo-Canadian
1964- Richmond, British Columbia (monthly). H, S.

Indra, Doreen
1977a The Production & Legitimation of East Indian Stereotypes in the Vancouver Press. mimeo. S.

Indra, Doreen (cont'd.)
1977b The Portrayal of Ethnicity in the Vancouver Press, 1906-1976. Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Simon Fraser University. in progress. S.

Issacs, Harold J.
1948 Scratches on our Minds: America Views India. New York: Capricorn Books. Hc.

Jain, Sushil Kumar
1971 East Indians in Canada. Research Groups for European Migration Problems. The Hague: Mouton. B.

Jensen, Joan
1969 Apartheid: Pacific Coast Style. Pacific Historical Review 38:335-340. H.

1976 Outcasts in a Savage Land: the East Indians in North America. in progress. H.

Johnson, A.T.
1922 Rag Heads: a Picture of America's East Indians. The Independent 109:234-235. Hc.

Johnson, Lukin
1921 The Case of the Oriental in B.C. The Canadian Magazine 57:315-318. Hc.

Josh, Sohan Singh
1970 Baba Sohan Bhakna: Life of the Founder of the Ghadr Party. New Delhi: People's Publishing House. HC.

Kessinger, Tom G.
1974 Vilyatpur, 1848-1968: Social and Economic Change in a North Indian Village. Berkeley: University of California Press. SC.

Khalsa Diwan Society of Vancouver
1947 Report of correspondence and Documents relating to Negotiations between 1939-47, culminating in Domiciliary Rights being Accorded to 210 Members of the Indian Community by the Dominion Government. Vancouver. H.

1963 A Memorandum concerning Immigration Problems of the Canadian Citizens of East Indian Origin in Canada. Vancouver: Khalsa Diwan Society. H.

Khalsa Diwan Society of Victoria
1947 Report on Dominion, Provincial and Municipal Franchise for the Hindus in B.C. Victoria: Khalsa Diwan Society. H.

Khush, Harwant K.
1965 The Social Participation and Attitudes of the Children of East Indian Immigrants. M.A. Dissertation, California State University, Sacramento. SC.

King, William L. Mackenzie
1908a Report of the Royal Commission appointed to inquire into the Method by which Oriental Labourers have been induced to come to Canada. Ottawa: King's Printer. H, S.

1908b Report by W.L. Mackenzie King on his Mission to England to confer with the British Authorities on the Subject of: Immigration to Canada from the Orient and Immigration from India in Particular. (sessional paper No. 36a, A 1908 Edward VII). Ottawa: King's Printer. H.

1908c Confidential Memorandum accompanying Report of W.L. Mackenzie King on his Mission to England, May 2, 1908. Gov. Gen. File Vol. 2(b) G21 #332, 1908. H.

1909 Oriental Immigration to Canada. Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University. (the same as King 1908a). H, S.

Kumar, Guru Datt
1912 Hindus in the United States: Activities of the Hindu Students and Laborers on the Pacific Coast. Span of Life 5(3):6-11. H, HC.

Lal, Brij
1976 East Indians in British Columbia, 1904-1914: A Historical Study in Growth and Integration. M.A. Dissertation, History Department, University of British Columbia. H, S.

Laut, Agnes C.
1913 Am I My Brother's Keeper? A Study of British Columbia's Labour and Oriental Problems. Toronto: Saturday Night Publishing Co. H, S, Hc.

Lockley, Fred
1907 The Hindu Invasion. Pacific Monthly:584-95. Hc.

Lok Awaz
1975 P. Lall, ed. Toronto (bi-weekly). H, S.

London Times, Reports on Sikhs in B.C. H.
1906 October 17, 4a: Police Prevent Landings
December 8, 5b: Canadian Public Opinion

1907 October 12, 5e: India Government Places Immigration Warnings

London Times, Reports on Sikhs in B.C. H. (cont'd.)
1908 April 8, 7e, 27
April 9, 9b
May 7, 5b
June 22, 7b, 24, 99
October 16, 73, 17
December 8, 5f .

1910 April 30, 7a, 7b
July 1, 5a
October 22, 4c

Lower, A.R.M.
1940 Canada and the Far East -- 1940. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations. HM.

Lowes, George H.
1952 The Sikhs of British Columbia. B.A. Honours Essay, History Department, University of British Columbia. S, HM.

McCrae, Lee
1916 Self-Exiled in America: Something about the Hindus in California. Missionary Review 34:525-526. HC.

1918 Birds of Passage in California.. Missionary Review 41:910. HCM.

McKelvie, B.A.
1964 Magic, Murder and Mystery. Cobble Hill, B.C.: Cowichan-Leader Printing Co. Hc.

Macinnis, Grace and Angus
1943 Oriental Canadians: Outcasts or Citizens? Vancouver: Federationist Publishing Co. 22 pp. H.

Majumdar, R.C.
1963 Rabindranath and the Indian Revolutionaries in the United States of America. Modern Review 113:453-454. HC.

Mackay, Principal L.
1914 Problems of Immigration, VII: Komagata Maru. Westminster Hall Magazine 5(6):5-9. Hc.

Malik, Hardit Singh
1956 Indians in Canada. External Affairs 8(Feb.-March):53-4. HM.

Mathur, Laxman Prasad
1970 Indian Revolutionary Movements in the United States, 1922-. Delhi: S. Chand. HC, H.

Mayer, Adrian C.
1959 A Report on the East Indian Community in Vancouver. University of British Columbia, mimeo. S, H.

Millis, H.A.
1911 East Indian Immigration to British Columbia and the Pacific Coast States. American Economic Review 1:72-76. HC, H.

1912 East Indian Immigration to the Pacific Coast. Survey (E. Stroudsburg, Pa.). 28:379-386. HC, H.

Misrow, Jogesh Chander
1971 East Indian Immigration on the Pacific Coast (Stanford, 1915) republished, San Francisco: R & E Research Associates. H, S.

Morah, Benson C.
1974 The Assimilation of Ugandan Asians in Calgary. M. A. Dissertation, Department of Sociology, University of Calgary. S.

Morse, Eric W.
1935 Immigration and Status of British East Indians in Canada: A Problem in Imperial Relations. M.A. Dissertation, History Department, Queens University. H, S, B.

1936 Some Aspects of the Komagata Maru Affair. Canadian Historical Association Annual Report. pp. 100-108. H.

Mukerji, Girinda
1908 The Hindu in America. Overland Monthly 51:303-308. Hc.

Mukherjee, Sujit K.
1963 Passage to America: The Reception of Rabindranath Tagore in the United States, 1912-1941. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania. HC.

Munday, Jenifer G.
1953 East Indians in British Columbia: A Community in Transition. B.A. Honours Essay. Department of Sociology, University of British Columbia. S, H.

Muthanna, I.M.
1971 East Indians in British Columbia (till 1910). Indo-Canadian 7 (304):3-17. H.

1975 People of India in North America (Part First). Bangalore: Lotus Printers. H.

Naidis, Mark
1951 The Propaganda of the Ghadar Party. Pacific Historical Review 20:251-60. H.

Nelson, John
1921 Will Canada Go Yellow? Macleans Magazine (October 15): 15-17, 40-43; (November 1):11, 45-57. Hc.

Noon, Sir F.
1939 Canada and India. London. HM.

Norris, John
1971 Strangers Entertained: A History of the Ethnic Groups in British Columbia. Victoria. HM.

O'Dwyer, Sir Michael
1926 India as I Knew It, 1885-1925. London: Constable. HC.

Ong, Paul M. & Lum, William Wong, comps.
1974 Theses and Dissertations on Asians in the United States with selected References to other overseas Asians. Davis: University of California, Davis, Department of Applied Behavioural Science. B.

Osterhout, S.S.
1929 Orientals in Canada: The Story of the United Church of Canada with Asiatics in Canada. Toronto: Ryerson Press. H.

Pannu, Gurdial Singh
1970 Sikhs in Canada. Sikh Review; October 1970:33-34. HM.

Pannu, R.S.
1966 A Sociological Survey of Teachers from India Teaching in Alberta, 1958-65. M.Ed. Thesis, University of Alberta, Edmonton. S.

Parivertan
1975 Karan Singh, ed. Vancouver (weekly). H.

Paul, Gurbachan Singh
1972 The Stay or Return Decision of Indian Students. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Oregon. SC.

1975 The Third World Immigrants and the Policies of Multi-culturalism in Canada: A Case of East Indian Immigrants. Edmonton: mimeo. S.

Pereira, Cecil Patrick
1971 East Indians in Winnipeg: A Study of the Consequences of Immigration for an Ethnic Group in Canada. M.A. Dissertation, Department of Sociology, University of Manitoba. S.

Perry, Martha E.
1929 The Sikhs in British Columbia. United Empire 20(10):577-581. Hc.

Pidgeon, G.C., and E.D. McLaren
1912 East Indian Immigration. Westminster Hall Magazine 1(8):23-28. Hc, H.

Rathore, Naeen Gul
1965 Indian Nationalist Agitation in the United States: A Study of Lala Lajpat Rai and the Indian Home Rule League of America, 1914-20. Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of History, Columbia. HC.

Raucher, Alan
1974 American Anti-Imperialist and the Pro-Indian Movement, 1900-1932. Pacific Historical Review 42:82-110. H.

Raymer, S.E., and Rober L. Reid
1942 The Komagata Maru and the Central Powers. B.C. Historical Quarterly 6:297-299. H, Hc.

Reid, Robie L.
1941 The Inside Story of the Komagata Maru. B.C. Historical Quarterly 5:1-23. H, Hc.

Samras, K.R.
1940 Naturalization for Hindus. Nation 151:516. HCM.

Sandhu, Kernial Singh
1972 Indian Immigration and Racial Prejudice in British Columbia: Some Preliminary Observations. In Peoples of the Living Land: Geography of Cultural Diversity in British Columbia. B.C. Geographic Series, Number 15. Julian V. Minghi, ed., Vancouver: Tantalus Research, Ltd. pp. 29-39. H, S.

1976 The East Indian Population of British Columbia from 1900 to the Present. in progress. H.

Scanlon, T. Joseph
1975 The Sikhs of Vancouver: A Case Study of the Role of the Media in Ethnic Relations. Carleton University: mimeo. HM, S.

Scheffaur, H.
1910 The Tide of Turbans. Forum 43:616-618. Hc.

Schibsby, Marian
1927 Hindus and American Citizenship. National Conference of Social Work Annual Report. pp. 579-581. HCM.

Shankhar, Richard A.
1971 Integration and Goal Definition of the East Indian Student in the Sutter County Area. M.A. Dissertation, California State University, Chico. SC.

Shastri, Srinivasa
1922 The East Indians in Canada. Empire Club of Canada Addresses, pp. 181-194. H.

Shaw, Charles Lugrin
1924 Canada's Oriental Problem. Canadian Magazine 63:334-338. Hc.

The Sikh Voice
1944-5 Vancouver: Khalsa Diwan Society (biweekly). H.

Singh, Anup
1944 A Quota for India too. Asia and the Americas. (April) p. 157. HM.

Singh, Dave
1975 Some Factors in the Relationship between the Police and East Indians. Vancouver: B.C. Police Commission. SM.

Singh, Diwaker Prasad
1964 American Official Attitudes towards the Indian Nationalist Movement, 1905-1929. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Hawaii. HC.

Singh, Ganda
1970 The Sikhs of Canada and California: A Bibliography. offprint from The Punjab Past and Present 4(2), October, 1970. B.

Singh, Gurdial
1946 East Indians in the United States. Sociology and Social Research 30:208-216. HM.

Singh, Bhai Jodh
1946 The Message of the Sikh Faith. Vancouver: Khalsa Diwan Society. H.

Singh, Kushwant
1966 A History of the Sikhs. 2 Vol. Princeton: University of Princeton Press. H, HC.

Singh, Kushwant and Satindra Singh
1966 Ghadar 1915: India's First Armed Revolution. New Delhi: R & K Publishing House. H, HC.

Singh, Pardaman
1922 Ethnological Epitome of the Hindustanis of the Pacific Coast. Stockton: Khalsa Diwan Society. H.

Singh, Saint Nihal
1907 The Sikhs in Canada or, Grievances of East Indians. Canadian Magazine 30(November):57-60. S, H.

Singh, Saint Nihal (cont'd.)
1908a Indians in America, I. Modern Review 3:204-7. Hc.

1908b Indians in America, II - Educated Indians in America. Modern Review 3:311-314. Hc.

1909 The Picturesque Immigrant from India's Coral Strand. Out West 30(1):43-54. Hc.

1912 The Position of the Hindu in Canada. British Columbia Magazine 8:664-668. H.

Singh, Saint Nihal and J. Barclay Williams
1907 Canada's New Immigrant: the Hindu. Canadian Magazine 28(4):383-391. H.

Singh, Randhir
1945 Ghadr Heroes: Forgotten Story of the Punjab Revolutionaries of 1914-15. Bombay: People's Publishing House. H.

Singh, Sundar, and L.W.H.
1911a A Summary of the Hindu Question and its Results in B.C. Victoria: Victoria Society of Friends of the Hindu. H.

1911b Sikhs in Canada. Empire Club of Canada Addresses, pp. 112-116. H.

1911c The Sikhs in Canada. Canadian Club of Toronto Address, December 28, 1911. H.

Sirha, Nand Singh
1913a Indians in Canada: A Pitiable Account of Their Hardships by One who Comes from the Place and Knows Them. Modern Review 14:140-9. H.

1913b Indians in Canada. Indian Review 14:453-456. H, Hc.

Smillie, Emmaline E.
1923 An Historical Survey of Indian Migration within the Empire. Canadian Historical Review 4(3):217-257. H.

Smith, Marian W.
1944 Sikh Settlers in Canada. Asia and the Americas 44 (8):359-364. S.

Solanki, Ratilal
1973 Americanization of Immigrants: A Study in Acculturation of Asian-Indians in the State of Colorado and the Educational Implications. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Denver. SC.

Speary, Earle E., and Willes M. West
1920 German Plots and Intrigues in the U.S. during the Period of Our Neutrality. U.S. Government, Red, White and Blue Series #10, Washington: Committee on Public Information. HC.

Spellman, John W.
1959 The International Extensions of Political Conspiracy as Illustrated by the Ghadar Party. Journal of Indian History 37:23-45. HC.

Stern, Bernard
1956 American Views of India and Indians, 1857-1900. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania. Hc, HC.

Stevens, Henry H.
1911 The Oriental Problem, Dealing with Canada as Affected by the Immigration of Japanese Hindus and Chinese. Vancouver. Hc.

Srivastava, Ram P.
1975 Family Organization and Change Among the Overseas Indians with Special Reference to Indian Immigrant Families of British Columbia, Canada. In G. Kurian, ed. Family In India: A Regional View. The Hague: Mouton. S.

Sugimoto, Howard H.
1966 Japanese Immigration, the Vancouver Riots, and Canadian Diplomacy. M.A. Dissertation, Department of History, University of Washington. H.

Sumida, Rigenda
1935 The Japanese in British Columbia. M.A. Dissertation, University of British Columbia. H.

Tolmie, J. Ross
1930 The Orientals in British Columbia. B.A. Honours Essay, Department of History, University of British Columbia. H.

University of British Columbia. Centre for Continuing Education.
1973 An Introduction to East Indian Culture. Vancouver: typescript. E.

University of British Columbia. Library, Special Collections
1966 Bibliography of East Indian Immigration into Canada, 1880-1920. Vancouver: typescript. B.

n.d. East Indians in British Columbia. A File of Newspaper Clippings. HM.

Vidyarthi, Ram Sharam
1970 Komagata Maru Ki Samudri Yatra (Sea Voyage of the Komagata Maru). Mirjapur: Krantikari Publishing Co. H.

Waiz, S.A.
1934 Indians Abroad Directory. Bombay: Imperial Indian Citizenship Association. HM.

Walhouse, Freda
1961 The Influence of Minority Ethnic Groups on the Cultural Geography of Vancouver, 1961. M.A. Dissertation, Geography Department, University of British Columbia. S.

Ward, N.L.
1925 Oriental Missions in British Columbia. Westminster: Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts. S, HM.

Ward, William Peter
1974 The Oriental Immigrant and Canada's Protestant Clergy. B.C. Studies 22:9-19. H.

1973 White Canada Forever: British Columbia's Response to Orientals, 1858-1914. Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of History, Queens University. H, S, B.

Wenzel, Lawrence A.
1966 The Identification and Analysis of Certain Value Orientations of Two Generations of East Indians in California. Ed.D., University of the Pacific. SC.

1969 The Rural Punjabis of California: A Religio-Ethnic Group. Phylon 29:245-56. SC.

Wherry, E.M.
1907 Hindu Immigrants in America. Missionary Review 30:918-919. HCM.

Wilson, J.D. and J. Dahlie
1975 Negroes, Finns, Sikhs -- Education and Community Experience in British Columbia. In Sounds Canadian: Languages and Cultures in Multi-Ethnic Society. Paul M. Mingus, ed. pp. 76-92. Toronto: Peter Mattin Associates. SM.

Woodsworth, Charles J.
1941 Canada and the Orient: A Study in International Relations. Toronto: Macmillan. H.

Wordsworth, James S.
1909 Strangers within our Gates. Toronto: Missionary Society of the Methodist Church, Canada. pp. 188-9. Hc, M.

Wynne, Robert E.
1964 Reaction to the Chinese in the Northwest and British Columbia. Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of History, University of Washington. H.

1966 American Labour Leaders and the Vancouver Anti-Oriental Riot. Pacific Northwest Quarterly 42(4):172-179. H.

Appendix I (Continued)

Unverified Source Materials

Chand, Mehar
1916 Sikhism in Canada. University of British Columbia.

Chakra Lata.
1973-date Calgary: India-Canada Society of Calgary (irregular).

Chakraverti, Robindra C.
1968 The Sikhs of El Centro: a Study in Social Integration. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Minnesota.

Deodhar, Shyama
1954 The Treatment of India in American Social Studies Textbooks, 1921-1952. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Michigan.

Duggal, Prakash V.
1969 The Treatment of India in Selected American Social Studies Textbooks, 1953-1968. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Michigan.

Free Hindustan
1907-10 Taraknas Das, ed. Vancouver, Seattle.

Dardar, Nari P.
1963 The Threatment of India in the American Press, a Case Study. M.A. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley.

Gupta, Santosh P.
1969 The Acculturation of Asians in Central Pennsylvania. Ph.D. Dissertation. Pennsylvania State University.

India Calling
1971-date Anant Singh, ed. Toronto (biweekly).

Jacoby, Harold S.
1959 A Half Century Appraisal of East Indians in the United States. Stockton: College of the Pacific.

Jain, Usha R.
1964 The Gujaratis in San Francisco. M.A. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley.

Josh, Sohan S.
1976 The Tragedy of the Komagata Maru. _____: Peoples Publishing House.

Khalsa Herald
1911-1912 Kartar Singh, ed. Vancouver.

Know India
1969-70 Veerendra Adhiya, ed. Toronto (biweekly).

The Link
1974-date Winnipeg (biweekly).

Miller, Allan P.
1950 An Ethnographic Report on the East Indians of the Sacramento Valley.

Oren, Stephen.
1964 The Sikhs and Punjab Politics, 1921-47. University of British Columbia.

Sansar
1912-13 Victoria.

Sara, Iqbal S.
1967 A Brief History of the Sikhs in Canada.

Singh, Baba Gurdit
n.d. The Voyage of the Komagata Maru. Calcutta.

Singh, Bhai Bhagwan
n.d. My Brief Life Sketch. Chandigarh: Public Relations Department.

Singh, Pardaman
1922 Ethnological Epitome of the Hindustanees of the Pacific Coast. Stockton: Khalsa Diwan Society.

Singh, Rattan
1929 A Brief History of the Hindustan Ghadar Party. San Francisco: Hindustan Ghadar.

Theosophical News
1914-15 Kartar Singh, ed. Toronto.

Virk, Gurbachan Singh
1969 The Sikhs and a History of their Immigration to Canada and the United States. Guru Nanak (Nov. 30th).