The Comrade.

A Weekly Journal. Edited by - Mohamed Ali.

'Stand upright, speak thy thought, declare
The truth thou hast, that all may share;
Be bold, proclaim it everywhere;
They only live who dare!

—*Morris.*

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EXPLANATORY NOTES.

ALLENSTEIN is a garrison town of Germany in the province of East Prussia, on the river Alle, about 100 miles by rail N.E. from Thorn and about 80 miles from Russian frontier. Its population in 1910 was 51,913.

ANCRE is the most important affluent of the Somme and runs north-east by way of Albert and Corbic.

AUGUSTOFF is a city on the border between Russian North Poland and East Prussia. It is situated some thirty miles south of Suwalki.

BRITISH EAST AFRICA consists of a large area on the mainland (including the Uganda Protectorate) together with the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba. The British defence forces were in 1913 located as follows :—

(1) East Africa Protectorate :—21 officers, 750 men of the 3rd battalion of the King's African Rifles and 13 officers 400 men of the 1st battalion. There are 1,735 policemen under 38 European officers.

(2.) Uganda Protectorate .—One battalion of King's African Rifles 983 rank and file, and 1,077 armed constabulatory, under a British Commissioner of Police and British officers. There is also a volunteer reserve of 101 Europeans.

Zangibar :—The Military force in the island consist of 2 companies of the King's African Rifles.

BAKLARJEVO (Baklarzow) is a town on the Russo-German border about 10 miles south of *Philipow*.

FORT DE WAELHEM is a fort in Belgium about 15 miles south of Antwerp. It is one of the outer circle of forts round Antwerp.

FORT DE WAVRE is a fort in Belgium some ten miles south-east of Antwerp. It is situated between Fort de Waelhem on its west and Koninos Hoyckt on its east. It is one of the outer circle of forts and redoubts with batteries round Antwerp and its inner circle of forts. It protects the railway that runs from Brussels to Antwerp.

FILIPPOW is a town on the Russo-German border, situated about 20 miles north of Augustow.

GHENT is the capital of East Flanders, Belgium. It is situated at the junction of the Scheldt and the Lys (Ley), and is about 30 miles east of Antwerp. In 1904 its population numbered 162,482. It is one the most historic cities of Belgium.

GERMAN NEW GUINEA, so-called after the island which contributes the greatest area, comprehends besides Kaiser Wilhelm's land, the islands which are now commonly called the Bismarck Archipelago—viz., New Pomerani, New Mecklenburg, with New Hanover and the Admiralty Islands and the Soloman Islands (Bongainville and Buka). There are besides nearly 200 smaller islands and islets scattered among their greatest neighbours. These all are the Pacific Protectorates of Germany. In 1884 New Guinea was absolutely wild, not a single white man living on what is now the German part. On the islands of New Pomerania and Miako only two trading firms had their establishments; the Lauenburg and Wesleyans had each a mission station. After the annexation, commercial enterprise set in at once, hand in hand with political administration. Now, on the mainland and in the islands plantation have been established and tobacco and cotton have been successfully grown. Three German mission societies formed settlements in New Guinea with a branch one on the Gazelle Peninsula. The protectorate is included in the universal postal union; each harbour has its post office, also a leading official with a number of assistants to control the natives and the revenue. It is divided into two districts with separate administration, New Guinea and the Bismarck Archipelago; over both presides an Imperial Governor, the seat of Government being Herbertshohe in New Pomerania. A line of steamers piles between New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago and Singapore. A special silver coin of rupee value has been introduced. The area of Kaiser Wilhelm's land is approximately 70,000 sqr. miles, and the whole population in 1913 numbered 531,000.

natives and 283 Germans. A small police force has been formed of the natives there. The New Guinea administration was transferred to the Government in 1897 for which the company of owners was to receive £70,000. The chief harbours are Friedrich Wilhelmshafen and Konstantinhafen, Nusa, Matupi, Kaweing, Namatain and Kieta. In 1912, 980 merchant vessels of 848,182 tons visited the port of Kaiser Wilhelm land and the islands. The estimated revenues and expenditure (for all the lands, except of the Samaon island) in 1913 was 3,410,000 marks, including 1,650,000 marks of Imperial subvention. Gold has recently been found in Bismark islands.

GAMBIA—The most northerly of the British West African dependencies. It consists of a stretch of land on both sides of the river Gambia. It has an area of about 4,000 sq. m. and a population officially estimated in 1907, at 163,000. It is administered by a Governor, assisted by an Executive and a Legislative Council. On the last named body nominated unofficial members have seats. The colony is self-supporting and has no debts.

ILTIS is a German gunboat of the R. class.

Its length is ... 203 ft.
Beam ... 299 ft.
and Draught ... 108 ft.

Its displacement is 886 tons, and its Indicated Horse Power: 1332. It has an average speed of 14 knots an hour.

Armament: ... 4-3·4 inches (16 pounders).
6-1 pounders.
2 Machine guns. It has a complement of 125.

KIELCE district is in the south-west of Russian Poland and is surrounded by the Governments of Piotrkow and Radone and Austrian Galicia. Its area is about 3,896 sqr. miles and its population in 1912, was 992,500. By religion 88 per cent. of the people are Roman Catholics. It is an agricultural district and exports grain.

LIERRE and MOLLI.—Towns in the province of Antwerp, Belgium. Lierre (Lier) is situated about 10 miles south of Antwerp and Molli (Moll) about 30 miles East of Antwerp.

LUDERITZ BAY in the German South-West Africa is situated about 150 miles north of the mouth of river Orange.

MASUREN LAKES (Mrosen)—They are in the south of East Prussia near Lyck.

MALINES is an ancient and important city of Belgium. It is situated on the Dyle and is in the province of Antwerp lying about half way between Antwerp and Brussels. The chief importance of Malines is derived from the fact that it is in a sense the religious capital of Belgium—the archbishop being the primate of the Catholic Church in that country. In the wars of the 17th and 18th centuries it was besieged many times and captured by the French, Dutch and English. The French finally removed the fortifications in 1804, since which year it has been an open town.

NIEMAN or Memel is a river running along the border of Russian Poland. It passes though the north corner of East Prussia and discharges into the Gulf of Courland.

OEKERMOGOE (Okermeza) is a town in Upper Hungary. The situation of the district is near Blismica mountains which form part of the Carpathian range towards the east end.

OSSOVETZ (Ossowice) is in Russian Poland. It is situated on the river Bobr and is about midway between Augustowa and Lomza.

OSSOWITZ (Ossovets) is a third class Russian fortress, situated near the Russian German frontier in the Vilna district.

OSTEND is a Belgian town in the province of west Flanders. Its population in 1904 was 41,181. It is the most seaside resort of the kingdom. Situated on the North Sea, it forms almost the centre point of the Belgian coast. It is directly connected by railway with Brussels, Cologne and Berlin.

PETROKOGY (Piotrkow) district is in the hands of the Government of the same name in Russian Poland. Its geographical position is in the south-west of Russian Poland. The town *Piotrkow* is its capital and is situated 90 miles by rail south-west of Warsaw. The population of the district in 1912 was 2,013, 600, It is the most thickly populated Government in the whole Russian Empire.

RIVER SENNE is in Belgium. It takes its source from the mountains near Mons and after passing through Brussels joins the rivers Dyle and the Nenth near Malines. The Senne is about 50 miles in length. Malines is a fort about 15 miles south of Antwerp.

RIVER NETHE is in Belgium. It takes its source from the mountains near Wychmael which is a town in the north of Limburg. The Nethe is about 45 miles long and after passing through Lierre joins the Dyle and the Senne off Malines.

SOMME is a river in North France. It rises to the N. N. E. of St. Quentin in the department of Aisne where it has a course of about 25 miles; it traverses the department of Samme from the South East to the North West for a distance of about 125 miles through a marshy valley and discharges into the English Channel. Commanded by Ham, Peromme, Amiens and Abbeville, this valley forms a Northern line of defence for Paris.

SEMLIN—An Austrian town in Croatia Slavonia in the county of Symria, situated beside the south bank of Danube on a tongue of land between that river and the Save. It is about 20 miles North-West of Belgrade. Its population in 1900 was about 15,079,—mostly Roman Catholics. It communicates with Vienna and Black Sea by the Danube; with Sissek by the Save and with Belgrade by the steam ferry and a bridge over the Save.

SCHEVENIGEN is a fishing port and watering place of Holland on the North Sea in the province of South Holland about 2 miles north of the Hague, with which it is connected by tramway. The town has a rapidly growing population of about 23,000.

SELZAETE (Selsaete) is a Belgian town in the north of East Flanders. It is situated on the Beljo-Holland border, about 10 miles north of the town Ghent.

S. 126 :—A German Destroyer of smaller type. Length 210 ft.; beam 23 ft; Draught 7-6 ft; Displacement 479; Indicated Horse Power 6,415; Speed 28 knots per hour.

SUWALKI is a Government or Province of Russian Poland of which it occupies the N. E. corner, extending to the north between East Prussia and the Russian Governments of Vilna and Grodno, with the Government of Kovno on the north. Its area is 4,846 sqr. miles. It includes the east of the low Baltic swelling 800 to 1.000 ft. above the sea and is studded with lakes. The Niemen forms its eastern and northern boundary. The population in 1906 was estimated at 633,900. The majority are Luthians mostly in the north. There are 21½ per cent. Poles chiefly in the towns, 16½ Jews, 5¼ Germans and 4¼ Russians. The Government is divided into seven chief towns which are Suwelki, Augustowo, Mariampol, Seiny, Wilkowiszki and Wladislawow.

TSAVA is a town in British East Africa. It is situated on the river Tsava, and is about 80 miles east of Kilima Njaro which is a German post on the Anglo-German border in East Africa.

UZSOK PASS is through the Carpathian mountains which separates North of Hungary from Poland. The pass is situated some ten miles south of the source of river San.

VITRY-LE-FRANCOIS, a town of north-eastern France, on the right bank of the Marne, 20 miles S.E. of Châlons, on the railway from Paris to Strassburg. Population in 1906, 7,985. The Marne-Rhine canal, the Haute-Marne canal and the lateral canal of the Marne unite at Vitry.

VERMAND is a town N. N. E. of St. Quentin at a distance of about six miles from that city.

VISHEGRAD or Visegrad is a town of Bosnia E. S. E. of Serajevo. It is situated on the river Drina. It is about 40 miles from Serajevo and 3 miles from the nearest point on the Servian frontier.

VILLE-SUR-TOURBE is a village situated on the river Aisne. It is at a distance of about 30 miles from Reims which lies to its west. In its east is Verdun at about the same distance.

WINDAU.—A Seaport and Sea-bathing resort of western Russia is in the Government of Courland. On its north is the Baltic Sea, and it is situated 110 miles north-west of Riga (on the Gulf of Riga). Population in 1897 numbered 7,132. It has a castle and its harbour 20 and 25 feet deep is free from ice all the year round.

"The Sword of Peace."

A Reply to H. G. Wells.

By Vernon Lee.

[Vernon Lee, the well-known author of "Vital Lies," the "Gospel of Anarchy," and other works, has asked for an opportunity to express in the "Labour Leader" the opinions of those Liberals who at present are refused publication in Liberal papers. Gladly we provide that opportunity.]

As prophet and planner of those Socialistic Utopias which have consoled and inspired so many of us in our poor little daily fight against "Bladesover" and "Villadom," it has been part of Mr. H. G. Wells' mission to make us realise the atrocious preposterousness of war. "My right hand, sir, my right hand," his mutilated soldier sobs out symbolically in the "World Set Free." "You can say what you like, it didn't ought ever to 'ave begun," sums up the illiterate survivor of a wrecked civilisation at the end of his "War in the Air."

The Apostacy of Mr. Wells.

It is because Mr. Wells has thus hitherto been in the forefront of the denouncers of war that I, his admirer, disciple, and occasionally his defender, in the past, now feel it my duty to warn the readers of the "Labour Leader" and the Radicals who, like myself, will rally to it, against Mr. Wells' present utterances on the subject of war; against his apostacy which is all the worse because it is sincere; against his advocacy which is only more efficaciously militarist because ostensibly undertaken against militarism in the name of future peace. I, therefore, wish to draw the attention of the readers of the "Labour Leader" to an article of Mr. Wells, dated August 3, and published in the *Daily Chronicle* of August 7, because it gives the key to everything else he goes on writing; and also because many people who have never read or even heard of that first article of Mr. Wells are now repeating the phrases and arguments, and are poisoning themselves and others with the spirit, of which that first article of his was probably the first self-righteous expression in this country. That article, endowed with the microbian fertility of all appeals to prejudice and passion, was entitled, "The Sword of Peace," and it carried the large type sub-title, "*Every sword that is drawn against Germany now is a sword drawn for peace.*"

What Bismarck Relied Upon.

Why the fourfold coalition (to which is to-day added Japan) now engaged in exterminating Germany and bringing her and Europe under Russia's predominance—why that coalition should be the "Sword of Peace," Mr. Wells is continuing to explain in every (formerly Liberal and pacific) paper. Here is his earliest version in that *Daily Chronicle* article, written on August 3:

"The monstrous vanity that was begotten by the easy victories "of '70, and '71, has challenged the world, and Germany prepares "to reap the harvest Bismarck sowed. That trampling, drilling "foolery in the heart of Europe, that has arrested civilisation and "darkened the hopes of mankind for forty years, German imperialism, "German militarism, has struck its inevitable blow. The victory of "Germany will mean the permanent enthronement of the war god "over all human affairs. The defeat of Germany may open the way "to disarmament and peace throughout the earth. To those who "love peace there can be no other hope in the present conflict than "the defeat, the utter discrediting of the German legend, the ending "for good and all of the wagging Teutonic Kiplingism and all "that criminal sham efficiency that centred in Berlin. Never has any "State in the world so clamoured for punishment."

Whether "flagwagging" Kiplingism is unknown to England which has produced Kipling himself, I leave the reader of the "Labour Leader" to think over. As regards Krupp, the Socialists who have published Mr. Snowden's and Mr. Newbold's speeches and pamphlets, and have read Mr. Perris's "War Traders," will answer Mr. Wells that Krupp is not only connected by business overlappings with our own international armament trusts, but has its exact equivalent in firms which bear English and not German names. This much in passing. What I want to point out is that Bismarck, of whom Mr. Wells speaks as the "*sower of all this harvest of war*," did not rely solely upon "Blood and Iron," but also upon something which seems as necessary, alas, for efficacious warfare: the delusion that oneself is right, that the adversary is a tyrant or a lunatic, that the war one is waging has been brought about solely by that adversary; briefly that "*Every sword that is drawn for X. Y. Z. is a sword drawn for peace.*"

I have replaced the name *Germany* in the quotation not by *France*, which was the name used by Bismarck himself, but by that diagrammatic X. Y. Z., because I want to draw attention to the fact that this formula is a blank one, equally adaptable by every nation, equally employed at every moment of history, and possessing the purely emotional cogency of a strain of music which makes men march equally, whether the words are those of the "Marseillaise," which sent France devastating Europe under the Directory and Consulate, or of "God Save the King," with which England answered under Pitt and Nelson; or of the patriotic hymns with which Arnot and Körner spurred on the Germans crushed by Napoleon at Jena to become the Germans crushing him at Leipzig.

Mr. Wells' Second Formula.

"Every sword that is drawn against X. Y. Z. is a sword drawn for peace." Remember the formula, for it is wonderfully efficacious in getting rid of all doubts and self-searchings; in uniting all parties, however legitimately opposed, in making every nation unanimous to slaughter or maim millions of men, waste milliards of men, waste milliards of wealth, and spread in every individual soul myriads of germs of injustice, hatred, credulity, and falsehood. For with that formula goes its correlative one, which Mr. Wells has not failed to furnish us: "*Never has any State in the world so clamoured for punishment.*" That was exactly what Bismarck and old pious William proclaimed about France in 1870; that is precisely what the Holy Alliance of England, Prussia, Austria, and Russia repeated when it sent Napoleon to St. Helena and handed back France and Naples to the Bourbons and Lombardy to the Austrians. That is what Napoleon said in every proclamation against England. That is what Louis XIV. said, or got his Court preacher to say, when he dragooned the Protestants or reduced Western Germany to a heap of ruins. "Never has any State (or *nation*, or *King*, according to the taste of the moment) so clamoured for punishment." That is what every State, nation, or King has always and everywhere said when trying to destroy an adversary. And that is what every one of the present belligerents is at this present moment saying.

The German H. G. Wellses.

I have before me a letter from a German Liberal, almost a Socialist, written August 17, in which that formula of resistance to tyrannous and perfidious aggression is repeated in words more sorrowful and modest, but not less convinced than Mr. Wells. Only the X. Y. Z. is in this case replaced by *Russia*; it is against Russia—Russia, which strangled Finland and progromed Jews and sent its Duma to Siberia—that the most anti-Prussian South German Liberals and the Socialists, crushed by Police-Director Von Jagow, are now uniting like one man.

We English have to fight now for the food and the security which we should be quietly enjoying had there been in England a few less prophets of peace in the future and a few more supporters of peace in the present. We have to fight now, as they all have to fight. So, since we are all fighting with sorrow in our hearts, and that is but a half-hearted way of fighting, let the drums and fifes and bugles drown our last doubts and regrets. And let Mr. H. G. Wells and all the other H. G. Wellses, French, German, Austrian, Russian, Japanese, strike up that old soul-stirring tune, '*The sword now drawn against X. Y. Z. is a sword drawn for peace.*'—*The Labour Leader.*

The War of the Mind.

All the realities of this war are things of the mind. This is a conflict of cultures, and nothing else in the world. All the world-wide pain and weariness, fear and anxieties, the bloodshed and destruction, the innummerable torn bodies of men and horses, the stench of putrefaction, the misery of hundreds of millions of human beings, the waste of mankind are but the material consequences of a false philosophy and foolish thinking. We fight not to destroy a nation, but a nest of evil ideas.

We fight because a whole nation has become obsessed by pride, by the cant of cynicism and the vanity of violence, by the evil suggestion of such third-rate writers as Gobineau and Stewart Chamberlain, that they were a people of peculiar excellence destined to dominate the earth, by the base offer of advantage in cunning and treachery held out by such men as Delbruck and Bernhardi, by the theatricalism of the Kaiser, and by two stirring songs about Deutschland and the Rhine. These things, inter-weaving with the tradesmen's activities of the armaments trust and the common vanity and weaknesses of unthinking men have been sufficient to release disaster—we do not begin to measure the magnitude of the disaster. On the back of it all, spurring it on, are the idea-mongers, the base-spirited writing men, pretentious little professors in frock coats, scribbling colonels. They are the ideas. They pointed the way and whispered "Go!" They ride the world now to catastrophe. It is as if God in a moment of wild humor had lent his whirlwinds for an outing to half-a-dozen fleas.

And the real task before mankind is quite beyond the business of the fighting line, the simple, awful business of discrediting and

discouraging these stupdities, by battleship, artillery, rifle, and the blood courage of seven million men. The real task of mankind is to get better sense into the heads of these Germans, and therewith and thereby into the heads of humanity generally, and to end not simply a war, but the idea of war. What printing and writing and talking have done, printing and writing and talking can undo. Let no man be fooled by bulk and matter. Rifles do but kill men, and fresh men are born to follow them. Our business is to kill ideas. The ultimate purpose of the war is propaganda, the destruction of certain beliefs, and the creation of others. It is to this propaganda that reasonable men must address themselves.

And when I write propaganda, I do not for a *moment* mean the propaganda with which the name of Mr. Norman Angell is associated: this great modern gospel that war does not "pay". That is indeed the only decent and attractive thing that can still be said for war. Nothing that is really worth having in life does pay. Men live in order that they may pay for the unpaying things. Love does not pay, art does not pay, happiness does not pay, honesty is not the best policy, generosity invites the ingratitude of the mean; what is the good of this huckster's argument? It revolts all honorable men. But war, whether it pay or not, is an atrociously ugly thing, cruel, destroying countless beauties. Who cares whether war pays or does not pay, when one thinks of some obstinate Belgian peasant woman being interrogated and not by a hectoring interman officer, or of the weakly whimpering mess of some poor hovel with little children in it, struck by a shell! Even if war paid twelve and a half per cent. per annum for ever on every pound it cost to wage, would it be any the less a sickening abomination to every decent soul? And, moreover, it is a bore. It is an unendurable bore. War and the preparation for war, the taxes, the drilling, the interference with every free activity, the arrest and stiffening up of life, the obedience to third-rate people in uniform, of which Berlin-struck Germans have been the implacable exponents, have become an unbearable nuisance to all humanity. Neither Belgium nor France nor Britain is fighting now for glory or advantage, I do not believe Russian is doing so; we are all, I believe fighting in a fury of resentment because at last after years of waste and worry to prevent it, we have been obliged to do so. Our grievance of every decent life-loving German, of every German mother and sweetheart who watched her man go off under his incompetent leaders to hardship and mutilations and death. And our propaganda against the Prussian idea has to be no vile argument to the pocket but an appeal to the commonsense and common feeling of humanity. We have to clear the heads of the Germans, and keep the heads of our own people clear about this war. Particularly is there need to dissuade our people against the dream of profit-filching, the "War against German Trade." We have to reiterate over and over again that we fight, resolved that at the end no nationality shall oppress any nationality or language again in Europe for ever, and by way of illustration, we want not those ingenious arrangements of figures that touch the Angell imagination, but photographs of the Kaiser in his glory at a review, and photographs of the long, unintelligent sidelong face of the Crown Prince, his son, photographs of that great original Krupp taking his pleasures at Capri and, to set beside these photographs pitilessly showing men killed and horribly torn upon the battlefield, and men crippled and women and men murdered and homes burnt and, to the verge of indecency, all the peculiar filthiness of war. And the case that has thus to be stated has to be brought before the minds of the Germans, of Americans, of French people, and English people, of Swedes and Russians and Italians as our common evil which, though it be at the expense of several Governments, we have to end.

Now, how is this literature to be spread? How are we to reach the common people of the Western European countries with these explanations, these assurances, these suggestions that are necessary for the proper ending of this war? I could wish we had a Government capable of something more articulate than "Wait and See!" a Government that dared confess a national intention to all the world. For what a Government says is audible to all the world. King George, too, has the ear of a thousand million people. If he saw fit to say simply and clearly what it is we fight for and what we seek, his voice would be heard universally, through Germany, through all America. No other voice has such penetration. He is, he has told us, watching the war with interest, but that is not enough. We could have guessed that, knowing his spirit. As a nation, we need expression that shall reach the other side. But our Government is, I fear, one of those that obey necessity; it is only very reluctantly creative; it rests, therefore, with us who, outside all formal government, represent the national will and intention, to take this work into our hands. By means of a propaganda of books, newspaper articles, leaflets, tracts, in English, French, German, Dutch, Swedish, Norwegian, Italian, Chinese, and Japanese we have to spread this idea, repeat this idea and "impose upon this war" the idea that this war must end war. We have to create a wide common conception of a re-mapped and pacified Europe, released from the abominable dangers of a private trade in armaments, largely disarmed and pledged to mutual protection. This conception has sprung up in a number of minds, and there have been proposals at once most extraordinary feasible for its realization, projects of aeroplanes scattering leaflets across Germany, of armies distributing tracts as they advance, of prisoners of war much afflicated by such literature. These ideas have the absurdity of novelty, but otherwise they are by no mean absurd. They will strike many soldiers as being indecent, but the world is in revolt against the standards of soldiering.

Never before has the world seen clearly as it now sees clearly, the "role" of thought in the making of war. This new conception carries with it the corollary of an entirely new campaign.

How can we get at the minds of our enemies? How can we make explanation more powerful than armies and fleets? Failing an articulate voice at the head of our country we must needs look for the resonating appeal we need in other quarters. We look to the Church that takes for its purposes the name of the Prince of Peace. In England, except for the smallest, meekest protest against war any sort of war, on the part of a handful of Quakers, Christianity is silent. Its universally present organization speaks no coherent counsels. Its workers for the most part are buried in the loyal manufacture of flannel garments and an inordinate quantity of bed-socks for the wounded. It is an extraordinary thing to go now and look at one's parish church and note the pulpit, the orderly arrangements for the hearers, the proclamations on the doors to sit awhile on the stone wall about the graves and survey the comfortable vicarage, and to reflect this is just the local representation of a universally present organization for the communication of ideas; that all over Europe there are such pulpits, such possibilities of gathering and saying, and that it gathers nothing and has nothing to say. Pacific, patriotic sentiment it utters perhaps, but nothing that anyone can act upon, nothing to draw together, will, and make an end. It is strange to sit alive in the sunshine and realize that, and to think of how tragically that same realization came to another mind in Europe.

Several things have happened during the past few weeks with the intensest symbolical quality; the murder of Jaures, for example, but surely nothing has occurred so wonderful and touching as the death of the Pope, that faithful, honest, simple old man. The war and the perplexity of the war darkened his last hours. "Once the Church could have stopped this thing," he said, with a sense of threads missed and controls that have slipped away—it may be with a sense of vivifying help discouraged and refused. The "Tribuna" tells a story that, if not true, is marvellously invented, of the Austrian representative coming to ask him for a blessing on the Austrian arms. He feigned not to hear, or perhaps he did not hear. The Austrian asked again, and again there was silence. Then, at the third request, when he could be silent no longer, he broke out: "No! Bless peace!" As the temperature of his weary body rose, his last clear moments were spent in attempts to word telegrams that should have some arresting hold upon the gigantic crash that was coming, and in his last delirium he lamented war and the impotence of the Church.

Intellect without faith is the devil but faith without intellect is a negligent angel with rusty weapons. This European catastrophe is the tragedy of the weak though righteous Christian will. We begin to see that to be right and indolent, or right and abstinent from the conflict is to be wrong. Righteousness has need to be as clear and efficient and to do things as sedulously in the right way as any evil doer. There is no meaning in the Christianity of a Christian who is now a propagandist for peace, who is not now also a politician. There is no faith in the Liberalism that merely carps at the manner of our entanglement in a struggle that must alter all the world for ever. We need not only to call for peace, but to seek and show and organize the way of peace.....

One thinks of Governments and the Church and the Press, and then turning about for some other source of mental control, we recall the organizations, the really quite opulent organization that are professedly devoted to the promotion of peace. There is no voice from The Hague. The so-called peace movement in our world has consumed money enough and service enough to be something better than a weak little grumble at the existence of war. What is this movement and its organizations doing now? Ninety-nine people in Europe out of every hundred are complaining of war now. It needs no specially endowed committees to do that. They preach to a converted world. The question is how to end it and prevent its recurrence. But have these specially peace-seeking people ever sought for the secret springs of war, or looked into the power that war for war, or troubled to learn how to grasp war and subdue it? All Germany is knit by the fighting spirit, and armed beyond the rest of the world. Until the mind of Germany is changed, there can be no safe peace on earth. But that, it seems, does not trouble the professional peace advocate if only he may cry Peace, and live somewhere in comfort, and with the comfortable sense of a superior dissent from the general emotion.

How are we to gather the wills and understanding of men for the tremendous necessities and opportunities of this time? Thought, speech, persuasion, an incessant appeal for clear intentions, clear statements for the dispelling of suspicion and the abandonment of secrecy and trickery, there is work for every man who writes or talks and has the slightest influence upon another creature. This monstrous conflict in Europe, the slaughtering, the famine, the confusion, the panic and hatred and lying pride, it is all of it real only in the darkness of the mind. At the coming of understanding it will vanish as dreams vanish at awakening. But never will it vanish until understanding has come. It goes on only because we, who are voices, who suggest, who might elucidate and inspire, are ourselves such little scattered creatures that though we strain to the breaking point, we still have no strength to turn on the light that would save us. There have been moments in the last three weeks when life has been a waking nightmare, one of those frozen nightmares when, with salvation within one's reach, one cannot move, and the voice dies in one's throat.—H. G. WELLS in the *Nation*.

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Replies to Mr. Well's "Nation" Article.

I.—By Mr. Norman Angell.

TO THE EDITOR OF "THE NATION."

SIR,—In your issue of the 29th ult., Mr. H. G. Wells says:—

"The real task of mankind is to get better sense into the heads . . . . of humanity generally, and to end not simply war, but the idea of war. What printing and writing and talking have done, printing and writing and talking can undo. . . . . Our business is to kill ideas. . . . . The ultimate purpose . . . is propaganda, the destruction of certain beliefs and the creation of others."

A very large number of men and women have not merely been convinced of this for many years, but—without waiting until the cataclysm had come upon us—have been attempting to carry their conviction into effect. They include some who, as a result of the study of the very complex problem of reaching the mind of the average hostile man in this matter, decided rightly or wrongly a year or two ago, that in a certain method of approach (which does not consist, as I shall indicate presently, emphasising the value of economic as against moral arguments) lay the best promise of success. The movement rallied to itself men of the most diverse political and religious parties, including, for instance, many in the church of England, but also very many of the Society of Friends. Particularly, however, did it win support in such centres as the Universities of Great Britain, Germany, America, and France. It is, perhaps, essentially a young men's movement; and, to my certain knowledge, very great personal sacrifices—hostility of relatives, surrendering of financial advantages, and so forth—have been made by young men in every one of the countries I have mentioned in order to take an active part in this work.

In part as a matter of justice to them and to others who have made sacrifices of other kinds, but much more because that warfare against false ideas which Mr. Wells urges will certainly not be helped by the distortion and misrepresentation of efforts which while more obscure, of course, than his own, are certainly not less sincere, may I crave a little of your space to deal with certain strictures levelled by Mr. Wells? Speaking of the need for propaganda he says:—

"When I write 'propaganda', I do not for a moment mean the propaganda with which the name of Mr. Norman Angell is associated, this great modern doctrine that war does not *pay*. . . . . What is the good of this huckster's argument? It revolts all honorable men. . . . . Our propaganda against the Prussian idea has to be no vile argument to the pocket. . . . . We want not those ingenious arrangements of figures that touch the Angell imagination. . . ."

Mr. Well's plain implication, of course, is that the propaganda to which he and I refer consists of an attempt to demonstrate that war does not pay in terms of dividends, so much per cent. cash; that it is concerned mainly with statistical demonstrations of such a proposition; that it is not concerned with what he calls "the unpaying things—love, art, happiness, honesty, generosity."

In all courtesy I would ask Mr. Wells a question or two. On what does he base his statement of our aims, and the character of our work? (I may mention incidentally that a mere fraction of my own writings deal with the financial and economic aspect of this question; and there are no "ingenious arrangements of figures": not a single table of statistics in the whole of them.) The view he has expressed is, I know, that of the "smart paragraphist"—just as it is the popular journalistic view that we have been trying to prove war to be impossible, or that bank panics would stop war, or that war would cause instant ruin, or rubbish of a like kind. But Mr. Wells is, of course, aware that that sort of misrepresentation is the invariable fate of all ideas that disturb old habits of thought. (For a generation all evolution was for the popular newspaper writer summed up in the proposition that "our grandfathers had tails.")

The first number of the monthly review which was created to further the propaganda Mr. Wells derides contained a general statement of aim and policy. With reference to any difference which might distinguish this movement from earlier anti-war efforts occurs the following passage:—

"That difference does not reside in the fact that we value the economic as opposed to the moral plea. All human values are moral, or they are not human. The value of wealth, as of food, is derivable from the fact that it supports human life; of literature, that it embellishes it; of religion, that it sanctifies it—though the first may connote a glutton, the second a bore, and the last a bigot. . . . We believe in peace in the sense of the substitution of union for disunion, of partnership for rivalry, of comradeship for quarrel, only in part because it is a means to the end whereby men can more efficiently carry on their war with Nature; much more because it is a means to the end of making human intercourse of greater worth and finer quality, more purged of cowardly suspicions, of hatreds and misconceptions masquerading as virtues, cruelties and stupidities that darken life. And it is so a means because the emergence of the finer things depends upon a form of human intercourse which can only rest upon a basis of justice, and that in its turn upon understanding; both of which are in jeopardy so long as they are subject to the mechanical hazard of physical force."

It is perfectly true that in dealing with ideals like those embodied in the literature of Nieztscheanism and Prussianism, ideals which extol war and force as beautiful and desirable in themselves, it was necessary to find for collective conduct a standard of judgment, a basic sanction, which should be common to all Western society now that (whether we like it or not) such common sanction can no longer be found in religious dogma or in any universally accepted authoritative code. The appeal to intuition, to sentiment, to "the universal conscience," fails, because with two equally sincere and thinking men, intuition, sentiment, and conscience will indicate too diametrically opposed courses. That final test, the common sanction, can be found in "the general well-being," on the meaning of which we in the Western world are sufficiently agreed for practical purposes.

In the sub-title of "The Great Illusion"—I merely take that book as a type of the literature which our movement has produced—the scope and subject are indicated as "A study of the relation of military power to national advantage." And, if one reads as far as the introductory synopses and the chapter headings, one sees that "advantage" is there defined as including such things as nationality—the right of people to be of their place and race and language, the right of groups to live in their own way. And as a matter of simple fact, the lesser part of the book deals with the material side, and the larger part with the relation of military power to the protection and enlargement of the moral and spiritual possessions of men. We have throughout—certainly I have—taken the essential realities by which our politics must be tested to be well-being, happiness, and dignity in the largest and broadest sense of the term: health, sufficiency, cleanliness, leisure, laughter, contact of mind with mind, satisfaction of physical, intellectual and emotional hunger and thirst, affection, the play of childhood, grace, courtesy, beauty, love—all those things which, by the common consent of Christendom and the Western world, give value to human life. And the question which first and last we ask is this: "What does political power, embodied in military force, do for the protection and extension of these things?—What, in terms of those things, can a nation or race achieve by the military domination of another?"

Such a query is certainly not irrelevant to the present war. That war is—we are told every day—a war for the "mastery of Europe," for the domination of Teuton over Slav or Slav over Teuton, with such subsidiary objects as the undoing of past conquests, the reconquering of conquered provinces, or, it may be, the conquering of new; and, in so far as Britain's part is concerned, the maintenance of the Balance of Power on the assumption that preponderant power of a neighbour is likely to be used against us. The whole struggle is, in so far as the volition of the peoples enters into its sanction or toleration at all, a struggle for the political power by one group as against another. And the whole effort of our movement has been to raise the fundamental question of what political power can accomplish when achieved: to ask what the real value of conquered territory is to the conqueror; to ask whether political mastery and domination over others can be turned to any moral, social, or economic end. Our doctrine, as applied to this struggle, is embodied in this question: "If you—Frank or Teuton, Slav or Briton—can secure this mastery of Europe, how will it profit your people or add any mortal thing—moral or material—of value to your lives?" In answering that

question we have attempted to show how, in the nature of things, the reason why, in a world which is necessarily a world of partnership and co-operation, military domination of other men must be futile. We have felt that there is all the difference in the world between asserting that a given policy is immoral because it shocks our intuitions and emotions (the contrary policy which *we* urge as moral may shock the intuitions and emotions of the man we are trying to convince), and showing, on the basis of some commonly agreed test that it is, if successful, empty and futile, irrelevant to those aims for which States are founded. I have attempted to state the difference between the two processes in these terms :—

"The real distinction, if any, between the older and newer pacifists is that the older appealed to an intuitive unanalyzed ideal which they did not justify by a process of reason, while the newer attempt to obtain their result by analysis, by showing the how and why of certain facts in human relations, instead of merely holding up an ideal, without the process of rationalistic justification. . . . If the history of human progress reveals anything, it is surely this—that some of the best human emotion has been expended upon some of the worst possible objects. . . . It has been from no defect of good intention that humanity has gone astray on these matters so long ; the more moral the man the greater often was the futility of his life and the cruelty of his acts. . . . It is overlooked that the emotion of humanity repelling from war may be more than counteracted by the equally strong moral emotions we connect with patriotism : war may occasion suffering, but men are, or should be, prepared to endure suffering for their country. That men are called upon to suffer for an ideal may be the very fact which constitutes its attraction to them. . . . The difference between the pacifist and the militarist is not at bottom a moral one (assuming that we take the best statement of each case), but an intellectual one, and if we are to bring about that political reformation of Europe which is to liberate us from the militarist burden, as the religious reformation liberated Europe from religious oppression, the processes will have to be intellectual."

And I have appealed, in support of this view, to something more than a mere historical analogy, in these terms :—

"How did religious warfare—at times the bloodiest, most hateful, most passionate, most persistent warfare that ever devastates Europe—come to an end ? Obviously it was a matter of advancing opinion, a change of ideas and intellectual conceptions in Europe. The world of religious wars and of the Inquisition was a world which had a quite definite conception of the relation of authority to religious belief and truth—as that an authority was the source of truth; that truth could be, and should be, protected by force. What broke down this conception was a growing realization that authority, force, was irrelevant to the issues of truth (a party of heretics triumphed by virtue of some physical accident, as that they occupied a mountain region); that it was ineffective, and that the essence of truth was something outside the scope of physical conflict. As the realization of this grew, the conflicts declined.

"So with conflict between the political groups. They arise from a corresponding conception of the relation of military authority to political ends—those ends for which governments are founded—the protection of life and property, the promotion of well-being. When it is mutually realized by the parties concerned that security of life and property, like the security of truth, is not derived from military force ; that military force is as ineffective, as irrelevant, to the end of promoting prosperity as of promoting truth, then political wars will cease, as religious wars have ceased, for the same reason and in the same way."

Because Mr. Wells has laid in his article such a special stress on the *rôle* of ideas in the causation and prevention of war, I will quote two more short passages to show to what extent the propaganda he derides is in accordance with his principles. In the introduction to my last book occurs the following :—

"It is the supremacy of certain ideas that creates the present condition of international society, just as it is the prevailing ideas among the units which compose any society, whether that of a cannibal island or a Catholic nunnery, which determine its character. The story of civilization is the story of the development of ideas; the Palæolithic man of Northern Europe was physically a much finer man than the modern Londoner, as is, indeed, the present-day Cameroon cannibal. The qualities which explain the differences between their respective social states are intellectual and moral."

And in that section of "The Great Illusion" in which I have dealt with methods there is the following:

"However we may start, with whatever plan, however elaborated or varied, the end is always the same—the progress of man in this matter depends upon the degree to which his ideas are just; man advances by the victories of his mind and character."

The foregoing are not "selected" passages. Their general drift and tone dominate practically everything I have written on this subject, and I do not think that Mr. Wells can quote a single passage which is in any way in contradiction with them.

Your readers must judge how far it is just to stigmatize such ideas as based upon "a huckster's argument that revolts all honourable men," and how far any useful purpose in our common cause is served by so misrepresenting them.

II.—By Clement J. Bundock.

Mr. H. G. Wells is confident of the power of his article in the *Nation* to dispose of the Russian menace. And, indeed, the article is very cleverly written, as the many readers of the "Labour Leader" who appreciate the subtlety of the novelist's pen and the fine quality of his thought will expect. But he might as cheerily hope that his article in the *Nation* will dispose of the Russian Tsar and all his court, for the fear of Russian barbarism is not the dread of an unseen and unfelt evil, but the certainty of an extended era of atrocity. It is not hypothesis ; it is deduction. It is not hysteria ; it is unemotional calculation.

Let us imagine H. G. Wells is Herbert George Smith, and so destroy the glamour of a name. Let us further imagine the *Nation* article is written in the crude, unadorned, artlessly constructed sentences of a man of average capacity, and so dispel the delusion of a cunning hand. There remains the argument to dispose of the Russian menace. Soldiery in these days is a business calling for individual initiative rather than obedience to leadership. The Russian people in the mass is an unintelligent, uneducated people, and because of this lack of education Russia has not the power to present a danger to European civilisation. When Russia has attained the general education that is essential to invest it with the power, Russia will not have the desire. For this reason the democracies of Europe may laugh at the Russian terror, which does not exist. (The stories of Persia, Finland, and Poland, we may be fairly convinced, have no more substantial foundation than the story of Aladdin's lamp.)

Dropping the script of H. G. Smith, and turning to the leaves that have passed under the pen of H. G. Wells, we read the argument in beautifully-turned phrases, and a highly-trained intellect imparts to it a more convincing note.

"Now first let me point out what the Boer War showed, and what this tremendous conflict in Belgium is already enforcing, that the day of the unintelligent, common soldier is passed ; that men who are animated and individualised can, under modern conditions, fight better than men who are unintelligent and obedient. Soldiery is becoming more specialised. It is calling for the intelligent handling of weapons so elaborate and destructive that great masses of men in the field are an encumbrance rather than a power. Battles must spread out, and leading give place to individual initiative. Consequently Russia can only become powerful enough to overcome any highly civilised country raising its own average of education and initiative, and this it can do only by abandoning its obscurantist methods, by *liberalising* upon the Western European method. That is to say, it will have to teach its population to read, to multiply its schools and increase its universities, and that will make an entirely different Russia from the one we fare."

I make no pretence to military knowledge, but I speculate with some interest upon the condition of the British Army and the complacency of General French when the theory of the displacement of leadership by individual intelligence and initiative becomes the practice of warfare.

Mr. Wells always thinks well in advance of his day, and we are indebted to him for much stimulating suggestion, but the habit of living in the future sometimes leads a great man to speak of his prophecies as if they were current realities. Perhaps one day obedience will withdraw from the battlefield in honour of initiative (though I am inclined to think, and most sincerely hope, that in the day when intelligence predominates there will be no battlefield), but an observation of the companies that are every day passing through the doors of the recruiting offices nourishes the thought that Mr. Wells is premature, that intelligent soldiery is what Mr. Wells would like to see rather than what is.

If we may rely at all upon the information we receive from the official Press Bureau it appears that the German militarists (who constitute the despotism of which, we are told, we may be reasonably afraid, and who are, therefore, according to the doctrine of Mr. Wells, the most highly educated and thoroughly intelligent of the martial hosts of Europe) do not accept the view that "great masses of men in the field are an encumbrance rather than a power," and have, in fact, achieved some notable success by the use of them.

Presumably Mr. Wells is hoping, too, that the Russian troops—who, being uneducated and without initiative, have no power and are in consequence no danger to European civilisation—will strike a blow at Germany so severe that the military arrogance of Potsdam will for ever be humbled. Why we should believe that Russia, if it can be effective in hurling Prussian militarism from its seat, will, when that work is done, be stricken suddenly with ineffectiveness is not the easiest of Wellsian problems.

The fear of Russian despotism is a real fear well grounded, and its justification is contained in a passage in the article which is supposed to dispense with it.

"In bulk she (Russia) is barbaric. Between eighty and ninety per cent. of her population is living on a level very little above the level of those agricultural Aryan races who were scattered over Europe before the beginning of written history. It is an illiterate population. It is superstitious in a primitive way. . . . It is indeed, a helpless, unawakened mass."

And because it is all that, the autocracy will the more easily impose its desires upon it and it will the more readily and the more savagely fight when it is ordered to fight. And I am afraid we cannot rely upon the theory that its lack of intelligence and initiative will render it harmless.—*Labour Leader.*



Mr. Well's Reply.

To the Editor of the "Labour Leader."

Sir,—Our country is fighting for existence. No one who remains sane can suppose we have any other alternative before us now except victory or destruction. I would like to know, therefore, what good Mr. Keir Hardie and Mr. Ramsay MacDonald imagine they are doing at the present time by trying to misrepresent the negotiations that preceded the war and suggesting that in some way we are cheats in defending the neutrality of Belgium. What do they want to happen now? Are we to sue for peace? Will Mr. Keir Hardie and Mr. MacDonald answer that question? And if not, what are we to do? The small section of the working class that still reads the "Labour Leader" is, no doubt, waiting for guidance. What lead are Messrs. Keir Hardie and MacDonald going to give it?

And have these ex-leaders of Labour nothing in all the world to offer in this tremendous crisis and opportunity except a whining criticism of the acts of Sir Edward Grey?

The great argument against our fighting to destroy, if we can, the huge war machine of Germany that has hung over our national life like a nightmare appears to be that Russia will profit. Russia is represented as a Bogey of the most terrible sort. I gave the fullest and clearest reasons against this Russian superstition in the issue of the *Nation* immediately preceding your last issue of the "Labour Leader." To that issue "Vernon Lee" has contributed an article, entitled "A Reply to H. G. Wells," in which she raises the same great Russian scarecrow and entirely ignores my *Nation* article. I cannot go writing one article over and over again, and so I must refer your readers to that *Nation* article for my countervailing view. It is at your disposal to reprint or quote at any length you like. It knocks the bottom out of all this nonsense which represents Russia as a kind of worst devil and the Kaiser-Krupp Prussian system as the clean, white fabric of a delightful yet disciplined civilisation, which not only aspires but deserves to dominate the world. Why, even the Poles hate Germany more than they do Russia.

If "Vernon Lee" wrote her "reply" to me before she saw that *Nation* article, I shall be obliged to her if she will consider the letter as my answer to her, and I shall be interested to see how she propose to meet the case I make therein.



Vernon Lee's Reply to Mr. Wells.

In his letter to the *Labour Leader* my former friend, Mr. H. G. Wells, takes me to task for not having studied his apology for Tsarism before venturing to laugh at his astonnding use (in the *Daily Chronicle* of August 7) of that "Sword of God" tag which all belligerents equally are now using, and always have used ever since men have had aggressive instincts and conscientious scruples. He is quite right. I had not then read any of Mr. Well's manifestoes except that first one, for the excellent reason that my answer (which he complains of) was written the very day on which, to my stupefaction, I read in the *Daily Chronicle* his "Every sword now drawn against Germany is a sword drawn for peace." That this answer did not appear in the "Labour Leader" until I had become quite familiar with Wells's additional arguments is due to this article of mine losing considerable time in the process of refusal by the *Daily Chronicle*, which had printed the article which it answered, and also by two other recently Liberal and anti-war papers—a refusal which sheds some light upon the natural selection by which unanimous public opinion is gradually evolved to its present highly-organised perfection.

As regards the comparative demerits of Prussian and Russian militarism (though, perhaps, considering how the Russian Government encouraged Tolstoi, Mr. Wells might call it anti-militarism or anti-anti-militarism!) I would point out a few differences.

Russia and Germany Compared.

First, that the German Empire, and even the Kingdom of Prussia, has freedom of the press, as is proved, I will not say by the Socialist *Vorwärts* and the Bavarian comic *Simplicisimus* (which has caricatured the Kaiser as no English paper would dare to caricature King George), but by the constant anti-militarism and anti-absolutist campaign of the *Berliner Tageblatt*, one of the greatest papers of Prussia and Germany.

Secondly, that although Jews are sneered at and excluded from smart society only a little less than in democratic France, they form in Germany one of the most influential factors in public life, instead of being liable to every civic disability, penned up in Ghetto-towns, and, even when not massacred with police assistance in the last two or three years, submitted to the incredible procedure of the recent Kieff trial for habitual ritual murder.

Thirdly, that instead of having been hanged and flogged to death, German Socialists constitute nearly the whole town council of Berlin, a large party in the Parliament of the Empire, and possess many papers, and have joined unanimously with every other German party in what they consider a defensive war against Russia and Russia's abettors, the story of Liebknecht's and R. Luxembourg's execution having turned out one of the war's innumerable inventions.

Fourthly, as my habitual acquaintance with German newspapers and with sundry leading German Radicals and Socialists entitles me to state, there has been every hope that better relations with England (and "through England," as the Editor of the *Berliner Tageblatt* told me 18 months ago, "with France") would diminish the need for, and *prestige* of, Prussian militarism, and then bring about a reform in the suffrage and the police *regime* of the Kingdom of Prussia, bringing that kingdom on to the level of democratic self-government already enjoyed by the other states of the German Empire, which are not, as Mr. Wells seems to think, slaves of Prussia, but his autonomous confederates.

Fifthly, that these hopes of the inner evolution of Germany will in all probability be utterly broken or indefinitely put off by the present war which, so far from delivering Germany from Prussian militarism, is uniting all her parties, states and provinces in obedience to that Prussian militarism which Germany has learned to regard as her weapon of self-defence; and a weapon which seems, also by no means as "sham-efficient" as Mr. Wells told us a month ago, when he prophesied that Berlin was in greater danger than Paris.

It is marvellous, by the way, how our war myth unites the controversial advantages of belief in Germany's ineptitude and inefficiency with belief in Germany as a menace to the life and liberty of all the four or five nations at present united against her. But then our grandfathers alternately denounced the French as a danger to the world, and as a set of miserable underfed "Frogs."

British Counterparts of Krupp.

And finally—about Krupp, whom Mr. Wells is flourishing about in all his manifestoes. It is, as I already hinted, rather a waste of words to talk about Krupp (with or without the Tiberian Capri scandals which Mr. Wells judiciously rakes up against a vast joint-stock company!)—it is a waste of words to talk of Krupp to Socialists who have learned from Mr. Snowden's and Mr. Newbold's speeches and pamphlet's (let alone, perhaps, from Perris's *War Traders*, and Delaisi's *Patriotisme des Plagues Blindees*), that the Krupp armament and scare-mongering not only has its exact counterparts in every country, but that such armament trusts, catering equally for *Triple Entente* and *Triple Alliance*, are alas, alas, the only really international organisation which has stood the disintegrating shock of this war.

To return to Russia. In a memorable subsequent article, Mr. Wells has begged us not to be too sceptical about the Russian Government's promises, although for the last ten years at least it has not kept *one*, either to its own subjects and Parliament, or to Finland, Poland, and Persia. And he has added (rather contradictorily), that we must rely upon England's and France's joint efforts in making it remember them. About France with its (except the Socialist) absolutely corrupt press and parliamentarism (c f., Delaisi's "La Dèmocratie et les Financiers," Editioride *la Guerre Sociale*, 1912), much is obvious, that ever since she took to financing Russia—as price of the alliance which has now brought German troops within forty miles of Paris!—and in proportion as the growing Russian loan obliged the creditor to keep the debtor going. France, Republican, democratic France, has quietly looked on at the strangling of Finland, the dissolving and imprisoning of the two first Dumas, the hanging and flogging to death of the Socialists, and the officially permitted

butchering of the Russian co-religionists of the craven (or patriotic) Finish-Jewish bankers.

So much for France's civilising influence on her ally. Will England, who has already connived at Russia's annexation of Northern Persia against express agreement, be more successful in civilising the Russian Government? She need well make the Tsar a pattern democratic monarch, for into his hands this war has delivered us and the whole of Europe, until the moment when our diplomatists will have to plan a new coalition, a new "Balance of Powers" against this new bugbear; or until the Tsar perchance remembers his old family friendship with the God-fearing house of Prussia, and between them the two old cronies, at present parted, may grasp each other's "mailed fists," and establish a corner in militaristic despotism."

Mr. Wells's Appeal to America.

I should like to say one thing more. Among the many articles and letters which Mr. Wells has written, I have been struck by one quite especially. It is (*Daily Chronicle*, August 24) called "An Appeal to the People of America," and what it asks is that the United States should display their neutrality not only (which they are bound to do under penalty of enormous damages such as Great Britain paid in the famous *Alabama* case) by abstaining from furnishing *contraband of war* to either belligerent, but also (and this alone was worth asking for) display their neutrality, or rather flagrantly infringe it, for Britain's convenience, and the sake of peace and civilisation, by refusing to furnish Germany with food on their neutral ships.

Now, when he passes from arguments to *appeals* of this kind, it becomes necessary to protest against Mr. Wells's use of the pronoun *we*, and his assumption that he and England happen to be the same thing. In such crises as these, every nation has always had its reclaiming majority and its protesting minority, and England—historical England, not the England of which Mr. Wells says *we*—has been especially rich in such minorities, gaining and maintaining those rights and ideals on which the majority afterwards found its self-righteous swagger. There has always been an English patriotism showing itself in shame at national crime or folly: there was an England which protested against making war against the Colonies and against the French Revolution; protested against Nelson quelling the Neapolitan Republic and hanging its patriots to please Lady Hamilton and her Caroline; an England which protested against the treaty which sent Napoleon (as *we* want to send Kaiser Wilhelm!) to rot in ignominy at St. Helena, and which handed France and Naples to the Bourbons, Venetia and Lombardy to the Austrians; the England of Shelley and Byron There was an England which protested with John Bright against the Crimean War, which denied Russia's legitimate southern expansion, and cooped her up to stagnate and be tyrannised; there has been, when the Liberals were in opposition, instead alas, of in office, an England which protested against the South African War, and was hooliganed as a traitor.

And to that England one had done Mr. Wells the honour to believe he belonged. *That* is the only belief of which, as he says, he has knocked the bottom out—by his array of catastrophic and mythopoeic pronouncement and self-justificatory arguments.

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Mr. Ramsay MacDonald's Reply to Mr. Wells.

To the Editor of the "Labour Leader."

Sir,—Mr. Well's aggressively ejaculated questions in his letter in your last issue have been answered by me already, and it is a pity that before he began to attack he did not take the trouble to understand what he was assailing.

The difference between Mr. Wells and myself is this: that when he finds himself in a war that might have been avoided, that is a danger to European democracy, and that even in some respects is a blow to European civilisation, he is willing to believe any false excuse given by the authors of the war, and to whitewash any Power that may be our ally in the conflict. Whereas I am not. He desires to suppress the truth because it is inconvenient—another new *role* for Mr. Wells, by the bye—I believe that the truth is not only not inconvenient, but necessary.

Mr. Wells imagines that he is patriotic because he is spreading error broadcast, but that is only one of his temporary delusions. The very valuable services which he is rendering to the military caste in this country and to the tyrannical authorities of Russia are winning for him their gratitude at present, and will earn for him their laughter later on. The time for critical opposition is not passed. Should it pass, as I have repeatedly said, even Mr. Wells in his present mood will have no cause to complain of my action.

Mr. Keir Hardie's Reply to Mr. Wells.

At last! Sooner or later it was bound to be said, and, apparently, only a couple of professing Socialists have been able to muster sufficient courage to say it. Russia is fighting for Democracy! That, at least, is the only meaning which I can read into the letters from Mr. H. G. Wells and Mr. R. C. K. Ensor in last week's "Labour Leader." It is a wonderful discovery. Nothing in all the bloodstained records of the countries now at war will ever outdo its shameless mendacity.

Attitude of German Reformers.

Mr. Ensor tells us that "Russian Reformers" know that the "fall of Kaiserism means the purifying of Tsarism." This child-like faith has its counterpart in Germany, where the "Prussian Reformers," including the Socialists, see in the triumph of Tsarism a bondage for themselves greater than anything they have ever had to endure. Junkerdom was being rapidly undermined by the growth of the Socialist Party and there were reasonable hopes that the next General Election would have seen its overthrow. Now, after Germany has been "crushed" and abased," and the Tsar rules over them from Petrograd, instead of the Kaiser from Potsdam, they see all hope vanishing. Surely the fears of the "Liberal Reformers" of Germany are as much entitled to our consideration as are the hopes of those of Russia?

I am writing this away from all books and papers, and therefore am unable to deal with Mr. Ensor's historical statements. (This remark also applies to Mr. Well's article in the *Nation* which I have not yet seen.) If, however, Mr. Ensor's reading of history be correct, then it would only show the ruling class in Russia to be a set of nincompoops who have allowed themselves to be driven hither and thither at the will of their Prussian masters. That is a theory which I cannot accept, not at least, without some very convincing proof. But leaving aside for the moment the question of whether or not Russia in the past has been a catspaw of Germany, let us take her recent attitude towards the Liberal movement within her own shores as an indication of her zeal for reform.

Instances of Russian Outrages.

The Pogroms against the Jews, for example, in which men, women, and children were ruthlessly massacred, and some of the organisers thereof, after having been found guilty of the outrage, publicly decorated by the Tsar himself. Was that due to German influence? Or take Bloody Sunday. A great peaceful procession of Trade Unionists and others were marching, if I remember aright, to present a petition of thanks to the Tsar for the reforms which had been granted, or promised, and when in front of the palace, machine guns opened fire upon them, killing and wounding many hundreds. When the Duma was elected was it not dissolved by force and over a hundred of its Socialist and Labour members banished into exile? Even now are not the dungeons of Russia filled with reformers? Only the other day Mr. Theo. Rothstein was telling us in a letter to the Press of some friends of his, the names of whom were given, who have just been sent to prison or exile (I forget which) for writing in favour of reform! Will Mr. Ensor trace all this murder and oppression to German influence, or is it not rather the real expression of the innate feeling of Russian Tsardom?

I can quite understand the feeling of Russian reformers who make themselves see in the war a means of perhaps weakening the barbaric power of the soulless oligarchy which for generations has been drowing all efforts at reform in blood and tears, but I can also see the fears of our German comrades lest the black shadow of Tsardom should fall upon them just at a time when they were on the point of getting rid of their own ogre of Junkerdom, and the I.L.P. shall certainly, neither by word nor by deed, make itself in any way responsible for that risk. I fear that the Russification of British institutions is a much more probable outcome of our alliance with Russia than is the Anglification of that country's methods of government.

Mr. H. G. Wells wants to know what we are going to do "now." That is like his colossal cheek. It is for him and his fellow war mongers to say what they are going to do "now." They should have thought of that in time. The nation, we say, could have been kept out of the war without loss of honour, dignity, safety, or position. As, however, he and others thought otherwise, it is for them to say what must be done "now."

What the I.L.P. Will Do.

But we, too, have work to do "now." The I. L. P. is the one streak of sanity left to the nation. We are going to keep it so, and to enlarge its borders. We are going to see whether we cannot prevent the German people from being "crushed" and

"debased" by Russia. The day will come when German militarism will be defeated, and we shall then seek for peace on terms consistent with our own self-respect and that of the Democracy of Germany. We shall seek, if we can, to prevent memories of rankling bitterness and desire for revenge being left behind as an outcome of the peace terms. We shall tell our people that the war is the outcome of knavish secret diplomacy and backstairs understandings, and shall demand that these be put down with a strong hand. We shall insist that the State shall pay adequately for the soldiers and sailors who do its fighting, so that their dependants may not be left to the irritating, fussy, degrading semi-private charity which they now resent so bitterly. We shall try to get the Trade Unions made almoners for their own war relief, the State finding the money. We shall insist on work or adequate maintenance being provided for every one, young or old, who is out of work, and that all children shall be properly fed, clad, and cared for. We shall say that there is a risk of militarism becoming supreme over the civil power in Great Britain. We shall try to keep the lamp of freedom and free speech burning. These are some of the things which the I. L. P. will do "now." Mr. Wells and his friends must make up their own minds as to what they must do. That is their own affair. But one thing they must not do. They must not lie about those who differ from them. When Mr. Wells writes that I am "trying to misrepresent the negotiations which preceded the war," he writes an untruth. Mr. Wells is shouting with the multitude, and it is unworthy of the man to speak of either Mr. Ramsay MacDonald or myself as having "whined" in our criticism of the policy of the Foreign Secretary. But, after all, Mr. Wells has a reputation not only in newspaper articles, but also in his books, of taking a mean advantage of those whom he doesn't like.

When Army was last Mobilised.

There is a final note which I feel must be written, though in no carping or unfriendly spirit. It was in the year 1911 that the British Army was last mobilised—and two men were shot dead at Llannelly. Would any railway man have touted for recruits for the Army then? And is not the enemy of the worker the same now as then? The most prominent of the South African exiles has been to Germany and comes back with the declaration that "the only attitude for the British Empire to adopt, I am convinced, is to fight with every available man until the Prussian military despotism is beaten. I am pleased to learn that South Africa is rising to the occasion." Now it was not the "Prussian military despotism" that sent troops to massacre striking miners in Johannesburg, or that sent into exile, where they still are, the writer of that passage and his colleagues. —*Labour Leader.*

"Fighting for Existence."

To the Editor of the "Labour Leader."

Sir,—This country is fighting. It is not necessary to make the sentence any longer, as Mr. Wells does in his letter in your present issue (September 3), by saying: "This country is fighting for existence." The extra words bring no meaning that was not there before. "To fight" *means* "to fight for existence," to stake existence upon combat, and to stand or fall by victory or defeat; and consequently to introduce "for existence" into this sentence, as if the addition flooded the facts with a new and glorious significance, is not only redundancy, but, in this particular case, dishonest.

And the dishonesty lies in the attempt to convert a war whose inevitableness might have been averted, not, perhaps, at the last moment, but if our foreign policy of late years had been different, into a war of pure self-defence; in the attempt to persuade the country that the existence we are now fighting to defend was threatened *before* we took up arms to defend it; whereas only by taking up arms in pursuit and in defence of the policy which led to our taking up arms, have we involved our own country and, as regards our foreign policy, contributed to involving other countries, in this "fighting for existence."

What Mr. Keir Hardie and what Mr. Ramsay MacDonald "imagine they are doing at the present time," and what "the small section of the working class that still reads the *Labour Leader*" and the small section of the middle class who turn to the "Labour Leader" because its other leaders, political and journalistic, have betrayed it, not only imagine, but know that what they are doing at the present time, is fighting for the existence of something which it seems to them even more essential to defend than the neutrality of Belgium. They are fighting for Truth, by whose guidance only can the negotiations which succeed this war secure this country and other countries from the necessity of "fighting for existence" again; for Truth, which the people of this country have not yet delegated, or been given a chance of delegating, or will delegate to any Foreign Minister; and against untruth, whose myriad forces in "this tremendous crisis and opportunity" darken our national life—Yours, etc.,

Irene Cooper Willis.

Blackheath.

Are We Liberating Europe?

A Reply to those who declare this to be a "Holy War."

By J. Ramsay Macdonald, M. P.

Since the war began the Conservative Press has constituted itself the mouthpiece of the Labour Party. It knows all about us, what we are thinking, how we are divided, and what we have done in our private meetings. The usual scribes are inventing their little tales and are supplementing their little incomes by a few extra coppers won in this way. In one newspaper these tales appear as a paragraph in a London letter, in another as a special contribution from "A Labour Correspondent," in a third as an editorial article. Needless to say, most of them are as false as they are offensive. But that is how the show is worked. Public opinion must be kept feverish; electors must be misled, and above all the Labour movement damaged. Otherwise, how could there be wars? How could the working class be kept divided? War is both the seed time and the harvest of the interests of the classes that prey upon the common people.

What the I. L. P. will have to Meet.

Unfortunately for us, the game of reaction is easily played. Every people has a prejudice and an allurement which, when awakened, makes them forget their civilisation and their reason. Whisper Russian aggression to Germany, for instance, and it goes off its head; raise an anti-German cry here, dub peace advocates "Herr" and "Von" and the same thing happens with us. The "return to Nature" is all too simple to make one sure of one's footing on reason. And behind the grievous lapse there is always a respectably good sentiment. I suppose if I were to put the very best face possible upon the present war and our part in it I should say that we are fighting because we want to liberate Europe from the German military bureaucracy. That is what the I. L. P. will have to meet, and in relation to that we shall have to define our attitude.

Personally, I am willing to go to great lengths to do this. I have always held that it was a legitimate purpose of British foreign policy to aid the birth of liberty wherever we could. But in doing that we have to choose our friends and we have to be careful of our own record. The policy of "the Little Englander" is to keep his country clean, to provide it with honourable friends, and to make its influence felt all over the world. This is our first reply to the deluded ones who think this is a war for liberty. Our chief ally, Russia, will not allow us to claim that good credit. The thought of liberty never entered into the minds of those who promoted the Triple *Entente*, it has never inspired the partners to this *Entente*—nay, more—its sacrifice has kept the *Entente* in existence. It is now a more misleading after-thought. Russia in arms with us to free Europe from an autocracy, whether political or military, is a grim joke.

How to Break German Despotism.

Now let me deal with a second point. Those of us who have striven for a good understanding with Germany have done so because we believed that the Russian autocracy could not survive the understanding. That was recognised in Berlin. When the Kaiser was here at the unveiling of Queen Victoria's memorial he was attacked by the Conservatives in Berlin because his friendship with Grear Britain was subversive to them and their methods. The German Social Democrats were steadily gathering force to the same end. German military autocracy was strong, but German democracy was getting stronger. The growing life within German society was cracking the shell which encompassed it. That shell could be cracked from within—our Socialist policy, or from without—the policy of our Foreign Office. For eight weary years British diplomacy has been strengthening the shell by affording it a reason for its existence. Now it comes forward in war pretending to do the breaking. I lay it down as an incontrovertible proposition that the best way to overthrow what despotism there is in Germany is by by Germans from within, and not by British, French, and Russians from without.

I want to go right down to the foundation of things. German military autocracy was bad for Europe—so is British secret diplomacy. But to try and break either by a war is stupid and criminal. Is it really true that in *Anno Domini* 1914 the only way to dethrone the German military caste is for Britain, France, and Russia to fight it? It is not. The end cannot be secured in that way, and, if it could, the price is too dear. I would rather that

militarism had flourished for another ten years than that we should have sent thousands of men along the path of privation, hate, and pain to death, that we should have clouded thousands of happy firesides, that we should have undone our social reform work for a generation, that we should have let loose in Europe all the lusts of battle and all the brutalities of war. Already there have been acts done in this war which make the blood run fast and proud, but such acts are done in every mine accident, every foundering of ship at sea, every sacrifice of a comrade. If I had to choose between German militarism for yet a little while and the battles already fought, the outrages already committed, the women and children already made desolate, I would, with their loved ones and protectors nothing now but shadows seen through tears, I would unhesitatingly choose the former.

The Unequal Sacrifice.

And that is not the full price. For a generation or so Europe will be paying for this war in an arrested civilisation, a weakened population, an increased poverty. We are but replacing one European menace by a greater one: We hope to remove the fiend with blood-splashed foot from Berlin and take in exchange the dreaded rider on the white horse as the monarch of Europe.

The bargain is thoroughly bad, and the people will have to make good the balance. "Ah, but," they say, "we are all rich and poor alike, to share our privations." That is untrue. The rich lose their children like the poor and mourn for them like the poor; the rich subscribe their thousands to the charity funds, and their womenfolk, in comfortable places, make shirts for the wounded and petti-coats for the orphans. But there is no equality in the sacrifice. The poor lose the breadwinners—they lose all. When the father is gone charity alone can fill the mouths and clothe the backs of his little ones, and charity is a bad start for life. The rich do not suffer that. Take your subscription lists. The widow gives her farthing and the rich man his ten thousand pounds. Result: the widow becomes a pauper and the rich man remains rich. There can be no equality of sacrifice under such conditions. The poor are driven into the darkest parts of the Valley of the Shadow bending under the heaviest burdens, and masses of them see the light of happy health no more.

Destroy the military bureaucracies as we should like to see them destroyed, and as we were destroying them, and the poor are blessed; but destroy them as we are now pretending to destroy them and the poor are cursed for generations.

What will be the Result?

There is a third point. What is to be the result of the success of our present methods? We debase one autocracy and exalt another. I have just been told that one of the ablest military men of our country remarked recently to a friend that the war might last for three years—eighteen months of which would find Russia and ourselves fighting Germany and the other eighteen Germany and ourselves fighting Russia. That is an exaggerated and dramatic way of putting an obvious possibility. It is unthinkable that Germany should win. It will be overborne by starvation and financial stress, even if victorious on the field of battle, and the military exigencies of its position have forced it to alienate the sentiments for liberty in the heart of our democracy. Morally and financially, it is weak, and that will settle the battles in the end.

Europe under new Barbarism.

What is then to happen? First of all who is to be victor? Not what is vaguely called "the Allies." For how can Russia and ourselves have a common victory? Before the war broke out we were beginning to see in our "high places" that we had done too much for Russia, and if any one goes back and studies carefully statements made by Sir Edward Grey within the past year it will be seen that he has been changing in his attitude to Russia. Not very long ago I received an explanation of our foreign policy from one qualified to speak, and it was that we were in the Triple *Entente* because we feared Russia, but that a conviction was growing that we had gone too far. Well, when Germany is down who will be up? We can gain little. A colony or two to add to our useless burdens perhaps. France will also have a colony or two, may be, and Alsace-Lorraine. It may or may not claim money payments. This will rankle in the German heart just as the loss of Alsace-Lorraine rankled in the French heart. But with strong democratic movements these things might be adjusted in a scheme of lasting peace. With Russia the case is different. It, too, will want something, but above all its autocracy will be rehabilitated, its military system will be strengthened, it will become the dominating power in Europe. No invader can touch it, as Napoleon found to his cost, and as Germany to-day assumes in its scheme of military tactics. It will press in upon us in Asia. Our defence of India will be a much bigger problem than it is now; China will be threatened; Persia will go. It will rivet upon us the Japanese Alliance, one of the greatest political menaces to our Imperial unity. Above all it will revitalise the Pan Slav movement, and if ever Europe is to be made subject to a new barbarism this movement is to do it. I know that if the Pan Slav movement could be democratised it might be harmless. But the Government of the Slav is just that which will yield last of all to democratic influences.

The Truth of the Matter.

So it comes to this. We are in this conflict in a senseless blind sort of way because years ago we had not the foresight and common sense to protect ourselves from being drawn into it. France is in it to wipe out 1870-71; Russia is in it to dominate the Old World—Asia as well as Europe.

I read and listen to the moral flam-buoyancies of those who tell us that this is the last war, that from it is to date the overthrow of the military castes of Europe, that from the destruction of the Berlin War Office the Peace Temple at the Hague is to come into real being. It is all moonshine. Far more likely is it that this war is the beginning of a new military despotism in Europe, of new alarms, new hatreds and oppositions, new menaces and alliances; the beginning of a dark epoch dangerous, not merely to democracy, but to civilisation itself.

To prevent this we must work with might and main, and our success will be measured by our clearness of sight and courage in explaining to our people now how this war has come, what it really means, and how it is to be ended.—*Labour Leader*.

♣

Thoughts in Adversity.

When we exaggerate our successes we set our minds travelling in one direction with an illusory and excessive momentum; and this, when it is suddenly checked by the news of failure, throws us into an intellectual and emotional bewilderment during which all the intellectual and emotional vices are apt to flourish. Many of us undoubtedly exaggerated the first successes of the Allies. We thought they meant more than they did mean, not merely in their effect upon the campaign, but also in the light they were supposed to throw upon the state of the German Army. We began to believe that the German organization, by a kind of divine justice, was no better than the German national conscience. We did not understand that the German national conscience was bad partly because it had surrendered itself to this matter of organization, because the German sense of duty, always very strong, saw nothing beyond the need to make Germany the most complete fighting machine in the world. It is clear to every one that the national sense of duty, thus perverted, had brought stupidity into the German diplomacy; and therefore we hoped and believed that it had also stupidity into the German military machine and that the divine justice was going to work as precisely and immediately on this earth as if it were Heaven. But the divine justice, as we all ought to know, does not work thus on earth. If it did, the German intelligence would never have permitted the present perversion of the German sense of duty. It is because it does immediately pay to turn a nation into a wonderful fighting machine that the German sense of duty has been able to lower itself to that task, that the German conscience has been able to take for an end what is really, at best, only a means. If a nation, by thinking and acting like a nest of marauding ants, did not attain to the excellence that it aims at, it would not be tempted to aim at it. The temptation is strong because the excellence can be attained to; and it is clear now, as it ought to have been clear from the first, that the Germans have attained to it. That is the fact we have to face, putting away from ourselves our first illusions that perhaps it was no longer a fact.

If we are to have a real faith in the divine justice, we must not expect it to be our ally on earthly battlefields; we must not hope to see the laws of God fighting for us, as the Great Twin-Brethren fought for the Romans at the battle of Lake Regillus. For the essence of faith is that it does not look for payment here on earth. When Cromwell said "Trust in God and keep your powder dry," he meant that God would not keep your powder dry for you, and, further, that he would not damp the powder of an unrighteous enemy. Faith is only pure and sound when the faithful are ready to face failure for it; and it only pays, in this world, when they are enduring just because they do not expect it to pay. The Battle of Marathon would not have the glory that it has—a glory that still shines upon us like a victory of our own—if the Greeks had gone into the field sure that they would win because the future of the world was in their hands. They must have believed that all the odds were against them; and there have been many Marathons in history that were defeats no less glorious. Faith and courage only exist because the future is always uncertain; and the faith and courage that are based upon an illusion of certainty are themselves illusions and turn to panic at the first touch of failure.

The Germans, no doubt, are expecting that this will happen now to us and our Allies. There whole method of war is based upon that expectation. Since they have, nationally, foregone the higher faith, they believe that it does not exist. They will sacrifice everything, including their national conscience, to strike a shattering blow, because they are sure that their first great success will intimidate us all as if we too were nests of ants fighting for our nests and nothing else. But it is here that we must disappoint them; and we can only do so if we make up our minds to the fact that, since they sacrificed everything to this power of striking a shattering blow, they are likely to have the power. They have struck; and the blow has been less rapid and terrible than they hoped or we might have expected; and for that we may be thankful. But now that their power is disclosed to us comes the time when we must exercise that counter-power in which they have no belief. It falls upon our Allies to exercise it more than upon ourselves; and we must therefore have faith in them just as much as in our cause. At first, perhaps, we thought that they could do more than they could do. At first we were tempted to believe that the high French and Belgian spirit must mean immediate success; and for that very reason there is a danger lest we should think that we have been deceived in the spirit when we have only been telling ourselves what we wished to be true. A high spirit and a righteous cause, even if combined with all material efficiency, do not ensure success in war; for they do not ensure that the enemy, however unrighteous his cause, is inferior in spirit or efficiency, or, above all, in numbers. And if we start by believing that they do ensure success, we are likely, when failure comes, to believe that the efficiency, if not the spirit, is wanting. Even if we do not despond about ourselves, we are likely to despond about our Allies; and that despondency is the most dangerous and the basest that we can fall into. But these are warnings that every one of us must give to himself rather than to others. If we have, in the first weeks of the war, indulged ourselves in the lower faith that we must win because we are right, now is the time for us to recover the higher faith that we must disregard defeat because we are right. And we must keep that faith, not because we hope to win by means of it, but because it is the only faith worth having and fighting for.

The French now are fighting for their national existence. We know what manner of nation they are, and we know that they have been preparing for this struggle for years. We may be sure, therefore, that their past preparations and their present war are worthy of them; and our business is to make our own war worthy of us, without pride in ourselves or misgivings about our Allies. We must foster no legend about the superiority of our own troops, for this is a war in which the allied nations are lost in the common cause and in which rivalry would mean treachery to it. On the field of battle there are no longer Englishmen and Frenchmen at all. There is only Europe, with all the best of its past and future, fighting against a heresy that the Germans have inherited from the Tartars of Asia. And they, because they are Europeans, have given to that heresy a new power and glory by enriching it with European intelligence and the European sense of duty. These they have inherited from the higher European labours of the past; and, though they may misuse them, they still possess them. They are figting against Europe, but with the strength of Europe, with some part even of its moral strength. And Europe itself, thus forced into a civil war against its own heretics, has no material superiority over them because they are heretics. The Germans, though they have the diplomacy of Attila, do not make war with Tartar caprice and inconstancy. Their machine, like all machines, is the product of long-exercised and self-denying intelligence, even while it has no more conscience than any other machine. Whatever they do, good or bad, whether they lay down their lives for their country or exact a ransom from neutral capital has a purpose in it; and we can only defeat them with the same steady purpose, and with a machine, inferior to theirs and yet superior, because it has a conscience in it. In so far as our machine is inferior to theirs, that is the material penalty we pay, and the French with us, because neither of us has ever been able to think of a nation as a fighting machine and nothing more. Just as the man who gives all his energy to growing rich does grow richer than the man who has some sense of higher things, so the nation that gives all its energy to material power is more powerful than the nation that has a sense of higher things. And the nation, like the man, may exercise many of the virtues in pursuit of the lower aim. That the Germans have done and are doing. They have learnt devotion, even if they are mistaken in its object. It may be an idol that they worship; but they will sacrifice to it as if it were the true God. And the true God does not now reveal himself in fire from Heaven to the confusion of the priests of Baal. "It is the way of Heaven not to speak; yet it knows how to obtain an answer." That is the truth about the universe as we know it; and it is for us now to make the answer of faith to this silence of a Heaven that faith alone tells us is not indifferent. And that answer now is one of deeds not words, but of deeds made constant by the faith that is behind them. It is for us not to expect failure or success, not to be cast down or puffed up by the winds of fortune, but to remember always that the cause is greater than the fortunes of those who fight for it. We believe, and with reason, that we must win in the end; but our victory would be worth nothing to the world if we had only fought because of that belief. We must fight as if all the odds were against us and there were nothing but the cause to make us fight, if we are to keep our souls worthy of the cause to the end.

The Times (*Literary Supplement.*)

Mr. Churchill and the Issue.

Message to America.

The following is the text of an interview given by the First Lord of the Admiralty to Mr. William G. Shepherd, the representative of the United Press Associations of America:—

On my asking Mr. Churchill about the cause of the war, he handed me the celebrated White Paper of Sir Edward Grey's negotiations, saying: "There is our case, and all we ask of the American people is that they should study it with severe and impartial attention."

I then asked what was the underlying cause apart from the actual steps which had led to the rupture.

He replied, in effect, that the war was started and it was being maintained by the Prussian military aristocracy, which set no limits to its ambition of world-wide predominance. In a word, it is the old struggle of 100 years ago against Napoleon. The grouping of forces is different; the circumstances are different; the occasion is different: the man, above all, is different—happily. But the issue is the same. We are at grips with Prussian militarism. England stan is right in the path of this overgrowing power. Our military force is perhaps small, but it is good and it will grow; our naval and financial resources are considerable, and with these we stand between this mighty army and a dominion which would certainly not be content with European limits.

I asked whether the end of the war would see some abatement of the strength of armaments.

Mr. Churchill replied: That depends on the result. If we succeed, and if, as the result of our victory, Europe is rearranged, as far as possible, with regard to the principle of nationality and in accordance with the wishes of the peoples who dwell in the various disputed areas, we may look forward with hope to a great relaxation and easement. But if Germany wins it will not be the victory of the quiet, sober, commercial elements in Germany, nor of the common people of Germany with all their virtues, but the victory of the blood and iron military school, whose doctrines and principles will then have received a supreme and terrible vindication.

What is at Stake.

I cannot understand (he continued) why Germany has not been contented with her wonderful progress since the Battle of Waterloo. For the last half century she has been the centre of Europe; courted by many, feared by many, treated with deference by all. No country has had such a reign of prosperity and splendour, yet all the time she has been discontented, solicitous of admiration, careless of international law, worshipping force and giving us all to understand that her triumphs in the past and her power in the present were little compared to what she sought in the future. And now the great collision has come, and it is well that the democratic nations of the world—the nations, I mean, where the peoples own the Government and not Government the people—should realise what is at stake. The French, English, and American systems of government by popular election and Parliamentary debate, with the kind of civilisation which flows from such institutions, are brought into direct conflict with the highly efficient Imperialist bureaucracy and military organisation of Prussia. That is the issue. No partisanship is required to make it plain. No sophistry can obscure it.

I asked whether the democracy of the United States, apart from the moral issues involved, had any direct interests in the result of the war.

You are the judges of that (replied the First Lord). You do not require me to tell to you of your interests. If England were to be reduced in this war, or in another which would be sure to follow from it if this war were inconclusive, to the position of a small country like Holland, then, however far across the salt water your country may lie, the burden which we are bearing now would fall on to your shoulders. I do not mean by that Germany would attack you, or that if you were attacked you would need to fear the result so far as the United States was concerned. The Monroe Doctrine, however, carries you very far in South as well as North America; and is it likely that victorious German militarism, which would then have shattered France irretrievably, have conquered Belgium, and have broken for ever the power of England, would allow itself to be permanently cut off from all hopes of that oversea expansion and development with which South America alone can supply it?

A War of Self-Preservation.

Now the impact is on us. Our blood which flows in your veins should lead you to expect that we shall be stubborn enough to bear that impact. But if we go down and are swept in ruin into the past, you are the next in the line. This was is for us a war of honour, of respect for obligations into which we have entered, and of loyalty towards friends in desperate need. But now that it has begun it has become a war of self-preservation The British democracy, its ardent social and philanthropic dreams, is engaged for good or for ill in deadly grapple with the formidable might of Prussian autocratic rule.

It is our system of civilisation and government against theirs. It is our life or theirs. We are conscious of the greatness of the times. We recognise the consequence and proportion of events. We feel that however inadequate we may be, however unexpected the ordeal may be, we are under the eye of history, and the issue being joined, England must go forward to the very end.

While I was speaking to Mr. Churchill, a telegram came in from Belgium announcing the total destruction of the town of Louvain as an act of military execution. Handing it to me, he said: "What further proof is needed of the cause at issue? Tell that to your American fellow countrymen. You know," he added. "I am half American myself."

German Ambassador's Reply.

The German Press Bureau on 30th August, issued a statement by Count Bernstorff, the German Ambassador in New York, replying to Mr. Churchill's interview.

The Ambassador said that the interview was merely another attempt, and he hopd a futile one, to deceive Americans. He charged Mr. Churchill, as the exponent of a big navy "which threatens Germany's existence as a naval Power," with being largely responsible for the present war.

"Mr. Churchill's assumption," continued the statement, "that there is a division between the military aristocracy and the people is wrong. Everybody in Germany has opposed a war, but when Germany was basely attacked by other nations acting on a concerted plan all Germans were united in the defence of their Fatherland."

Alleged German Barbarism.

The Press Bureau has communicated a detailed statement by the Belgain Minister concerning German violations of the customs of civilized warfare. The statement is as follows:—

In spite of solemn assurances of good will and long-standing treaty obligations, Germany has made a sudden, savage, and utterly unwarranted attack on Belgium.

However sorely pressed she may be, Belgium will never fight unfairly and never stoop to infringe the laws and customs of legitimate warfare. She is putting up a brave fight against overwhelming odds; she may be beaten, she may be crushed, but, to quote our noble King's words, "she will never be enslaved."

When German troops invaded our country the Belgian Government issued public statements which were placarded in every town, village, and hamlet warning all civilians to abstain scrupulously from hostile acts against the enemy's troops. Nevertheless the German authorities have issued lately statements containing grave imputations against the attitude of the Belgian civilian population, threatening us at the same time with dire reprisals. These imputations are contrary to the real facts of the case, and as to threats of further vengeance no menace of odious reprisals on the part of the German troops will deter the Belgian Government from protesting before the civilized world against the fearful and atrocious crimes committed wilfully and deliberately by the invading hosts against helpless non combatants, old men, women, and children.

Long is the list of outrages committed by the German troops and appalling the details of atrocities, as vouched for by the Committee of Inquiry recently formed by the Belgian Minister of Justice and presidad over by him. This committee comprises the highest judicial and university authorities of Belgium, such as Chief Justice Van Iseghem, Judge Nys, Professors Cottier, Wodon, &c.

Instances and Particulars.

The following instances and particulars have been established by careful investigations based in each case on the evidence of reliable eye-witnesses:—

German cavalry occupying the village of Linsmeau were attacked by some Belgian infantry and two gendarmes. No one of the civilian population took part in the fighting. Nevertheless, the village was invaded at dusk on August 10 and two farms and six outlying houses were destroyed by gun fire and burnt. All the male inhabitants were then compelled to come forward and hand over whatever arms they possessed. No recently discharged firearms were found. The invaders divided these peasants into three groups, those in one group were bound and eleven of them placed in a ditch where they were afterwards found dead, their skulls fractured by the butts of German rifles.

During the night of August 10 German cavalry entered Velm in great numbers. The inhabitants were asleep. The Germans, without provocation, fired on M. Deglimme-Gevers's house, broke into it, destroyed furniture, looted money, burnt barns, hay and corn stacks, farm implements, six oxen, and the contents of the farmyard. They carried off Mrs. Deglimme, half naked, to a place two miles away. She was then let go, and was fired upon as she fled without being hit. Her husband was carried away in another direction and fired upon. He is dying.

Farmer Jef Dierickx, of Neerhespen, bears witness to the following acts of cruelty committed by German cavalry at Orsmael and Neerhespen on August 10, 11, and 12:—

Nameless Atrocties.

An old man of the latter village had his arm sliced in three longitudinal cuts; he was then hanged head downwards and burned alive. Young girls have been raped and little children outraged at Orsmael, where several inhabitants suffered mutilations too horrible to describe. A Belgian soldier belonging to a battalion of cyclist carabiniers, who had been wounded and made prisoner, was hanged, whilst another, who was tending his comrade, was bound to a telegraph pole on the St. Trond-road and shot.

On Wednesday, August 12, after an engagement at Haelen, Commandant Van Damme, so severely wounded that he was lying prone on his back, was finally murdered by German infantrymen firing their revolvers into his mouth.

In different places, notably at Hollogne-sur-Geer, Barchon, Pontisse, Haelen, and Zelck, German troops have fired on doctors, ambulance bearers, ambulances, and ambulance wagons carrying the Red Cross.

At Boncelles a body of German troops marched into battle carrying a Belgian flag.

On Thursday, August 6, before a fort at Liege, German soldiers continued to fire on a party of Belgian soldiers (who were unarmed, and had been surrounded while digging a trench) after these had hoisted the white flag.

On the same day, at Vottem, near the fort of Loncin, a group of German infantry hoisted the white flag. When Belgian soldiers approached to take them prisoners the Germans suddenly opened fire on them at close range.

On Aug. 19, after a Belgian resistance on the previous day, German troops entered Aerschot without a shot having been fired from the town and without any resistance whatever having been made. The few inhabitants that remained had closed their doors and windows in compliance with the general orders issued by the Belgian Government. Nevertheless, the Germans broke into the houses and told the inhabitants to quit.

In one single street the first six male inhabitants who crossed their thresholds were seized and shot at once under the very eyes of their wives and children.

The German troops then retired for the day, only to return in greater number the next day,

They then compelled the inhabitants to leave their houses and marched them to a place 200 yards from the town. There, without more ado, they shot M. Thielemans, the Burgomaster, his 15-year-old son, the clerk of the local judicial board and 10 prominent citizens. They then set fire to the town and destroyed it.

The following statement was made by Commandant Georges Gilsen, of the 9th Infantry of the Line, now lying in hospital at Antwerp:—

"I was told to cover the retreat of our troops in front of Aerschot. During the action fought there on Wednesday, August 19, between 6 and 8 o'clock in the morning, suddenly I saw on the high road, between the German and Belgian forces, which were fighting at close range, a group of four women, with babies in their arms, and two little girls clinging to their skirts. Our men stopped firing till the woman got through our lines, but the German machine-guns went on firing all the time, and one of the women was wounded in the arm. These women could not have got through the neighbouring German lines and been on the high road unless with the consent of the enemy.

"All the evidence and circumstances seem to point to the fact that those women had been deliberately pushed forward by the Germans to act as a shield for their advance guard, and in the hope that the Belgians would cease firing for fear of killing the women and children."

This statement was made and duly certified in the Antwerp Hospital on August 22 by Commandant Gilson in the presence of the Chevalier Ernest N. Bunswyck, Chief Secretary to the Belgian Minisiter of Justice, and M. de Cartier de Marchienne, Belgian Minister to China.

In publishing the above statements the only comment the Press Bureau can offer is that these atrocities appear to be committed in villages and throughout the countryside with the deliberate intention of terrorizing the people, and so making it unnecessary to leave troops in occupation of small places or to protect lines of communication In large places like Brussels, where the diplomatic representatives of neutral Powers are eye-witnesses, there appear to have been no excesses.

Belgians' Address to the King.

Gratitude to England.

The Belgian Mission to the President of the United States, which arrived in London on August 31st, was received on September, at Buckingham Palace by the King, and afterwards paid visits to Sir Edward Grey at the Foreign Office and to the French and Russian Ambassadors.

M Carton de Wiart (Minister of Justice) told a representative of the *Times* that the Mission would also have felt it its duty, had Parliament not adjourned, to have visited Westminster to thank the Prime Minister, Mr. Bonar Law, Lord Crewe, Lord Lansdowne, and Mr. Redmond for their graceful allusions to Belgium and her people in their speeches and that a report of these speeches will be printed in Flemish and French and distributed among the Belgian troops.

The members of the Mission, in addition to the Minister of Justice, are M. de Saedeleer M. Emile Vandervelde, and M. Paul Hymans They are accompanied by Count Lichtervelde as secretary. Before leaving Antwerp they were received by the King of the Belgians, who said he wished it to be impressed upon the civilized peoples of the world that Belgium would see this fight through to the end with unconquerable spirit.

The Belgian Case.

At Buckingham Palace, where the members of the Mission were introduced to the King by the Belgian Minister, the following address to His Majesty was read to the King :—

Sire,—Belgium, having had to choose between the sacrifice of her honour and the perils of war, did not hesitate. She opposed the brutal aggression committed by a power which was one of the guarantors of her neutrality. In this critical situation it was for our country an inestimable tower of strength to see coming forth the resolute and immediate intervention of great and powerful England.

Commissioned by His Majesty the King of the Belgians with a mission to the President of the United States, we have considered it to be our duty to make a stay in the capital of the British Empire to convey to your Majesty the respectful and ardent expression of gratitude of the Belgian nation. We have never forgotten that England presided at the birth of Belgian independence. She has had confidence in the wisdom and loyalty of our country. We have tried to justify this confidence by remaining strictly true to the *role* which has been assigned to us by international politics.

In 1870 the Government of Queen Victoria of illustrious memory intervened spontaneously between the belligerent Powers to ensure the neutrality and integrity of Belgium. To-day the personal messages addressed by your Majesty to our Sovereign, the solemn and impressive declarations by your Government, the noble speeches of representatives of all parties in your Parliament, the courageous cooperation of the British land and sea forces, have revived the gratitude and fortified still further the will of the Belgian nation to defend her right.

Forced to go to war for the protection of her institutions and her hearths, in this resistance Belgium wanted to bring to bear the care which is imposed on each civilized nation by international Conventions and the human conscience. Our adversary, after invading our territory, has decimated the civil population, massacred women and children, carried into captivity inoffensive peasants, put to death wounded, destroyed undefended towns, burned churches, historical monuments, and the famous library of the University of Louvain. All these facts are established by authenticated documents, which we shall have the honour to submit to the Government of your Majesty.

In spite of all our suffering, Belgium, which has been made the personification of outraged right, is resolute in fulfilling to the utmost her duties towards Europe. Whatever may happen she must defend her existence, her honour, and her liberty.

The King's Reply.

The King made a brief reply, in which in cordial terms, he paid a tribute to the courage and heroism of the King of the Belgians, his Army, and people, and expressed the sympathy of the British nation with the Belgian people. The King is also stated to have said that he was very shocked at the reports of German brutality.

The visit to the Foreign Office took place in the afternoon, when Sir Edward Grey was handed a copy of the minutes of evidence taken by the Belgian Commission of Inquiry into the reports of outrages by German troops. In the evening the members of the Mission explained to a number of representatives of the Press their objects and some of the evidence they intend to make public.

M. de Wiart said that the Mission, composed of Ministers of State belonging to different political parties at home had been sent to the United States to lay a plain statement before President Wilson showing the atrocious way in which the Belgians had been treated by the German Armies. He went on to explain various heads of offence—the violation of neutrality, the bombardment of open towns, the destruction of villages without any military necessity, and the massacre of non-combatants, including women and children. He gave several specific instances, with the names of the victims :—

A woman, aged 45, with her daughter, aged 12, discovered hiding in a drain, were shot.

A man named Willem, aged 23, was bound to a tree and burned alive.

In a village near Diest two men, each 40 years of age, must have been buried alive head downwards.

These were facts, said M de Wiart, which had been duly inquired into by the Commission. As to the sacking of Louvain, he produced a statement, dated August 30th, which had been handed to the Commission by a person of universal repute in Belgium. This person, on August 30th, travelled from Brussels to Louvain. His evidence was that the whole town had been destroyed by fire, with the exception of the town hall and the city station. The cathedral and the theatre had been destroyed and had completely collapsed, as also had the library, rich in its old manuscripts. In general the town presented the aspect of an old ruined city—a modern Pompeli —in which the only people one could see were drunken soldiers carrying bottles of wine and liqueurs, and their officers seated in the streets at tables, drunk like their men. Even on August 30th, according to this witness, the Germans were not content with the destruction they had wrought. They were kindling new fires in the town and feeding them with straw.

M. de Wiart added that he had been given information personally in the hospitals by the wounded that as they lay suffering on the battlefield they received bayonet thrusts from German soldiers. A druggist, as the result of a patriotic refusal to give the enemy information, was carried to the hospital with a number of bayonets and other wounds.

M. Vandervelde said he had received personally the testimony of Belgian soldiers that the German soldiery had frequently adopted the plan of placing women and children in front of their ranks to cover their advance. He had visited Malines to find the Germans still bombarding a deserted town. It had been the policy of the German Army in the North of Belgium to lay the whole countryside waste—he supposed with a view to stopping the food supplies of the refugees.

M. Vandervelde is accompanied by his wife, who is going later to the United States to address audiences of women in New York and other cities.

French Government's Manifesto.

The Retirement from Paris.

The following is the translation of the manifesto issued by President Poincaré and the French Government to the people of France on the 3rd September announcing the decision of the Government to leave Paris.

People of France !

For several weeks relentless battles have engaged our heroic troops and the army of the enemy. The valour of our soldiers has won for them at several points marked advantages, but in the North the pressure of the German forces has compelled us to fall back.

This situation has compelled the President of the Republic and the Government to take a painful decision.

In order to watch over the national welfare it is the duty of the public powers to remove temporarily from the city of Paris.

Under the command of its eminent Chief, the French army full of courage and zeal, will defend the capital and its patriotic population against the invader.

But the war must be carried on at the same time on the rest of its territory.

Without peace or truce, without cessation or faltering, the struggle for the honour of the nation and the reparation of violated right must continue.

None of our armies is impaired. If some of them have sustained too considerable losses the gaps have immediately been filled up from the reserves, and the appeal for recruits assures us of new reserves in men and energy to-morrow.

Endure and fight! Such must be the motto of the allied British, Russian, Belgian, and French armies.

Endure and fight, while at sea the British aid us, cutting the communication of our enemy with the world.

Endure and fight, while the Russians continue to advance to strike the decisive blow at the heart of the German Empire.

It is the duty of the Government of the Republic to direct this stubborn resistance.

Everywhere Frenchmen will rise for their independence: but to ensure the utmost spirit and efficacity to the formidable fight it is indispensable that the Government shall remain free to act.

At the request of the military authorities the Government is therefore temporarily shifting its headquarters to place where it can remain in constant touch with the whole of the country.

It calls upon members of Parliament not to remain away from it in order that they may form with their colleagues the symbol of national unity.

The National Government only leaves Paris after having assured the defence of the city and of the entrenched camp by every means in its power.

It knows that it does not need to recommend to the admirable population of Paris that calm resolution and coolness which it is showing every day, and which is equal to its highest duties.

People of France, let us be worthy of these tragic circumstances; we shall gain the final victory; we shall gain it by unflagging will, endurance, and tenacity.

A nation which does not wish to perish, and which in order to live does not flinch either from suffering or sacrifice, is sure of victory.

This manifesto is signed by President Poincaré and all the Ministers.

German Change of Front.

The London correspondent of the *Statesman* writes:—On the night of September 7th, the official Press Bureau sent out the following terse intimation:—"General Joffre's plans are being steadily carried out. The allied forces, acting on the offensive, have been successful in checking and forcing back in a north-easterly direction, the German forces opposed to them." This was supplemented by a French War Office announcement in the following terms: "A general action is being fought on a line passing through Nanteuil Le Haudouin, Meaux, Sezanne and Vitry Le Francais, and extending to Verdun, a front of about 150 miles. Thanks to the vigorous action of our troops, powerfully supported by the British Army, the German forces which had advanced on September 5th and September 6th as as far as the Coullommiers and La Ferte Gaucher district, were compelled to fall back." As the cables have already informed you, there lay behind these curt *communiqués* a vital change in the conditions of the conflict. It indicated a complete change of front on the part of the German force, a change almost amounting to a right-angle turn. The beginning of the alteration of the German plans was noticeable at Creil. Hidden by a thick screen of troops from the army in the field, but observed by aerial squadrons, the enemy was seen to be on the move. Ground won at Senlis was given up, and the German troops, which at that point were nearer Paris than any other men of the Kaiser's army, were marched to the rear. Only the commandants in the field can say whether the movement was expected; but it is the fact that immediately the enemy began their strategic movement, British and French dispositions were changed. This alteration in the German plans was wholly unexpected, for, as matters stood, the way was apparently open for the march on Paris. The north-west of France was abandoned as far south as Abbeville, and Amiens was but lightly held by a mixed army corps of French and Algerian troops with their head-quarters at Aumale. Always obsessed with the idea that the Germans must come from the east, the almost fatal error of this was that the French had girdled Paris with almost impregnable forts on that side, from those of Ecouen and Montmorency by the far-flung forts of Chelles and Champigny to those of Susy and Villeneuve, the outer lines of a triple cordon. But on the west side, between Pontoise and Versailles, the defences of Paris were weak. This then, was the enemy's chance. It was for this that they had fought their way westwards and southwards through an incessant battlefield, from Mons and Charleroi to St. Quentin and Amiens, and down to Creil and Compiègne, flinging away human life as though it were but rubbish for the death-pits. The prize seemed to be within their grasp. All the north-west corner of France was denuded of the allied troops. The forts were unguarded. Havre, which has been the scene of military tumult, was silent and deserted, our base having moved elsewhere.

Paris awaited its fate, sick with fear and despair in the first moment of that inevitable panic which took possession of its citizens. It is useless to say that it was not panic-stricken. The mothers and fathers of little children cannot afford to brave the approaching hurtling shells. Then quite suddenly there came a new and extraordinary activity of the French and English armies. Regiments were being rushed up to the centre of the allied forces towards Creil, Montdidier and Noyon. That was before last Tuesday, when the English troops were fighting hard at Creil. This great movement was directed from the west, the south and the east, and continued for several days.

"I saw regiment after regiment entraining," writes Mr. Philip Gibbs in the *Daily Chronicle*, in a despatch dated from St. Pierre Du Vouvrey. "Men from the southern provinces speaking the patois of the south, men from the eastern departments whom I had seen a month before at the beginning of the war at Chalons and Epernay and Nancy, and men from the south-west and centre of France in the garrisons along the line, they were all in splendid spirits, utterly undaunted by the rapidity of the German advance.

"Fear nothing my little one," said a dirty unshaven gentleman with the laughing eyes of D'Artagnan, "we shall bite their heads off. These brutal of Bosches are going to put themselves in a veritable deathtrap. We shall have them at last."

The railway carriages were garlanded with flowers of the fields. The men wore posies in their kepis. In white chalk they had scrawled legends upon the cattle trucks in which they travelled. "A mort Guillaume," "Vive la gloire," "Les Francais de se redut jamais," Many of them had fought at Longwy and along the heights of the Vosges. The youngest of them had bristling beards. Their blue coats with the turned back flaps were war-worn and flaked with the dust of long marches. But they had not forgotten how to laugh and the gallantry of their spirits was a joy to see. They are very proud, those French soldiers of fighting side by side with their old foes the English, now after long centuries of strife, from Edward the Black Prince to Wellington, their brothers in arms upon the battle-field. All our English reserves had been rushed up to the front from Havre and Rouen. There was only one deduction to be drawn from this great swift movement. The French and English lines had been supported by every available battalion to save Paris from its menaces of destruction and to meet the weight of the enemy's metal. By a force strong enough to resist its mighty mass. It is still possible that the Germans might be smashed on their left wing, hurled back to the west between Paris and the sea and cut off from their line of communications. It was undoubtedly this impending peril which scared the enemy's headquarters staff and upset all its calculations. They had not anticipated the rapidity of the supporting movement of the allied armies and at the very gates of Paris they saw themselves baulked of their prize, the greatest prize of the war, by the necessity of changing front. Instead of proceeding to the west of Paris they swung round steadily to the south-east in order to keep their armies away from the enveloping movement of the French and English and drive their famous wedge-like formation southwards for the purpose of dividing the allied forces of the west from the French army of the east. Their right army struck down to the south-east of Paris though Chateau Thierry to Ferte la Jouorre and beyond. Their centre army marched from Troye in the Department of the Aube, and their army of the left forced the French to evacuate Rheims and fall back in a south-westerly direction.

Mr. W. T. Massey supplements these details in a long telegram to the *Daily Telegraph* from Puntoise. "Eight days ago," he says, "when I was in Ameins, just as it was being evacuated by the allied troops, it was proved conclusively that our fighting line must be more strongly supported or all hopes of preventing a rush to the fortifications of Paris would have to be abandoned. The overwhelming mass behind the arrow head of the German right would have broken through but for the steadiness of the British ranks and the skilful handling of the whole force by Sir John French. The large addition to the Allies fighting strength accounted for a revision of the German scheme of attack. That is the opinion of military men, and at the very moment when there was a possibility of a vigorous and sustained attempt to pierce the Paris fortifications on the north, and the comparatively lightly held lines on the west, the enemy swung round to the east, fearful lest a repulse on the north might jeopardise the safety of the troops thrown forward on his right. There was another reason and this one is stronger than the fear for his flank. If by throwing all his weight on a portion of the allies he could break the line, turn, meet one army at a time and crush the detached force, the enemy would immediately discount the value of the reinforcements received by the allies.

Scenes in Liege.

Professor Hamelius's Experiences.

PROFESSOR PAUL HAMELIUS, Professor of English Literature at the University of Liege, left that place and has arrived in London in mail week. In conversation with a representative of the "Morning Post" he gave an account of his experiences in Liège and of his journey home.

Professor Hamelius said that he left Liège on foot and walked to the railway station at Ans, just above the town, where he got on board a train composed simply of one carriage and an engine, He and several others, including a young Red Cross doctor, travelled some distance towards Brussels by this; but after a time the engine-driver refused to go farther, for fear of German patrols which were about the country. The passengers therefore got out and walked along the line for some distance and then get aboard another train. Once at Brussels their difficulties were at an end. The Professor slept the night there, proceeded to Ostend on the 19th August and crossed to Folkestone on board the Belgian steamship "Princess Clementine" the same afternoon. The passengers included a large number of cultured Russian people who were hurriedly leaving Belgium.

ENTHUSIASM AND EXCITEMENT.

On the first news of the outbreak of war everybody, said Professor Hamelius, responded enthusiastically to the call to arms. The people assisted the Government in every possible way in preparing for the German invasion and submitted to the commandeering of motor-cars, food, horses, etc., with the greatest goodwill. They were one and all filled with the determination to defend the country. The people in Liège were extremely patriotic, and there was not the slightest sign of flinching. There was naturally a tremendous amount of excitement, and they were all extremely nervous. They could hear firing going on at intervals throughout the surrounding country, but the bulk of the people were entirely ignorant of what really was taking place. There were indications that the Belgian troops were steadily contesting the German advance and falling back very slowly, fighting the whole time. The nervousness of the people showed itself in various ways. Women would be busily packing up bundles of their possessions and running ont of their houses with them. When asked where they were going they replied, "To my mother's, or some such answer. There was no rhyme or reason in their conduct. They were simply filled with a dread of impending trouble and felt that they must do something to avoid it. The better educated people, the Professor thought, were the more nervous. The ignorant people were liable to sudden panic, but on the whole took matters somewhat stolidly and were free from the terrors of the imagination. As an instance of this the Professor quoted the remark made by his housekeeper. There was heavy firing going on one night from Belgian fort close by his house, which aroused the whole household. His housekeeper opened the door leading into the garden and said to him, "Sir, they fire so loud that they keep me awake."

TUNNELS DESTROYED.

As the Belgians retired they destroyed the railway tunnels. Their manner of doing so was to pull up the rails for some distance inside the tunnel and then run an engine in, the driver jumping off the locomotive just before it entered. The engine became derailed at the point where the rails had been torn up and so effectively blocked the road. More engines were run in until the tunnel was choked with iron and debris which it would take some considerable time for the Germans to clear out.

The German troops advanced apparently from Vise along the Dutch frontier, thus heaving their right flank protected and a practically clear country to traverse. After some three or four days of this tension in Liege, rumours began to get about that the Germans were approaching and about evening on the 20th August the Belgian soldiers retired to the forts and the Germans took possession of the town. They appeared to enter the place by arrangement, for the civil authorities just previous to the entry of the German troops called together the Civil Guard and ordered them to lay down their arms. Everyone else who had arms was ordered to give them up, and there was, therefore, no resistance of any kind made when the German troops came in. Apparently also the Belgians left most of the bridges in tact in the town, for the Professor knew of only one being destroyed and that was repaired shortly afterwards by the Germans.

The troops on arrival seemed vere hungry and much fatigued; but they found ample food supplies in Liège, for they took over all the provision that had been commandeered previously by the Belgian authorities. It appeared that the authorities some little time before the German troop entered gave the people permission to carry off what they wanted in the way of food and cattle, and people could be leading cows away. Large numbers of cattle were slaughtered and great joints of fresh meat handed out to whoever cared to carry them away.

RESISTANCE NOT EXPECTED.

The German troops, said the Professor, seemed most anxious to conciliate the Belgian people and to create as good an impression as possible. They were evidently surprised by the resistance which they had met with and had clearly not expected it. They complained bitterly of the attacks made on troops by civilians and threatened severe reprisals against any who took part in the fighting. They detained seventeen of the influential people of Liege as hostages and threatened that for every German soldier shot by the civilians one of the hostages should be shot. They adopted these stringent measures in order to secure complete immunity from such irregular attacks. In conversation with a German officer Professor Hamelius gathered that two women had been shot dead for attacking German troops. The Professor explained to the officer that the people were entirely ignorant of the usages of warfere and that it was owing to this ignorance that these things had occurred. "The people," said the Professor, "know no more about the laws of warfare than savages." "Then," replied the officer, "they must be treated like savages." The officer proceeded to state that when a shot was fired from a house it was immediately surrounded and an inquiry was made as to who had fired. If no one admitted having done it, the whole of the inmates were shot.

This same officer told the Professor about the demoralising effect of shrapnel fire. He admitted that, though the German Army was brave and every officer and man trained not to quail before bullets, yet all the while he was urging his men forward to the attack, he himself was filled with a desire to run away, so terrifying was the effect of shrapnel upon him. The officer said it was nerve-racking and absolutely unbearable. Professor Hamelius saw also several Belgian soldiers who had been subjected to a similar experience, who were partically imbeciles for the time being. Their nerves were entirely shattered. One man had eaten nothing for four days and could not eat, although Professor Hamelius gave him bread and butter. Another man could do nothing but stand upright with dropped jaws, mumbling to himself in an unintelligible jargon.

POLICE GERMAN OFFICERS.

The Professor's experience of the German offieers was by no means an unpleasant one. He found them very polite, anxious to cause as little inconvenience as possible, and the hostages which they had detained on entering the town were gradually released as they became more and more assured of the good conduct of the people. There were even some attempts at fraternising on the part of the German soldiery, for they started petting the Belgian children and referring to their own children at home. Professor Hamelius thought that there must have been some arrangement between the Belgian authorities and the Germans by which in return for the peaceful surrender of the place the Germans promised not to bombard the town. Twice was a bombardment begun, and considerable damage done to property, and a few people were wounded, but each time it was stopped after a short interval. The inhabitants took fright and retired to their cellars now and again, but on the whole there were no grounds for so doing. There was no lack of food in Liege even after the arrival of the German troops. In fact in the case of some articles of food prices were lower than those which had been fixed by the Belgian authorities.

SLIGHT REGARD FOR RUSSIA.

Professor Hamelius thought that very little reliance could be placed on estimates of numbers, because the Germans were constantly moving from place to place and a party of troops would be quartered in one large building one part of the day and be occupying another a little later, so that it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to arrive at a correct estimate. A German officer, in the course of conversation told Professor Hamelius that the troops had not been provided with a sufficient numbers of tools for dealing with barbed wire entanglements, of which there was much about: indeed, they had not expected to meet with it. This officer said, too, that the soldiers had been trained for fighting in the open and were unaccustomed to the kind of fighting they had experienced during their advance, namely, from behind hedges and round corners. Professor Hamelius sought the German officer's opinion about Russia, and his reply was they (the Germans) had not much regard for Russia. It was a colossus that could not move itself.

German Siege Guns.

How Liege Forts Fell.

Mr. Albert J. Leroy, of London, who was probably the only Englishman in Liège during the siege, reached Rotterdam during the mail week.

He is a steward on the Red Star line and went to Chinee, near Liège for a holiday. He went into Liège and was asked by the mayor to help in digging entrenchments for the defence of the town. This he did willingly, and worked from four in the afternoon until midnight. After that he joined the Belgian Red Cross.

His opinion (says the *Daily Telegraph's*, Rotterdam correspondent) is that the Belgians did everything they could for the defence of Liège, but there was a deficiency in infantry that prevented them from making an effective resistance.

The bombardment of the town itself lasted only about seven hours, during which the University was reduced to ruins, the Germans having apparently mistaken the University for the Government House. He saw one shell fall in the town. It blew a house to pieces. Three forts gave in within a week of the first shots being fired. Three forts still held out, and the Germans were compelled to bring great guns through the town. To do this they laid down a military railway upon which the guns were moved, running on flanged wheels about 7 ft. high.

"As a sailor I have been all round the world and have never seen such large guns before. I was told by wounded officers brought to the Red Cross Hospital that these guns could not be used by the ordinary German artillery men. They were handled by specialists from Krupps'. To silence the forts with these guns took only two hours. For one of the forts only four shots were required."

Red Cross Fired On.

"I have seen the wounded taken from one of these forts," he said. "Their conditions was dreadful. They were blackened by explosion, and so burned and injured that they died the same night. What I wish you specially to state is that the Germans fired upon the Red Cross. I saw Red Cross wounded and dead. The Germans took their wounded from the Belgian Red Cross on the plea that they were not being well treated, although the chief medical officer had taken German officers to his own house for treatment. The last forts were silenced about fourteen or fifteen days after the Germans first came.

"I was arrested as an English spy and imprisoned for six days in a room at the railway station. By the soldiers I was treated very badly. They kicked me if I dared to move after I had been told to lie down on the straw and sleep. They hit me with the butts of their rifles, and all I had to eat was bread and soup. Finally I was released, and went to Liège, out of which I escaped by securing in a false name a pass to go to Maastricht to buy provisions. The journey to Holland took me six hours on foot."

Patriotic Unemployed.

Mr. Leroy says that the managers of the Belgian powder factory and the firm which constructed the defences of Antwerp refused, even under the threat of being shot, to work the powder factory or give up the plans of Antwerp. They were spared. Belgian unemployed refused tempting wages to work in the powder factory or dig trenches. Every night as he lay a prisoner in the railway station ten or twelve trains, each with fifty wagons, passed through carrying German wounded and prisoners.

He confirms the report that the Germans placed citizens before the guns to prevent them being fired upon by Belgians, whose aeroplane flew over the town and dropped leaflets encouraging the people in the fort to hope Liège would soon be retaken by the Allied forces. Only German money is used and German spoken in Liège.

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Thrilling Story of the Gordons.

Pte. A. Black of G. Platoon, 1st Gordon Highlanders, formerly railway signalman at Grantown, a small town on Speyside, Scotland, has made the following report to Mr. Farmer, the British Vice-Consul at Boulogne :—

"The Gordons were in action all day on Sunday, August 22nd, at Mons. On Monday we retired to a new position, marching all day. On Tuesday we were in action again and suffered considerably through the enfilading fire of German machine-guns mounted on motor-cars which caught us in the trenches. At eleven o'clock that night the word was passed along to retire. We rose quietly and slipped away, warning other trenches as we went. Before starting we were told that we had a long march and were bidden to get rid of all the weight we could. Most of us left our packs in the trenches. About one or two o'clock in the morning as we were marching down a narrow road taking the sides in order to go as quietly as possible, we were fired on from a field on the left. The word passed that it was a French picket. We thought we were retiring on the French lines. Our Colonel (Col. W. E. Gordon, v. c.) ordered us to line the barbed wire fence in the field on the right hand of the road and went alone into the field on the left calling out 'Les Anglais, Les Anglais.' We heard them answer him and it was evident that he was trying to make them understand, still thinking they were French. While we were waiting behind the fence the Germans were getting round us on the far side. The Colonel then came back across the road and into our field and stood in front of us. We were quite helpless. We stood there surrounded. For a few minutes we were talking quietly in the dark asking each other what was going to happen. I heard one word "Highlanders," and then they began to shoot. I dropped at once for shelter. Darky Wilson, who had been with me all through in the trenches, said 'now we're in for it,' and fell on top of me shot dead. Some tried to move off to the left, but there was no way to escape. The Germans were within three yards of us and shot straight at every man who was standing. Too frightened to move, I stayed there till light came and then crawled out and looked this way and that. It was like pictures you see with groups of dead men everywhere. I could see the Colonel lying apart from the other men. A number of other Highlanders were making off in the distance. I ran after them and fell in with two others and together we came through to Boulogne walking the whole way."

A DUEL IN THE AIR.

A Dutchman who has returned from Aix la Chapelle has given to an *Express* correspondent at Rotterdam the following account of an exciting three-cornered air duel fought by British, French and German aeroplanes, which ended in the flight of the German biplane as told to him by the German Flying Officer. "After the battle of Mons," the officer said, "I was instructed to do some important reconnoitring in the northern district of France, especially near Lille and Maubeuge. I left Belgium in my Taube biplane with a mechanic. While I was flying into France I suddenly heard the noise of an aeroplane which I soon recognised as a British military Bristol biplane which had come to fight us. Our first tactics were to prevent the Bristol climbing higher than us but the British machine was cleverly handled and soon was 150 yards over us. Several attempts were made by us to fly higher, but the British aeroplane checked them all. It was evident that each of us feared that the other would drop bombs on him. Meanwhile we had turned northward, hoping to reach German camp before the Englishman damaged us or forced us to land. The Bristol was coming closer and closer and we felt like a bird on which a vulture was going to pounce. I said to my mechanic 'I think our last hour has come.' He answered with a laugh 'rather our last half hour.' I am sure that if the Englishman had any bombs aboard I would not be here to tell the tale but fortunately he had none. He could not have missed us and owing to his clever steering he was about fifty yards over us. These were terrible minutes. We fired our automatic revolvers at the enemy and he responded vigorously. Our machine was hit several times but not in vital parts. The wings show many revolver bullet holes. We were nearing the Belgian boundary when I saw a small Bleriot monoplane come to the aid of the Bristol. The French aircraft reached 1,000 feet in no time and then began flying in circles around us always drawing nearer. The three machines engaged in an unprecedented duel, firing revolvers continually. Our ammunition was nearly exhausted when we had reached a German camp where our terrible situation was speedily realised and our soldier were firing on the two enemy flying machines in order to cover our retreat and descent. We were saved but needless to say I did no reconnoitring work that day.

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The "Emden's" Exploits.

TONNAGE OF THE VESSELS SUNK.

The *Tymeric* is a steel screw steamer of 5,314 tons gross burden. She was built in 1901 by Messrs. Russel & Co., of Port Glasgow. The owners were the S. S. Tymeric Co., Ld. (A. Weir & Co.).

The *King Lud* is a King Line steel screw steamer of 3,650 tons gross burden. She was built in 1906 by Messrs, Thompson & Sons of Sunderland for the King Line, Ltd. (Messrs. Philips, Philips & Co., Ltd., Managers.)

The *Riberia (? Ribera)* is a steel screw steamer of 3,500 tons gross burden. She was built in 1904 by Messrs. Thompson & Sons of Sunderland for the Bolton Steam Shipping Co., Ltd.

The *Foyle* is a steel screw steamer of 4,147 tons gross burden. It also was built in 1902 by Messrs. Thompson for the Mercantile Steamship Company, Ltd.

The *Gryfevale*, which is the latest *Emden* comedy has played the part of the *Kabinga* in the seizure of the Hooghly steamers, is a steamer of 4,424 tons, built in 1906 by the Grangemouth and Greenock Dockyard Company for the Greyfevale Steamship Company, Ltd.

The *Buresk* is not classified either in Lloyd's Register or Clowes's Naval Pocket Book.

The following is a complete list of the *Emden's* ten victims up to date :—

	Tonnage destroyed.
Diplomat	7,615
Lovat	6,000
Clan Matheson	4,779
Foyle	4,147
Trabboch	4,014
King Lud	3,650
Killin	3,544
Ribera	3.500
Indus	3,393
Tymeric	3.314
Total ...	43,956

With the *Buresk* the German Navy has now succeeded in detaining or capturing 91 British ships. Of these the *Emden* is responsible for eleven (including the *Buresk*). She has to her credit nearly one-fifth of the total tonnage accounted for. She still, however, has considerable lee-way to make up before she brings the total British tonnage captured to the level at which the captured German tonnage now stands, namely 1,140,000 tons gross.

"Komagata's" Return.

A TRAGIC SEQUEL.

The following official statement has been issued:—

The passengers on the "Komagata Maru," who were being repatriated by the Government of India, arrived in the Hooghly on Saturday evening, September 26th. The Bengal Government had been asked to arrange for their safe transport at Government expense to the Punjab; and so a special train was arranged to meet the steamer at Budge Budge on the morning of Tuesday, the 29th. A number of Punjab officers and the Magistrate of the 24-Parganas with others, had met the steamer; and after some persuasion prevailed upon the men to land. This was effected about 2 P. M.; but they were still unwilling to believe the assurance of the Magistrate that they were to travel direct to the Punjab. The Magistrate had power under Ordinance No. 5 of 1914 to compel them to follow his instruction in this respect, but he scrupulously refrained from exercising his powers until he found that the men refused to enter the train and were determined to march by road to Calcutta. He then produced the Ordinance and explained its terms to the leaders, but in complete disregard of his orders they proceeded on the Calcutta road and he had no sufficient force to prevent them. Troops and police were then requisitioned to stop them, and they were stopped when they had gone three or four miles. Sir William Duke, who had proceeded with the troops, met them there, taxed their leader with breach of the Ordinance, and told them that what they had to say would be considered at Budge Budge whither they must return. On this they went back without further demur, followed by the police, and at a distance by the troops.

The first special train had already gone off with about 60 men who most willingly had already gone on; and Sir William Duke preceded the party to Budge-Budge and procured a second special. He was actually inside the station making final arrangements when the following occurrences took place.

As soon as the party arrived at the station just after dusk Mr. Donald called for the leader with the intention of explaining the position to him. At this moment the men suddenly became very excited, and, without warning, a hot revolver fire was opened on the police and the officers, while others charged them with staves, knives, and even one or two swords which they had with them. The revolver fire was returned by the four out of the posse of sergeants who alone were armed with revolvers. In a few seconds Sergeant-Major Eastwood was brought to the ground and shot in the back; Sir Frederick Halliday was wounded in the foot; Mr. Petrie was shot through both leg and arm; Mr. Humphreys was seriously injured; Mr. Lomax, assistant Traffic Superintendent, Eastern Bengal State Railway, was fatally shot through the body, and several sergeants were badly wounded in the head. The troops were behind, and the affray was partly screened from them by the railway fencing. Also the police and officers were at first mixed up with their assailants. It was only when this front was cleared, although that may not have taken many seconds, that the troops could be ordered to fire. Even when they did so, the rioters did not desist immediately but made two or three further rushes, while a party of them occupied some shops from which they maintained a steady fire and here the majority of their casualties took place.

Sixteen of the rioters were killed as well as two innocent onlookers. In addition to the casualties mentioned above the Punjab police had one killed and six injured.

The Punjabis scattered through the surrounding villages, a certain number surrendering to the police and to picquets. An extensive combined sweeping movement is being made by the military and police to collect the rest and up to an early hour this morning 32 prisoners had been made.

The Government of Bengal deeply deplore the loss of life which has occurred. They were acting in pursuance of the openly declared intention of sending to their homes the passengers who had suffered so much in pocket by the voyages of this ship. They were aware of the existence of a certain amount of strong political discontent amongst some of the passengers; and, in full concurrence with the Punjab Government, considered that their return to their native country should be prompt and direct. Needless to say, no one had the smallest suspicion that any of the party were armed for a desperate and unprovoked attack on British officers.

The War Through German Spectacles.

Wild Exulting Over British "Reverse."

The official wireless messages circulated from Berlin on 29th August and received in London by the Marconi Company contain the following passages:—

"The main body of the German army operating in the west entered the district of Cambrai, after advancing for nine days and gaining continuous victories.

"To the south, in the Vosges, the enemy have been defeated everywhere and are now in full retreat.

"The troops commanded by General von Kluck repulsed the English army at Maubeuge and attacked them again to-day south of Maubeuge, where they succeeded in encircling them.

"The troops commanded by Generals von Bülow and Baron von Hausen completely defeated eight French army corps and the Belgian troops between the Sambre, Namur, and Maas. The engagements lasted several days, and our troops, who have passed Maubeuge, are now pursuing the French and Belgians towards the East."

AN IRON RING ROUND THE ALLIES.

"It is difficult to describe the unbounded exultation of all classes when the news of the British reverse at Maubeuge reached the capital. The resentment against England is so deep that news of the surrender of the British army would be received with greater joy and satisfaction than would be news of the fall of Paris.

"A portion of the British troops are reported to be shut up in Maubeuge.

"The reports from headquarters show how an iron ring is being fastened around the French, English, and Belgian forces, extending from Cambrai to the Vosges."

("TIMES" TELEGRAM.)

New York, August 29.

A wireless message from Berlin to the German Embassy in Washington says that a large number of prisoners, chiefly Turcos and British soldiers, have passed through Aix-la-Chapelle.

THE LAST GERMAN RESERVE CALLED UP.

The official wireless messages from Berlin on 29th August state that, as the men left behind to guard the lines of communication are "urgently required at the front," the Kaiser has ordered the mobilisation of the last reserve, who will be employed to protect the lines of communication and to occupy Belgium.

The Russian Defeat.

GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN "VICTORS."

The German official wireless message received in London on 31st August says:—

"The news of a German victory over the Russian forces has been received with great rejoicing at Konisberg, where it is hoped that the invaders will be speedily cleared from East Prussia. Hamburg citizens have contributed 200,000 marks to the fund for the relief of East Prussian refugees.

"It is reported from Vienna that the battle with the main Russian force has not yet been decided, but some estimte of the extent of General Bankal's victory at Krasnik may be gauged. After the heroic storming of the Russian position, strongly established among the highest of Nieder Zwithnaduza, the Austrian troops were successful in again defeating the Russians already thrown back at Kraenik, together with their reinforcements, consisting altogether of ten divisions and six other corps. The battle is still in full swing, and the Austrian position is favourable."

80,000 Prisoners in East Prussia

(Officially circulated through the German wireless stations, and received by the Marconi Company.)

Berlin, Sept. 1.

The Russian defeat at Ortelsburg is described by the war correspondent of the "Lokalanzeiger." The variable nature of the country and the extended line of operations made the maintenance of an unbroken front impossible. The right wing of the German army was near Soldau and Gilgenburg and the left wing near Allenstein, Wartenburg, and Bischofsburg, the centre being at Hohenstein. The Russians made Wartenburg, and Bischofsberg, the centre and the effect of their heavy artillery fire was to reduce the northern part of the town to ruins. They eventually succeeded in breaking through, but a movement by the German troops on the right through Weidenberg and on the left through Passenheim was successfully carried out. This operation enabled the army completely to encircle the Russians, who where made prisoners.

Later.

The reported victory in the East by the army commanded by General von Hindenburg is of greater importance than was at first supposed, 80,000 prisoners, including two general commanders, having been made. The Russian troops in the north of East Prussia have begun to withdraw.

160 Guns Captured.

Sept. 3.

Major General Hofer, Deputy Chief of the Austrian General Staff, has issued the following communication :—"After a week's heavy fighting in the plains between Zomosc and Tyszowce, the Austrian army under General Auffenberg achieved a complete victory. One hundred and sixty guns have been captured, and the Russians are retreating through the Berg. The forces attacking Lublin are meeting with uninterrupted success. In East Galicia Lemberg is still in our possession, but the situation there is difficult on account of the vastly superior Russian forces."

Berlin Correspondent's Description.

The war correspondent of the "Berliner Tageblatt" describes in triumphant tone the victory over the Russians on the east frontier, in which it is officially claimed that 70,000 prisoners were taken, and all the Russian artillery. He says :—

We arrived in Hohenstein, a friendly town of 30,000 inhabitants. But instead of kindliness, war reigns here in all its terribleness. Everything lies in ruins, nothing remains standing. Here heavy clouds of smoke wreath their way towards the sky ; there the flames dart forth, sending out an unbearable heat. Dead Russians lie in the streets next to dead cattle. The pestilential air can scarcely be borne. For three days the Russians have kept house here ; now they are hunted out. Our heavy artillery, which is working capitally, made their farewell very warm for them. Hidden away in cellars and barricaded, there were still Russians here who traitorously shot dead a few men of the Landwehr ("Land Defence" force). These murderers were shot.

The mixed Landwehr brigade bore itself remarkably well by Hohenstein. They had to withstand the first onset of the Russians, who wanted to break through towards the north-west, but the heavy artillery intervened. The way along which we are riding was that taken by the Landwehr, supported by the adjoining division on the right, and northwards by the Army Corps coming from Allenstein.

After a heavy fight the Russians were hurled backwards and many thousands made prisoners. Guns and mitrailleuses also fell into our hands in numbers. The Russians were pushed back eastwards against the lakes.

At the same time the army corps stationed to the south of the Landwehr struck into the fierce struggle with a strong right wing. Northwards from the Landwehr division other strong sections of our troops rushed on to the attack by way of Allenstein, Wurtemberg, and Bischofsberg ; the left wing, advancing through Tassenheim, was, especially, very strong. Thus the Russians were fallen upon on three, almost on four, sides and driven into the marshes and lakes. At the same time, it must be remembered that the enemy were in greatly superior forces. It was through clever operations that the successes were obtained, and also, of course, through the wonderful bravery of all our troops, who thus achieved an unheard of feat.

On Sunday fighting continued with a Russian army corps which had retired. Near Neidenburg the heaviest fighting raged, and partly in the woods, the Germans maintaining the upper hand.

What our troops can endure was shown by the separate sections of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, almost without exception reserve formations, who passed through Hohenstein in the afternoon. The soldiers bestrode their horses with wonderful vigour ; the marching was fine, the spirit was good, notwithstanding all the wearying work which they had been through.

(Reuter's Correspondent.)

Amsterdam, Sept. 4.

The war correspondent of the "Frankfurter Zeitung," describing the defeat of the Russians in the battle of Hohenstein-Gilgenburg-Ortelsburg, says that by this victory the five or six Russian army corps which had entered the southern parts of Eastern Pruseia have been completely routed.

The Advance on Paris.

The chief feature in the official wireless message circulated from Berlin yesterday is the disclosure, that the Germans are not now pressing the advance on Paris, but that their main forces have turned south against the French and British armies on the Marne.

(Received by the Marconi Company.)

Berlin, Sept, 4.

German troops are closing up the north-eastern side of Paris. English cavalry divisions were again defeated yesterday at Senlis, 20 kilometres north-east of Paris.

English and French troops have been put to flight between Paris and Rheims, and are retreating across the Marne.

French troops between Rheims and Verdun are also in retreat and they are endeavouring to cross the Marne.

Such French troops as attempted to resist our advance north-west of Verdun were defeated.

Conde, La Fere, and Laon have been captured without any resistance, and all the outpost forts in the north of France, with the exception of Maubeuge, are now in our possession. The attack on Rheims has been commenced, and cavalry under the command of General Colonel Kluck are making raids in the direction of Paris.

The western army has passed the Aisne line and continues its advance towards the Marne, which has already been reached by advance guards. The enemy are withdrawing across the Marne before the advance of the troops commanded by General Colonels Kluck, Bullow, and Hansen, and the Duke of Wurtemberg. They are still holding out in strongly fortified position against the armies of the Crown Prince of Bavaria and General Colonel Heeringen.

[The two last-named armies are on the frontier of Lorraine and Alsace.]

The Kaiser Addresses the Soldiers.

The Kaiser left the Crown Prince at Sorbey, near Metz, and motored to the region in which Prince Oscar is situated, were he adressed the regiment during the evening. The moon shone from a clear sky over the scene where the Emperor delivered his speech to the accompaniment of guns booming in the distance at Verdun. The singing of the National Anthem brought an impressive gathering to a close.

It may now be disclosed that Austrian motor-batteries, which consist of two 12-in. guns mounted on automobiles, have been co-operating with the German heavy artillery in the work of reducing the northern fortresses. The mobility and accuracy of the aim of these guns have been highly praised by the headquarters staff. (These guns are also described as rendering excellent service in the fighting round Givet as well as at Namur.)

Lieutenants Zalin and Rheinhardt, of the Aeril Fleet, have been awarded Iron Crosses for the distinguished achievements.

Kaiser in the Field.

In the official German messages circulated from Berlin by wireless and sent out by the Marconi Company the most unexpected piece of news was the statement that the French centre, consisting of about ten army corps, was defeated on 2nd September between Rheims and Verdun. The following are the portions of the messages relating to the operations in France:—

Berlin, 1st Sept.

The following despatch was sent by Quartermaster General von Stein from the main Headquarters on August 31 (Monday):—

"An army corps commanded by General Colonel Klück repelled a flank attack undertaken by a weak French force in the neighbourhood of Combles.

"General Colonel Bulow's troops defeated a superior French force at St. Quentin after having previously captured an English infantry battalion in the course of the advance.

"Elsewhere the troops commanded by General Colonel Hausen forced back their opponents in the direction of the Aisne, near Rethel.

"In face of a superior hostile force the Duke of Wurtemberg's army was compelled to withdraw across the Meuse, but it regained its position later, and is now advancing on the Aisne. Les Ayvelles (?) fortress has fallen.

"Another section of the army, commanded by the Crown Prince, is advancing across the Meuse."

3rd. Sept.

About ten French army corps, comprising the centre of the opponents' army, were defeated yesterday between Rheims and Verdun, French sorties from the latter place being repulsed. The pursuit is being continued to-day. The Kaiser was with the Crown Prince's army during the battle, and passed the night in the midst of his troops.

This message was signed by Quartermaster General Von Stein.

BRITISH PRISONERS' DEMEANOUR.
("TIMES" TELEGRAM.)

Copenhagen, 2nd Sept.

The German press is making a great outcry about the sinking of the Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse by the Highflyer on the ground that it occurred whilst she was at anchor in the neutral territorial waters of the Spanish colony of Rio del Oro.

British prisoners have arrived at Munster camp, in the Province of Hanover, from France; also some Belgians and French. The British make a very favourable impression compared with the rest, but are exceedingly downcast.

Anger of the Germans.

The official wireless message from Berlin has the following in regard to Belgium:—

Berlin, Sept. 5.

Four Belgian divisions from Antwerp made an attack upon our connections in the direction of Brussels yesterday and the day before. The Belgians, however, were driven back by the troops which we had left behind.

The Belgian population are taking part in the battles almost everywhere, and the most severe steps have been taken for the suppression of these bands of franctireurs.

The safeguarding of the lines of provisional halting-places has up to the present been left to the army, but, as the men left behind for this purpose are urgently required at the front, his Majesty has ordered the mobilisation of the last reserve. The latter will be employed to protect lines of communication and to occupy Belgium, which country, now under German administration, will be used to supply the requirements of the army and so relieve our home resources.

According to the "Berliner Tageblatt," Louvain has been bitterly punished for the civilian uprising, which has now been almost quelled.

In the village of Dalheim (Lorraine) the German troops were fired on from behind, and the village was therefore razed to the ground.

Herr Just, a former Minister of the Interior, has been appointed Imperial Commissioner to investigate and to report on atrocities perpetrated by the Belgians upon the Germans.

The Reichstag and the Navy.

The wireless messages officially circulated from Berlin contains the following passages:—

Berlin, Sept. 7.

It is reported that fear of the German fleet has caused great alarm in English seaport towns. In Hartlepool torpedo nets are set in front of the docks every evening, and elsewhere round the coasts the nervousness occasioned by German mines is said to be indescribable. The enrolment of recruits for the British army is proceeding slowly, and from one town of 700,000 inhabitants not more than 100 men reported themselves, the majority of them being tramps. The nation has not been permitted to learn the real situation at the seat of war.

The "Norddeutsche Allegemeine Zeitung" denies the statement of Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons that the German official report dealing with the exchange of telegrams passing between England and Germany previous to the outbreak of war omitted an important telegram.

A conference between members of the Reichstag was held to demonstrate that the representatives entitled to speak on behalf of the entire population are prepared to stake the whole strength of the nation in the present conflict. The meeting advised the Secretary of the Admiralty that it would approve of all measures which the Admiralty deemed it desirable to adopt. The meeting especially expressed its readiness to guarantee the necessary sums required for the immediate replacement of lost ships and the immediate execution of all measures adopted in 1912. It further undertook to guarantee the immediate construction of substitute ships for 1915 and the reduction of the life of ships from 20 to 15 years. A manifesto embodying these resolutions was drawn up and signed by the following:—Passche, Baron Gamp, Erzber, Groeber, Wiemer, Count Westarp, Schultz, and Bromberg.

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False News.

"The Times" Amiens Despatch.

"It is a pitiful story I have to write. Would to God it did not fall to me to write it."

Thus the *Times* of yesterday, in an article which, if words mean anything at all, stated that the British Force in France was not only defeated but routed. To say that London was stunned is but to give a faint impression of the way the news was received. Men looked at each other in hopeless silence; women sought each other's company for consolation. And then, later in the afternoon, came an official statement from the Press Bureau, which was a complete and absolute denial of the story published in the *Times*, as the following extracts show:—

Our small British force could not stand before a volume so powerful, so immense. It has been scattered all over the country, so I learn from officers—staff officers among them—and men met here and there—*Times*.

The troops offered a superb and most stubborn resistance to the tremendous odds with which they were confronted, and at length extricated themselves in good order, though with serious losses and under the heaviest artillery fire.

Reinforcements amounting to double the loss sustained have already joined. Every gun has been replaced, and the Army is now ready to take part in the next great encounter with undiminished strength and undaunted spirit.—*The Press Bureau.*

Still later in the day the Press Bureau issued another statement that it has not thought it necessary to forbid the publication of messages...provided that such messages neither grave away military organisations nor the position of the troops."

What I want to know, and what everybody in Britain will want to know, is: Is it not the duty of the Press Bureau to stop the publication of false news of such a grave character?

For spreading a lie to the effect that the Black Watch had been cut up a man was sent to prison. Is not a published statement that the British Army "is scattered all over the country" more serious than the verbal rumour that a regiment has been cut up?

The Press Bureau owes not only a duty to the Army and Navy, but also to the Nation. This may not be the official view, but it is the view of the mothers of our soldiers.

Only fools expected an easy victory, only fools will be dismayed even if the worst has happened. Against a foe so skilful and brave as Prussia, a foe able to play with such vast masses of men, and so reckless in their playing, our losses are bound to be enormous. When the shock comes we must brace ourselves to stand it, but we have a right to demand that the Press Bureau shall do everything possible to safeguard us from false news.

The real news is grave enough. Reinforcements must be poured into France; every Briton with a pair of stout legs, at hand to hold a rifle and an eye to see Prussian must enlist—*must enlist at once!*

Your business can wait, your homes have only the second call. Your country wants you now.

On the grave of every one of our valiant comrades lie three Germans, and so, though the Allies are retreating and retreating, though they may have to retreat to the Pyrenees and the sea, we shall win in the end if there is a Briton left in France to help our Allies to strike the blow. If all our young men do their duty Britain can raise an army of a million, two million men. *We shall want every one of them.*

THE MAN IN THE STREET.

Question in the Commons.

The following question was asked in the House of Commons on 31st August.

M. Llewellyn Williams (L—Carmarthen District) asked the Prime Minister whether he was aware that the "Times" on Sunday published despatches from two correspondents, to the effect that the army had met with defeat and disaster, that British regiments had been broken to bits, and that the Secretary for War during the day issued a reassuring bulletin contradicting these sensational messages, and that the Press Bureau warned the public against such statements "because there are no correspondents at the front, and information is derived at second and third hand from persons who are often in no condition to tell coherent stories, and are without the perspective necessary to construct or to understand the general situation"; and, whether, having regard to the untold pain and anxiety—(cheers)—caused by the dissemination of such misleading statements, the Government will not return to the time-honoured practice of this country and allow press correspondents to accompan our army to the front. (Laughter and Opposition cries of "No.")

Mr. Asquith (Prime Minister): It is impossible too highly to commend the patriotic reticence of the press as a whole—(cheers) from the beginning of the war up to the present. The publication to which my hon. friend refers would appear to be a very regrettable exception, and I trust it will not recur. I doubt whether my hon. friend's suggestion is the best way under the altered condition of modern warfare of dealing with the matter. The Government feel, after the experience of the last two weeks, that the public is entitled to prompt and authentic information of what has happened at the front, and they are making arrangements which they hope will be more adequate. (Cheers.)

Lord R. Cecil (U—Hitchin): Were these despatches published in the "Times" and other papers yesterday submitted to the Press Censor and passed?

Mr. Asquith: They were.

Question in the Lords.

Viscount Halifax asked on 31st August whether the attention of the Government had been called to communications professing to come from the seat of war, published in the "Times" of Sunday, which were calculated to cause distress and alarm, and which were apparently not justified by the facts. (Cheers.)

The Lord Chancellor replied that attention had been called to the articles in question—very reprehensible articles and articles inconsistent with the facts. (Cheers.) The press had acted very loyally in carrying out arrangements which were thought out long before the war and which have been carried out since, and the Government had no cause to complain with some slight exceptions. But the article of the previous day was a most regrettable incident. "I believe there must be some explanation of it," he added. "Sunday editions come out sometimes when those reponsible are not on the spot. I have every hope the incident will not be repeated, and that the loyalty which the press has shown—a loyalty which has been very great—will be observed in the future generally." If more of these things happened it might be necessary to consider asking Parliament for exceptional powers to deal with such cases. (Cheers.)

Meanwhile the Government were taking steps to supply as fully as they could, and in a more adequate form than had been possible up to the present, a narrative of events from day to day founded on direct information from the seat of war which would satisfy the legitimate public desire to know what was going on.

The "Times" and the Press Bureau.

The Press Association has received the following statement from the editor of the "Times":—

"Mr. Asquith's statement in the House of Commons this afternoon renders it necessary to make clear the position of the "Times" in publishing yesterday the despatch which has provoked so much criticism in other newspapers to-day. The despatch, which reached the office of the 'Times' in the early hours of Saturday evening, was from the pen of an experienced and trustworthy correspondent who has seen fighting in many parts of the world, and is not in the least likely to be deceived by idle rumours. As such it was necessarily treated with serious consideration by the editorial staff of the "Times," and in accordance with instructions was at once submitted to the official Press Bureau.

"The Press Bureau retained the message about three hours before returning it. When it again reached the office of the 'Times' certain passages containing references to the correspondent's routes had been deleted. Other passages and embellishments, however, had been added by the head of the Press Bureau, who further conveyed an intimation that in its new form the despatch was approved for publication.

"In these circumstances the editorial staff of the 'Times,' who were astonished at the decision of the Press Bureau and had made no arrangements for publishing the message, came not unnaturally to the conclusion that it was the wish of the Government that it should appear."

The "Times" on its Defence.

The Press Association has received from the "Times" a further statement regarding the despatch from Amiens published in the "Times" of Sunday last. In the course of this statement it is said:—

"In the first place we have been attacked for lack of judgment, for irresponsible conduct, for subordinating public to private interests. In reply we are content to point to the past history and present position of this journal. We enjoy, as we have enjoyed for five generations, the confidence of Englishmen and the respect of the world. This confidence has not been earned by the methods now being attributed to us in such attacks as the successful in all branches of public life are accustomed to disregard. The sense of responsibility handed down from the wars of Napoleon through every great moment in our history for a hundred years has only been quickened, as we may well ask the public to believe, by the present crisis in our national destiny."

In regard to the despatch in question the "Times" says:—

"We not only obtained leave to publish it—we were definitely requested in writing to do so by the head of the Press Bureau. With such a request before us we should have failed in our public duty if we had withheld the despatch from publication. If that despatch was in accordance with the knowledge which was in hands of the military authorities at the time of its receipt by the Censor then he was justified in passing it and in urging its publicity. If it was exaggerated, distorted, as is now maintained, the Censor who urged its publicity made an error of judgment. Time will reveal the truth. In either event our hands are clean."

The "Times" and the Press Bureau in Parliament.

Sir A. Markham (Notts, Mansfield, Min.).—I am not going to refer to the subject after the Prime Minister's speech, but before he leaves the House I wish to draw his attention to what I am sure after the statement he made at question time he will regret. A question was asked with regard to the unfortunate article that appeared in *The Times* yesterday and gave every one in the country cause for the gravest anxiety. I have just had put into my hands a copy of the *Evening News* of this date 6.30 edition, in which the following appears in the stop-press:—

The Times and the Press Censor.

"We have received the following statement from the Editor of *The Times*:—

"Mr. Asquith's statement in the House of Commons this afternoon renders it necessary to make quite clear the position of *The Times* in publishing yesterday the dispatch which has provoked so much criticism in other newspapers to-day.

"The dispatch, which reached the office of "The Times" in the early hours of Saturday evening, was from the pen of an experienced and trustworthy correspondent who has seen fighting in many parts of the world and is not in the least likely to be deceived by idle rumours. As such it was necessarily treated with serious consideration by the editorial staff of "The Times," and, in accordance with instructions, was at once submitted to the Official Press Bureau.

"The Press Bureau retained the message for about three hours before returning it. When it again reached the office of "The Times" certain passages, containing references to the correspondent's route, had been deleted. Other passages and embellishments, however, had been added by the head of the Press Bureau, who further conveyed an intimation that, in its new form, the dispatch was approved for publication.

"In these circumstances the editorial staff of "The Times," who were astonished at the decision of the Press Bureau and had made no arrangements for publishing the message, came, not unnaturally, to the conclusion that it was the wish of the Government that it should appear."

The Prime Minister was very severe, and rightly so, I think, with regard to a statement being published which caused so much intense feeling and agony to the people of this country yesterday, but a grave responsibility rests on the Press Bureau.

The hon. member proceeded to take exception to the constitution of the Bureau. The right hon. member for the Walton Division was at its head, and his brother, the hon. member for Warrington, was appointed secretary, and he had letters from newspaper editors who complained that the hon. member for Warrington acted more like a

Staff Officer of the Kaiser in his dealings with the Press. The Prime Minister had stated his intention of going to the country to appeal to every able-bodied man to take up arms but he would do a far greater service to that end if he placed the Bureau in a position to enable the country to take a human interest in what was going on. He thought that the Government should have placed a Minister of the Crown in charge of the Bureau.

"KILLING RECRUITING."

The action of the Government in silencing information was killing recruiting in the country (Some dissent.) The right hon. member for Walton had done his best in a very difficult position and had in the most patriotic manner offered his services to the Government, and he was sure that the Government appreciated the work that he had done. The editor of a large London daily paper had told him that they had to thank the right hon. gentleman for much of the information that they had received. The real fact of the position was that they had to-day at the War Office in Lord Kitchener a gentleman who had the full confidence of the country, but who was not in touch with Parliamentary institutions. The idea of Lord Kitchener was that all information should be held back from the public. He might be a great soldier, but he did not understand Parliamentary institutions and that the human element was what the public desired. Everybody who had any sort of military command seemed to think that the civil power must be subordinate to the military power. But in his view the civil power must always be the predominant power, and on that account the appointment of a soldier as head of the War Office was undesirable. In many cases the action of the Censor was incomprehensible. It could not be explained by the necessity of preventing the publication of information that might be useful to the enemy. The "Evening News" made the statement that an engagement took place between blank and blank near blank. (Laughter.) Surely the suppressed particulars were already well known to the Germans. If it were necessary to have a Press Bureau at all, and he felt convinced now that its institution was a mistake, a Cabinet Minister should be placed at the head of it.

Mr. Asquith.—I have no responsibility of my own for the Press Bureau, nor does it fall within the administrative sphere of any Cabinet Minister. All my colleagues are at this moments so fully occupied that I should be sorry in the public interest to add to the labours of any one of them.

Sir A. Markham thought it absolutely essential that the Press Bureau should be strengthened by the appointment of a Cabinet Minister as its head, assisted by Lord Roberts and Lord Charles Beresford, and three trained journalists. The Bureau, as at present constituted, had not the confidence of the country. "The Times" had well said that the time was passed when a great and free democracy would consent to go to war in the dark. It was necessary that the full light of the Press should be thrown on the conduct of the war. Otherwise we might have mismanagement similar to that which occurred in the Crimean War.

He lived at Shorncliffe, where troops arrived wounded from the front on Saturday last. There were men in hospital there who stated that after they were wounded they were placed in trains, by chance or otherwise, which took days and days to reach the point of embarcation for this country. No food whatever was supplied to them during a three days' journey in France, and they had to get apples or what other food they could at the station side. On their arrival at Boulogne there was no organization to dress wounds or give first aid. Even when they reached Folkestone there was not even the Red Cross or any organization to dress the wounds of the men, many of whom had kept their boots on for days. (Interruption.)

Mr. Tenant said he hoped these statements were exaggerations. There was a large hospital at Folkestone, and it was improbable that there would be no Red Cross.

Sir A. Markham said his statement was that there had been no preparation for the arrival of the wounded. By good chance Colonel Wilson, in command of the Medical Corps at Folkestone, went to meet them. The hon. member added that he would communicate to the War Office a number of other cases.

Mr. H. Lawson (Mile End, Opp.) considered the attack on the head of the Bureau most unfair and very ill informed When the war broke out it was intended that the newspaper Press should be represented at the front by authorized correspondents, and it was not the fault of his right hon. friend nor of the Secretary for War that this was not done. It was in deference to the protests of our Allies. He foresaw that the result would take the place of narratives of facts. When the Press Bureau was organized it was not intended that it should take on itself to supply a full narrative of events to the public, but merely that a censorship should be exercised on what should appear, and that bulletins shoud be issued. His right hon. friend had suddenly been called upon to organize a new service, and he had struggled manfully with great difficulties. If the public had had a certain amount of light from official dispatches it was largely because he had insisted on this so far as he could. He was sure there had been an improvement in the Bureau and he believed the public could look forward to a better supply of news in the future. As the Press Bureau had been hardly tried, so also had been the newspapers themselves. They had been inundated with stories coming from all quarters of what had happened, and they had had to pick and choose, and perhaps the very existence of the Bureau had made them a little less careful than they otherwise would have been. The Government and the country were under great obligation to the right hon. and learned member for Walton for the way he had worked an essentially empirical experiment which might result in a better system being set up.

Mr. Pirie (Aberdeen, N., Min.) said war was not waged for the benefit of the Press. In his opinion it would be quite sufficient for the public information if they had three editions a day. The real authority must be concentrated in the War Office at the present time, and they had to submit to it. Even members of Parliament had to take a third place for a short time.

Mr. T. P. O'Connor (Liverpool, Scotland, Nat.) thanked the right hon. and learned gentleman the head of the Press Bureau for the courtesy with which he had received every suggestion made to him and for the improvements he had carried out.

Mr. Peto (Wilts, Devizes, Opp.) said he had felt indignation to read the letters in *The Times*, particularly in the night edition, printed alongside the official version of what had happened. He was indignant to see in a newspaper like *The Times* the headline in large print "Broken British Regiments," and then a little smaller "Untarnished Honour of our Troops." As if anyone required the assurance of *The Times* that the honour of our troops was untarnished. Would it not be wise to take powers during the currency of the war to suppress altogether the publication and sale of any newspaper which printed articles at all comparable to those which created such alarm and distress the previous day?

Mr. Llewelyn Williams thought the Bureau had been rather too anxious to censor some of the messages. Lord Kitchener said that our troops, excepting one cavalry regiment, had not been molested since Wednesday. Why, therefore, was not the country told of the issue of that glorious fight on Thursday, Friday, or Saturday of last week? He believed that unless the Government allowed Press correspondents to go to the front there would be a constant repetition of the sort of thing that had pained the country so much.

Lord R. Cecil, (Hitchin, Opp.) thought that much of the criticism of the Press Bureau disclosed the absence of a sense of proportion in those from whom it came. When we were fighting desperately for our lives the question whether a particular statement was or was not published in the Press was relatively of very little importance. They had been told that if regiments were seriously cut up the names of the regiments ought to be given, but for his part he could imagine more cruel than to publish the names before there was a probability of the issue of the casualty lists. That, he held, was exactly the kind of information which the Press Bureau should prevent. While he regretted the publication of the alarmist article in *The Times* on Sunday he dissociated himself completely from the criticism passed upon the action of his right hon. friend, who, he felt convinced, had discharged his duty with ability, judgment, and tact.

MR. F. E. SMITH'S REPLY.

Mr. F. E. Smith (Liverpool, Walton).—I hope the House will think it reasonable if I explain at the outset with reference to some criticism which has been made on the constitution of the Bureau, that certainly I never sought an office which I was well aware would mean many antagonisms, much invidiousness, and much that would involve every day the expenditure of almost more hours than ever I worked in the course of a somewhat busy life. Let me give the House an indication of what the general character of the difficulties has been. There was not in existence at the time the war broke out any coercive machinery of any kind by which the publication in the Press of matter injurious to the public service could be prevented. When it was anticipated that it might be desirable that some greater discretion should be shown in the Press in dealing with certain public matters a committee was created, and on that committee there sat the representatives of the great newspapers of the country and also representatives of the War Office and Admiralty. Discussions took place from time to time and indications were given by the representatives of the War Office and the Admiralty respectively of the matters with which it was not thought desirable that the Press should deal. With the outbreak of war it was realized that the system was loose, and it became clear that some new method of controlling the Press must be devised. The censorship in this country has been a dual system, and the quality of the system has been responsible for a great deal of the criticism which has been made and a great deal of the undoubted inequality of treatment. I will give an illustration. The House will be aware that all the cables

go out of the country from different offices. I daresay there are some 10 or 12 offices from which outgoing Press cables are delivered. It is of course necessary—it has not been necessary up to the present—that at every one of those offices there should be a trained band of censors ready at every moment of the day and night to examine the Press cables which are sent abroad and to form a judgment on their propriety or impropriety. That means an enormous staff of some 80 or 90 censors. The work this staff is doing is difficult and novel, and it would be impossible to suppose that 80 or 90 men working on standards which are not always the same should invariably reach the same conclusions, and this is the explanation of a great many of the inequalities of which complaints have been made in the last few days. Mr. Smith described a scheme that was in contemplation for abolishing the necessity for a duel censorship, and testified to the ready co-operation of the Press in the administration of the Bureau. Having explained the system at work, he said that many of the criticisms that had been made were based on a misunderstanding. Complaint had been made that *The Times* was permitted to publish the overhauling of the liner Galician by the German armed cruiser four or five days before the other newspapers. That was due to the assumption by *The Times* that the reasons for witholding the publication of the news that the enemy would be informed that His location was known were no longer in force ; in that *The Times* was perfectly right ; but they ought to have informed him of their intended action so that he might have set the news free for all newspapers at the same time. Regarding the complaint of insufficient information he had received nothing from the War Office or the Admiralty of importance or public interest which had not been instantly published. In regard to the consership, he said that Lord Kitchener had considered most carefully and patiently every consideration which the mind of a layman could suggest against the necessity of a particular prohibition,

"The Times" Messages.

The right hon. and learned gentleman continued.—Now I pass to the circumstances connected with the articles which appeared in *The Times* and the *Weekly Dispatch* on Sunday. Up to Sunday morning many criticisms had been against the Bureau on its censoring side, It was stated that we were suppressing international information in the publication of which there was no harm. To-day a different criticism is made. It has been stated that the articles in question—and for all I knew it may be true—that the articles in question were in the Bureau for some hours before they were dealt with. Those were just the hours in which the greatest pressure comes for all the newspapers. I think the papers in question—*The Times* the *Daily Mail* and the *Weekly Dispatch*—were hardly dealt with. I think I had better make the association of the individual papers clear. It was a *Daily Mail* message which appeared in the *Weekly Dispatch*, because the latter paper is published on Sunday. I will tell the House candidly why I think the papers in question were hardly dealt with. From the moment the Bureau came into existence no two papers have behaved better or more loyally to the wishes of the War Office and Admiralty than *The Times* and *Daily Mail*. I should not single them out—because it would be invidious to do so seeing that all the papers behaved well—but for the fact that they have been subjected to so much criticism the statement made by the correspondent presented an accurate picture of what had taken place, I think it would be difficult to contend that it would have been right under any circumstances to stop the article. Of course, the message, which had been received in perfect good faith by *The Times*, really showed on the face of it that it was the message of a man who was speaking from hear-say and without direct contact with the front. I myself examined the article, certain references were excised, and it was returned with my own initials upon it, and I take the responsibility of having returned it, initialled by me in the shape in which it appeared in the paper. I think now that if one had known everything that was going to happen, and perhaps had had a little more time to give to every important article which was clamouring for attention, it would have been better if I had written a note to the editor asking him to consider whether, quite apart from the legal powers which I possessed, it was a wise article to publish. I think now it would have been much better if I had done so. I have no doubt, too, that if I had done so he would have suppressed the article altogether. The only observation I will make on the communication made by *The Times* to the *Evening News* to-night is equally that it might have been well if they had conveyed to me, when they sent the message, the fact that they had already a doubt in their own mind as to whether, apart from the censorship, it was a wise article to publish. *The Times* and the *Daily Mail*, as I have said, have been specially active in co-operating with me, and I am most anxious that they should be fairly treated in the matter.

An Hon. Member asked whether the right hon. gentleman made any addition to the article.

Mr. F. E. Smith.—I have been asked by Lord Kitchener as far as possible to assist his object, which was, of course, to obtain recruits. In these circumstances I suggested that a reference might be made at the end of the article to the fact that what was wanted was reinforcements, and still more reinforcements; that and that alone was the nature of the addition made. I am most anxious that it should be clearly understood that I acquit of responsibility the editors of *The Times* and the *Daily Mail*. They received this news believing it to be true, and the discretion I exercised was a discretion to the effect that on the face of it was a report that only purported to come from a gentleman who was not at the heart of things, and furthermore I took the view that it did not come in conflict with the rules laid down.

The right hon. gentleman concluded by referring to the difficulties encountered by an entirely new organization and by assuring the House that so long as he was connected with its administration he would grudge neither time nor labour in considering every interest that could be brought forward as one in which the public were concerned.

Mr. McKenna said there had been no attempt to attack the right hon. gentleman, whose great ability, knowledge, and exertions had been given to the service of the Government with the greatest personal generosity and with considerable sacrifice to himself. (Cheers.) With such suppression as everybody recognized is reasonable all the information which had been received had been published.

Mr. Lawson.—Can the right hon. gentleman tell the house whether autherized correspondents are to be allowed at the front.

Mr. McKenna said there was no change of policy in that respect.

Mr. Tennant told the house that there were ample preparations for dealing with the wounded in the field, and that when it became known that there were some wounded at Folkestone who had crossed from Boulogne emergency measures were immediatelytaken at that port, Several Red Cross men who had returned had expressed admiration at the completeness of the arrangements.

Mr. MacCallum Scot (Glasgow, Bridgeton, Min.) pointed out that the article which had been so much criticized was not only passed by the Bureau, but its publication was encouraged, and that it was made the basis of an appeal for additional recruits.

Mr. Sherwell (Huddersfield Min.) objected to the apparently unequal treatment that the Bureau had extended to various journals. At the outset of the war the Admiralty asked the newspapers not to publish the shipping news, but *The Times* and the *Daily Mail* had persisted in publishing it and were doing so to-day.

Mr. Dillon (Mayo, E., Nat.) said that the great scandal of the publication of the article in *The Times* had been intensified and increased by the amazing statement of the Press Censor *The Times* was placed in a position of discrimination, if not by the Press Bureau at least by other State Departments. He had read the extermely able and interesting articles by *The Times* Military Correspondent and said that they were based on information that was not open to the public. That was a monstrous state of things, and most unjust and unfair to the other newspapers, which had exhibited extraordinary self-restraint and self-denial to meet the wishes of the Government.

Published at the Request of Mr. F. E. Smith.

The *Times* on September 1st published the following statement:

On Sunday last we published in a special edition a despatch from a Special Correspondent at Amiens which has been the subject of much discussion and has exposed the *Times* to attacks in the newspaper press and in Parliament. We desire, therefore, to make a plain statement of the facts as to the receipt, censorship, and publication of this message.

The despatch was written at Amiens early on Saturday morning by a member of our staff who has known the horrors of war in many parts of the world and has often risked his life in the service of this journal. He is a trained journalist, accustomed to sift fact from fiction, and is specially fitted by experience for the duties which he is now undertaking.


The despatch reached the *Times* office by special courier early on Saturday evening. The extreme gravity of its contents was at once apparent to the Editor and to the Chief of the Foreign Department to whom it was referred. A discussion took place, and it was agreed that, although it must be referred to the Censor at once, it was highly improbable, on the assumption that the news was true, that the authorities would allow it to be published except in the form of an official announcement.

The fact that the despatch was retained by the Censor for three hours without comment seemed to confirm this view; and all preparations for issuing the edition without it were made. Between

POSITION OF GERMAN FORCES

Supplement to "The COMRADE," 10th Oct. 1914.

FROM AUG. 16th UP TO DATE.



POSITION OF GERMAN FORCES

FROM AUG. 16th UP TO DATE.

10th Oct. 1914.

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Diest
Aerschot
Hasselt
Aug 19
St Trond
Aug 16
Maastricht
Tongres
Aug 18
Sittard
Meuse
Aachen (Aix la Chapelle)
Duren
LIEGE
Alost
BRUSSELS
Louvain
Landen
Audenarde
Courtrai
Renaix
Aug 21
Aug 24
Hal
Ath
St Omer
Lille
R. Scheldt
Tournai
Aug 25
Gembloux
Namur
Huy
Stavelot
Malmedy
Trois Ponts
St Pol
Arras
Aug 28
Mons
Charleroi
R. Meuse
Valenciennes
Cambrai
R. Sambre
Le Cateau
Landrecies
Avesnes
Philippeville
Dinant
Givet
Cinay
Marche
La Roche
S. Hubert
Bastogne
Prum
Bapaume
le Catelet
Peronne
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Chateau Porcien
Craonne
R. Aisne
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Montmedy
Longwy
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Compiegne
Soissons
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Thionville
Spincourt
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Senlis
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Jouarre
Chatillon
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Suippe
Verdun
Sept 6
METZ
Chateau Thierry
Epernay
Sept 6
S. Menehould
Chalons
PARIS
La Ferte
Montmirail
Thiaucourt
Pont à Mousson
Nomeny
Chateau Salins
Meaux
Vitry
Sept. 8.
Coulommiers
La Ferte Gaucher
Sezanne
Fère Champenoise
Bar le Duc
Commercy
NANCY
Corbeil
Provins
Nogent
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"& "The Hamdard" at the Comrade & the Hamdard Press" Delhi.

SCALE 20 MILES TO AN INCH.

11 and 12 o'clock at night, however, our messenger returned from the Censor with the despatch, and with a signed memorandum from the Head Censor.

Certain passages from the despatch had been cut out; other passages which we had ourselves crossed out as undesirable for various reasons were marked *stet* with the Censor's initials; and fresh sentences, summarising the effect of the news and pointing its moral, were inserted. The despatch in fact had been carefully edited for publication.

The memorandum accompanying it is marked "Private" and we are therefore debarred from publishing it without the writer's consent. We are entitled, however, to say that in it Mr. F. E. Smith, over his signature, begged us to publish it in the form in which he returned it. With this document before us we could no longer hope that our correspondent had been misled, *and we published in accordance with the official request.*

At 3-40 on Sunday afternoon the War Office issued, through the Press Bureau, the far more hopeful and satisfactory account of the battle which we reproduced yesterday; and later, a postscript was added, on the same authority, warning the public to accept "with extreme caution" such despatches as *the one it had begged us to publish.*

NEWSPAPER COMMENT.

A number of newspapers yesterday morning and evening commented severely on the publication of the despatch. The facts related above cannot have been before the writers, for we received no inquiries as to our authority for publishing. One paper, for example, informs its readers that the Censor "merely excised names of regiments and places," and proceeds to lecture the *Times* on the duty of journalists.

Another paper refers to the despatch as a "disgraceful outburst"; another convicted us of "a grave error of judgment" in obeying the urgent request of the Censor; a third praises the caution and judgment of Mr. Smith, who urged us to publish the document which it denounces as untrue and uncensored; and a fourth accuses us of deliberately inflicting "needless agonies" on the public mind. Now that these and other newspapers have been informed that the Censor not only passed the despatch in question, but urged us to publish it, we assume that written apologies will reach us in due course.

IN PARLIAMENT.

The subject was raised, as will be seen from our report, in both Houses of Parliament yesterday by members who were unacquainted with the fact related above, which would have been placed at their disposal had they taken the simple precaution of inquiring at our office. Mr. Asquith referred to the publication as "a very regrettable exception" to the patriotic reticence of the press. In reply to this we may observe that we should have been only too glad to withhold the message if we had not been urged to publish it by the official authorised by the Government to do so.

In the House of Lords the Lord Chancellor also referred to the article as regrettable, and suggested that its publication was due to the fact that "Sunday editions come out sometimes when those responsible are not on the spot." Such is not the practice of the *Times*. In the evening in the House of Commons Mr. F. E. Smith made a statement on the subject which is fully reported elsewhere. The difficulties of his position are recognised nowhere more clearly than in the office; but if the despatch was not accurate, or at least consistent with the known facts, no special pleading justifies his begging us to publish it or even his *imprimatur*.

The Censor's Addition to the Despatch.

The *Daily Mail* yesterday published the following statement at the request of the editor of the "Weekly Dispatch," in which Sunday paper the *Times* Amiens despatch also appeared :—

The report . . . was received at the "Weekly Dispatch" office on Saturday evening, and was immediately submitted to the Official Press Bureau. When, after some hours of detention, it was returned to the editor of the "Weekly Dispatch," shortly before midnight, it was accompanied by the following note from the Censor, who had excised a number of passage from the report. The Censor wrote :—

"I fear I have left you a muddle, but our present position must "not be disclosed. Forgive my journalistic effort at the end, but "that is what we want. I have passed far more than the W. O. "[War Office] would sanction, but I think we should realise the "truth."

The above note was written on the official notepaper of the Press Bureau and not marked "Private." It was regarded by the editor of the "Weekly Dispatch" as conveying important official advice to him, and he accordingly published the report in his issue of Sunday morning. It was afterwards published also in the special midday edition of the *Times*.

"The journalistic effort at the end" to which reference is made in the Censor's note consisted of the following paragraph, which was not part of the original report, but was added by the Press Bureau :—

"England should realise, and should realise at once, that she must send reinforcements, and still send them. Is an army of exhaustless valour to be borne down by the sheer weight of numbers while young Englishmen at home play golf and cricket? We want men, and we want them now."

The "Manchester Guardian."

August 31st.

Many thousand of Englishmen, women, and children must have passed an afternoon and evening of bitter misery yesterday (30th August) through reading one or other of two circumstantial accounts of a crushing disaster which was alleged to have befallen our army in France. They were published in a Sunday edition of the "Times" and in the "Weekly Dispatch," and were copied elsewhere. They represented the British Expeditionary Force as being utterly defeated with appalling slaughter, and as having lost almost every officer in some of its regiments. Readers were given pictures of starving fugitives in British uniform, and were asked to believe that staff and other officer were scattered all about the country, cut off or in flight before invincible German army corps. The story was offered to the public on the authority of war correspondent, or correspondents, at Amiens—which of course is far from the scene of the real battles. It was a quite untrue story. There had been no disaster, but, as we know te-day, a stand by the British army so gloriously staunch, so magnificently successful, and in its probable results, so momentous that it will surely be remembered for ever as one of the most stirring of all the triumphs of British courage and steadfastness in battle. One can easily imagine how the falsehood took shape. One imagines an excitable or broken-nerved man collecting the fragments of hysterical narrative carried to a distance from a battlefield by chance fugitives from its neighbourhood, probably driven half out of their wits by terror and suffering. Then one imagines the fragments pieced together, not with an insincere intention but in a spirit of neurotic despondency, and the monstrous tissue of horrors emerging as the result. Perhaps it was in some such way that the notorious circumstantial account of the (imaginary) murder of all the European legations at Pekin came into existence too. We do not suppose there was deliberate fabrication in either case, but it is horrible to think of the agonies inflicted in both cases, till the truth was known, upon the families and friends of the English people falsely remoured to have been slaughtered wholesale. We cannot help adding that, until a few years ago, it would have been almost unbelievable by any English journalist that these needless agonies would be inflicted by the "Times."

The Press Bureau issued last night a moderately worded rebuke to those responsible for this terrible failure to supply the public with true news. It would have been still kinder on the Censor's part to suppress what he must have known to be baseless. This, however, does not seem to be regarded as any part of the Bureau's duty. It is left, therefore, to the public to be its own protector againt falsehood in war news. Especially should it remember that war correspondent in the old sense, no longer exists, that no correspondents witness battles now, and that when a vivid and apparently personal account of a battle, or of any part of it, is published it should be regarded with suspicion as being, in all probability, built up or inferred by some non-eye-witness out of scraps of narrative picked up from other persons, mostly untrained to observe, crazy with fear and excitement, and capable of seeing anything in anything.

The "Morning Post."

We have already discussed the great battle of which the Secretary of State for War has given the nation what we take to be a clear, candid, and adequate account. London was at the same time tortured by a newspaper report of the situation across the Channel published with the dubious prestige of a name at one time illustrious in English journalism..... Why, we ask, did the Censor allow to be published this "pitiful story," which it must have known was out of focus if not false in detail, and which was, in substance, flatly contradicted the same day by the Secretary of State for War? Such Yellow Press panics and lamentations may have the most serious effect on the policy of certain neutral nations whose future course of action may now be hanging in the balance.....As to the Press Bureau, we presume that it failed to veto this unhappy eccentricity of panic journalism because it had not the power. If this is so, the necessary power should immediately be conferred upon the Government by Parliament.

"Timely."

The "Times" military correspondent says: Lord Kitchener's statement is a very plain, straightforward statement, and it is timely because when an army is in retreat and constantly attacked parties become detached, consider themselves the only survivors, and spread far and wide most astounding stories of disaster. The farther we are from the fighting line the worse is the news, and it is only when we reach the front that we find order and coolness to prevail.

The Attacks on "The Times."

In another column we publish a plain statement of the circumstances in which the despatch from Amiens was published in our editions of Sunday last. For its publication we have been bitterly attacked in public and in private, in Parliament and in the Press, and in every case by these who were not in a position to know the facts of the case. These facts are before the world to-day, and we submit them in all confidence to the judgment of every candid reader of *The Times*. We offer no further justification of our action. The facts are before the public: let them judge for themselves. We have no doubt as to the verdict.

There are, however, two observations which we think it right to make on this occasion. In the first place we have been attacked for a lack of judgment, for irresponsible conduct, for subordinating public to priv te interests. In reply we are content to point to the past history and the present position of journal. We enjoy, as we have enjoyed for five generations, the confidence of Englishmen and the respect of the world. This confidence has not been earned by the methods now being attributed to us in such attacks as the successful in all branches of public life are accustomed to disregard. A sense of responsibility handed down from the war of Napoleon through every great moment in our history for a hundred years has only been quickened, as we may well ask the public to believe, by the present crisis in our national destiny. *Sic fortis Etruria crevit.*

Secondly, we desire to make our position with regard to the Press Censorship quite clear. We welcome a censorship as a valuable support to the Press in time of war. No newspaper can conceivably desire to publish news which is either inaccurate or calculated to assist the enemy; and a Censor with real military knowledge and in close touch with the military authorities is a necessary adjunct to the Press. In the case, however, of the dispatch under discussion these conditions were not fulfilled. We not only obtained leave to publish it; we were definitely requested, in writing, to do so by the head of the Press Bureau. With such a request before us, we should have failed in our public duty if we had withheld the dispatch from publication. If the dispatch was in accordance with the knowledge which was in the hands of the military authorities at the time of its receipt by the Censor, then he was justified in passing it and in urging its publication. If it was exaggerated and distorted, as is now maintained, the Censor who urged its publication made an error of judgment. Time will reveal the truth. In either event our hands are clean.

Distress in Germany.

Mr. Dudley Ward, late Berlin correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*, in a recent article in that papers, ays:—"To judge from copies of the Socialist organ *Vorwarts* which have just reached England over Holland, the war is already producing appalling destitution and misery over a very large part of Germany. There is, of course, the want among the families of those called to the front, but equally severe or even greater is the distress caused by the shutting of the greater part of all industrial concerns. In the Solingen district for instance, where, in normal times three quarters and more of the products are sent abroad, all works except those engaged in the production of weapons are idle. In the great Rhineland-Westphalia industrial district there is the same shutting of almost all works not directly connected with the provision of warlike materials. Among the coalfields of Westphalia there is some slight recovery, and in some cases as much as 60 per cent of the work done in normal times has been reached. How great are the restrictions even here, however, can be judged from the fact that instead of the usual three shifts all the work required is done in one. Up to now no orders beyond those of the State are allowed to be fulfilled. From Berlin comes the same story, and here in addition are many complaints that in some industries overtime is being worked at reduced wages despite the thousands of unemployed waiting to be taken on. Altogether it was calculated by the trade union authorities on August 25 that there are something more than 100,000 unemployed in Berlin, and that after workers to the number of between 25 and 75 per cent. have been withdrawn from industry for the army. The large stores are dismissing many of their employees and in other cases are reducing wages. A fund for dealing with distress in Berlin caused by the war has been headed by a subscription from the Kaiser of £2,500. Special eating houses for destitute and unemployed are being arranged in the poorer parts of the city where midday meal can be obtained for a penny and free meals for children are being arranged on a large scale. The official boycott of Socialist restaurants and beer-houses has been raised in most centres, and permission has now been given for the sale of *Vorwarts* and other Socialist papers on all railway stations in Prussia. The calling up of part of the Landsturm and the warning of the rest has caused great trouble, since employers are dismissing any of their workers liable to this service and are refusing to take on any others who may be eventually called up.



Offers of Assistance to the Imperial Relief Fund.

The following communication has been received by all local Governments and Administrations from the Secretary to the Government of India, Army Department:—"In connection with many generous offers of assistance in kind to the Imperial Relief Fund which have been made by all classes of the community in India, I am directed to forward the following list of articles which will be of use to members, British and Indian, of the Indian Expeditionary Force together with the necessary instructions for their packing, despatch, etc.:—'Chocolate, Dried Figs, Dried Appricots, Dried Apple Chips, Dried Dates, Raisins, Pomegranates, Monkey Nuts, Walnuts, Pistacho Nuts, Almonds, Cocoanuts, Edible pine seeds, Cardamoms, Mineral alum earth (Nepal), Cystallised Sugar, Dry Ginger, Betel-nut Catechu, Slaked Lime, Hindu Biscuits (Hindu Biscuit Co., Delhi), Tobacco leaf, Tobacco Compressed, Cigars, Cigarettes, Pipes, Portable Hookas, Material for making up hookas, Socks and Belts, Handkerchiefs, Mitten."

"False" News.

The *Times* in its Sunday edition of 30th August published a despatch from its correspondent at Amiens which caused immense shock and anxiety in London. We have not seen the whloe text of that sensational message, but from the outburst of general indignation it evoked, it appears to have been of a very disquieting character. We reproduce elsewhere the *Times* explanations, the discussions in both the Houses of Parliament and a few of the comments made by other papers. This despatch was among the chief causes of a tendency to "scare" headlines which for the first time began to appear in certain sections of the press. "Our Army's Fight for Life—Desperate Situation. Can Our Men be Saved?" were among the headings leading off the "Observer War Bulletin" sold about the streets on Sunday afternoon, and the article underneath them told how the British army had been on the brink of the most disastrous possibilities "in the whole history of the British army," and how at any moment within the next couple of days the public must expect to hear story of the "final overthrow or deliverance at the last moment of the Allies' northern army." Even the "better feeling" which the *Observer* reported in military circles on the night of 29th August was only admitted to the point of an opinion "that what is left of our army might be saved after all." As a finale the *Observer* "addresses one sentence more to all who have the heart of Britons—no panic, not a trace of it." Then there was the *Times* Amiens article. The one thing to be thankful about was that it appeared on a Sunday. The *Times*, like other papers, is sometimes misled, and its correspondent, acting in all good faith but apparently making his story from diverse information, compiled a narrative which shook London opinion to its foundations. It was, of course, taken that the worst had not been stated, and naturally people, with their old belief in the reticence of the *Times*, took it that things were twice as bad as what was published. It was believed that if the Censor, who had been so immovable against the publication of news which was of trifling significance compared with the *Times* story, had allowed its publication they had not only to read between the lines but to multiply their significance. On a week-day the result would have been an instant rise in the Bank rate, even a panic, and a big collapse of City business, which had been so gingerly reviving in the past week. Happily it was a Sunday, and Lord Kitchener's detailed and reassuring announcement overtook it in England and in the world—except Germany. The unfortunate thing is the Victorian reputation of the *Times* as a semi-official paper, despite all the vicissitudes of that journal and its present alliance with the other papers of Lord Northcliffe's syndicate, is still a lingering article of

faith outside England. The Censor had doubtless made a mistake in permitting the publication of its Amiens telegram, just as he had made previous mistakes in his refusal to permit publication of messages of a more authentic character. But the *Times* declares that its hands and conscience are clean and that of the story it published time will reveal the truth. Is it, inspite of official denials, still convinced of the accuracy of its correspondent's tale?

The Extremes.

The *Times* has preached moderation and practised extremism so long that one is not much astonished nowadays at what it says. In its Sunday issue (30th August) it published the despatch of its Special Correspondent from Amiens, whose experience and trustworthiness have since been vouched for by the *Times* itself, which was intended to give to its readers the idea that all was lost. Two days later it published another despatch of a different variety sent by one of its special correspondents from Ostend according to which all is lost so far as the Germans are concerned. He writes:—"I managed to get between Ghent and Brussels on Saturday, and on my way back met an officer in the 52nd German Foot Regiment. He was perfectly candid over the situation, and in the course of conversation said:—'The *morale* of some of our troops is not what it should be. Some of the men feel they are only going to butchery. We know, they say, 'that as we go towards Paris we shall meet with Anglo-French troops superior in training to ourselves and we shall be crushed.'" What did the German Chancellor say of the *Times*? Yes the *edition de luxe* of the *Daily Mail*! When will sensations cease? In view of what has happened one must only believe that the "candid" German officer was only courteous and wished to make the *Times* Special Correspondent happy for at least a week. Or, possibly he may have been busy in practising on the *Times* correspondent the operation known to the vulgar as "pulling one's leg." What purpose it served by publishing such old women's tale?

Dreyfus Again.

The whirligig of time brings many changes and many revenges. Militarist and anti-Semite France, which had broken the sword of Major Dreyfus before his troops as the punishment of a traitor, at last makes amends to him. It is reported from the Hague that the eldest son of Major Alfred Dreyfus, who is serving as a sergeant in the French Army, distinguished himself before Charleroi and was promoted on the battlefield. Major Dreyfus has written to some relatives at Utrecht stating that he applied for a commission in the French Army, and that his request has been complied with by M. Millerand.

The Abolition of the Capitulations in Turkey.

We wonder why Reuter forgot to cable to India the news of an event of the utmost significance to the honour and welfare of the Ottoman Empire, although a message from its agent at Constantinople was published in the English evening papers on 11th September, *i. e.*, on the day the last mail left England. The message stated that "the Imperial Ottoman Government has notified the representatives of the Powers that the Sultan had abolished the capitulations and that henceforth all foreign subjects would be tried in civil and criminal cases by the Ottoman courts." This decision of the Sultan is a wise stroke of statesmanship and it will be hailed with unalloyed satisfaction by those who have no desire to see Turkey shorn of its strength and independence as a sovereign State. The capitulations were originally generous concessions granted to subjects of the Christian Powers by Turkey for purposes of freer commercial intercourse, but in course of time they were converted into most irksome fetters which paralysed the hands of the State in dealing with mischief and sedition at home and unscrupulous intrigue from abroad. We are glad Turkey has seized this opportunity to strike off the humiliating bonds which has become so galling to her sense of honour and impeded her freedom of action in innumerable ways.

The London Moslem League and the War.

In mail week a meeting of the Committee of the London Moslem League adopted the following resolutions:—"1. That the Committee of the London All-India Moslem League desire to convey, through the favour of the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for India, to his Majesty's Indian troops their good wishes for success in the opportunity accorded to them to share with their British comrades-in-arms in the defence of the Empire on the battlefields of Europe. 2. That the Committee further desire to place on record their conviction that the Moslem States will, in the Titantic struggle in which the nations of Europe have become involved, do all in their power to avoid being drawn into the vortex; and that the Turkish Government will unswervingly maintain the neutrality which it has hitherto faithfully observed, and not allow the Ottoman people to be goaded by malign attempts into any deviation from strict fidelity to its pledges." Every Mussalman will echo the sentiments of the League on an occasion when in the face of a great Imperial danger all those stupid artificial distinctions of race and colour were swept aside by His Majesty's Government and such valuable military assets as the Indian troops were not kept idle simply because of the pigment of their skin. It has been suggested in some quarters that the reason why Indian troops were not employed in war against a white skinned enemy was the possibility of their inability to restrain their feelings and outstepping the bounds of humanity in crushing the foe. If one can believe a tenth of what each of the belligerents has to say of the other, we expect most our troops to teach a much needed lesson in humanity and chivalry to Europe. The League's hopes that the Moslem States will do all in their power to avoid being drawn into the vortex are shared by all Mussalmans, and one is relieved to find that the community at least has no Admiral Mahon to suggest an early participation of Moslem states in this war in the interests of their "world position."

Turkey's Intentions.

The papers received with the last mail are full of various rumours about Turkey's intentions. We give a few samples of these to show how the process of thought-reading had been working. The Press Association learnt on the 1st September that a feeling of uncertainty was still expressed as to the attitude of Turkey. It is satisfactory to note that the Grand Vizier had again confirmed the assertion of the Turkish Ambassador in London as to Turkey's peaceful intentions. The Ottoman Embassy had telegraphed to Constantinople for information regarding the reported passage of Germans towards Constantinople, and was awaiting a reply. The Exchange Telegraph Company was informed that these men were probably Turkish officers who were in England in connection with the building of the two battleships for the Turkish Government. These officers recently left England to return overland to Constantinople, their services no longer being required in England since the ships had been taken over by the British Government. A Press Association telegram from Kaghyzman, Trans-Caucasia, stated that deep trenches had been dug around Erzerum and beyond, and on many points on the frontier fortifications and wire entanglements had been constructed. German engineers were said to be directing the work. A *Manchester Guardian* telegram from Athens on 7th September stated that the latest news from Constantinople represents that, notwithstanding the pressure exercised by the German Ambassador on Turkey to declare herself in open hostility to the Triple Entente, the Turkish Government was hesitating. This was considered as a partial success for the Ambassadors of the Triple Entent in their strenuous endeavours to dissuade the conservative element in the Cabinet against following Enver Pasha's headlong policy. According to conversations which the correspondent has had with Balkan diplomatic representatives here, the irreconcilable interests of Greece, Bulgaria, and Turkey constitute an element making for peace in the Balkans, and the probability was that all the three countries would will not be embroiled in the war, at least among themselves.

Turkey and Bulgaria.

Since the outbreak of the war rumours have been rife about an alliance between Turkey and Bulgaria to throw in their lot with the Austro-German Powers. Turkey has made her position clear in no uncertain way on more than one occasion. Bulgaria has similarly declared her intention to maintain strict neutrality. The recent report that the King of Bulgaria had sent a telegram of congratulation to the Hungarian army was taken as a proof of Bulgaria's sentiments. Bulgarians qualified to express an opinion say, however, that King Ferdinand's personal act in no way reflects the policy of the Government or the wishes of the people. They say that the telegram, if it ever was sent, expresses only the King's well-known Hungarian sympathies. He lived part of his youth in Hungary, he is bound to Hungary by many ties, and he owns estates there. If a revolution had broken out as a result of the defeat of Bulgaria in the second Balkan war it is to Hungary that he would have retired. They say that the Bulgarian people will never combine with Turkey to join in the war, for the simple reason that they have nothing to gain. Some might say that they could gain Macedonia. Bulgaria undoubtedly would be glad to gain the part of Macedonia that was to be hers in the original settlement, but to stake her existence again in war there must be a very great reward. Macedonia is not that. "What Bulgaria urgently needs is a port. What Turkey most wants is Salonika. The end of the Balkan Wars, however, left Bulgaria as a buffer State between Greece and Turkey, but without a real port. Salonika (if it fell to the Turks as a spoil of war) divided from Turkey by Bulgaria would be a political impossibility, and if Bulgaria got Kavala the situation would become worse for Turkey's

future development. The position is that neither could get what she wants without injury to the other."

The Defences of Antwerp.

The Germans have begun the bombardment of Antwerp in real earnest and, according to the latest news, they have taken the inner forts and have even entered the city. The place was considered to be almost impregnable and its easy and rapid fall would be little short of a unique feat in German military history. The following history of the fortifications of Antwerp will be of interest to our readers. In the art of fortification Antwerp can claim to have been a model to Europe from the earliest days of its history. In the sixteenth century, when the idea of the bastion—the protruding defences built out with the intention of covering, from their two flanks, the portions of the rampart from which they sprang—began to be the dominating principle of fortification, the citadel which the Spaniards built at Antwerp in 1568 was the first example of the complete bastioned system. Nothing remains of it to-day except a restored portion which is used as a museum, but it was the centre of General Chasse's defence against the French troops in 1832. In 1859, when the whole system of Belgium's fortress, as they had been constructed under Wellington's supervision, were overhauled, Antwerp again became a fine example of the fortification theories of its period. It was only just of its period, however; for it was the last occasion on which the mediæval enceinte—the continuous line of strong fortifications enclosing the whole town, as opposed to the modern system of detached forts at a considerable distance from the city—was employed, and the coming of high explosives made the old idea of the enceinte a thing of the past. The fortifications, begun in 1859, were carried out as follows:—At that time Antwerp still had its old enceinte. This was removed, and a new one, between eight and nine miles in length, was built, which included not only Antwerp but the two villages of Bechen and Bougerout. Beyond the enceinte, at a distance of about two miles, a line of eight detached forts was built, completely screening the south and south-east sides of the city. The forts are about a mile and a quarter apart, and are each constructed for a garrison of 1,000 men. Each has frontal works of over 700 yards, and is intended for an armament of 120 guns and 15 mortars. There were already one or two other forts in existence on other sides of the city, and the north was to be amply protected in event of a siege by the flooding the River Scheldt over the lowlands. In 1870 Fort Merxern and redoubts at Berendrecht and Oorderen were constructed to dominate at inundation zone. This was the position of Antwerp's defence up to the arrival of long-range artillery and the infinitely destructive modern explosives. With the coming of these it became evident that the defence of 1859 were useless without some extension of the area which they covered to meet the longe range of the artillery. Accordingly it was decided in 1878 to build an outer line of 15 forts and batteries at a distance of nine to six miles from the enceinte of Antwerp, and seven to four from the first line of forts. By 1900 ten of these outer forts had been constructed, and a commission was appointed to fix the positions of the remaining five. Though the maps of two years ago do not show the line as completed, the work was in rapid progress in 1908. The existing defences of Antwerp fall, then, into three sections—the new outer line of forts, the old 1859 line, and the now almost useless enceinte. It will be seen that nearly all the defensive works have been concentrated on the right bank of the Scheldt; the supposition is that no enemy can get round to the west of the city in sufficient a strength to be really dangerous. One interesting problem has arisen out of the necessity to fortify this great Belgian port. Antwerp needs growing room, and it has been proposed to remove the old enceinte into order to give the city this. But if the old enceinte was removed and a new one built to connect the 1859 line of forts this would be 30 miles in length. And if the city then took advantage of its growing room and spread out to the new enceinte the outer line of forts would be too near to screen the town from bombardment. And a further extension of the outer forts is an extremely difficult proposition; for the whole Belgian army would be hardly strong enough effectively to garrison such an extended position. So Antwerp remains with her enceinte of 1859, and if she does extend it will apparently have to be on the left bank of the Sheldt.

German Socialists and the War.

It would appear from various accounts emanating from different sources that the German Socialist Party is overwhelmingly on the side of the War Lord in struggle. Even such a pronounced Socialist organ as the Berlin *Vorwarts* regards the war as a necessity forced on Germany and thinks it the duty of every German socialist to support the Government. The following is from one of its leading articles which appeared under the title of "The Great Victory". The victory referred to is apparently the repulse of the French in Lorraine on the 21st and 22nd August. The *Vorwarts* says:—"Great have been the successes of the German army against France and the first important decision has come sooner than anyone expected. The rash decision of the French Staff to take the offensive and thereby surrender the great advantages which their system of frontier fortifications would have assured to them has soon been punished. The French have been beaten, perhaps already vanquished, though great sacrifices may still have to be made to reap the fruits of the victory." The *Vorwärts* proceeds to discuss the effect of this success on the policy of the neutral States. It reminds its readers of the maxim of Clausewitz, that war is only a "continuation of politics" by other means, and it asks what is now the object of the German policy. "When the war broke out the phrase was 'War against Tsarism.' It was this phrase which made the war appear inevitable, even to those who are enemies of war and had advocated a policy which would have excluded 'a continuation by other means,' in the phrase of Clausewitz. Though war is subordinate to politics, when once it has broken out it follows its own laws, and its events settle decisively its political aim. And here is the problem to which we would draw the attention of the German people. From the beginning of the war it was clear that the first blow must be directed against the allies of Russia. Military experts recognised it as an unavoidable necessity first to bring France to her knees in order then, in combination with Austria, to make head against Russia. And the rest of us are compelled to acquiesce in this necessity, much as we deplore the terrible hazard that brings two civilised nations into this murderous conflict. But strategical necessities are not without influence on the political issue. In a military sense the defeat of France is our first desire, but politically the most urgent necessity is the overthrow and annihilation of Tsarism. The defeat of Russia's allies is necessary, because they are the allies of Tsarism, but it is necessary only so far as suffices to prevent them from defeating the overthrow of Tsarism. Just as Bismarck in 1866 built a golden bridge over which the vanquished might enter into an alliance with Germany, so must we now leave open the way for an understanding between the great civilised nations. We must keep before our eyes a policy which avoids attacks on the unity and independence of other nations—attacks that might perpetuate hostility between the three Western Powers, and so put Russia, even after her overthrow, into the intolerable position of arbiter of Europe. No, Tsarism is, and remains, our enemy, and nothing is more distressing than the thought that our forces must be so long tied up in the west that they prevent us in the east from bringing our battle there to a successful completion. Should we not succeed in overthrowing Tsarism, strategical necessity would throw political necessity into the background, and then the final solution would take a form that has always been in the minds of the governing classes. Instead of close friendship between the civilised nations of the west we should go back to the days of the Holy Alliance in which Tsarism would again possess the dominant influence. It would be a return of Austrian and German policy to lines which this war should make for ever impossible. In such a case this war would lose all its justification, we should be in danger of antagonising all who are now neutral, and this war, even should its immediate result to us be victory, would only be the prelude for a new and still more terrible conflict. No, this war should be a war not for aggrandisement, nor for the substitution of German for English and Russian supremacy, but for the freedom of the nations. Freedom from the influence of Moscow, freedom for Poles and Finland, freedom in its political development, and dissolution of the unnatural alliance of two civilised nations with the barbarism of the Tsar—that is the goal which the German people, enthusiastic and ready for all sacrifices, has set before itself."

Germany's Feeling Towards France.

A German official communication sent out from Berlin sets out to explain how "painful" it has been for everyone in Germany, without distinction of party, to have been obliged to go to war with France and that, too, at the will of Tsarism. Now that blood has flowed, it continues, this feeling has naturally given place to the firm resolve to have a complete reckoning with France. At the same time more and more voices are being raised in favour of building a golden bridge for France, because a permanent condition of traditional enmity between two nations who mutually complete each other's civilisation would be an enormity. The writer then proceeds to quote *Die Welt am Montag*, which declares:—"The struggle with France must be fought out to the bitter end, yet it must be carried on in the proper spirit. We have not to do with a harmful monster that must be rooted out, but with an honourable enemy, with whom afterwards an honourable, righteous peace is possible. Out of military considerations we must beat France, yes, even crush her, but when we have gained the victory we do not

wish to destroy her. This civilised people will retain also after the war the right of existence. We emphatically reject the plans of phantasists who are already putting forward a programme for the splitting up of entire France. No, we will destroy Tsarism, but France we will maintain. We will so carry on the war and so beat France that, after peace is re-established, it shall be possible to form with France a European community of civilisation." The communication then quotes a passage from the *Vorwärts* article which have reproduced above and proceeds :—"We must in consequence keep our eyes fixed on a statesmanship which shall not by conquests and the disturbance of the unity and the independence of other nations prolong for ever the regrettable enmity with the Western Powers, whereby Russia, even after she has suffered a defeat, would be again placed in the position of the fearful and unbearable arbitrator of Europe. For us Tsarism remains the one enemy. This war must not have as its object the making of conquests and the setting up, in place of the British, Tsaristic world lordship of a new one, but the freeing of the nations, their liberation from Moscowdom, liberty and independence for the Poles and Finland, free developement also for the great Russian nation itself, the redeeming of two cultured nations out of the unnatural alliance with Tsaristic barbarism. This was the goal which made the German people enthusiastic and self-sacrificing. That this may thus be the result statesmanship has now to see to." That Berlin journals may openly express such opinions, adds the German news agency, although the censor examines and weighs each word, shows that the ideas of the Government cannot differ much from these. "However premature it may at the moment appear, on account of the embittered struggle, yet the hope of an agreement with France in the future is general on Germany's part." This communication is very significant and may have possibly been intended to hint at the policy which Germany may be thinking of pursuing when she has succeeded in "hacking her way through." Was the declaration of the Allies to prosecute the war and make peace conjointly meant as a rejoinder?

French Opinion.

THE report that had reached England from Copenhagen that Berlin papers, with obvious approval of the Government, were holding out "golden bridges" to France was confirmed by information received in Paris. The *Temps* said on 29th August that the report had been "discreetly circulated" that Germany was prepared to make peace with France on excellent terms. A telegram from Washington received in Paris about the same time attributed to "an eminent diplomatist" of a neutral country the opinion that the German Emperor would make proposals for peace within two months. The *Temps* saw in these reports evidence of the desire of Germany to induce France and England to separate themselves from Russia. "But that explanation is not the only possible one," says the Paris correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*. "Other people here consider that the fact that Germany has been successful at the beginning of the war will make it much more easy for her to sue for peace at a comparatively early date than if she had been beaten at once. Had Germany done badly from the first, the Emperor would have been compelled by regard for his prestige and perhaps for the safety of his throne to hold out to the bitter end. But he could now plead that Germany had defended herself brilliantly against overwhelming odds. France will fight to the bitter end to rid herself of the invader, but should the war at any moment have reached a point at which it was very much of a draw I doubt whether the opinion of the French people would allow the war to be continued merely to secure a crushing victory over Germany, should Germany be willing to end it on terms that France could honourably accept. A really conclusive victory might, of course, change that opinion. It seems unhappily already plain that, whatever the result of the war may be, France will suffer even more severely from it than from the war of 1870."

Germany's Plan of Naval Attack.

A LETTER, received by the *Times*, describing the experiences of two American oil engineers who reached London from Roumania by way of Berlin, says:—"The Americans paid a visit to the flying station and estimate that there were over 50 Zeppelins ready waiting to start, and hundreds of aeroplanes ready also. There was immense activity in constructing new craft and in training men, as many as a hundred aeroplanes being in the air at once with learners. From general conversation they gathered that there would be a great combined attack by the naval and aerial fleets at some auspicious moment."

Big Gun Talk.

ACCORDING to a Press Association message of 8th September, a German American, who had just arrived at Rotterdam from Essen, reported that at Krupps' Works, which he had visited, all departments were working day and night, turning out new guns and substructures. All the workmen of the firm had been excused military service, and thousands of new workmen had been engaged. New Zeppelins with, it was declared, numerous improvements are also under construction, and some are nearly completed. He heard much talk of the new big guns which, it was declared, could easily throw shells from Calais to Dover, and of the intention of the Germans to occupy Calais, and thence to carry out under the protection of these huge weapons a Zepplin invasion of England. With this end in view, it was intended, he was told, to waste no time on a siege of Paris. Time was too precious, as with the advent of rough weather in the autumn the Zepplins would be useless. Perhaps the time has passed.

The War through German Spectacles.

SOME of the English papers publish extracts from the German papers that had reached England about the beginning of September through neutral countries. Those extracts throw an interesting light on some aspects of the war. It will be remembered, for instance, that the Admiralty reported that on August 18 there was a "certain liveliness apparent" in the southern parts of the North Sea. Some statements which appear in the German press explain in detail the meaning of that phrase. Thus, the issue of *Vorwarts* of August 21 gives the following official announcement :—"The two small cruisers Strassburg and Stralsund have during the last few days made a journey into the southern parts of the North Sea. The Strassburg sighted two enemy submarines off the English coast, and with a few shots from a distance succeeded in making one of them sink." The official statement leaves it obscure whether the Strassburg thought she had sunk the British submarine. We know, of course, that, as a matter of fact, she did not. The statement continues :—"The Stralsund exchanged shots with several British destroyers at long range, and two of them suffered damage." The latter statement, so far as we know, is quite incorrect. Finally, the official report says :—"Thanks to this incident, as well as to the report of an airship which has gone as far as Skagar Rack, it may be affirmed positively once more that the German coasts and waters are free of the enemy, and that neutral shipping may pass without hindrance." As to the sinking of the German submarine U 15, the *Berliner Tageblatt* makes the following comment :—"The material loss is substantial ; on the other hand we understand that during the last few days three new submarines have been commissioned, so that the loss of the U 15 is wiped out. Besides which, some new torpedo-boats have just been made ready for service. Indeed, there is no need to emphasise the fact that a feverish activity now rules in our dockyards in order to get more warships ready for sea." The *Hamburger Fremdenblatt* of August 24, compiles a list of the achievements of the German fleet up to date. It includes the mine-laying of the Konigin Luise ; the action of the Goeben and Breslau in "breaking through the hostile fleets in the Mediterranean—an exploit which the enemy will not find it so easy to imitate" ;—the journey of the Strassburg and the Stralsund ; and the raid of the German submarines against the British fleet. Says the *Fremdenblatt* : "What the German submarines have accomplished is not yet known, but the expedition will not have been devoid of success." As we know, its only result was the sinking of the U 15 by the cruiser 'Birmingham.' From another issue of the *Berliner Tageblatt* it appears that the German Government has through a neutral country, made a formal protest to the Russian Government against the alleged action of Russian troops in burning and plundering Prussian territory on the line of their advance. Says this document :—"Germany makes public protest against a method of conducting war which is so contrary to international law, and if the conduct of the struggle in consequence assumes a particularly brutal character Russia alone must bear the responsibility."

Counting their Chickens.

SOME of the most thrilling passages in the despatch sent by Field Marshal Sir John French related to the efforts of the Germans to drive the English army against Maubeuge on August 24 and 25 and surround it there. One of these passages reads: "The French were still retiring, and I had no support except such as was afforded by the fortress of Maubeuge, and the determined attempts of the enemy to get round my left flank assured me that it was his intention to hem me against that place and surround me. I felt that not a moment must be lost in retiring to another position." Then, speaking of the afternoon of Wednesday, August 26, General French says:—"At length it became apparent that if complete annihilation was to be avoided a retirement must be attempted, and the order was given to commence it about 8-30 p. m." The German newspapers of this date which reached England furnish a very interesting commentary on General French's reports, for they show that both the German General Staff and the German people believed with the utmost confidence that on August 25 and 26 the English army was on the point of being captured or destroyed. In the official headquarters report

appear the words :—"The army of General von Klück has defeated the English army near Maubeuge and attacked it repeatedly to-day south-west of Maubeuge while encircling it round (Unter umfassung)." The German General Staff made a very bad miscalculation, and great must have been the disappointment in Germany when no information came that the encirclement had been complete. How complete was the German confidence that the English army was on the point of destruction may be judged from the following passage in an article by the military expert of the *Berliner Tageblatt* :—"While in the extreme north our line drove its attack deep into France, near Maubeuge the tragic fate of the English Expeditionary Army has been partially fulfilled, and the news that it has been cut off from the Allied line cannot now be far distant. Some days ago the English cavalry brigades were thrown back on Belgian soil, then followed the struggle east of Maubeuge, and now the army of General von Klück has succeeded in hurling back and encircling the English. Such an encirclement by the German troops, accustomed as they are to victory, usually leads to nothing less than annihilation,, as to which the English will now no longer be in doubt." Also, the Berlin *National Zeitung*, on reading the official statements which appeared to indicate that the Germans had got in between the French and British, indulged in the following description of the fate awaiting the British army :—"The British Expeditionary Corps, which was so enthusiastically greeted by the French on its landing in Boulogne hardly three weeks ago, is cut off from its communications and can only now save itself by flight to the French harbours of Dunkirk, Calais, Havre, or Cherbourg. There thus stands before the fragments of the British army a retreat which is a lively reminder of the historic retreat of the British General Sir John Moore in the Spanish campaign against Napoleon. It is the fate of British armies on the Continent, after failures in warfare, to be obliged to flee to harbours of safety, whence they can sail home again under the protection of the guns of the British fleet. . . . It is really very questionable whether Field Marshal French will succeed, like his predecessor Moore, in getting the fragments of his army safely to England." These predictions read quaintly in the light of Sir John French's report.

The German Advance and French Losses.

The Paris correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* in a long despatch on 30th August, after noting the alterations made in the composition of the French Press Bureau, which it was hoped would remove the deep dissatisfaction felt on account of the suppression of news, says:—"We are still without any information here as to the casualties on the French side since the beginning of the war. They have been very heavy on both sides, and probably exceed even proportionately the losses in any war for a long time past. On both sides two regiments have in some cases had to be merged into one, and even in the new regiment thus formed the companies are often very small. I hear from an excellent source that the French casualties in the battle in the north up to last Tuesday, August 25th, were about 80,000. Indeed my informant said that he believed that these figures included only killed and missing, but not wounded. I give the figures with all reserve, but they are not at all improbable, at any rate for the total casualties. The fact that a soldier is killed, missing, or seriously wounded is privately communicated to his family, often after several days. It was only yesterday morning that the Parisian public learned for the first time by the statement in the curt official communication that the French line stretched from the Somme to the Vosges, that our forces had retreated to within so short a distance of Paris, and that eight departments of France were invaded. Up to then the official communications had been worded in such a way as to suggest that our forces were still near the frontier. This news, coming like a bolt from the blue, naturally caused great alarm and led to all sorts of rumours. It was a great mistake not to prepare the public for this news. It is possible, perhaps probable, that this retirement is in accordance with deliberate tactics adopted in order to draw the enemy's forces on until they are exhausted and then attack them. This would mean that General Joffre had adopted the tactics which Jaures always declared to be the only course. Indeed the whole of the present campaign up to now has confirmed the prohecies and proposals of Jaures, who is proved to have known more about military tactics than the military experts. Military experts are now almost unanimously of the opinion that the offensive tactics first employed (specially those in Alsace-Lorraine) were a mistake, and that had Jaures's plan been followed from the first our position would now be much better than it is and our losses much smaller. Even, however, on the hypothesis that the French retreat has been deliberate, the German advance seems to have been so extraordinarily rapid that the plan cannot have entirely succeeded, and there must have been incidents of which we know nothing. It is probable that some French railway lines are being used by the Germans. Even now we are not being told the whole truth. Nothing has been heard here of the reported and very probable German occupation of Arras, which I first learned from the *Manchester Guardian* of Friday, and we know nothing at all of what is passing in the invaded departments."

The Economic Position in Germany.

A SUFFICIENTLY instructive view of the economic situation in Germany at the end of the first four weeks of the war is afforded in an article in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, the writer of which incidently wanes very indignant over England's war on German trade, though the indignation is a measure of how hard the trade war is likely to hit the Germans. "We may note with satisfaction," says the review in question, "that the first fright and confusion produced by the outbreak of war in our economic life has rapidly vanished, thanks to the co-operation of all circles in the endeavours to meet the altered conditions. If this has not been entirely achieved it is hardly to be wondered at. Railway traffic, that had been almost entirely ceased, and to some extent a reflow of savings to the banks and savings banks may be observed. On the open money market, too, things are easier. According to the last statement issued by the Reichsbank, a further issue of notes approaching 1½ milliards of marks was permissible without going under the (gold) backing of a third required. The private war credit banks which have been established at numerous places will considerably relieve the State Bank in the direction of loans. Stock Exchange business is at a complete standstill, and until the general position has sufficiently cleared it will certainly be wisest to let things so remain. Even when a commencement is made it must be a gradual one, starting with home Government stocks, municipal bonds, &c. In view of the status of the Reichsbank and the general money and credit conditions, it is necessary to wait before issuing the planned big war loan. For the present the Richsbank is available for the covering of the considerable cash needs of the war. Presumbly the issue of the war loan will only be decided on when further decisive German victories can be stated. In no case is there any occasion for anxiety in regard to the provision of this money. It is an open question also whether the markets of neutral foreign States cannot be taken into consideration for the German loan. News is lacking regarding the general economic conditions in England, but an extraordinarily bad impression has been made by the English economic war that has been started against Germany with such petty means, and much less on account of the disadvanteges which might result therefrom for Germany as on account of the spirit which this expresses and which with brutal clearness reveals the motives which have impelled England to participation in this war. It is the attempt to destroy Germany economically, the troublesome competitor on the world market. This goal, and the means used in reaching it, recall the time when England, in the year 1598, robbed the German merchants settled in London of their priviliges and turned them out. What England is now undertaking against Germany, and in which it does not stop at the breaking of agreements, as in the case of the German patents, reminds us of such instances as that referred to in times long past, whose revival is not apparently hindered either by culture and morals or by the elements of justice."

War Conditions in Russia.

WE practically know little as to the condition, economic and social, under which Russia is fighting, but it is probable that they cannot be as reassuring as those prevailing France and England. A native of Bolton, who holds a responsible position in St. Petersburg, in a letter written on August 12th and received in Bolton on August 29 says :—"I am sorry for the poor women and children left here. The Government is doing all it can to help them, and all sorts of collections are going on. Notices are up that no landlord can turn out the wife of a soldier for non-payment of rent. All wine and beer places are closed, and I never saw Petersburg so sober. At a large number of mills notices are already posted up that in two weeks' time they will shut down. What a terrible prospect for the working people and I expect it is the same in Germany. All provisions have been much dearer here, but to-day notices are posted stating the prices to be charged for meat, bread, &c., and anyone asking more than these prices is to be put into prison or pay a fine of 3,000 roubles. That is the best thing the Government has done yet. Notices are put up at my mill that the work-people will get their accounts in two weeks' time. It is rumoured that those in official positions will also have their salaries stopped. If that turns out correct I am off to England."

Professor Harnack and the War.

PROFESSOR HARNACK is one of the most eminent and famous German scholars, whose name commands great respect abroad. At the outbreak of the war between Germany and England he is reported to have made a speech in which he described the onduct of Great Britain as that of a traitor to civilisation. The

following are extracts from a letter which has been addressed to Professor Harnack by a number of well-known British theologians, including Principal Selbie, Principal Forsyth and Professors Herbert T. Andrews and H. H. Scullard:—"We, the undersigned, a group of theologians who owe more than we can express to you personally and to the great host of German teachers and leaders of thought, have noticed with pain a report of a speech recently delivered by you, in which you are said to have described the conduct of Great Britain in the present war as that of a traitor to civilisation. We are quite sure that you could never have been betrayed into such a statement if you had been acquainted with the real motives which actuate the British nation in the present crisis. Permit us, in the interests of a better understanding now and subsequently, to state to you the grounds on which we, whose obligations to Germany, personal and professional, are simply incalculable, have felt it our duty to support the British Government in its declaration of war against the land and people we love so well. We are not actuated by any preference for France over Germany, still less by any preference for Russia over Germany. The preference lies entirely the other way. Next to the peoples that speak the English tongue, there is no people in the world that stand so high in our affection and admiration as the people of Germany. Several of us have studied in German universities. Many of us have enjoyed warm personal friendship with your fellow-countrymen. All of us owe an immeasureable debt to German theology, philosophy, and literature. Our sympathies are in matters of the spirit so largely German that nothing but the very strongest reasons could ever lead us to contemplate the possibility of hostile relations between Great Britain and Germany. Nor have we the remotest sympathy with any desire to isolate Germany, or to restrict her legitimate expansion, commercial and colonial. We have borne resolute witness against the endeavour made by foes of Germany to foment anti-German suspicion and ill-will in the minds of our fellow-countrymen. But we recognise that all hope of settled peace between the nations, and indeed of any civilised relations between the nations, rests on the maintenance inviolate of the sanctity of treaty obligations. We can never hope to put law for war if solemn international compacts can be torn up at the will of any Power involved. These obligations are felt by us to be the more stringently binding in the case of guaranteeed neutrality. For the steady extension of neutralisation appears to us to be one of the surest ways of the progressive elimination of war from the face of the earth. All these considerations take on a more imperative cogency when the treaty rights of a small people are threatened by a great world Power. We, therefore, believe that when Germany refused to respect the neutrality of Belgium, which she herself had guaranteed, Great Britain had no option, either in international law or in Christian ethics, but to defend the people of Belgium. . . . It has cost us all the deepest pain to find the Germany which we love so intensely committing this act of lawless aggression on a weak people, and a Christian nation becoming a mere army, with army ethics. We loathe war of any kind. A war with Germany cuts us to the very quick. But we sincerely believe that Great Britain in this conflict is fighting for conscience, justice, Europe, humanity, and lasting peace. . . . We have been grieved to the heart to see in the successive acts of German policy a disregard of the liberties of State, small or great, which is the very negation of civilisation. It is not our country that has incurred the odium of being a traitor to civilisation or to the conscience of humanity."

THE Russians have rechristened St. Petersburg Petrograd, perhaps to remove its Teutonic Association, but Teutonism in Russia goes further than names. Of the real rulers of Russia are many Teutonic both in name and blood. According to one account, most of them belong to the Teutonic nobility of the Baltic provinces, which is largely descended from the crusading order of the Teutonic knights who conquered and converted these provinces in the fourteenth century. But Russia has imported Germans on a considerable scale ever since Peter the Great brought them to carry out his work of reorganisation. If all the German names of men and cities in Russia are to be Slavised, there will be a rechristening on a large scale. The Russian General in East Prussia at the present moment bears the German name of Rennenkampf. The Russian Ambassador in London is Count Benckendorf. At the same time, curiously enough, the German Ambassador bore the Slavonic name of Lichnowsky. The famous Russian defender of Plevna, by the way, in the Russo-Turkish War, bore the German name of Todleben. Among places, the Tsar's palace itself must change its German name of Peterhof, and the great neighbouring fortress of Kronstadt (Crown City) must be given a Slav translation.

Teutonism in Russia.

THE following throws further light on the *Times'* announcement that the German Consul has been sent away from Tripoli. Mr. Austin West, the Special Correspondent of the *Daily Chronicle*, wired thus from Milan and it was received in London on the 9th September :—"Despicable intrigues on the part of the German Consular staff in Tripoli to foment a general Mussalman rising in North Africa have just come to light through the vigilance of the Italian authorities. To make clear the position of affairs I should mention that prior to the Italian occupation of Tripoli German interests there were represented by the Belgian Consul, Commendatore Laby, an Italian subject. Last month, however, a new consul arrived there from Germany, bringing with him as his secretary one named Cook, and it very soon became apparent that these two, who were in reality German army officers, had come on a special mission, the object of which was to corrupt leading citizen to help in in the undoing of France in Tunis and Great Britain in Egypt. From that time a certain unwonted liveliness had been noticeable in the movements of the native population of Tripoli to and from the Consulate. But the local military commander had his eyes open and realised full well that such a propaganda was directed primarily against England and France, and that the circumstances suggested a development in the nature of an anti-European movement. Opportunity for defeating these machinations was afforded, when one day the German Consul, having wrongly inferred from his name and perfect German speech, that a certain prominent resident, Signor Umberto Wiedlich, was a Teuton subject, summoned him to the Consulate and made a proposal that he should muster a large Arab contingent to start for Tunis on an important secret mission. 'You've mistaken your man,' answered Wiedlich, indignantly, 'for the truth is I am a Neapolitan.' This matter Wiedlich reported to the military police, and Major Ridolfi, of the Royal Italian Carabineers, was charged with the duty of putting the German suspects aboard the first outgoing steamer, which happened to be the Memphi. On the day before the steamer sailed a special German messenger arrived bearing confidential correspondence and bringing £4,000 in gold to the Consulate from the German Embassy in Rome. The authorities, however, refused to allow the messenger to disembark. The *Corriere Della Sera*, in giving further detail of the Consul's suspicious behaviour, says that Italy cannot afford to wink at such knavish tricks, the consequences of which might well prove as ruinous to her own interests as to those of her neighbours."

A German Intrigue in Tripoli.

A PICTURE of the psychic experiences of a soldier plunged for the first time into the pandemonium of a modern battle is given in the *Retch*, a Russian paper, by a wounded artillery officer. He says :—"At daybreak positions were assigned to us, and the Commander of the brigade handed us a plan of the action of our artillery. From that moment horror possessed our souls. It was not anxiety for ourselves or fear of the enemy, but a feeling of awe in the face of something unknown. At six o'clock we opened fire at a mark which we could not distinguish but which we understood to be the enemy. Towards midday we were informed that the German cavalry was attempting to envelop our right wing, and were ordered in that direction. Having occupied our new position we waited. Suddenly we see the enemy coming, and at the same time he opens fire on us. We turn our guns upon him, and I give the order to fire. I myself feel that I am in a kind of nightmare. Our battery officers begin to melt away. I see that Germans are developing their attack. First one regiment appears and then another. I direct the guns and pour a volley of projectiles right into the thick of the first regiment. Then a second volley, and a third. I see how they fall among the men, and can even discern the severed limbs of the dead flying into the air after the explosion. One of the enemy's regiments is annihilated. Then a second one. All this time I am pouring missiles in among them. But now the nervous feeling has left me. My soul is filled with hate, and I continue to shoot at the enemy without the least feeling of pity. Yet still the enemy is advancing, rushing forward and lying down in turns. I do not understand his tactics, but what are they to me? It is enough for me that I am occupying a favourable position and mowing him down like a strong man with a scythe in a clover field. During the first night after the battle I could not sleep a wink. All the time my mind was filled with pictures of the battlefield. I saw German regiments approaching, and myself firing into the thick of them. Heads, arms, legs, and whole bodies of men were being flung high into the air. It was a dreadful vision. I was in four battles. When the second began I went into it like an automaton. Only your muscles are taxed. All the rest of your being seems paralysed. So complete is the suspension of the sensory processes that I never felt my wound. All I remember is that a feeling of giddiness came over me, and my head began to swim. Then

As in a Dream.

I swooned to the ground, and was picked up by the Medical Corps and carried to the rear."

How the German Soldier Marches.

THE special correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* and *Daily Telegraph* gives the following graphic picture of the western sweep of the German hosts as seen from behind :—" At half-past one on Thursday, August 20, the German army started its entry into Brussels. Never before have I seen a more wonderful and impressive sight. It was impossible to imagine that these men had been fighting continuously for ten days, or that they were even on active service. First of all came six cyclists, then a detachment of cavalry, and then a great mass of infantry. Then guns, field guns, then more infantry, then huge howitzers, then a pontoon train, and then more infantry ; and so on from half-past one on the Thursday until Sunday morning, August 23, without a break. All the horses of the cavalry, guns, and trains were in wonderful condition. The men also struck me as being very fresh and very keen. Each company was accompanied by its travelling stove, the fire of which is never allowed out. There is always something hot for the troops. Time and time again the German soldiers have told me that it is only this hot coffee or hot soup ever at hand which keeps them going on their forced marches. An aeroplane kept its station ahead of this invading horde. It signalled both during the day and at dusk by dropping various-coloured stars. All the movements of the troops were regulated by these signals. I calculated that in all some 250,000 men passed through Brussels, but thousands more never entered the city, but marched south direct from Louvain. This immense horde of armed men after passing through Brussels continued their march south, splitting into three huge columns. One marched by Waterloo to Nivelles, and there split into two portions, the one marching on Mons and the other on Binche and Charleroi. But the flower of the German army, commanded by General von Kluck, and accompanied by the Duke of Holstein and many notabilities, turned off at Hal, and by forced marches of thirty miles a day gained Tournai by Enghien and Ath. Then I realised for the first time how the Allied left was being threatened by this overwhelming mass of men. I do not know which way they went after reaching Tournai. I have seen these companies, followed by their smoking kitchens, march thirty miles a day for six days on end. The men sleep as they walk. They fall exhausted into ditches by the roadside. I have seen the non-commissioned officers kick them until they woke, prod them with bayonets, curse them with unrepeatable oaths, and then give them hot coffee or soup, replacing them in the broken ranks like so many tin soldiers in the nursery upset by someone knocking against the table. The human element does not count in this army. The men have never been given the chance to think. They are just there to march. They are fed when they cannot stand, and are killed when the moment arrives which suits their chiefs."

The Lahore Islamia College and the Government Grant.

THE Secretary of the Islamia College Committee has, at our request, furnished us with the following proceedings of the meetings of the College Committee and the General Council at which the question of accepting the Government grant-in-aid on certain conditions was finally decided :—"At a meeting of the Islamia College Committee, held on September 15, 1914, the following resolution was passed :— With the permission of the Chairman (literally, "as directed by the Chairman") the Secretary laid the question of Government grant before the Committee for its consideration. Mention was made of the Director of Public Instruction's letter to the Secretary, College Committee, dated the 21st July 1913 (I) as also of the letter No. 30, dated the 18th May, 1914, (II) sent to Governmen in accordance with the instruction of the College Committee and the General Committee. The opinion which had already been expressed in regard to the loan of two officers of the Indian Education Service was discussed and the Shahdara Scheme draft (III) incidently alluded to. After this mention was made of the Director of Public Instruction's letter No. 53, dated the 4th January, 1913, (IV) and the whole correspondence commencing with the Director of Public Instruction's letter, dated the 21st July 1913 (I) were carefully examined :—V.—Letter from the Secretary, College Committee, dated the 14th March, 1914. V'.—The Director of Public Instruction's reply to the above, dated the 6th April, 1914, VI.—Application for grant in compliance with V. VII.—Letter to the Secretary, College Committee, dated the 19th August 1914 received on 21st August *re* proposal No. 67, 1914 (application for maintenance grant) sanctioned by the College Committee on 7th May, 1914, and approved by the General Council on June 3rd 1913. VIII.—Letter from the Hon'ble Mian Mohammad Shafi, dated the 21st August. IX.—The Director of Public Instruction's letter No. 684 in answer to a written request for a copy of the detailed orders. The Secretary stated that on the receipt of the detailed orders many members of the Anjuman and some of the members of the College Committee had made enquiries of him as to the posts to which the condition of Government approval was to apply and as to the scope and meaning of the expression 'Government approval.' They had also referred to the dissatisfaction which the Muslim Press had expressed in regard to this very condition. On the basis of this criticism and also because the question was bound to be raised in the College Committee, a letter was sent to the Director of Public Instruction on the 5th September, 1914, (X) in which, in view of the criticism, it was submitted that the condition of Government approval was unnecessary (as the grant was sanctioned only for a period) and that its cancellation was sure to give considerable satisfaction to the Muslim public. It was also submitted that some members of the College Committee were thinking of adopting the Aligarh Constitution. If, however, none of these suggestions could be accepte1 the Director of Public Instruction was requested to favour the Committee with official interpretation of the condition relating to "Government approval" in clear, unambiguous language. It was also represented to him that though the Committee was anxious to do all to win the Government's goodwill, it could not afford to ignore or disregard public opinion as the college depended, for its maintenance, on public subscriptions. In reply to this the following letter, dated the 9th September 1914, was received from the Director of Public Instruction :—"You say that the condition that the appointment of the new staff should be subject to the approval of the Government has been criticised in the Press, and has caused some doubt as to whether the grant should be accepted. My view is briefly as follows : All grants of public money to private bodies are made subject to the condition that the grants are expended on the subjects for which they are given. In this case the main object of the grant is the improvement of the staff, and the condition criticised is merely safeguard that the money is spent on engaging a competent staff. The condition does not imply any desire whatever on the part of the Government to interfere with the discretion of the managing body in making appointments. So long as it is clear that they are fulfilling their part of the contract, it merely reserves to Government the right of objecting to incompetent men being paid for out of public money. Such a contingency is not in the least likely to arise, and approval in ordinary cases would be merely a matter of form. The condition of course, applies only to posts of which the cost is met from the grant. "I do not think, therefore, that an application to Government for the withdrawal of the condition in question would have a chance of success. Considering that the grant is on a liberal scale, the conditions attached to it seem to me as lenient as could be hoped for; and if the grant is refused, I shall sincerely regret, as a friend of the college, that an opportunity which is not likely to recur has been thrown away." (XII). The Secretary then read out the Hon'ble Mr. Shafi's letter. After considerable discussion it was decided that the College Committee should form its opinion about the whole question of grant, and recording it, should submit the same to the General Council for consideration with as little dealy as possible. One member was of opinion that the matter should be discussed and opinion thereon formulated in the General Council and not in the College Committee. After much discussion and deliberation the following was agreed to:— I. The grant which the Government of India have sanctioned on the recommendation of the Punjab Government is as follows :— (1) Grant of Rs. 26,000 in the current year for the seven months 1st September 1914 to 31st March 1915, and thereafter Rs. 30,000 a year. During the initial years savings may be used for capital expenditure and preferably funded for the carrying out of the scheme of removal to Shahdara should that be sanctioned and mature. (2) It is not considered necessary to give the grant necessary for the full pay of the principal. The recurrent items included in the scheme for which a grant is given are accordingly the following:—

				Rs.		Rs.
(*a*)	Science	Biology Asstt. Professor	...	200	to	380
		Physics and Ch: Professor	...	400	to	600
	"	Asstt. Professor Ch:	...	200	to	380
(*b*)	Arts	European Professor of English	...	400	to	600
	"	Professor of Arabic and Persian	...	200	to	350
(*c*)	Administration.	Additional pay of Principal.	...	300		
	"	Supdt., Hostel	...	100		
				1,800	to	2,650

II. The conditions are as follows:—(1). The college accounts

should be audited. (2). The appointment of the new staff should be subject to the approval of Government. (3). Condition (2) is an alternative to the suggestion that two officers of the Indian Educational Service might be lent to the College, as is being arranged in the case of the Khalsa College, and while that offer is kept open in the event of suitable officers being available, the condition requiring the approval of Government to the appointment of the new staff will meet the case for the present. (4). The recurring grant is limited in the first instance to a term of three years and its periodic renewal is subject to the working of the college being proved to be satisfactory not only as regards educational results but in respect of the tone and discipline of the institution. Of these conditions, Nos. 1 & 4 are clear. As to No. 3, the College Committee and the General Council had after full consideration expressed their opinion (in letter II) that it was not quite practicable to secure the services of two officers of the Indian Educational Service. Firstly, because when officers were not available even for Government institutions, it would be all the more difficult to secure suitable and sympathetic officers for denominational establishments; secondly, because the grades of their pay and the rules governing their appointment and leave, etc., would be quite different from those of the rest of the staff; and thirdly, because such officers would have, in any case, to work under the Principal who would, in all circumstances, be appointed by the Anjuman. And then there was the possibility of the Professors drawing more pay than the Principal. There were thus many good grounds on the strength of which the Committee and the General Council were not prepared to avail themselves of this offer; and now again the College Committee have come to the same conclusion. The Government having graciously left the matter to the discretion of the College Committee it is decided to leave this offer alone and to consider the alternative proposal only. Condition No. (2) was certainly not quite clear, but it is evident from the satisfactory interpretation contained in the Director of Public Instruction's letter, dated 9th September 1914, that the Government has no desire whatever to interfere with the discretion of the managing body in making appointments, so long as it is clear that they are fulfilling their part of the contract, it merely reserves to the Government the right of objecting to incomptent men being paid for out of public money. As the Director of Public Instruction has stated, the occurrence of such cases is highly improbable; andlgenerally Government approval would be a purely formal affair. Besides, the condition would apply only to those posts the salaries whereof would be paid out of the grant. It is evident from this satisfactory interpretation that this condition *does not* apply to posts the salaries of which are paid out of the Anjuman Funds. Nor does the Government assume the function of weighing the comparative merits and qualifications of the various candidates. Only intimation of appointment will have to be sent to Government, and if a person has been appointed whom the Government deem objectionable, the appointment will not count for purposes of grant. Precisely the same condition applies to appointments of Professors by the Punjab University. In short, this interpretation of the condition completely removes the objections and doubts that had been created in the minds of the public. It was resolved to convey grateful thanks to the Government of India and to the Provincial Government for sanctioning this grant, and to assure both the Governments that the Anjuman-i-Himayat-i-Islam was anxious to discharge its educational duties and obligations in as thorough and efficient a manner as possible and that the welfare of the institutions it maintained and controlled was wholly dependent on the encouragement and support of the public and Government. In the end the Anjuman hoped that its work would continue to give entire satisfaction to Government. It was further decided to submit these minutes to the General Council as soon as possible. The General Council confirmed the proceedings of the College Committee held on 15th September, 1914, and appended these explanations. (1) That the Government offer as to lending the service of Professors belonging to the Indian Education Service is in the opinion of the General Council also impracticable and the Council resolves that if by any chance the grant is conditional on the acceptance of this offer, then the Council regrets that it cannot avail itself of the grant. (2) That of the new posts, only those will be subject to the formal sanction of the Government specified in the Director Public Instruction's letter, dated 9th September 1914 (the translation of which appearsin the College Committee minutes) whose entire pay is met from the Grant, and the Principal's post, as already decided, will remain subject to the sanction of the General Council only.

The Moslem University Association and an Illegality.

We publish below the correspondence that has passed between Mr. Mohamed Ali and Nawab Muhammad Ishaq Khan Sahib, Hon. Secretary of the Moslem University Association, in regard to the exclusion of Mr. Fazlul Hasan Hasrat Mohani from the list of graduates declared to have been elected members of the Muslim University Association. The facts constituting this illegality are set forth fully in the correspondence. Mr. Mohamed Ali wrote the following letter to the Hon. Secretary, Muslim University Association, on the 22nd September 1914 :—

'Sir, I have the honour to enter my emphatic protest against your exclusion of Mr. Fazlul Hasan Hasrat Mohani from the list of graduates declared to have been elected members of the Muslim University Association. 2. Neither you nor the seven gentlemen elected by the Foundation Committee on the 26th and the 27th July, 1913, for having the Muslim University Association registered are entitled to act or exclude any graduate otherwise eligible. Nor can the Association itself even when it is fully constituted—which it cannot be without the election of the full complement of 20 graduates—adjudicate on the claims of any graduate elected or excluded. The right belongs only to the Foundation Committee. 3. This opinion concerns only the question of the legal eligibility of Mr. Fazlul Hasan Hasrat Mohani and I reserve my opinion on the question of the suitability or otherwise of that gentleman for membership of the Association which is to be given in the course of an election by ballot by me along with other members of the Graduates' Guild. 4. Unless the question of Mr. Fazlul Hasan Hasrat Mohani is settled, the members hitherto elected are not entitled to act legally as electors of the Ulama. 5. Kindly specify the reasons why Mr. Fazlul Hasan Hasrat is considered by you to be ineligible for election, and state the Resolution of the Foundation Committee according to which he is ineligible."

The Hon. Secretary, the Muslim University Foundation Committee, sent the following reply on 6th October 1914 :—"Dear Sir, I am in receipt of your letter dated the 22nd instant? (ultimo), about Mr. Fazlul Hasan Hasrat Mohani, and I have also seen your editorial note in the *Hamdard* of 24th September. You are obviously labouring under the misconception that Mr. Fazlul Hasan's enrolment fee was received first of all in my office and that his name was enrolled in the register of the Guild, and that notwithstanding his name having been enrolled, he was excluded from election. This, however, is not the case. In fact Mr. Fazlul Hasan applied last of all for enrolment and he came to see me for the first time on 15th July, the final date fixed for enrolment of votes. I had special reasons against the enrolment of his name, and I distinctly informed him that I could not accede to his request without consulting the other 6 members authorised by the Foundation Committee to carry out its resolutions. I actually returned the fee left by Mr. Fazlul Hasan, but he refused to take back his money. I accordingly consulted my colleagues, and the majority declared positively against the enrolment of Mr. Fazlul Hasan, and his name was therefore never registered as you could have elicited from my letter published in the *Hamdard*—the registered names being altogether 22, of which 3 were already elected and the remaining 19 now declared as members of the Association. Thus you will see that it was entirely the question of Mr. Fazlul Hasan's enrolment and not of his 'election after enrolment' as supposed by you. 2. As for my reasons of consulting my colleagues about Mr. Fazlul Hasan's enrolment, I shall lay them before the Association, when putting up his case before that body to whom I am responsible as its elected Secretary. 3. The Foundation Committee under its resolution No. 13 delegated the power of carrying its resolutions into effect to 7 members who certainly have discretionary powers to safeguard the interests of the proposed Association. If the Association does not agree with the views of these members, it is at liberty to over-rule their decision. 4. As regards Mr. T. A. Alam and Dr. Ansari's case, you yourself seem to admit to a certain extent the special reason of the former's. As for Dr. Ansari, of course, I shall deal with his case just as I would ordinarily do when a vacancy occurs amongst the graduate members of the Association and when there is no other candidate on the list." Mr. Mohamed Ali wrote on the 7th October, 1914, as follows on the receipt of this reply. "Sir, I am grateful to you for your letter of the 6th October 1914 in reply to mine of the 22nd September. 2. I have laboured under no misconception as you imagine. My contention is and has always been as follows. The Foundation Committee, which is the fount and origin of all authority, passed some resolutions on the 26th and 27th July 1913, authorising the creation of the Muslim University Association and appointed you, as its Honorary Secretary, and six other members to co-operate with you and have the Association duly registered. The Foundation Committee resolved at that meeting that 20 Members of the Association should be elected by Moslem graduates from among themselves and clearly laid down two and only two conditions for eligibility, namely, five years' standing as a graduate and the payment of a certain prescribed fee. Mr. Fazlul Hasan Hasrat Mohani fulfilled both these conditions when he paid his fee, which you acknowledge to have received, and *ipso facto* became eligible for election. 3. The Foundation Committee did not give you individully nor jointly with your 6 colleagues any power to refuse to enrol any person who fulfilled the above conditions, and it is no concern of Mr. Fazlul Hasan's or mine whether you are acting *ultra vires* on your own responsibility or have fortified an illegality by obtaining the support of some others as well. An illegal act does not become less illegal

because instead of one person committing it, half a dozen do so. In fact your own knowledge of law would convince you that on the contrary acts which are perfectly legal when a single person commits them sometimes become illegal when others join him in committing them. Legality and illegality have nothing to do with majorities and minorities. 4. If, as you say, you did not register Mr. Fazlul Hasan's name when he on his part had done all that he was required by the Foundation Committee's Resolution to do, you failed to do your obvious duty and I am astonished to find that you plead *that* as a bar to Mr. Fazlul Hasan's election. 5. You tell me that you had 'special reasons' against the enrolment of his name. This in no way affects his position or ours. Those reasons may have existed on the 6th and 7th July 1913 also, in which case you should have persuaded the Foundation Committee to except Mr. Fazlul Hasan, whether by name or by qualification—or rather, disqualification. If your special reasons came to exist subsequently, you had nearly a year in which to call another meeting of the Foundation Committee and persuade it to modify its previous resolution so as to disqualify Mr. Fazlul Hasan. You have failed to do either and have no right now to plead such a failure as a reason for rejecting the enrolment of Mr. Fazlul Hasan Hasrat Mohani. 6. Whatever opinion I may have about the *desirability* of Mr. Fazlul Hasan's election as a member of the Moslem University Association, nobody with any intelligence can have two opinions about his *eligibility*, and those who deemed him to be an undesirable associate should have done their duty by enlisting in large numbers in the Graduates' Guild and outvoting him in the election. It is a sad commentary on our graduates that all but twenty-one refrained from doing that which Mr. Fazlul Hasan—the so-called 'undesirable'—was patriotic and prompt enough to do, namely, to pay his fee in time to be enrolled and elected. This fact alone places him higher in rank than the 'desirables' who may now object to his election. 7. But I do not apprehend that many graduates will object to his election. His only offence known to us is that six years ago he published in his Review an article written by a student of our College which two of the law-courts in the United Provinces considered, during a period of panic, to be seditious. For that offence he has suffered enough and more than enough and law does not rob religion of its monopoly of eternal damnation. Such punishments must be left to the Judge of us all, nor must we confuse the Here with the Hereafter. The student, who wrote that article for which Mr. Fazlul Hasan suffered incarceration in the common jail with all its rigours, is not only still at large but an undergraduate of our College, who would I hope, in due course become a graduate and qualify himself for membership of the Moslem University Association. That would be an irony too great even for those who are relentlessly pursuing and persecuting Mr. Fazlul Hasan Hasrat Mohani. That is not the way to wean off seditionists from sedition, but to compel the high-spirited to seek salvation in sedition. 8. All this I write not because it can in the least affect the question of Mr. Fazlul Hasan's election, for he has already been duly elected. I write this only to convince you and through you those whose wishes you are respecting in the matter that your 'special reasons' are no reasons at all and are specially ill-suited to the requirements of *to-day*. 9. I am credibly informed that you are endeavouring to place the case of Mr. Fazlul Hasan in proper perspective before those who suspect him and I trust it will not be considered impertinent of me to say that such endeavours are in every way worthy of you personally and worthy of the great position you occupy in the community. In all such endeavours I wish you success. Mr. Fazlul Hasan is in no worse position than the Hon. Mr. Surendera Nath Bannerji who is a colleague of His Excellency the Viceroy in legislating for the Indian Empire, and if Government of their own accord exempted Mr. Bannerji from a legal disqualification, is it not strange that we of our own accord should disqualify Mr. Fazlul Hasan when neither Government requires it of us nor our own rules sanction it? I repeat that I wish you success in your endeavours to clear the position of Mr. Fazlul Hasan, but if such noble and entirely worthy endeavours are covered even by the suspicion of casuistry, they will be robbed of all their credit. 10. In conclusion, I will only add that the decision of the Foundation Committee to make every Moslem graduate of 5 years' standing eligible for election as Member of the Moslem University Association if he paid the prescribed fee, could have been modified only by the Foundation Committee and not by you or your 6 colleagues or by the Association itself, and now that on the last day fixed for the payment of the fee only 20 qualified graduates who had not been elected by other bodies had paid the prescribed fee, and Mr. Fazlul Hasan Hasrat Mohani was one of them, not even the Foundation Committee can unseat him.

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The Comrade.

Sidelights on the Final Issue.

In the vast welter of opinion occasioned by the furious conflict in Europe, we find nothing so remarkable as the triumphant, almost savage shouts of chauvinists both of the press and the platform at the so-called collapse and failure of the pacifist ideals. They declare in exultant tones that the peace propaganda of Europe has ended in froth, that the peace advocate had always talked silly moonshine and that the real, grim forces of thought and feeling that sway the world have swept him and his bundle of inane doctrines once for all into the dustbin. They find in this war a curious satisfaction of mind, a complete vindication of the views that they had always preached about the incorrigibility of human nature and the philosophy of armaments. There is, however, one thing supremely amusing in their attitude. They dismiss the whole tribe of pacifists as charlatans or imbeciles who wanted to stifle the whole world with peace whereas for its life and development war was a vital "biological necessity." In the same breath they are crying aloud for the utter, absolute smashing up of German militarism with a view to secure *permanent peace for Europe*. They welcome this war as finally establishing the necessity of war in the development of human affairs and as silencing, at any rate for a long space of time, the inconvenient babble of pacificism. They at the same time call aloud for the grinding down of Germany to the extreme limits of political, military and commercial impotence that the world may securely enjoy peace. The contradiction and the fallacy of this position may not strike the chauvinist temper, but the immediate purpose that it is designed to serve is fully grasped by the chauvinist mind. It is well to remember that Germany does not claim monopoly of the type. He flourishes in France and England as well, and is just now bulking large in public prints. He loves nothing in his heart but the mailed fist, the shining armour, the methods of blood and iron. He wants to "go" full tilt at Germany now that he has had a chance, and he takes up the future "peace of Europe" as a necessary tag to conciliate the consciences that he has readily and strenuously helped to mobilise. The class he stands for is unfortunately the most powerful and dominant force in the public affairs of Europe. He worked for the war by exploiting every sanctity human and divine. He is working now with full vigour to maintain at boiling-heat the passions that he has energised. Those that differ from him have little hope of salvation at his hands. All the honest and kindly folk, who have been scared by his clamour or by the ghostly and dark suggestions of their own idealism into an attitude of acquiescence about this war, he is cleverly pressing into his service. Now that he has got the opportunity of his life-time, he is riding the situation at his will. He has started new and catching cries. He thinks it is necessary to convince everybody that the future of mankind is bound up with the wiping out of Germany from the map of Europe. Those who doubt this simple, short and efficacious cut to the millenium are, of course, traitors to the cause of civilisation and peace. He has just now discovered a new Russia, a land of prayers and of saints, of simple kindly colonels and grand Dukes, of beautiful dreams, of generous impulses, of soul-nourishing piety. He is seriously talking of conscription for England. Incidentally he has not forgotten mortals of lesser clay whose chief concern is with material gain and loss, and he is cheering their little souls with visions of fat prosperity by devising plans of a trade war. When one hears his earth-shaking and cloud-compelling din, one feels a little spasm of wonder at the irony of things that have yoked the Wells and the Shaws of sunny Utopias and beauteous dreamland to his dark and iron destiny. We need not study the mechanism of his mind. A few illustrations would suffice just to show its actual working at the present time.

What would he do if Germany is "beaten to her knees"? He would of course do everything to prevent her ever rising on her legs again. He abhors militarism and armaments (God save the mark!) and would remove root and branch the causes responsible for their growth. Their visible symbols must go first of all—the German army, the German fleet, the German guns and fortresses and munition, the German Krupp and the German Kaisers. But this is not all. He has on such occasions an evident taste to think philosophically and he has made his case morally complete for the awful things that he is preparing for the Germans. "Germany must be rendered politically and militarily innocuous"—that is the prescription, for he is absolutely certain that "between this consummation and the ruin of European civilisation there is no middle way." And least the thick-skinned man of the street may not find it easy to get this formidable formula into his head, he argues somewhat as follows to illumine his path to the moral heights he has scaled. According to him, if the

cultural acquisitions of modern times are to be preserved to the human race, the cancerous growth of systematic double-dealing and cynical faithlessness must at all costs be cut out. The German State has been guilty of such systematic double-dealing. It, therefore, becomes an *outlaw*. And it behoves European diplomacy to keep it well in view towards the end of the war when peace conditions come up for discussion. The practical lesson that should be derived from this is obvious. The limitation of Germany's liberty to make mischief in future must be effected *not by those moral checks which treaties and conventions supply, but by the impootence which material force inflicts.* The German people of to-day are endowed with a mental and moral mechanism which differs widely from that of the rest of mankind. Germany was bitten with an insatiable greed for territory and power. This was the prime cause of the war. A repetition of this state of things would be fatal to Europe, and a repitition is inevitable if at the close of this war Germany is not struck powerless. Nothing short of material impotency can secure the much suffering peoples of Europe the *permanent peace without which the commercial and industrial activity and consequently the national and individual life which alone is worth living, are possible.* The corollaries to this proposition are self-evident. The struggle must be carried on till one side or the other is beaten beyond recovery. Then and only then can Europe hope for salvation.

A sharp distinction has been and is still being made by several well-meaning people in Great Britain between the German people and their Government. But the dominant voice in public affairs to-day declares that the German chiefs responsible for the war are much more numerous than the British public is apt believe. They include, we are told, University professors, publicists, school-masters, the bulk of the civil servants, and most of the officers—in a word the intellectual and educated classes of Germany. Practically, therefore, there is little to choose between the people and their Government. The whole nation, so to speak, stands indicted. Can the intellectuals of Germany as well as its political chiefs be wiped out of existence? For the future peace of Europe no less heroic remedy would seem to be possible. Mr. Wells has tallked of this war as "a war of the mind." The triumph of his "idea" very likely involves a wholesale extermination. On his doctrine of the freedom of thought this would be a fine commentary. The Inquisition of the Middle Ages that fought heresies with such ruthless rigour would seem to be a mild affair in comparison.

And how the "material impotence" is to be inflicted? In the first place, it is to be a matter of £. s. d.—so says the dominant voice. Germany must compensate for all the destruction her armies have wrought in Belgium and France, and pay indemnities to those whose homes and properties have been destroyed, pay for the support of the widows, the parents and the childrens of those who have been slain; pay for robbing the western world of two years of carrying French railways, for the interruption of the North Sea fishing industry, for the loss of every penny occasioned by enforced idleness or foreign imprisonment, for every ship and life she has destroyed.

But how is Germany to pay? some will ask. She will soon be bankrupt, even if by some perverse turn in the wheel of fate she recovers lost ground in France and her unopposed occupation of Belgium. Even then her colonies are only worth so much, nothing near the £100,000,000 she will be asked to pay to Belgium, the £200,000,000 she will owe to France, and the as yet uncalculated sum she will (in addition to her war fleet) be required to make over to Britain and Russia. Well, she will only meet her obligations, which will have to be enforced by territorial occupation on a large scale, by a virtual revolution—says the dominant voice. All the German States must go into the melting-pot, Prussia most and first of all. The private estates of all her rulers and princes—first and foremost of the Hohenzollerns—must be escheated by the Revolutionary Government and be applied to the redemption of German territory. If Germany likes to retain, after war is over, her present, or something near her present, territorial divisions and dynasties, she must allot to her chosen princes, kings and emperor a reasonable civil list, payment for value received. But all their private estates, their vast domains, their house treasures and trusts and concealed funds must become national property.

But in the Day of Reckoning justice must not end there, says the dominant voice in the shape of Sir Harry Johnston. "Whether Turkey strikes or not at the Allies, she has already injured them in devious ways. No longer—the German prop and aid removed—must the autonomy and preservation of Armenia be delayed. Russia must have the fullest satisfaction and security she cares to demand, that the Bosphorus and Hellespont shall be no more a padlock on her trade and enterprise and on the world's need for Russian grain and Russian oil. The least the Western world can do for her in return for saving Western civilisation and restoring Poland to nationhood is to provide her with that free access to the Mediterranean which is necessary to her development. Belgium must have territorial enlargement in several directions, France a Rhine frontier, the international character of the Baltic Sea must be secured for all its limitrophe nationalities."

We wait to learn, by the way, what the dominant voice has to say about Italy.

In contrast to such graspish instinct and boundless greed, the symptoms of which are growing among the class we have referred to, the following remarks of a Russian paper about the final settlement read astonishingly mild. The paper says:—"The war must be terminated in such a way that it shall leave no vengeful aspirations on either side. The change in the map of Europe must be final, and no nationality must be opposed in the satisfaction of its legitimate ambitions. The ideal is, however, irreconcilable with the existence of an Empire like Austria-Hungary. It is also irreconcilable with the hegemony of Prussia to Germany. Further, it is irreconcilable with the division of Poland and the Treaty of Bucharest. The unifications of Russia, Italy, Germany, Roumania, and Servia must be completed. France must recover what has been taken from her, and Bulgaria also. A hundred years' fight for the principle of nationality must finish with a decision free from all compromise and therefore final."

We can offer no better comment on the greed of the cynically selfish and the mistaken enthusiasm of the idealist than the following words in which Mr. Ramsay MacDonald states the real issues. "I read and listen to the moral flambuoyancies of those who tell us that this is the last war, that from it is to date the overthrow of the military castes of Europe, that from the destruction of the Berlin War Office the Peace Temple at The Hague is to come into real being. It is all moonshine. Far more likely is it that this war is the beginning of a new military despotism in Europe, of new alarms, new hatreds and oppositions, new menaces and alliances; the beginning of a dark epoch dangerous, not merely to democracy, but to civilisation itself. To prevent this we must work with might and main, and our success will be measured by our clearness of sight and courage in explaining to our people now how this war has come, what it really means, and how it is to be ended." Bernhardi-ism made elsewhere cannot shatter Bernhardi-ism "made in Germany." Yet it is exactly this force that is being summoned to fight for the issues which Mr. Asquith outlined in the House of Commons. What this ultimately would mean to civilisation and Europe, we would discuss in our next.

The Campaign—V.

We regret that owing to various circumstances we could not give our review of the campaign from week to week, and the compelling episode of the "Choice of the Turks" forced upon us the unwelcome task of reviewing in our last issue the entire situation with reference to Turkey, thus interrupting the continuous resumé of the events of the campaign. Now that we revert to the subject we find ourselves only a little to the west of Liège, while the Germans have in the meantime not only reached the environs of Paris, but also turned back from the attractions of the capital of France to the trenches which they had evidently prepared for themselves beforehand along the Aisne and the Oise. This necessitates a change of our own plans also if we mean to keep pace with the fast moving Germans. Therefore, instead of giving a detailed account of the fighting we shall have to confine ourselves to the main events of the campaign, and devote ourselves to an explanation of the chief operations of the Allies and the enemy, setting forth the probable purpose of each, and stating how far that purpose was in fact achieved, and how success or failure in one affected the next.

I.—The 11·2 in. German Howitzers and Guns.

In our issue of the 12th September we had taken final leave of Liège, but we did not then know that we should have to commence this article with another reference to it. However, we have to revert to it to correct an error into which we had fallen through the guidance of one of the *Times'* Correspondents. We had stated that there appeared to have been no big siege-guns when the attack on Liège commenced, and that the Germans did not evidently wait for the arrival of the siege howitzers with the enormous 11·2 in. calibre. This is disproved in two important particulars. In the first place, the Germans *had* brought up their siege guns when the attack on Liège commenced, and, in the second place, they were not their well-known howitzers "with the enormous 11·2 in calibre" but their wholly unknown siege howitzers with the still more enormous 17 in. calibre hot from Krupps' furnaces and for the first time exposed to the gaze of a gaping world. A typical piece of siege gun for high angle fire is the 11·2 in. Krupp howitzer, of which the *Hamdard* hopes to give a sketch in an early issue. It is 12 calibres, about 11½ feet in length. It has a charge of 28½ lbs. smokeless powder, and fires a steel shell weighing 470 lbs. or 760 lbs. (5¾ or 9¼ mds.) It is provided with a shrapnel shell of the former weight which contains 1,888 bullets. It will not be amiss if we also give some particulars of the 11·2 in. German naval gun which is mounted on her battleships—though not the most recent

ones (on which 12 in. guns are mounted, while those now being completed are to have as large as 16 in. guns) but those completed before 1911—and on her latest battle-cruisers including the *Goeben*. The weight of the gun is 33·3 tons or over 900 maunds. Its projectile or shot weighs 529 lbs. or about 6½ maunds. When the projectile passes the muzzle of the gun it has a velocity of 2,854 feet per second, or about 32½ miles per minute, and its energy at the time is such that it can lift a weight of one ton to a height of 29,878 feet or more than the height of Mount Everest. Turning this into maunds and miles the muzzle energy of this gun is such that it can lift a maund to a height of 154 miles. If wrought iron was placed against this gun it would pierce it to the extent of 40·2 inches. It can fire one round per minute. These are the particulars with reference to the German naval guns of only 45 calibres or 48·73 ft. in length. The 11·2 in. naval gun of Germany which is 50 calibres, or 48·33 ft. in length weighs 43·9 tons or nearly 1,200 maunds. It fires a charge of 291 lbs. or more than three and a half maunds. Its projectile weighs 760 lbs. or 9¼ maunds. Its muzzle velocity is 2,871 feet per second. Its muzzle energy and armour piercing value must be correspondingly larger. Krupp's naval and coast defence ordnance of the same calibre is heavier in weight, fires a heavier projectile and has also a higher muzzle velocity and muzzle energy, and it perforates from 49 to 52 inches of wrought iron, while it fires 2 to 3 rounds per minute.

II.—The New German Monster and its Work.

If the new 17 in. Krupp howitzer has particulars varying in the same proportion as its calibre differs from the 11·2 in. piece, it must be about 17 ft. long, must have a charge of about 43 lbs. of smokeless powder and must be firing steel shells weighing about 1,150 lbs. or 14 maunds. Its shrapnel shell must be weighing more than 700 lbs. and containing some 2,850 bullets. We reproduce (on page 258 of this issue) an extract from the *Daily Telegraph* entitled "German Siege Guns" which contains its Rotterdam correspondent's interview with Mr. Albert J. Leroy of London who was probably the only Englishman in Liège during the siege. He tells us not only that the Germans used these tremendous new weapons of offence against Liège, but describes the effect they had on the extremely strong fortifications of Brialmont. "To silence the forts with these guns," says Leroy, "took only two hours. For one of the forts only four shots were required." He also tells us that three-forts gave in within a week of the first shots being fired, which tallies with the telegram of the 6th August from Paris, published by the *Times*, announcing the silencing of two of the Liège forts, and with the Zurich telegram of the 7th August, which gave details of the capture of the forts stating that the general attack had been directed in the beginning towards the forts Chaudfontaine, Boncelles and Flemalle. We are informed that the last forts were silenced about 14 or 15 days after the Germans first came, three forts holding out and compelling the Germans to bring their great guns through the town.

III.—Siege Guns of the Belligerents and Locomotion.

If it was a remarkable feat of mechanical engineering to construct such guns, it was no less remarkable to carry them to the seat of war. Hitherto the heaviest guns are those mounted on battle-ships, or used on coast defences and the "safety armament" of important forts. Once mounted they are not removed from their platforms or whatever other contrivance they may have on which they are mounted, for their weight is so great that they do not easily lend themselves to locomotion, while they require like steam or oil engines, a strong concrete "bed" to be prepared for them so as not to sink in the ground. When a serious siege has to be undertaken it is necessary to organize one or more siege trains in addition to the troops of the field army. Both heavy and light siege units enter into the composition of a siege train. Heavy siege units are seldom mobile in the sense that light siege units are, the ordnance comprising the former having usually to be transported by some special means, such as ordinary rail or ship, to some place from which special siege railways would admit of its conveyance to a place in battery. During the siege of Sevastopol a civil engineer, Robert Mallet, designed a 36 in. mortar, but it never reached the seat of war. In 1904, the Japanese, however, made use of their 11·1 in. coast howitzers at Port Arthur. At the siege manœuvres in France in 1906 the heavy siege units were represented by their 5·1 in. gun and their 10·7 in. howitzer. The official British pieces are a 6-in. gun and a 9·4 in. howitzer. As a typical piece the 10·7 in. French howitzer may be taken which the French transported by special horse draught, as it was found too heavy for the type of siege railway made use of at the mock siege at Langres in 1907. Its total equipment weighs 22 tons or nearly 600 maunds, and it is transported in four components, namely, the piece, the carriage, the slide, and the platform. A battery of six pieces would thus require, exclusive of ammunition transport, 24 vehicles that would weigh 130 tons or 3,186 maunds. The howitzer was designed originally for coast defence. It weighs about 5¾ tons or about 157 maunds and its bed weighed 6⅓ tons or about 172 maunds. To this equipment was added a slide and a platform consisting of a thick plate of iron upon which the slide moves. But the Germans have now not only invented a heavy siege unit, of almost twice as large a calibre as the British howitzer, but had also brought it to Liège within a few days of attacking it, and have since then been carrying it about almost as if it was an ordinary field-gun, for not only have Liège, Namur, and Antwerp felt its effect in the present war but the soldiers in the trenches along the Aisne river have also experienced a shower of the "Jack Johnsons" as its shells are called. And the latest that we hear from Athens is that these monsters have been mounted on the Dardanelles and Bosphorus forts. Germany has certainly astonished the world with the ease with which she moves such heavy ordnance about, and whether one thinks that these guns came along the Danube across Austria, skirting Servia and traversing Roumania, and thence, through the Black Sea, into the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, or whether one believes that after all the *Goeben* and the *Breslau* refused to give battle to the *Gloucester* for fear of risking the loss of their awful cargo, one cannot withhold from Germany the truest tribute of astonishment and wonder. We heard a great deal in the early part of the war about the superiority of the French artillery, but since the real fighting commenced on the Sambre at Mons and Charleroi, the Allies have frankly admitted both the power of the new German ordnance and the accuracy of the German artillery. Leroy tells us that when the Germans were compelled to bring these great guns they laid down a military railway upon which the guns were moved, running on flanged wheels about 7 ft. high. We have yet to know how these guns have been taken to the trenches on the Aisne and to Russian battlefields across rivers and forests. For the present, at any rate, the Germans have clearly carried the palm with these new monsters and belching huge flames of fire.

IV.—The Lure of Liege.

We have dealt with these guns at great length because they suggest to us a conjecture about the earlier stages of the German plan of campaign. In our very first article in the issue of the 12th August, we had stated that if the French poured over into Belgium to meet Germany half way they would be playing her game and equalizing the chances of loss. An obstinate defence without risking too much in any pitched action north of the well-known line of French fortifications at La Fère, Laon and Reims would clearly be the best French strategy. Time would thus be gained for England to play her part, and the further the German troops got south of the Semois the better the British chance of striking in the rear. We stated that it would not be a bad thing for France's chances of final victory if the first great battle of the war could be deferred until the Germans were in the Aisne valley, where the battle is now raging. It is true that the taking up of a strong position on the Aisne by the German armies, marching through Belgium and Luxemburg would have represented, as we stated in that issue, the successful achievement of the first stage in the German plan of campaign against France, and in spite of the confident assertions of Mr. Hilaire Belloc, based on his intimate knowledge of the exceedingly difficult country of the Ardennes, we had relied on other authorities for our own assertion that it was not easy to see how a German success upto that point could be prevented. To obtain her primary objectives, Germany, as we then stated, was prepared to waste a large number of men. On the other hand, we expressed the fear that the French Generals might not relish the idea of giving ground and that they might strain every effort to meet the Germans before the latter had got off Belgian territory. This, we stated, would be to fight the Germans' battle and to risk giving the colour to the whole war by an initial blunder due to military pride. We had suggested that the French should make allowance for the conditions under which alone their allies could come to their help. Therefore France must be patient and give ground. We recommended to her to take Catinat as a model for her generalship, and *Reculer pour mieux sauter* ("Wait for something better") as her motto. The only way to baffle the German plan of campaign was to leave the development of its inherent difficulties to time and distance. The Germans, we said, would be far less formidable at Rethel or Vouziers than they would be at Libramont or even Sedan. It would, we thought, no doubt be disagreeable to French sentiments to see the first battles of the war occur on French soil, but, we had added, victories there would be better than defeats further north. Germany had always counted on the strength of her offensive, while the French had always prepared themselves to defy Germany by the stubbornness of their defence on which they had lavished enormous treasures, often at the expense of their field army. But the national temperament of the French was at war with their military policy, and this has now cost them more than they are evidently prepared to acknowledge. Well, we have heard a great

deal about the lure of Paris; but if any army was ever lured it was not the German but the French, and in the light of Leroy's statement, we are now inclined to think that, the Germans, after having experimented with their new howitzers on the casemates and cupolas, glaces and revetments of some of the forts of Liège, and having found four shots sufficient for one of them, purposely refrained from knocking down the others so as to lure the French into Belgium and clip their wings in their initial flight. We would have been very chary of launching this as a prophecy at the commencement of the campaign, and even now, after the event, we put this forward only as a hypothesis.

V.—Our Hypothesis.

It must be remembered that the French Ministry for War did not announce until the 14th of August that French troops had entered Belgium at Charleroi though small bodies of the French must have entered Belgium earlier, and it was announced that there had been an interchange of the Belgian and French staffs. The British Expeditionary Force had also landed at Boulogne on the 14th, and unless the German intelligence in the field was just as bad as Mr. McKenna makes out German espionage in England to have been, the Germans must have come to know of the landing of the Expeditionary Force soon after the event. It is now clearly understood that the earlier successes of the Belgians which were so grossly exaggerated were not achieved against the main German armies but were only advanced guard actions. Is it not possible that the German advanced guards were not only covering the several armies concentrating behind them, but were also purposely kept weak and allowed to appear to be beaten by the Belgians so as to encourage the French and the British to come into Belgium and there crush a feeble foe that had met with a check in its very first movement? By the 15th of August it was generally believed on the side of the Allies that the Germans had planned neither to turn to the right nor to the left through Belgium but to keep steadily on to the appointed course, and it was a matter for considerable exultation that the first fighting line of the German army instead of facing south had had to turn practically west. Instead of France being invaded it was Belgium. With the German guns facing west the Allies were reported to be considering the interesting question whether the Germans would dare to attack Namur summarily or have the nerve to neglect a fort which the Allies declared to be much stronger than Liège. And what were Germans doing? It is our belief that by the 7th of August the Germans had reduced the three forts mentioned by Leroy, and even if they had not taken possession of the town of Liège till the 10th it is admitted by the Allies themselves that they had invested the entire ring of forts which were still intact. According to an English correspondent who was present at the great assault on Liège, the German artillery practice was perfect, shells exploding on the ramparts of the forts and smashing the disappearing carriages of the guns at Fort Fleron which was silenced. This news was conveyed in a message from London, dated the 11th August, and we may take it that this was at least the fourth fort reduced before the Germans occupied the town of Liège. Although the telegrams from the Allies continued to tell us of "violent attacks" on the Liège forts from time time, it appears that once the Germans were masters of the town and had reduced a number of the forts, the bombardment was neither persistent nor violent. In fact, Leroy confirms this indirectly, for he mentions that to reduce the last three forts the Germans coolly set about laying down a military railway upon which their guns were moved through the town in order to reduce the last three forts. This may have been either necessary, or only adopted as an excuse for delay. To the west of Liège they met with a reverse at Haelen on the 12th and at Eghesée on the 13th. On the 15th they were once more defeated at Dinant, this time by the French. All these and the legend that the Liège forts were still intact were sufficient encouragements for the French and the British to advance into Belgium and make short work of this disturber of European peace. The bubble of German invincibility had on their own admission been pricked and the French must have found ample support in these events for their own passionate desire to attack their assailant before he set foot on French soil. If any other proof was needed of an unexpected check having been received by the enemy in Belgium it was furnished by the Uhlan who allowed himself to be captured in Belgium with a map in his possession showing that the Germans were timed to reach Brussels on the 3rd August—just a day before they actually invaded Belgium—and to reach Lille on the 5th August—only a day after the commencement of hostilities. A still more plausible witness was the German subject in France, who received a notification to report himself at Reims on the 13th day of the mobilization, namely, on the 15th of August. By the 13th of August the mobilization of the German armies was scheduled to have been completed, and we may take it that in fact also it was completed about that date. For a couple of days there was a lull in the fighting, and then on the 17th August the Kaiser and his staff arrived from Berlin at Mainz and the landing of the British Expeditionary Force in France was announced. After that things got interesting all of a sudden. The Belgian seat of Government was removed the same day from Brussels to Antwerp, and although it was announced that this was done for strategic reasons, and a good deal of confused comment was freely offered about the advantages of working on "interior lines"—a phrase which hardly appeared relevant in this connection, we agree with the *Times'* Military Correspondent that this move was very dangerous inasmuch as it foreshadowed the retreat of the Belgian Army to the entrenched camp of Brialmont's construction where it has ever since been cooped up. By the 18th, as the sketch map showing the position of German forces on different dates, which is issued as a Supplement to this week's *Comrade*, shows, considerable bodies of German troops had crossed the Meuse at Huy without any fear of the Liège forts even if these had not all been captured by the date. German advanced guards had reached the river Dyle by the 19th and reattacked Diest. They had also bombarded Tirlemont, and the Allies had given ground and commenced to evacuate the advanced positions occupied as the result of the previous day's cavalry drive. It now appears that Diest and Aerschot were occupied by the Germans on the 19th. On the 20th Louvain was occupied, and the same day, the retreat of the Belgium army from Louvain to Antwerp having cleared the way, Brussels was occupied by German troops under General von Arnim. It was asserted that Brussels was sacrificed to tactical exigencies and that the Belgians' gallant subordination of themselves for loyal co-operation with the Allies showed splendid grit and courage. But there is evidence to show that with all their gallant subordination of themselves and loyal co-operation with the Allies, and in spite of their splendid grit and courage, the Belgians did not like it a bit and there was a great soreness of feeling in Belgium at the sacrifice of its capital without any effort having been made by the Allies to defend it after the Belgian army had been asked to betake itself to Antwerp. But the fact is that the French had fallen between two stools. They had not had the patience to stop in France and await the attack of the Germans, and they had not had the promptness to bring into Belgium as large a force as was necessary to save the country from the Germans. In other words, they had fallen a victim to the lure of Liège, which the Germans had designed for them. They had not come sufficiently forward to save Brussels and they had advanced too far forward to avoid a crushing defeat at Charleroi. Alost and Wettern were taken by German advance-guards on the 21st, and the whole of Flanders was overrun right upto Ostend. The battle of Charleroi, the first great encounter between the Germans and the French, commenced on the 21st when the two combatants disputed the possession of the town. On the following day, the 22nd August when the Germans attacked Namur also, such overwhelming forces were brought by them against the French at Charleroi that they were compelled to withdraw. Thus ended the battle of Charleroi. On the 23rd three of the Namur forts were destroyed and the town was evacuated by the Allies by 5 p. m.

VI.—The British Retreat.

Shortly after the other forts also fell at the bidding of the 17 in. howitzers, as their experience at Liège had led the Germans to expect. Our hypothesis is that just as all the Liège forts could have been reduced before the French had entered Belgium so too all the Namur forts could have been silenced before the English had taken up a position on the line Conde-Mons-Binche on the 22nd August if the Germans had wished it. It suited them to draw in both the English and the French before they swept down upon them and that the Belgian forts fell not a day later nor a day earlier than the Germans desired. On the 23rd August, the day on which the first of the Namur forts to fall were silenced, also occurred the engagement of the British army for the first time at Mons, with greatly superior German forces. No clearer account of this action can be given than in the terse and manly despatch of Sir John French, dated 7th September. The concentration of the British Expeditionary Force was completed only on the 21st August, and General French was able to make dispositions to move the force during the 22nd to positions he considered most favourable from which to commence operations which the French Commander-in-Chief, General Joffre, had requested him to undertake in pursuance of his plans in the prosecution of the campaign. The line taken up extended along the line of the canal from Conde on the west through Mons and Binche on the east. Early on the morning of the 23rd August General French assembled the commanders of the first and second corps and the cavalry division and explained the general situation of the Allies and General Joffre's plan, and discussed with them the immediate situation. From information received from French headquarters which had evidently not been sufficiently disillusioned even after the retreat from Charleroi, General French understood that little more

than one or at the utmost two German Army Corps, with perhaps one Cavalry Division, were in front of his position, and he was confirmed in this opinion by the evidence of his patrols and the observation of his aeroplanes which gave no indication of any attempted outflanking movement by the enemy. But about 3 p. m. reports began to come in to the effect that the enemy was commencing an attack on the Mons line apparently in some strength, and that the right of the position from Mons and Bray was being particularly threatened. This led to more or less a general retirement and Binche was occupied by the Germans. About 5 p. m. he received a most unexpected message from General Joffre by telegraph, telling him that at least three German Corps were moving on his position in front, and that the second Corps was engaged in a turning movement from the direction of Tournai. He was also informed that the two reserve French Divisions and the fifth French army on his right were retiring, the Germans having gained possession on the 22nd August of the passages of the Sambre between Charleroi and Namur. This forced a retirement from the Mons position to a position in the rear resting on the fortress of Maubeuge on the right and extending west to Jenlain south-east of Valenciennes, on the left. The retreat began at day-break on the 24th when the news of the retirement of the French, and the heavy German threating on his front reached General French, and was confirmed by aeroplane reconnaissance. Those who would like to study the account of the retreat in detail with all the perils of rearguard actions against a persistent and pushing enemy must carefully read Sir John French's despatch. It is full of arresting interest, and were it not for the skill and leadership of General Sir Horace Smith Dorrien and General Sir Douglas Haig and the other commanders, and the cool courage of the men themselves, it is doubtful if the British army engaged at Mons would have escaped from the bear-bug of General Kluck's enveloping army on the German right. No doubt the Expeditionary Force suffered heavy loss, but it could not well have been avoided, and it is a wonder that the British losses were not considerably heavier. Particularly interesting is the incident concerning the attempt of the enemy to hem the British force against the fortress of Maubeuge which was temptingly left open for Field Marshal French to enter in search of support. But in vain was the net spread in the sight of the bird. Nevertheless, had not General French with great presence of mind and determination kept himself clear of the fort the British Army, which had escaped from Mons by the skin of its teeth, would now have been an army of prisoners surrendering within the walls of Maubeuge along with their French comrades who numbered about forty thousand.

After the Conde-Mons-Binche line had been relinquished three other lines were occupied on three successive nights and had to be relinquished at day-break. It had been decided to occupy the Cambrai-Le Cateau-Landrecies position, and although the ground had been partially prepared and entrenched on the 25th August when the Expeditionary Force had retired from the Maubeuge-Bavai position, it was not found possible to stand in this position either. In view of the retirements of the French on the right of the British, their own exposed left flank and the sweeping enveloping arm of General Kluck coming closer and closer, and, above all, the exhausted condition of the British troops, Field Marshal French determined to withdraw from this position also, and to continue the retreat till be could put some substantial obstacle such as the Sambre or the Oise between himself and the enemy. The new line selected was Vermand-St. Quentin-Ribemont. The first Corps had continued its march throughout the 25th and far into the evening, arriving at a Landrecies at about 10 o'clock. Field Marshal French had intended that it should go further west so as to fill the gap between Le Cateau and Landrecies, but the men were exhausted and could not get further without rest. The enemy, however, would not allow them this rest and about 9-30 p. m. a report was received that the fourth Guards brigade was heavily attacked in Landrecies by troops of the 9th German Army Corps who were coming through the forest on the north of the town. Thanks to the re-inforcements received from two French reserve divisions on the right of the British force, and Sir Douglas Haig's skill, the First Corp managed to extricate itself from an exceptionally difficult position in the darkness of the night and to resume at dawn its march south towards Wassigny on Guise.

But the worst day was the 26th. At day-break it became apparent that the enemy was throwing the bulk of his strength against the left of the position which had been taken up on the previous evening by the Second Corps and the 4th Division, which had their right on Le Cateau, their left in the neighbourhood of Caudry and the line of defence continued thence by the 4th Division toward Seranvillers. The guns of four German Army Corps were against them, and it being impossible to send them any support from the 1st Corps which was incapable of movement, Field Marshal French ordered General Smith-Dorrien to use his utmost endeavours to break off the action and retire at the earliest possible moment. On the 24th the French General Sordêt who was in billets at Avesne had promised co-operation and support on General French's left flank, though he had said that his horses were too tired to move before the next day. On the 26th General French sent him an urgent message to do his utmost to come up and support the retirement of his left flank. But he did not comply with this urgent request and the plea once more offered was that his horses were too fatigued! The comfort of the French horses was evidently of greater account to him than the existence of the troops of the great ally of his country! There had been no time to entrench the position properly and the artillery was outmatched by at least 4 to 1. At length it became apparent that if complete annihiliation was to be avoided a retirement must be attempted ; and the order was given to commence it about 3-30 p. m. This was the most difficult movement, but it was covered with intrepidity and determination by the artillery. Fortunately, the enemy had himself suffered too heavily to engage in an energetic pursuit. The retreat was continued far into the night of the 26th and through the 27th and 28th on which date the troops halted on the line Noyon-Chauny-La Fére, having then thrown off the weight of the enemy's pursuit, General Sordêt and the French cavalry division which he commanded assisted in the retirement and in driving back some of the enemy in Cambrai, while General D'Amade with his two reserve divisions moved down from the neighbourhood of Arras on the enemy's right flank and took much pressure off the rear of the British forces.

VII.—"The 120-Mile Non-Stop Trek."

But although there was an appreciable easing of the situation after this ceaseless retirement with rear-guard actions which commenced at Mons in the 23rd August and really constituted a four-days battle ending on the 26th, the retirement did not end there. As a writer in the *Daily Mail* says, it was a "120-Mile non-stop trek" forced on the British by the initial reverses which in their turn were due to the lure of Liège. In the despatch of Sir John French we get a candid description of these reverses, but we have not yet come across a word of explanation from the French General Staff of the reverses or a justification of their strategy. Even the casualties have not been mentioned, although all sorts of inferences have been drawn from Germany's delay in publishing the casualities in the latter phase of the campaign. But whether the French explained their reverses or not, the reverses remain, and as the sketch maps of the position of German forces, which we publish this week as a Supplement, will show, the Germans had reached as far south as Coulommiers, La Ferte Gaucher, Sezanne, Fère Champenoise and Vitry La Francois. To some extent we have already shown why the German right receded from Paris and instead of investing Paris the Germans have entrenched themselves along the Aisne and the Oise. Further details will be given later, but one fact needs no emphasis after a glance at the sketch map. and that is the fact of the total collapse of the French defence during the last two weeks of August and the first week of September, notwithstanding the remarkably strong line of defence La Fere-Laon-Reims-Chalons wthence they could have defied German attack if they had not been lured by the exaggerated description of resistance offered by Liège, but where they could actually make no stand in their precipitate flight from Charleroi.

VIII.—The Advance of Six German Armies.

So far as we can make out from the news published in England—the telegrams sent to India were too meagre to make anything intelligible—six different German armies have advanced or tried to advance, in the western theatre of war. As the London *Observer* says, their course appears like six showers of rockets falling on a line drawn through Paris. The six armies, taking from east to west were as follows : The sixth Army, commanded by the Crown Prince of Bavaria, attacked from Lorraine through the gap of Epinal in the barrier-chain of fortresses which we explained in some detail in the issue of the 12th August. The fifth army, under the German Crown Prince, attacked immediately north of the barrier-chain through Luxemburg by Stenay, where the bridges cross the Meuse, towards Chalons. The fourth army, commanded by the Duke of Würtemberg, was entrusted with the difficult task of getting out of the Ardenhes and marching across the Meuse, by Meziers and Sedan, towards Rheims. The third army, under General Hausen, coming down from Charleroi and Namur, had also been marching towards Rheims, a point of such importance owing to its railway and road connection and its whole strategical position as to be the master-key of the routes to Paris. The second army, under General Bülow, seems to have advanced from Mons towards Laon and Le Fère. The first army, commanded by General Kluck, at first heavily engaged with the English, seems afterwards to have diverged to the West, to have crossed the Somme east of Amiens, and

then to have carried its great outflanking march straight down towards Paris. Across the whole of Northern France, along successive battle fronts some hundred miles wide, the Allies were forced back further and further, as our sketch map clearly shows, as if by elemental pressure. The *Observer* is forced to confess that this colossal effort to envelope and crush was designed by the Germans "with solid ability and has been executed with thorough audacity unexcelled in the annals of war."

IX.—The "Pre-Conceived Objective."

We see in the movement nothing perhaps of the individual genius of Napoleon whose strategy we attempted to explain in our issue of 12th September. Mr. Bonar Law is perhaps quite right in observing that the militarism of the Germans is Napoleonism without a Napoleon. But German strategy, as we tried to make clear in our last article on the campaign, was modest enough not to have based its calculations like French strategy on the probability or even likelihood of having Napoleons among the Generals of the national army. German strategy, and to a great extent even German tactics, rely upon a "preconceived objective," and we have seen in this campaign how the German Generals and German soldiers have executed the orders of those who conceived this objective with great audacity and the good fortune that favours the bold. It is true, and we have already explained it, that the obvious disadvantage of the German tactics of envelopment is that once the Commander-in-Chief has set his army in motion he loses control of the operations, and the initiative passes into the hands of his subordinates, making co-ordination difficult, and condemning the whole army to adhere to a plan previously settled although fresh and valuable information may be received which suggests a modification of the original programme. This disadvantage to some extent appears to have been illustrated in the present campaign also. For it is very probable that the German General Staff did not expect that their six armies which commenced to advance across an almost straight frontier extending from Upper Alsace to the Dutch Limburg would, within a month, occupy a position in which the armies between Nancy and Paris would form a line almost at right angles with the forces operating from Mulhausen to Nancy. The German forces standing from Mulhausen to Liège made on the 16th of August a line almost as straight as an arrow, but within a fortnight the line appeared like a bow, and in a few more days the bow was so bent that, as we stated in our issue of the 12th September, it was in danger of breaking. This was evidently because, while the third army had swung round Givet with sufficient rapidity and the second army had wheeled at a still greater pace further west, and the first army under General Kluck had swept all before it like a whirlwind, the fourth army under the Duke of Würtemberg had taken much longer to get out of the difficult country of the Ardennes, and the fifth army commanded by the German Crown Prince had met with still greater difficulties in getting through the Stenay gap and marching through the Argonne, while the sixth army commanded by the Crown Prince of Bavaria, although it had taken Lunèville and marched across the French frontier right up to Epinal, had not succeeded in breaking through the barrier-chain of French forts and in crossing the Moselle. This by itself is sufficient to explain why the wide-flung German right was contracted and receded from Paris. But a no less important reason for this change of plan was the fact that the "preconceived objective" of the German General Staff had to be altered, and it must have taken some time for the first and second armies to be once more got into control. That "preconceived objective" was Paris, and when the French Government evacuated Paris and went to Bordeaux on the night preceding 3rd September, Paris lost its chief attaction for the German General Staff.

X.—The Change of Plans.

And what was the result? A glance at our sketch map would show that immediately afterwards the right wing began to contract and recede. And although on the 8th of September the German forces reached points more southerly than they had done before, the German flood had also receded a good deal in an easterly direction. The Germans decided to "neglect" Paris, and, while retreating northward across the Marne, made considerable attempts at what we called in the last article on the campaign as the lifting of the latch from the inside. Apparently Verdun has been able to withstand the blows of the German Jack Johnsons better than Liège, Namur, Maubeuge and Antwerp, and the Germans are still endeavouring to reduce this northern-most barrier in the chain of fortifications. They desire to widen the gap across the Franco-German frontier for the passage of their armies which was made by the reduction of Longwy—another result of their advance which, like the capture of Lunèville was never cabled to India. But although the Germans are still endeavouring to reduce Verdun as well as to open a passage for themselves near Epinal or Toul, their objective in the retreat across the Marne has evidently been to entrench themselves along the Aisne and the Oise and exhaust the armies of the Allies by fighting a parallel battle from a position in which they had entrenched themselves carefully, before making their next advance. The wonder is not that the Germans retreated across the Marne, but that an army with enveloping tactics so difficult to control after it had once set out to achieve its pre-conceived objective should have altered its plans so quickly after the change of circumstances brought about by the evacuation of Paris. Although the change of plan was made about the 3rd September, that is, immediately after the transfer of the French seat of Government from Paris to Bordeaux, it was not till the 7th that the Allies clearly understood it, and even then it did not seem intelligible to them that the retreat of General Kluck's army was not due to the pressure of the Allies. They proclaimed it, although somewhat diffidently as a reverse similar to their own retirement from Belgium, and even after the 14th September when the German withdrawal practically ceased, they attributed it to the pressure of Russia in the East. At least this is what one understands from the perusal of British newspapers. But we who know how Russia had to be on the defensive when the Germans advanced practically all along the 500 miles of the Russo-German frontier, and particularly in the Governments of Suwalki and Lomza are in a better position, than English journalists a month ago being clearly prophets after the events to say that the German withdrawal to the Aisne was in no way due to Russian pressure.

XI.—Reason for the Change.

We have already given in this article three reasons for this withdrawal, the unequal rapidity of advance of the various German armies; the change in the German objective caused by the evacuation of Paris by the French Government and the desire of the Germans to break through the barrier-chain of fortifications. We have also hinted at another reason, a corollary of the second, namely, a desire to beat the armies of the Allies in the field after exhausting them in the parallel battle on the Aisne. It seems that the lure of Paris was not as great for the German General Staff as the Allies had imagined, and most probably the Germans had already decided what they should do in the event of Paris becoming a comparatively negligeable objective. For we have been told that the armies which had been advancing rapidly enough on Paris had also taken the trouble of preparing entrenchments for future use, and every account of these trenches indicates that they are like semi-permanent fortifications which must have taken time to construct. This leads us to our second hypothesis that all this forethought is indicative of a desire to fight a defensive-offensive battle on equal terms with the Allies. This could not have been possible if lured by Liège the main French army had not gone beyond the well-known line of fortifications, Chalons-Rheims-Loan-La Fère, only to retreat behind this line, and that so precipitately as to allow the Germans to take them and after retiring make a considerable use of them. As for the desire of widening the gap on the eastern side, it was not only because German armies knocking at the gates of the French fortresses would have entered France through it, but because the line of communication between Metz and Paris would have been much shorter than the line of communication between Cologne and Paris which passed through two hostile countries instead of one. As the crow flies the distance between Cologne and Paris is about 240 miles, while the distance between Metz and Paris is only 170 miles, so that the considerable saving of 70 miles was an important consideration. These and not particularly the pressure of Russia were the reasons that induced German right to retreat to the Aisne, and the serene complacence with which the Germans are fighting in their trenches does not apparently betray the anxiety with which they were credited by the Allies. The hour-glass does not now appear to be much in evidence. In fact, if there ever was a race westward it was run by two competitors and not one, and if Germany was galloping towards Paris, Russia galloping towards Berlin. And unless Russia can reach Berlin before the end of this month she is not likely to reach the post at all whether Germany reaches Paris or not. The roads to Berlin would become impassable when the snow begins to fall, and although sledges can work on the ice, frost is not always to be trusted, and when the thaw sets in the whole country becomes a treacherous bog.

XII.—The Tactics of Artillery.

Next week we shall deal with the Eastern theatre of war, but before we leave the Western theatre let us try to make one matter clear. The present war is likely to prove even more than the campaigns of Napoleon a war of the artillery. Field artillery has nowadays been used, firstly, to assist, if necessary, the advanced guard in the preliminary fighting; secondly, to prepare; and, thirdly, to support or cover the infantry attack, "preparation" consisting chiefly in engaging and subduing the hostile artillery. The task of the guns is to destroy the opposing guns and artillery-men, a task which engages almost all the resources of the assailants' artillery in the struggle for artillery superiority which is often spoken of as "an artillery duel." Shielded guns, enhanced rate of firing, perfection in indirect "laying" apparatus (including "elevation", or the vertical inclination of the gun, and "direction", or the horizontal inclination to the

right or left, necessary to direct the path of the projectile to the object aimed at) and many other factors have modified the lessons of 1870, and complicated the work of achieving victory in the artillery duel so far that the simple "hard pounding" of former days has given way to a variety of expedients for inflicting the desired loss and damage. One point is, however, clear, and meets with universal acceptance. "The whole object of the duel," say the French regulations, "is to enable the artillery subsequently to devote all available resources to its principal task which is the material and moral support of the infantry during each succeeding stage of the fight." One side must be victorious in the end, and not until the hostile artillery is beaten out of action the victor has acquired the power of pressing home the attack. The British regulations (1906), indeed, deal with the steps to be taken when, though the artillery of attack is beaten, the infantry advance is continued, but only so as to order the guns to "reopen at all costs", in other words, as a forlorn hope. The second part of the preparation, the gradual disintegration of the opposing line of infantry, has practically disappeared from the drill books. The next task of the guns, and that in which modern artillery asserts its power to the utmost, is the support of the infantry attack. The artillery and the infantry co-operate, "the former" say the British *Field Artillery Training* (1906), "by firing rapidly when they see their own infantry . . . press forward, and the latter by making full use of the periods of the intense artillery fire to gain ground." Thus aided, the infantry closes into decisive ranges, and when it gains ground to the front, every gun "must be at once turned upon the point selected . . . the most effective support afforded to the attacking infantry by the concentrated fire of guns and field howitzers. The former tie the defenders to their entrenchments (for retreat is practically impossible over ground swept by shrapnel bullets), distract their attention and tend to make them keep their heads down, while the shell from the field howitzers searches out the interior of the trenches, the reverse slopes of the position, and checks the movement of reinforcements toward the threatened point." In these word the British Field Artillery drill-book of 1902 summarizes the act of "covering" the infantry advance. Unofficial publications are still more emphatic. The advance of the infantry to decisive range would often be covered by a mass of one hundred or more field guns firing shrapnel at the rate of ten rounds per gun per minute at the critical moment. Against such a storm of fire the defending infantry, even supposing that its own guns had refitted and were again in action, would be powerless. Captain C. F. Atkinson of the 1st City of London (Royal Fusiliers), to whom we are indebted for these observations, remarks that it was in recognition of the appalling power of field artillery (which is increased in ratio out of all proportions to the improvement of modern rifles) that the French system was elaborated to the perfection which it has attained in recent years. But even from the meagre telegrams which we have received about the operations of the French armies, it is clear that General Joffre himself has had to acknowledge the superiority of German tactics of "preparing" for and "covering" the infantry assault, and there seems to be a universal recognition of the accuracy and the power of German artillery. The field artillery in defence is always at a disadvantage and the initiative gained by the Germans after the fighting at Mons and Charleroi and retained throughout the following fortnight no doubt helped them to bring out to the full the effectiveness of their artillery.

XIII.—Power and Mobility of German Artillery.

We shall deal a little later with the circumstances under which the German infantry advances so rapidly, but in dealing with artillery tactics it must be noted that the effectiveness of this arm on the German side was due not only to the number and power of their guns and the accuracy of their pratice, but also to the rapidity of their marches. The importance of having the artillery well up at the front of a marching column, is perhaps best expressed in the phrase of Prince Kraft von Hohenlohe-Inglefingen—"Save hours not minutes." The Germans in 1870 so far acted up to the principles that Prince Hohenlohe when asked at the beginning of the battle of Sedan for a couple of guns was able to reply, "You shall have ninety." The German regulations say very plainly, "the horses have not done their work until they have got the guns into action, even at the cost of utter exhaustion." Forced marches such as that of the British 62nd Battery, R. F. A., in the battle of the Modder river, when it marched 32 miles mostly through deep sand and arrived in time to take part in the action, even if rare, are nowadays expected to be within the powers of field artillery to accomplish. Horse artillery is capable of more than this, and, as to pace, of manœuvring at the cavalry rate. Heavy guns are the least mobile and would rarely be able to keep pace with the infantry in a forced march. As a rule field artillery walks four, trots nine, and gallops at the rate of fifteen miles an hour. A fair marching pace is four miles an hour for field and five for horse batteries. A march of fourteen miles would, according to the German regulations, be performed under favourable circumstances by field battery in five hours and horse battery in four hours. Every gun represents a compromise between power and mobility and each type of artillery has been evolved in accordance with the relative requirements of these conditions in respect of the work to be performed. After the Boer War the question was raised whether field artillery, as the term is usually understood, should not be abolished and only heavy guns and horse artillery retained with the field army. We do not know the details of German field artillery, but we shall not be surprised if the tremendous weight and calibre of their new howitzers and the startling rapidity of their advance turn out to be merely indications of their having combined both power and mobility to an extraordinary extent instead of merely effecting a satisfactory compromise between the two. Horse artillery must be regarded as field artillery of great mobility and manœuvring power, and its chief value lie in augmenting the weak fire-power of the mounted troops and in facilitating their work as much as possible. Thus when cavalry meets serious opposition in reconnoitring, the guns may be able to break down the enemy's resistance without calling for assistance from the main body of the cavalry, and in the action of cavalry *vs.* cavalry the chief duty of the horse artillery is to shatter the enemy's cavalry, that is, to "prepare" the success of the cavalry charge by breaking up as far as possible the enemy's power of meeting it. In the cavalry battle covering fire is practically impossible, owing both to the short distances separating the combatants and to the rapidity of their movements. But steps are taken "to enable all the guns to bear on the enemy's cavalry at the points of collision." The ideal position for the horse artillery is out to a flank, the cavalry manœuvring so as to draw the enemy's cavalry under enfilade fire and at the same time to force them to mask the fire of their own horse artillery. We have little doubt that in the enveloping movement of General Kluck's army the horse artillery of the Germans has played no insignificant part. Another and the most important function of the horse batteries is to reinforce, with the greatest possible speed, any point in the general line of battle which is in need of artillery support. For this reason the artillery in each Army Corps generally includes field-batteries.

XIV.—Howitzers and Ready Ordnance.

But evidently it is the German howitzers that have taken the most prominent part in fighting an enemy that understands the value of cover and knows how to dig itself in. Even the field howitzers are generally somewhat less mobile than field guns. They have, however, far greater shell power. The special feature of the howitzer is, as we have stated in an earlier article, the "searching" of the interior of earthworks, a task which is beyond the power of high velocity field guns which pour forth a direct fire. They are also used for demolishing work, which is equally beyond the power of even a high explosive shell of field gun calibre. The first of these conditions implies a steep "angle of descent" which implies a high "angle of elevation." The second requires great shell-power, but does not call for high velocity. The howitzer, therefore, is a short gun firing a heavy shell at high angles of elevation. Ranging must be done very accurately, and yet economically, as but few of the heavy shells can be carried in the wagons, and the shells descending almost vertically upon the enemy lose the long sweeping effect of the field shrapnel which neutralizes minor errors of ranging. The projectiles employed are high explosives and shrapnels, the former for the demolition of the field works, casemates or buildings, and the latter for use against men behind cover. There is, besides, heavy field artillery including all guns of 4in. calibre and upwards mounted on travelling carriages. In South Africa, where firm soil was usually to be found, 6 in. guns were employed as heavy field guns, but in Europe even the 5 in. British Service gun is likely to sink into the ground. In Great Britain guns only are used by this branch, but continential armies have light siege trains or heavy artillery of the field armies as a rule composed of howitzers of a heavier calibre than the field howitzer, the 15 c m. (6 inch) howitzer being most commonly met with. But this artillery has a different tactical *rôle* and it is always with a view to the attack of permanent or semi-permanent fortifications. They use high explosive shells and time shrapnels, the former for ranging and demolishing cover, the latter against *personnel*. The tactical principles upon which heavy artillery does its work are based in the main on the long range (upto 10,000 yards) and great shell power of the guns. This power enables the artillery to reach with effect targets which are beyond the range of lighter ordnance, so that even if they are dispersed along the front of the armies, they can concentrate their fire on any points though they could not have otherwise done so owing to their want of mobility. In the attack, besides the general task of all guns, the heavy artillery demolishes cover, and buildings held by the enemy and during the infantry assault they can sweep a great dept of ground effectively. In the defence, long range fire has great value, specially in sweeping approaches which the enemy must use. In pursuit, the heavy artillery can reach the main body of the enemy during its retreat

even if it has left the rear guard, as in the case of the British retreat from Mons. Only in retreat the want of mobility of these guns militates against their employment in exposed positions such as rear guards usually have to take up. But the Germans who have surpassed all past records in bringing into the field a heavier howitzer than any ordnance yet employed even in sieges have evidently such confidence in the success of their offensive and their rapidity of movement that they have practically neglected to think of the consequences of such tactics in retreat.

XV.—The German Infantry and its Rifle Fire.

While the superiority of German artillery and the rapidity of all arms has been acknowledged, we hear a general condemnation of the shooting of their infantry. But before we condemn the Germans on this score, let us understand the objective of their infantry. It is a well known fact that in an attack very few bullets find their billets. We do not know the latest opinion in England and France about the exact proportion of casualties to the number of rounds fired by the assailants. But we may be sure that this ratio bears no recognizable proportion to the death-roll due to the sniping done by the Afghan on our frontiers to whom a rifle and a few rounds of cartridges are as the wealth of Ormuz and of Ind. Continental armies have no reason to be so parsimonious in the use of ammunition and enormous quantity of lead passes through the barrel of a rifle before life passes out of the body of a single soldier under cover. The Germans have, therefore, never set much store by careful shooting by their huge hordes when on the offensive. They have always preferred mobility to accuracy in shooting by the general body of their troops, and for power they rely more on mass than on marksmanship. This in clearly borne out by the German regulations of 1906 which define the offensive as "transporting fire towards the enemy, if necessary to his immediate proximity", and they consider that the bayonet attack only "confirms" the victory. While in Germany movement "transports the fire," in France fire is regarded as the way to make movement possible. Now the Germans have evidently thought that for the mass of their troops to stop and take aim is more likely to make them much slower in their attack than more effective in aim, and at the cost of the accuracy of shooting they have been deliberately purchasing their marvellous rapidity of movement. They, therefore, refrain from halting to shoot, but go on firing as they march, shooting from the hip, and thus saving time and effort and the exhaustion due to recoil, instead of shouldering the rifle. Unless the rifle rests on the ground or on some mechanical contrivance to steady it, accuracy of aim is exceedingly difficult. Kneeling or lying flat on the ground and then getting up at intervals in the course of the assault takes time. If the assailants halt and shoulder their rifles while standing, both arms act as factors likely to alter the angle from which the shot is fired and thus vitiate the aim. If, however, both arms are dropped as far as they can go and the trigger is pulled, although the "direction", or horizontal inclination, may vary, though not to any great extent—for keeping the right arm close to the side would prevent it, and in any case the variation would not be appreciable when a long line of troops is being attacked—the "elevation", or vertical inclination, could not vary except very slightly. Again, the recoil would only carry the right arm in the direction in which it naturally goes when the man is marching. Thus, without losing the accuracy of aim altogether, the Germans, firing from the hip, while still moving on, must have gained enormously in rapidity of movement. Their guns having proved superior in the artillery duel, and their howitzers searching the trenches of the enemy as effectively as they have been doing, the objective of the infantry seems to be not so much the accuracy of aim at long range, but the traversing of the intervening space in the shortest possible time. With the enemy pinned down by the artillery, the infantry's one object was to be up and at him as quickly as possible, and it appears that the firing from the hip while marching has been as effective a devise as could have been thought of for executing the German conception of the offensive, namely, "transporting fire towards the enemy, if necessary to his immediate proximity." To make up for the shortcoming of the mass of the troops in accuracy of aim they seem to have designed the system of having with each unit of infantry a body of sharpshooters to pick out the officers of the enemy and take deliberate aim.

XVI.—From Frederick the Great to William II.

In the war of 1870 it was noted that "more and more German infantry was pushed forward to support the firing line, and, like its predecessors, each reinforcement, losing most of its unwilling men as it advanced over the shot-swept ground, consisted on arrival of really determined men, and closing in the firing line pushed it forward, sometimes 20 yards, sometimes 100, until at last rapid fire at the closest ranges dislodged the stubborn defenders. Bayonets (as usual) were never actually used, save in sudden encounters in woods and villages. The decisive factors were: first, the superiority of the Prussian guns, secondly, heavy and effective fire, and, thirdly, deliberate short range, and above all the high *moral* of a proportion of resolute soldiers, who, after being subjected for hours to the most demoralising influences, had still courage left for the final dash. "These three factors," says Capt. Atkinson, "in spite of changes in armament, rule the infantry attack of to-day." The Germans still adhere to shock tactics, for although "individualism" has gained ascendancy everywhere, "drill" is still the basis of the German infantry. For long after 1870 Europe in general followed the lead of Prussia. But controversy in the early stages took the form of a contest between drill and individualism, for until about 1890, the material efficiency of the gun and the rifle remained very much what it had been in 1870, and the only new factor bearing on infantry tactics was the general adoption of a "national army" system similar to Prussia and of rifles equal, and in some way superior, to the chassepot. There was in fact an equilibrium among the national armies, and the question was how in such conditions was the attacking infantry to force its way forward, whether by fire or movement, or by both. France sought the answer in the domain of artillery; but for the moment the lead in infantry training was admittedly in the hands of the Prussians. The extremist statement in favour of drill pure and simple advocated a return to the "old Prussian fire discipline" of Frederick's day for giving fire its maximum efficacy. Vollies and absolutely mechanical obedience to word of command represent the most complete application of fire-power that can be conceived, and Frederick, who had drilled his soldiers so well that the firing line managed to manœuvre with some approach to the precision of the barrack square, could rely on his troops' *peloton feuer* or company volley, which gave him an advantage of 5 shots to 2 against all opponents. The bayonet attack, if the rolling volleys had done their work, was merely "presenting the cheque for payment" as a modern German writer puts it. The cheque had been drawn, in the fire-fight itself. But the proposals of the extreme close order school appeared merely pious aspirations, not so much because of the introduction of the breechloader, as because it was feared that the short service "national" army could never be "drilled" in the Frederician sense. But hitherto the present campaign has shown that, given a sufficiency of numbers, such as Germany enjoys, at least so far as France is concerned—though in no theatre of war does she now outnumber her opponents—Germany can still give a good account of herself, because she has shown "drill" also in the Frederician sense to be still possible notwithstanding the short service "national army," and close-order formation to be far from impossible in spite of all the critics of such tactics. The spirit of the German offensive can best be judged from the following extract from the German regulations: "In the offensive the entrenching tool may be used where it is desired, for the moment, to content one's self with maintaining the ground gained. . . . The entrenching tool is only to be used with the greatest circumspection because of the great difficulties of getting an extended line to go forward under fire when it has expended much effort in digging cover for itself. The construction of trenches must never paralyse the desire for the irresistable advance, *and above all must not kill the spirit of the offensive.*" This war has shown that such a spirit can surmount the obvious difficulties and damage entailed in close formations, and it is obvious that the German have for the moment upset the equilibrium of national armies because infantry and artillery have discovered a way of hacking their way through, both by fire and movement.

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
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