The Comrade.

A Weekly Journal. Edited by - Mohamed Ali.

Stand upright, speak thy thought, declare
The truth thou hast, that all may share;
Be bold, proclaim it everywhere;
They only live who dare!

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The Choice of the Turks.

Let the Turks be under no illusion. They stand at the parting of the ways. If they elect for war at the bidding of Germany, they will be staking their existence as a State. The Powers of the Triple Entente have no quarrel with them. England has always been anxious to see them advancing in security and peace on the path of reform. All she and her Allies now ask is that Turkey should preserve her neutrality in the European war and refrain from attacks upon her Balkan neighbours. For compliance with this straightforward and easy demand they offer her a great price. They are prepared to guarantee the integrity and independence of her dominions, to give her liberal financial support, and, doubtless, to liberate her from the oppressive obligations which Germany has forced upon her by a long series of one sided contracts. All those advantages, together with the good will of England, France, and Russia, she may win by simply sitting still and fulfilling the promises she has solemnly made. But if she is rash enough to spurn them, to disregard the wishes of England and her Allies, and to plunge into a policy of adventure, her ruin will be on her own head. The naval victory we report to-day and the spectacle of the fugitive *Goeben* should remind her to look to the sea as well as to the land. The three Powers which can hurt her most, as they can help her most, will not spare her if she compels them to treat her as an enemy. It is for her to bear in mind before she commits herself what prospect she would have of resisting them in Asia Minor, in Arabia, and in Europe. In all these regions she lies open to their attacks; in none of them can she hope for effective aid from Germany or from her hereditary foes in Austria Hungary. If she deliberately provokes the Entente Powers they will take up the challenge, and their victory will mean the wiping out of the Ottoman Empire from the States of the world. Germany is tempting her to defy them, but Turkish statesmanship should have learnt by this the value of the advice that comes to her from Berlin. The whole intercourse of Turkey with that city has been one monotonous record of German faithlessness and deceit, and of Turkish credulity and loss. From the days when Frederick the Great, in plotting the partition of Poland, induced Austria to betray and abandon her Turkish ally, and facilitated the Russian occupation of the Black Sea fortresses, until the days of Abdul Hamid and the Baghdad Railway concession, what good has ever come to Turkey from the Germans? All the loss has been here, all the profit has been theirs. They have been the puppets, first of Prussia's European policy, and now of Germany's world policy. Now Berlin is egging them on to a course from which it is hardly conceivable that they can gain anything, and on which they would venture at the risk of their existence.

The choice is in their hands. Let them deliberate well before they make it against us, for it will be fateful and it will be irrevocable. The counsel which the Germans give them is excellent—for Germany. A diversion in the Caucasus, a diversion in Egypt, and a possible Holy war throughout North Africa would be very useful to her military operations, however heavy and however prompt the punishment these adventurers might bring upon her Turkish friends. But what chance is there that any one of these schemes would bring profit to Turkey? Ten years ago an invasion of Russian Armenia would at least have had the sympathies of the Armenians. Now those sympathies on both sides of the border would be heartily with the armies of the Tsar. We are quite alive to the Turco-German intrigues in Egypt. We know all about the Turkish Staff officers who have gone there, who has sent them, who has instigated the senders, and what is their work. We know that the Germans have been inciting the Turks to attempt an invasion from Syria—a dangerous business, as Napoleon taught them—when the work of these emissaries is deemed ripe, and we have heard on good authority that the Turks have been concentrating troops in that province. The measures which we have already taken in Cairo should teach all concerned that our eyes are open, and that, if need be, our action will be drastic. The Hedjaz Railway is not difficult of access, and the Arabs of the Yemen would welcome encouragement in the revolt against Turkish rule which has already begun. They do not forget, nor does the rest of the Mahomedan world forget, the friendliness we have shown to Islam, even if the "enlightened" leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress ignore it, and they remember the proof of that friendliness we lately gave by protecting Aziz Ali, the Arab, from his Constantinople enemies. The message from the Bengal Moslems to the Grand Vizier, in which they informed him that they regard their loyalty to the Crown as "their first paramount duty" and that they would deplore any estrangement between England and Turkey, should remind the

Committee how deeply that friendliness is appreciated where it concerns us most. The lure by which Enver Bey and his associates are attracted is not, however, in the regions to which Germany would direct their efforts. They are hankering after Salonika, and it seems probable that our acquisition for our own defence of the two Dreadnoughts with which they hoped to defeat the Greek Fleet has done more to irriate them against us than all incitements from Berlin. The irriation is unreasoning and absurd, and so is the Turkish mobilization of some 500,000 men whom they cannot manœuvre or feed. Both, however, are dangerous—dangerous not to the Entente Powers, who are quite able to chastise any attempts Turkey may make, or stir up, against them, but dangerous to Turkey herself. The simplest common sense, the most elementary knowledge of the real bearings of the world struggle ought to impose upon her absolute neutrality and fulfilment of her engagements. Unhappily for her, we cannot rest assured that knowledge or common sense will prevail with Enver and the Committee to save their country from disaster that will be irreparable and final.—The *Times*.

The Attitude of Italy.

The criticisms upon the inaction of Italy in the present war which have appeared in some newspapers do not make allowance for the difficulties of the position in which the sudden outbreak of hostilities has placed her. She has been for many years in close alliance for certain purposes with Germany and Austria-Hungary, and barely two years have gone by since the terms of that alliance were prematurely renewed. Though the *casus foederis* provided for by the Triplice has not arisen, her partners in that agreement have not hesitated to put severe pressure upon her in order to induce her to stand by their side. They have made her, a Rome Correspondent tells us, alluring offers, but she has refused to be allured. She hastened to declare her neutrality. What more could she have done? In what other way could she have met with propriety the immediate needs of the situation? Was it reasonable to expect that she would have forthwith assailed her Allies, before any of her own interests were directly menaced? What judgment would her self-respect have pronounced upon such action? But she has not forgone her rights to oppose those Allies if and when those interests are endangered. She has held her hand, but she may not hold it for long. She is ready. Our Correspondent confirms the information to that effect which has reached us through other channels. She will make her own decision in her own time, and when it is borne in mind what issues for her depend upon the result of this war, little doubt can be felt as to what that decision will be. No Italian Government could induce Italy to fight side by side with Austria-Hungary against France, and no Italian Government could wish to commit her to action so hateful. The great memories of the Resorgimento and the present claims of "Italia irredenta" combine to forbid such a preposterous step. If Italy draws the sword, it can only be "for the most popular war since the unity of the kingdom"—the war for the liberation of the Trentino and of Trieste. To draw it for the foreigner who retains Italian populations under his domination by force of arm would be to provoke revolution at home.

The beginning of active operations in the Adriatic by the British and French Fleets has modified the position of Italy from what it was in the first weeks of the war. There her interests are very directly involved, and she must know that their future depends upon her conduct. She has to reflect what would be the consequences to her prestige and to her power were these Fleets to liberate the Slavs over against her coasts, and even the Italians of Dalmatia and of Istria, while she stood idly by. Italy can hardly look on that possibility without the deepest concern. And besides the Adriatic question, the Mediterranean question must be before her eyes. Italy must wish, as England wishes, that the balance of power in those waters should be recognized and safeguarded when the war is done by harmonious co-operation with other Mediterranean Powers, for none has deeper and more vital interest in the preservation of that balance than she has. What England and France desire, as their past dealings with Italy abundantly prove, is that her sense of that interest should bring her, of her own free will and as mistress of her own destinies, into line with them in the present struggle. That, they feel, would be in accordance with the sentiments, the traditions, and the aspirations of the Italian people as well as to the advantage of the Italian State. What have the progressive democracy of Italy to do with the cause of aggressive militarism, of absolute domination, and of feudal reaction against the progress, the enlightenment, and the civilization of free England and free France? Those who know and love her best feel confident that she will take her stand in the right place and at the right time. She who has so long endured oppression and has so lately flung it off, will not, we may rest assured, help to rivet it upon others—and upon herself.—The *Times*.

Egypt and the War.

Cairo, Aug. 25.

To-day is the day the Indian mail usually goes out, and we select it to write upon from sheer force of habit. Otherwise, there seems no particular reason why we should do so, as no announcements of any kind are being made as to the arrival and departure of mails as and from Port Said and Suez. We have merely a Post Office notification saying the Postal authorities can give no information in this connection and the public are recommended to post letters when written and without reference to mail days. I can only hope, therefore, that my present screed reaches you within a reasonable time.

We have had many thrills since I last wrote. True it did not take long for matters to settle down on a comparatively normal footing after the first excitement had subsided. Food prices have dropped, and having been fixed by a Government decree, are, with the exception of meat, flour and rice, practically as usual. So far as our inner man is concerned, we are more concerned with the fact that the supply of German beer in Cairo is nearly done, than with anything else. The Banks also, with the exception of the Banco di Roma, have all opened up again, though the Deutsche Orient is taking full advantage of the moratorium and refuses absolutely to pay depositors more than five per cent. of their balances. A considerable sensation has been caused in Egypt by the allegation which seems practically proved, that by the last steamer which left Egypt with any prospect of getting to a Continental port, and while the original "run" had actually commenced, the Deutsche Orient Bank in Egypt shipped £250,000 in gold to Germany.

When the war first started, the native of Egypt was largely indifferent. Where he did take some glimmer of interest in what was transpiring, his expressed feelings were mostly pro British. Within ten days or a fortnight, however, matters were very different. A great wave of pro-Germanism seemed to spread through the country. The cafes of Cairo and the Delta Towns became centres of animated discussion as to great German and Austrian victories, tales regarding which were spread everywhere. The source was not hard to trace. The country was flooded with German agents, mostly Turkish officers from Constantinople, who were passing from village to village, retailing the news of German successes and stating that when Germany had thoroughly defeated England and France, she would turn her attention to Egypt, kill off the British residents and proclaim a free and independent Egypt under its own king. The greatest efforts were made to get the natives to rise everywhere. The Government, however, had the situation well in hand. Most of the Turkish officers alluded to have been laid quietly by the heels including, if rumour is to be believed, the recently much talked about Aziz Bey el-Masri, who was rescued from Enver Pasha's clutches by timely British intervention only a few months ago. It is known also that a number of native officers of the Egyptian Army are incarcerated in the Citadel for sedition. Rumour says forty. The night of the 22nd instant, the last day of "Ramadan Bairam," was a critical period. At such a time it is always easy to work upon the sympathies of a Mahomedan mob, and the few British troops left in Cairo were held in readiness to meet eventualities. Everything passed off quietly, however, and it is felt that any danger there may have been is now over. Yesterday, the first troops of the Indian Contingent disembarked at Suez. More are following to-day, and within forty-eight hours the garrison of Egypt will be more than sufficient to deal with any interior trouble or exterior trouble either for that matter.

Yesterday evening, also, the work of German spies was well evidenced at Suez. The dock in which oil tank ships moor is situated about a mile away from the Anglo Egyptian Oil Company's refinery, and further still from the tanks in which refined oil is stored. About 6 p.m., an oil tank steamer in the dock suddenly blew up and became enveloped in a sheet of flame. A rush was, of course, at once made for the dock, and the refinery and tanks appears to have been temporarily deserted. At 6-30 p.m., half an hour afterwards, the tanks blew up also, oil valued at about £ E. 12,000 being lost. We have not yet had an official *communiqué* on the subject. When it does come, it will probably tell a tale of a cigarette lit in the wrong place. Nevertheless there is not the slightest doubt that the whole affair was the outcome of a very cleverly planned, and as it turns out highly successful, *coup*.—POTIPHAR in the *Capital*.

The Responsibilities.

(By Sir Valentine Chirol.)

I.

Whatever the outcome of the tremendous conflict which Germany has challenged, this country can at least claim that, until she actually smashed the scales by casting into them the brutal weight of her sword, British public opinion maintained a forbearance—nay, an indulgence—towards her without a parallel in any of the great international controversies of the past.

On every phase of German and Austrian action Englishmen have been willing to place the most charitable construction, sometimes almost in defiance of common sense. When Austria, with the consent of Germany, set a match to the European powder magazine at Belgrade Englishmen consented still to credit both Powers with a desire as sincere as our own to avoid a European conflagration. We accepted assurance after assurance, though the event promptly belied each assurance in turn. Influential English newspapers extended in their columns the most generous—perhaps more than generous—hospitality to one-sided statements of the German case, at the expense even of the fair-minded hearing to which the other parties were at least equally entitled. The great illusions of well-meaning English pacifists and the honest anti-Russian fanaticism of English Radicals were called in aid of the widespread sympathy which all Englishmen must feel for the finer aspects of German culture, whilst in the background lurked the less reputable influences of German cosmopolitan finance. Englishmen, knowing their Imperial Germany better, hesitated rightly enough to hamper the desperate efforts of British diplomacy. They could, indeed, afford to remain silent, being convinced that in the end Germany herself would betray the true inwardness of her purpose.

The result has, however, been that to a considerable section of the British public the origin and development of the present crisis has remained obscure and the action of the parties against whom Germany's aggressive policy has been primarily directed has been left open to dangerous misconception. Now it is time to set forth plainly the elementary facts and the inexorable sequence of events which have fulfilled General von Bernhardi's sinister forecasts of "the next war."

Germany's World Policy.

To any full comprehension of the present situation, a brief survey of the fundamental change which German policy has undergone since the accession of William II. is indispensable.

Under Bismarck the policy of Imperial Germany was mainly confined to the undiminished maintenance of the dominant position she had acquired in Europe after 1870. The object he attained by substituting where he could binding alliances for mere friendships, whilst his diplomacy laboured unceasingly to keep all other Powers, as far as possible, apart, and so to prevent the establishment of any other system of alliances than the Triple Alliance, which Germany dominated. It was, in the main, a policy of conservative concentration, and he never concealed his reluctance to take the risks of speculative entanglements, whether in the Balkans or beyond the seas, which might have endangered his main position. This did not satisfy the Emperor William's more ardent imagination. His ambition was to transform the German Empire from a purely Continental Power into a world Power. This involved the substitution of a world policy for Bismarck's policy of European concentration, and, with it, naval and colonial rivalry with England—"the Trident," he declared, "must be in our hands"—and the establishment, in co-operation with Austria of Germanic preponderancy in the Near East even at the risk of a collision with Russia. Combined with the wonderful expansion of German commerce and industry, which enabled Germany to bear the ever-increasing burden of huge armaments by sea as well as by land, the Kaiser's world policy achieved some brilliant successes, but it undermined one of the corner-stones of the Bismarckian edifice. The Powers which the great Chancellor had succeeded in keeping asunder gradually drew together, and even those on whose mutual antagonism he had most surely reckoned decided to sink their differences. First came the Franco-Russian Alliance, and later on the Anglo-French and the Anglo-Russian agreements, which paved the way for the diplomatic group known as the Triple Entente. There was, as the Germans were themselves ultimately bound to admit, nothing aggressive in this grouping, so long as Germany herself was not contemplating aggression, but the desperate attempts which Germany made, twice over Morocco, in 1905 and 1911, and once in connexion with the Near Eastern crisis in 1908-9 to break up the Triple Entente gave the measure of the ambitions to which she feared it might prove an obstacle. From this point of view all three attempts ended in failure, though in 1909 the failure was tempered by the temporary success of "the shining armour" coup at St. Petersburg.

The Balkan Wars and Austro German Policy.

The enfeeblement of Turkey and the new partition of her European provinces before Germany had completed her exploitation of the Turkish Empire, and the aggrandisement of Servia and Greece, which barred the way to Salonika against Austria and checked the growth of Austro-German preponderancy in the Balkan Peninsula, constituted a severe, if indirect, blow to the whole fabric of European relationships which the Austro-German alliance had slowly and laboriously sought to build up. Incidentally the exacerbation of the always latent jealousy between Austria and Italy, barely veiled by the outward appearances of co-operation in Albania, undermined, to a degree which the Italian declaration of neutrality has suddenly illuminated, the foundations of the Triple Alliance in which Italy had been for many years the prisoner rather than the partner of Austria and Germany. Early this spring the German Chancellor himself alluded ominously to the imminence of a decisive conflict between Germandom and Slavdom, and it was obvious that if the Germanic Powers were determined to provoke such a conflict, it was in Servia that they would seek their opportunity.

For in 1909 England had frankly confined her intervention within the limits of diplomatic support, and if the quarrel could be picked over a question which should primarily affect, not France but Russia, though the German mailed first would ultimately strike on less hard on France than on Russia, Germany might at least hope to see England stand aloof for the time being, especially in view of the internal situation in the British Islands and the hatred of autocratic Russia amongst a large section of the British Government's supporters.

II.

"Give a dog a bad name and hang him," and unfortunately for Servia there had been enough dark passages in her history, or in that of her rulers, to give a very bad name to an otherwise gallant little nation. Into the dubious record of Austrian dealings with Servia for the last half century this is not the moment to enter, though it can alone explain the hatred of Austria amongst Servians and the resentment with which Austria saw the little kingdom which she had alternately exploited and contemned emerge last year triumphantly from the twofold ordeal of the Balkan wars. A storm was clearly brewing. The Serajevo tragedy on June 28 precipitated it. It burst with in less than a month.

On July 24 Austria flung at Servia an ultimatum of which the terms and the tone are without parallel in the history of European diplomacy. It contained a series of demands which no sovereign State, however puny, could be expected to accept. Even if it could be proved that responsible Servians connived in the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his Consort, or were actively implicated in the conspiracy which led to the murder, would Austria have been justified in extinguishing the independence of a whole nation? But no proof of any kind has been published to the world, and if we are told we must assume the existence of such proof, it is an assumption Austria has no right to expect from us after the revelations of the Friedjung trial after the anti-Servian campaign of 1908-9, when before a reluctant Austrian tribunal a series of gross forgeries were traced right into the Austrian Legation at Belgrade. Could there indeed be anything more calculated to justify suspicion than the refusal of Austria to give Servia breathing time even to answer the charges brought against her?

The ultimatum required reply within 48 hours. Yet, monstrous as were its terms, Servia, acting, be it noted under Russian advice, agreed to all the conditions imposed by Austria except two, and these she merely asked to have referred to The Hague Tribunal. Even such an abject surrender did not satisfy Austria and dismissing with equal contempt a request from Russia for an extension of time, she withdrew her Minister from Belgrade on July 26 and made preparations for immediate hostilities. The actual declaration of war by Austria took place two days later, on July 28.

A Secret Conspiracy.

What was Germany's part in this tragic *lever de rideau*? That Austria would never have ventured on such a momentous decision without having received from Berlin the fullest assurance of support no one presumably will venture to contend. But there is more than that. Why was Italy, the ally of both Austria and Germany, kept in the dark? Simply because rapidity and secrecy were of the essence of the plot, which aimed at much more than the mere coercion of Servia. To secure these essentials, Germany and Austria were prepared, as the event has shown, to forfeit the active support of the Italian armies. Had Italy been consulted she would have interposed at once her influence for peace. She would have put other friendly Powers, such as France and England, on the alert, and there would have been time for a concerted effort of the peaceful Powers towards a compromise, to which the adhesion of Russia cannot be doubted in view of the wise and self-denying advice she had at once given in Belgrade. If it had been a question of merely chastising Servia,

Austria would have received abundant satisfaction even for graver offences than any of which Austria had offered any little of evidence beyond her own *exparte* statements. But that Germany wanted was not that Austria should receive satisfaction, but that Russia should be made to stand by and abandon Servia to the tender mercies of an Austrian Army on the strength of an almost paradoxical assurance that, after the war Austria would respect that independence of Servia which, even before the war, she had claimed to reduce to a mere shadow. To this Germany knew full well that Russia, as the great Slav Empire, could never agree without surrendering all her religious and racial traditions and all national interest. Such a challenge was a deliberate challenge to war.

The Helplessness of Diplomacy.

In such circumstances the efforts of diplomacy, in the ordinary sense of the word, are foredoomed to failure. Diplomacy requires time, and from beginning to end time was just what Vienna and Berlin were determined to deny. Sir Edward Grey made one desperate attempt. He proposed, on July 28, an immediate conference of the Ambassadors of the four "disinterested" Power—Great Britain, Italy, France, and (save the mark!) Germany. That might have given a moment's pause. All accepted save, of course, Germany—Germany, who, in the face of her refusal, has now issued a barefaced statement that she "worked throughout shoulder to shoulder with England!" Germany was out to force on the *grosse Abrechnung*. All the rest, the conversations, the fiction of mediation, the courtesy telegrams, were the merest by-play for the gallery, unless as far as the German Emperor himself is concerned, they represented perhaps some futile and belated qualms of conscience. The publication of the Tsar's reply to King George has torn to shreds the whole web of German duplicity.

The War Foreseen and Predetermined.

Within less than 10 days after the first bolt from the blue, the Austrian ultimatum at Belgrade, Germany flung off the mask. The declaration of war against Russia, the invasion of France without even the form of a declaration of war, the violation of Luxemburg, the shameless ultimatum to Belgium, the occupation of Belgian territory are but the logical sequence of events breathlessly rushed by the German powers to the fateful climax they had foreseen and predetermined. That England did not want this war every Englishman knows. Italy did not want this war; she has shown it by detaching herself ostentatiously from her allies. France did not want this war; she laboured as heartily as we did in the cause of peace, and even delayed her preparations for defence until her engagements towards Russia actually brought upon her the invading forces of Germany. Russia did not want this war; for in advising Servia to such a surrender as was embodied in the Servian Note she showed herself ready to make in the cause of peace a sacrifice of which the magnitude has only escaped recognition because it was treated with scorn and never allowed to bear fruit. Germany and Austria have alone wanted this war; for they alone have rejected every overture and denied every delay that might have saved the peace of Europe.

The Verdict of History.

The great French Socialist, M. Jaurès, the day before he was cruelly struck down, pronounced, with the courage which his most bitter political opponents have never denied him, the judgment which history will confirm when he invoked against Germany and Austria the "immanent justice of things" which in its own day will bring retribution. "As to Imperial Germany," he said, "she will not be able to clear herself of the just charge that she encouraged Austria on her evil path." And of the two evil-doers Germany is as much the greater as she is the more powerful.

Why We are at War?

A Reply to Sir Edward Grey.

By J. Ramsay MacDonald, M. P.

On that fatal Sunday, the second of August, I met in Whitehall a member of the Cabinet and he told me of the messages and conversations between Foreign Secretaries and Ambassadors which were to be published for the purpose of showing how we strove for peace and how Germany immovably went to war. "It will have a great effect on public opinion," he said, and he was right. It is called "Correspondence respecting the European Crisis," but is generally referred to as "The White Paper." I wish to comment upon it for the purpose of explaining its significance.

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It begins with a conversation between Sir Edward Grey and the German Ambassador on July 20 regarding the Austrian threat to punish Servia, and finishes with the delivery of our ultimatum to Germany on August 4. From it certain conclusions appear to be justified, the following in particular:

1. Sir Edward Grey strove to the last to prevent a European war.

2. Germany did next to nothing for peace, but it is not clear whether she actually encouraged Austria to pursue her Servian policy. The mobilisation of Russia drove Germany to war.

3. Russia and France strove, both by open pressure and by wiles, to get us to commit ourselves to support them in the event of war,

4. Though Sir Edward Grey would not give them a pledge he made the German Ambassador understand that we might not keep out of the conflict.

5. During the negotiations Germany tried to meet our wishes on certain points so as to secure our neutrality. Sometimes her proposals were brusque, but no attempt was made by us to negotiate diplomatically to improve them. They were all summarily rejected by Sir Edward Grey. Finally, so anxious was Germany to confine the limits of the war, the German Ambassador asked Sir Edward Grey to propose his own conditions of neutrality, and Sir Edward Grey declined to discuss the matter. *This fact was suppressed by Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Asquith in their speeches in Parliament.*

6. When Sir Edward Grey failed to secure peace between Germany and Russia, he worked deliberately to involve us in the war, using Belgium as his chief excuse.

That is the gist of the White Paper.

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That Sir Edward Grey should have striven for European peace and then, when he failed, that he should have striven with equal determination to embroil Great Britain, seems contradictory. But it is not, and the explanation of why it is not is the justification of those of us who for the last eight years have regarded Sir Edward Grey as a menace to the peace of Europe and his policy as a misfortune to our country. What is the explanation?

* * * * * *

Great Britain in Europe can pursue one of two policies. It can keep on terms of general friendship with the European nations, treating with each separately when necessary and co-operating with all on matters of common interest. To do this effectively it has to keep its hands clean. It has to make its position clear, and its sympathy has to be boldly given to every movement for liberty. This is a policy which requires great faith, great patience, and great courage. Its foundations are being built by our own International, and if our Liberal Government had only followed it since 1905 it would by this time have smashed the military autocracies which have brought us into war.

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But there is a more alluring policy—apparently easier, apparently safer, apparently more direct, but in reality more difficult, more dangerous, and less calculable. That is the policy of the balance of power through alliance. Weak and short-sighted Ministers have always resorted to this because it is the policy of the instincts rather than of the reason. It forms groups of Powers in continents. It divided Europe into two great hostile camps—Germany, Austria, and Italy on the one hand; Russia, France, and ourselves on the other. The progeny of this policy is suspicion and armaments, its end is war and the smashing up of the very balance which it is designed to maintain. When war comes it is then bound to be universal. Every nation is on one rope or another and when one slips it drags its alliances with it.

As a matter of practical experience the very worst form of alliance is the *entente*. An alliance is definite. Every one knows his responsibilities under it. The *entente* deceives the people. When Mr. Asquith and Sir Edward Grey kept assuring the House of Commons that we had contracted no obligations by our *entente* with France they said what was literally true but substantially untrue. That is why stupid or dishonest statesmen prefer the *entente* to the alliance; it permits them to see hard facts through a veil of sentimental vagueness. Had we had a definite alliance with France and Russia the only difference would have been that we and everybody else should have known what we had let ourselves in for, and that might have averted the war.

* * * * * *

It is interesting to gather from Sir Edward Grey's speech of August 3 and the White Paper how completely the *entente* entangled him. There were first of all the "conversations" between French and British naval and army experts from 1906 onwards. These produced plans of naval and military operations which France and we were to take jointly together. It was in accordance with these schemes that the northern coasts of France were left unprotected by the French Navy.

Those schemes, moreover, assumed that the neutrality of Belgium would be violated if a general war broke out. The "conversations" were carried on for about six years without the knowledge or consent of the Cabinet. The military plans were sent to St. Petersburg and a Grand Duke (so well-informed authorities say) connected with the German Party in Russia sent them to Berlin. Germany has known for years that there were military arrangements

between France and ourselves, and that Russia would fit her operations into these plans. We had so mixed ourselves up in the Franco-Russian alliance that Sir Edward Grey had to tell us on August 3 that though our hands were free our honour was pledged!

* * * * * *

The country had been so helplessly committed to fight for France and Russia that Sir Edward Grey had to refuse point blank every overture made by Germany to keep us out of the conflict. That is why, when reporting the negotiations to the House of Commons, he found it impossible to tell the whole truth and to put impartially what he chose to tell us. He scoffed at the German guarantee to Belgium on the ground that it only secured the "integrity" of the country but not its independence; when the actual documents appeared it was found that its independence was secured as well. And that is not the worst. The White Paper contains several offers which were made to us by Germany aimed at securing our neutrality. None were quite satisfactory in their form and Sir Edward Grey left the impression that these unsatisfactory proposals were all that Germany made. Later on the Prime Minister did the same. Both withheld the full truth from us. The German Ambassador saw Sir Edward Grey, according to the White Paper, on August 1—and this is our Foreign Minister's note of the conversation:

> The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions upon which we could remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her Colonies might be guaranteed.

Sir Edward Grey declined to consider neutrality on any condition and refrained from reporting this conversation to the House. Why? It was the most important proposal that Germany made. Had this been told to us by Sir Edward Grey his speech could not have worked up a war sentiment. The hard immoveable fact was that Sir Edward Grey had so pledged the country's honour without the country's knowledge to fight for France or Russia, that he was not in a position even to discuss neutrality.

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Now, the apparent contradiction that the man who had worked for European peace was at the same time the leader of the war party in the Cabinet can be explained. Sir Edward Grey strove to undo the result of his policy, and keep Europe at peace but, when he failed, he found himself committed to dragging his country into war.

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Without this wide survey of policy it is impossible to estimate either Sir Edward Grey's culpability or Germany's share of blame.

Germany's share is a heavy one. Taking a narrow view, she, with Russia, is mainly responsible for the war; taking a longer view, we are equally responsible. The conflict between the *entente* and the alliance had to come and only two things determined the time of its coming. The first was the relative capacity of the countries to bear the burdens of an armed peace. That was reaching its limit in most countries. The second was the question of how the changes which time was bringing were affecting adversely the military power of the respective opponents. The alliance was to receive a great blow on the death of the Austrian Emperor; Russia was building a system of strategic railways up to the German frontier, and this was to be finished in 1916, by which time her Army was greatly to be increased. The *entente* therefore was forcing Germany to fight within two years. We can understand the military mind of Germany forced with these threatening changes if we remember how scared we were when we were told of German threats against ourselves. The stubbornness of Germany, shown on every page of the White Paper, was not merely military offensiveness, but the stand of a country being put into difficulties by time tipping the power against it. The breaking point had been reached. Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors had to give place to the war lords.

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So I come back to the statement which I think I have clearly proven: that the European war is the result of the existence of the *entente* and the alliance, and that we are in it in consequence of Sir Edward Grey's foreign policy.

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The justifications offered are nothing but the excuses which Ministers can always produce for mistakes. Let me take the case of Belgium. It has been known for years that, in the event of a war between Russia and France on the one hand and Germany on the other, the only possible military tactics for Germany to pursue were to attack France hot foot through Belgium, and then return to meet the Russians. The plans were in our War Office. They were discussed quite openly during the Agadir trouble, and were the subject of some magazine articles, particularly one by Mr. Belloc. Mr. Gladstone made it clear in 1870 that in a general conflict formal neutrality might be violated. He said in the House of Commons in August, 1870:

> I am not able to subscribe to the doctrine of those who have held in this House what plainly amounts to an assertion that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee is binding on every party to it, irrespective altogether of the particular position in which it may find itself at the time when the occasion for acting on the guarantee arises.

Germany's guarantees to Belgium would have been accepted by Mr. Gladstone. If France had decided to attack Germany through Belgium Sir Edward Grey would not have objected, but would have justified himself by Mr. Gladstone's opinions.

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We knew Germany's military plans. We obtained them through the usual channels of spies and secret service. We knew that the road through Belgium was an essential part of them: That was our opportunity to find a "disinterested" motive apart from the obligations of the *entente*. It is well known that a nation will not fight except for a cause in which idealism is mingled. The *Daily Mail* supplied the idealism for the South African war by telling lies about the flogging of British women and children; our Government supplied the idealism for this war by telling us that the independence of Belgium had to be vindicated by us. Before it addressed its inquiries to France and Germany upon this point, knowing the military exigencies of both countries, it knew that France could reply suitably whilst Germany could not do so. It was a pretty little game in hypocrisy which the magnificent valour of the Belgians will enable the Government to hide up for the time being.

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Such are the facts of the case. It is a diplomatists' war, made by about half-a-dozen men. Up to the moment that Ambassadors were withdrawn the peoples were at peace. They had no quarrel with each other; they bore each other no ill-will. A dozen men brought Europe to the brink of a precipice and Europe fell over it. To-day our happy industrial prospects of a fortnight ago are darkened. Suffering has come to be with us. Ruin stares many of us in the face. Little comfortable business are wrecked, tiny incomes have vanished. Want is in our midst, and Death walks with Want. And when we sit down and ask ourselves with fulness of knowledge: "Why has this evil happened?" the only answer we can give is, because Sir Edward Grey has guided our foreign policy during the past eight years. His short-sightedness and his blunders have brought all this upon us.

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I have been reminded of one of those sombre judgments which the prophet who lived in evil times uttered against Israel.

A wonderful and horrible thing is commited in the land: The prophets prophesy falsely, and the priests bear rule by their means, and may people love to have it so: and what will ye do in the end thereof?"

Aye, what will ye do in the end thereof?

War and Class-War.

The "Times" View.

At the breath of war and the higher call of patriotism in the hour of national danger the voices of party and faction have sunk into silence. The artificial conflicts they represent are dispersed at the touch of a real one. But we are witnessing a still more instructive test of value. The class war of Socialism and the international peace movement associated with it have evaporated into words and are in process of collapsing altogether. For more than half a century one of the cardinal doctrines preached by Socialists has been the division of society into two sharply defined classes, between which a perennial state of war is proclaimed transcending the boundaries of nationality. The interests of Labour or "the workers" are declared to be identical in all lands, and the counter-interests of Capital must be equally united, according to the theory, though less is said about them. In 1864 an International Labour Association was founded to give expression to this idea. It expired after a short and feeble existence, but was replaced some years later by another international organization which has been carried on with more success. Started in 1889, it has not only continued but has increased in numbers and influence. One of its functions is to denounce and prevent war between nations, and it held a special representative meeting in Brussels only the other day for that purpose. The doctrine of the class war and the international solidarity of labour interests obviously entails the corollary that international warfare is hostile to those interests; and that view is strengthened by the burdens involved in expenditure on armaments and by the obstacle to Socialist aspirations offered by the Army in the hands of the Government. These are cardinal points in every Socialist programme. Hence the campaign against "militarism." Year after year we have been told that the united voice of "the

workers" will forbid war, and strenuous efforts have been made to put some substance into the promise. A universal strike on the advent or approach of war has been proposed and much discussed as an effectual means of frustrating it, and, if the plan had been earnestly entertained by wage-earners, it must have exercised a great and perhaps deciding influence.

Now the occasion has arisen and the doctrine has been put to the test. What do we find? France has gone to war with a Socialist at the head of her Government, supported by the great anti-militarist trade union organization, which has issued a proclamation calling on all Frenchmen to serve their country; and one of the most famous prophets of anti militarism in Europe, M. Gustave Herve, who was the other day preaching desertion to soldiers, led the way in asking permission to join the colours. Belgium is at war, and in order to strengthen the Government, which is enthusiastically supported by the whole people, irrespective of class, M. Vandervelde, the most distinguished Socialist living since the assassination of M Jaures, and the leader of the Belgian Socialists, has joined the Ministry. The Socialist Party has officially declared for the military campaign, and announced that its members who are called to the colour will show how Socialist workers "can conduct themselves in the face of danger." But France and Belgium, it may be said, are fighting for the defence of their country against aggression, and Socialists have always allowed the armed defence of one's country; they advocate a citizen army. It would be more accurate to say that some of them do. The largest Socialist body in this country does not. Its horror of militarism is so uncompromising that it even objects to the Bombay Scouts. But the argument that French and Belgian Socialists are taking part in a defensive war involves the admission that Germany, against whom they are fighting, is engaged in an aggressive one. Where, then, are the four and a half million Social Democrats of Germany? What are the two and a half millions of Social Democratic trade unionists doing? Are they doing anything to prove their class solidarity with their French and Belgian comrades? If they are, there are no signs of it. They have been protesting—against the Austrian policy towards Servia and against war in general. But that amounts to nothing. What of the wanton aggression of Germany against Belgium and France, which is the centre of the whole miserable business? There has certainly been no effective opposition; and only a few days ago the *Verwarts*, by far the most influential Socialist paper in the world, was praising the "pacific" policy of the Kaiser. It is significant that the German Social Democrats have always declined assent to the anti-war Labour proposals. Actually the "proletariate" of every nation engaged in the war is fighting for its own country, and for the most part with obvious enthusiasm. Such attacks and such defence as have within the last few days riveted the amazed attention of the world upon Liege could not be sustained without intense patriotic ardour. The spectacle we are witnessing furnishes convincing proof that the tie of nationality is still incomparably stronger than that of class, and that when it is invoked by national war the class war shrivels into an empty phrase.

The evidence at home is not less emphatic. With one accord employers and employed have called a truce in the stubborn and wide-spread conflicts which were being waged in continuance of the industrial warfare that has signalized the four years. The remarkable list of quarrels recently composed, which we published on Saturday, strikingly illustrates the superior claim of national need. This must be added to the list of fatal miscalculations made by Germany. British labour troubles, as well as the Irish crisis, were relied upon in Berlin. They have been closely watched by the German authorities. They have been misinterpreted through reliance on the coloured reports sent by German correspondents, and particularly by those attached to Socialist newspapers. These writers do not understand the labour movement here because they take their cue from a few voluble Socialists, who are supposed by superficial observers to represent it. They are still denouncing the war and demanding British neutrality, but they have no following. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald's resignation of the leadership of the Labour Party indicates their failure. They have put themselves out of court by persistently ignoring the aggressive action of Germany and the cumulative proofs—patent to all the world—that the whole thing was deliberately planned and prepared by her. Their laboured excuses for Germany are so transparent as to suggest ulterior motives. Nor are British workmen likely to listen to the incredibly mean exhortation to abandon for the sake of ease their own comrades who are fighting for national existence in Belgium and France against wanton aggressors. They know that, if the attack succeeded, their own turn would come next. The crushing of Belgium and France is only a step towards the ultimate aim, which is to destroy British sea power and dominate the world. The profound and ineradicable sentiment of nationality which fills the mass of the German people with rage against foreigners—witness the behaviour of the mob in Social. Democratic Berlin—compels all classes in the menaced nations to resist it shoulder to shoulder.

England's Intervention.

[From the "Labour Leader."]

The People and the War.

There is still no popular enthusiasm for the war. From all over the country we receive reports denoting an entire absence of Jingoism. The people regard the conflict not as a holy crusade but as a hellish calamity. They may think it inevitable, perhaps, they certainly think its issues beyond their understanding and control, but they have no mind for flag waving and boastful shouting—they are dumb with the horror of the thing. The temper of the public is an encouraging and reassuring sign. It may be that British victories on land and sea will arouse temporary enthusiasm, but deep down in the hearts of the people is a realisation of the horror of war such as there has never been before, and, when the black night of fratricide has passed and the dawn of fraternity has come, that realisation will, we believe, have grown into a determination to sweep into oblivion the scheming Chancelleries of Europe, with all their suspicion-breeding ramifications, and to establish in their place a permanent federation of interdependent States.

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Is Germany the Aggressor?

Even many of those who are supporting the war are disclaiming any antagonism to the German people. With us they say the German working class has no quarrel with the British working class, with us they point to the strength of the Socialist movement in Germany as an indication of the peaceful inclinations of the people. But, they argue, the Kaiser and his War Lords must be crushed. The military despots of Potsdam, they say, have been holding a pistol at the head of Europe, they have thrust the rule of a military caste upon the democracy of Germany. For the sake of the German people, equally with the people of Belgium, France, and Great Britain, Kaiserdom and all its works must be vanquished finally and entirely. In such fashion even Mr. Bernard Shaw and Mr. H. G. Wells have argued.

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What of the Tsar?

The first comment we desire to make on this argument is that the German apologists of the war are making the same appeal to the German working class—the only difference is that the autocracy of the Tsar is substituted for the autocracy of the Kaiser. We must fight against Russia the German counterparts of Mr. Bernard Shaw and Mr. H. G. Wells are saying not only for the sake of Europe, but for the sake of the Russian democracy. We have no quarrel with the Russian peasant, they cry, but the Tsar and his Court must be crushed, because they are a menace to the civilisation of Europe and an intolerable tyranny to their own people. Every battle won against the Russian army, they declare, is in reality a battle won for the liberty of the Russian people. What have Mr. Shaw and Mr. Wells to say to that?

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Great Britain's Part.

In the second place, it is monstrously unfair to thrust upon the War Lords of Germany all the responsibility for the present conflict. It may be true that they have held a pistol at the head of Europe, but is there not some justification for a man whipping out his pistol when he is surrounded by armed enemies plotting his downfall? That has been the position of Germany. During the last ten years Great Britain, France, and Russia have deliberately schemed to isolate and degrade Germany. Our *entente* with France was entered into, as recent events have proved, not so much to establish a basis of friendship between the two countries as to establish a common basis of action against Germany. The Anglo Russian agreement of 1907 was signed for the same purpose, and so anxious was the British Government to maintain the armed ring around Germany that it shamelessly acquiesced in, and even encouraged, the violation of the independence of Persia by Russia, despite the fact that in the very agreement which allied it to Russia it had solemnly pledged itself to maintain that independence. It is all very well to speak of Germany's military arrogance, but what of Britain's naval arrogance? At the Hague Conference in 1907 the German representatives supported a proposal by which merchant vessels would, had it been accepted, have been made immune from attack in time of war. Because Great Britain had a supreme navy, the British delegates at the conference opposed this proposal; they knew that the British fleet, armed to the teeth and patrolling the trade routes of the world, could make short shift of the unprotected ships of other nations peacefully carrying food, and the material and products of trade, from one land to another. The defeat of the proposal to remove merchant vessels from the stage of war made it inevitable that Germany

should build a strong navy to protect her trading vessels, otherwise at the mercy of the British navy, but our Government became exceedingly indignant when Germany began to increase her fleet and retorted by increasing year by year the British fleet to a still greater degree. In 1909 the Premier and the First Lord of the Admiralty announced that they had received reliable information that Germany was secretly extending its naval programme so that it would possess seventeen Dreadnoughts by March, 1912, instead of the nine publicly foreshadowed. Overcome by panic, Parliament agreed to retaliate by constructing four additional Dreadnoughts, but when March, 1912, was reached Germany was found to have only nine Dreadnoughts, and the charge of deception was proved entirely untrue. What did Great Britain do then? She calmly accepted the new standard of naval superiority over Germany and announced that she intended to maintain it! Before March, 1912, Great Britain kept her navy at double the strength of the navies of any two possible enemies. From that date onward, the First Lord of the Admiralty declared the British navy would be maintained at a 60 per cent. standard of superiority over the German navy only. In the following July he adopted a 100 per cent. standard of superiority. And we speak of Germany's armed arrogance!

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Get Rid of Cant.

German militarism is, of course, arrogant, and no one hates it more than we do. But to suggest that all the War Lords naval or military, are resident in Prussia and none in England, is either prejudice or cant. We are fighting Germany not because we think the mailed first of her military caste is a danger to Europe or to small peoples or to German democracy. We are fighting Germany because we are jealous and afraid of her increasing power; for that reason and that reason only. If we were in this war to uphold European civilisation, the liberties of minor nationalities, and the freedom of the German masses, should we be allies of Russia? The defeat of Germany means the victory of Russia, and a Europe under the heel of Russia would be worse tenfold than a Europe under the heel of Germany. For our part we say frankly we prefer the avowed Jingo who declares "Now's our chance to down Germany; let's take it while we've got it" to the apologist of war who tries to justify his attitude by pretending that Britain is the saviour of Europe.

England in Earnest.

To the Editor of the "Times."

Sir,—I would like, if I may, to write to you words which, through you, will best reach my fellow countrymen. For I would that I could make them see what I see and feel for myself—the greatnes of of England in the greatest crisis which as yet she has had to face. As the Germans were misled by Great Britain's internal discord, so perhaps have we in India been misled; and misled also by the astounding levity of the side that is shown to the world.

I remember the comments of the Tibetans on the eve of the taking of Lhasa, when the English community, fighting and waiting, continued its Hill programme of gaieties till the very morning when we gathered to see the soldiers go forth to the war. "Such peoples," said one, "are either devils or lunatic." I do not think that yet the Indian mind is quite made up as to which. Later on, when treaties were in contemplation, a group of Lamas went in person to look on at "the Mad Dance" (fancy dress ball) at the local gymkhana, sitting with the grave faces used at meditations for the world-mysteries alone, but coming away baffled by the inscrutable.

And here in London, at this time, one sees another version of that which puzzled the Lamas. In the twinkling of an eye England is plunged in war. In the twinkling of an eye the unprepared are prepared. As one man the nation has responded to the call of King and country.

And the silence of it—the silence of the self-advertising, of the commercial-spirited, those whom in India we were misled into thinking would never forgo a business advantage—their silence and self-restraint must surely impress us in as great a measure as the march past of the entire British Army. Not without defence is an Empire which can show in the Motherland, together with the muscle and training of the British soldier, the gifts of the spirit which we had believed were ours alone in India.

In London one has one's fingers on the pulse of the war, and the paradox is here seen at its best. Enthusiasm for King and soldier, as red as the flannel on which the women work, and with it the calmness which has dislocated apparently nothing of the daily life of the City. Reserve which still shows no sign of the tearing of the heart's fibres, and a new friendliness, the rare friendliness of the reserved to men and women met in street or train or omnibus. Never has one felt so little a stranger and a foreigner, so little alien, as in this England which is bound by their own treachery to hunt out those who alone deserve the stigma of "alien." The Empire creeps closer together in the common danger to the Empire, and hand meets hand when stretched out in the darkness of the great uncertainty which broods over us all.

And again, the great reliance (God-reliance, self-reliance, what is it?), the assurance of the victory which attends the righteous—this is the most astounding thing of all, and irresistibly infectious. While nothing can equal the impression given of the calm yet eager readiness to pay to the uttermost, whatever it may cost a nation to keep its word to a friend. We needed that assurance in India. We have been forgetting. And the women of England in England—they seem to me wonderful.

Only a short month ago a world's pageant of beauty and luxury, dancing the dance of pleasure with zest which seemed to have no margin for other issues. Now dancing the dance of—death, with just as brave faces of cheer for the world to see; turning with just such whole-heartedness to the ministry of help—calm with the intensity of feeling, cheerful with divine dissimulation. I have seen them with my eyes, in houses robbed of their best-beloveds, and in the worst temptations of the great silence which has lain on all that might be happening; and the sight has given me something which must surely go without need of words to those with whom I would share my vision and my conviction.

There is a tale told of how the gentle Sita of the Sanskrit epic tried to dissuade Rama from the making of war even on the deserving. And Rama answered that he is of the knightly caste, and no knight may forswear his birth-right. In England it seems to me that every man and woman is born of the caste of knighthood, for the spirit of the warrior and of the mothers of warriors is confined to no single rank in life. And yet another Eastern story comes to my mind as I write. Krishna has come to Karna, the archer, before the great battle of Kurukshethra, has come to dissuade him from fighting. "It will be a terrible war," he urges, "brother against brother, sometimes friend against friend. You have played together and together have learnt the use of weapons. Give me your sheaf of arrows, and make a great peace before life is staked and lost." But Karna shakes his head, firm in some hidden knowledge of the issues of life and of death. "Think of this not as a war," says he, "but as a sacrifice of arms, demanded of the gods. We may not defeat the great offering decreed for us. Victory must follow the cause that is righteous. Reflect on that. And if death be for any of us, let us die as beseemeth warriors by the touch of noble weapons, there on a field which shall be sacred." Then, smiling as if he foresaw that which indeed was written for himself, he dismisses the messenger of the timid heart with the mystic's *au revoir*, "Beyond death we meet again."

Yours faithfully,

Cornelia Sorabji

London, Aug. 19.

To the Editor of the "Times."

Sir,—Miss Sorabji has paid us the highest compliment which any nation could hope for. It is true that many of us have been called upon to make the greatest sacrifices to a future of uncertainty; it is true that a spirit of unusual friendliness between the normally reserved is abroad; and it is true also that we are entering on this war with no thoughtlessness or levity—the lesson of the South African War has been learnt too well for that. But before we can accept Miss Sorabji' estimate of the national temper (would that we could, and may she prove right!) we must seriously ask ourselves whether the great mass of us really comprehends what is happening. So far none of us has seen any sign of the enemy. Not a shot has been fired in our hearing; not a single hostile aeroplane has been descried on the horizon; no account of an engagement by sea or land in which our soldiers or sailors have taken part has reached us. Even the Amphion did not go down in battle, though she sank on active service. It is early to speak of fortitude and courage among the home-abiding populace. The war, though not the preparations for war, has so far hardly affected us at all. We are fortunate to have been at war so long and to have felt it so little.

When, perhaps (which Heaven forbid!), our coasts shall have been in imminent and visible danger of a raid or a bombardment; when our Navy (which Providence protect!), through circumstances at present unthinkable to us, either by ill-fortune or by superior strategy, shall have been driven to take a decidedly defensive attitude; when an airship—an equally unthinkable supposition—shall have successfully hurled its deadly cargo into one of the busiest of our market places; then, and then only, will some of the awful realities of war be brought home to us. We are no doubt mentally prepared for bereavement and privation; but neither of these afflictions has yet visited us, while of such horrors as are now being enacted in Belgium we can form no conception, for not only our memory, but even our whole history, fails to supply a parallel. To judge by your

Special Correspondent's article to-day on the effects of the war in Glasgow it would appear that the war is not felt there at all; your Correspondent's language points rather to a state of ignorant, if not culpable, indifference. The very cry, "Business as usual," though uttered with the best intentions, shows how far we are from understanding what war means. The fact is we are islanders, *penitus toto divisi orbe Britanni*; and war has never meant to us what it has meant to Continental peoples. Our geographical position is an unspeakable blessing, but it blunts the understanding.

While, therefore, thanking Miss Sorabji sincerely for her enheartening letter, and praying that her divination of our character may prove to be just, we ought—nay, we must—wait for trials far more fiery than those of the last fortnight before we can honestly declare ourselves to be what we hope we are, and what, as we believe, the best part of us is trying to be,

Yours truly,

STILL A SPECTATOR.

August 20.



The Unsound Foundations.

ALL other speculations as to the causes of this catastrophe, or lessons to be drawn from it, must take into account this central and pivotal fact: that the men of Europe have not yet learned so to organize their society as to make their conduct obey their intention. We are all of one mind to do one thing, and we all do the next reverse. We are slaves and puppets of forces which make our conduct, not something which our minds and consciences have settled upon, but something as much divorced from moral responsibility and human choice as the bending of the growing corn before the wind.

This fact is most generally cited as demonstrating the inevitability of war: as proving that men can have no choice. It only proves, of course, that so far men have failed to lay even the foundations of their society aright.

It is not in this present case even a matter of uncontrollable elemental passion. There is no passion. A Chauvinist journalist writes of it as "a war without hate," and all first-hand testimony as to feeling in France and Germany is to the effect that the millions are going submissively, unresistingly, to kill and be killed for some cause concerning which they have little feeling and less understanding. Nor is it a question of the collision of two rights. The general population does not know in all this tangle on which side right lies. So that in simple fact, we have a population of 350 million souls, the immense majority of whom—and by that I do not mean something more than half, but more nearly a proportion represented by 349,900,000 as against the 350,000,000—were in favour of peace. And all these millions who wanted peace have gone to war. Everybody wanted not to go to war. Everybody has gone to war. The action which we did not intend we have taken. The action we did intend, we have not taken.

This essential helplessness of man, their failure to have formed a society which can carry out their intention, goes a great deal deeper than mere political machinery. It would be easy to show, of course, that in our own country, in some respects the most democratic in Europe, the determining factor of policy has been the secret action of three or four men, incurring, without popular sanction, without the nation knowing to what it was committed, obligations involving the lives of tens of thousands and the destiny of our Empire. We find that we have obligations of "honour" of which not one man in a hundred thousand was a week ago aware—obligations which, indeed, we had been assured solemnly did not exist. The particular political contrivance which makes that possible may, perhaps later, be changed, if, after the welter into which we are entering is over, sufficient civilization is left to us. The superficial aspects of the trouble we may be able to change, unless the improvement of Parliamentary institutions in Europe becomes something which the quite possible development of this war in the direction of a Slav hegemony of Europe places outside practical politics.

But one must look for the prime cause beyond the mere defects of machinery: in the defects of an education which makes it impossible for the mass to judge facts save in their most superficial aspect, or to think war as other than a jolly football match; which also makes it impossible for the average man to keep two co-related facts in view at the same time. In all this business, the average man has overlooked so capital a fact as the predominating 150,000,000 of peasants, at the real head, it may be 200,000,000, in control of a country impregnable by its bulk, much more resistant to the paralysis of war than more developed nations, largely hostile to Western conception of political and religious freedom. This fact is obscured, because another fact, the alleged menace of Germany, has taken hold of the public mind. Yet even our present public is capable of realizing that a country of 65,000,000 highly civilized, wedged in between hostile States, with a culture that has contributed in the past so much to civilization, racially allied to ourselves and with moral ideas resembling our own, with a commercial and industrial life that is dependent upon an orderly and stable Europe, is necessarily less of a menace than the Slav hegemony.

But the collective mind as it exists in our age can only see one such fact at a time: in the Crimean War we saw Russian barbarism but not Turkish; in 1914 we can see German barbarism but not Russian. The first step to a better condition in Europe will be some demonstration enabling the collective mind to seize upon a truth so wide embracing as to render the eclipse of minor facts of little practical importance. Such a demonstration might come with the collaps, of credit and industry dragging with it so much of the structure of civilization, thus making visible the essential unity of European civilization and the futility of that struggle for purely political domination, which the present war constitutes. A war which the great mass certainly did not desire is accepted passively as inevitable because parties representing the protection of old privileges, attached to an older form of society, can appeal to the momentum of old political conceptions so intimately associated with ideas as to the preponderating need of military power and political domination.

And there is this curious psychological fact. The parties which may be termed the parties of ideas, seem to show less capacity for ready movement and effective action in imposing their point of view than do the parties composed of men who have simply taken over old prejudices. The military and chauvinist elements in Parliament and in the press are, numerically perhaps, in a minority. But their effectiveness in propaganda, in the presentation of their case, has in this crisis been greater than that shown by their opponents. Take the incidents of the last week or two. As soon as the possibility of war became evident, forward sections of the Opposition carried on, with the help of the "Times" and the "Daily Mail" and the allied papers, what was in fact a war propaganda with "a kick and a punch," as the Americans would call it, that swept the inert mass of the country to the point at last of "accepting the inevitable." At that early stage a move was made among small groups on the anti-war side to resist this propaganda with an equal "kick and punch"; but immediately considerations of "not being controversial," "not embarrassing the Government," 'not alienating X, Y, or Z," began to paralyze, to some extent at least, the clear, downright expression of opinion hostile to intervention. There seemed to be no general realization on the peace side that the danger was desperate, that we were on the edge of a volcano; that the war party were not hampered by considerations of "not embarrassing the Government"; and of not being "too controversial." There was thus created a situation in which all the psychological momentum which goes for so much in these things was on the side of war, while the forces which might have been ranged on the side of peace were in large part inert or disorganized.

The instance is only worth noting at this early stage after the catastrophe, as bearing upon what the attitude of democrats and pacifists must be if we are to salve anything from the wreck. If such case for peace as that which this week's situation presented cannot win to itself the element of pugnacity and fight which are put into the opposite case, cannot redirect those elements of human nature to its own cause, then it is incapable of grappling with the problems which will confront it in the years that face us. We who favour peace have suffered in the past from the general impression that good intentions and high aspirations would in some way atone for the absence of the humbler virtues of technical efficiency in the method and management of propaganda, in the direction and control of the fighting forces.

Perhaps this catastrophe will help us to realize the magnitude of the problem which faces us. Peace is not a section of certain social problems which we have to solve, not one among many. It is the basis of the whole democratic and social problem. Our scheme of social reform must now be shelved. Perhaps they will wait for a generation, perhaps longer. The efforts of many years of social endeavour will be nullified because, instead of so marshalling all the forces of reform as to make them in some measure all parts of the army of peace, we have conceived of anti-war propaganda as a separate and limited task. The problem of peace is neither more nor less than the problem of so laying the foundation of civilized society that a stable and secure superstructure problem becomes possible. It is all one general interdependent problem. Constructive social work depends upon making peace secure; peace depends upon an educated democracy; the military organization of states in the long run fatal to democracy; if democracy is to survive, the general war problem must find solution.

In so far as that problem is one of change in ideas—and it is mainly that—it is essential that the old fallacies concerning the place

and efficacy of force and the nature of political power should not merely be relegated to the background by the preoccupation of the public with other things, but so undermined as to be destroyed. If the old ideas are definitely to pass from politics, a large body of the public must see fairly clearly how and why the agruments that supported those ideas are false. Failing this, it will always be possible to revive the old ideas by some incident like that through which we have passed. The importance of securing the realization of certain economic and material truths is not the hope of dissuading men from going to war because their bank account would suffer, but of showing that the interdependence of the modern world has made the whole conception of society as a conglomeration of rival States an absurdity, an impossible foundation for our work in the world. What is now happening to the credit system of the world is important in this: that it is a very visible demonstration of the unity of mankind, of the need for confidence and co-operation, if States are to fulfil these functions for which they were created.

NORMAN ANGELL.

Anti-War Opinion.

The Anti-War Manifesto.

WAR ARGUMENTS REFUTED.

THE following amongst others had expressed their willingness to give effective support to an organisation for insisting that this country should take no part in a Continental war unless directly attacked. This was before the declaration of war:—Lord Welby. The Lord Mayor of Manchester. The Lord Provost of Glasgow. The Bishop of Lincoln. The Bishop of Hereford. Sir William Mather. Sir Albert Spicer. Mr. C. P. Stott. Sir Arthur Hawarth Sir William Hartley. Mr. D. A. Thomas. Professor Sir J. J. Thomson. Dr. Horton. Mr. Richard Whiteing. Mr. W. Stubbs. Mr. Ernest Schuster. Mr. P. Price.

It is felt that it is urgent to bring home to the public the importance of showing the strength of the feeling in favour of neutrality. In the absence of such expression the agitation now being maintained in powerful quarters in favour of England's joining the war may be accepted by the Government and by foreign nations as the general view of the country.

A Provisional Committee has drawn up a manifesto refuting the main argments for taking partin the war. It has not been possible, owing to shortness of time, to submit the text of the document to all those who have joined the organisation, and the above are not individually or collectively responsible for its terms. But all those who are in favour of England's neutrality are strongly urged to give publicity to the arguments contained therein.

Copies of it, together with other leaflets, for distribution may be obtained from Mr. D. Robertson at the temporary offices Salisbury Hotel, Salisbury Square, Fleet Street, London, E. C.

THE TEXT OF THE MANIFESTO.

The manifesto is as follows :—

A determined effort is being made in certain quarters to involve this country in the European war.

It is the definite responsibility of all to consider the grounds upon which this intervention is urged.

It is urged that we must ensure the victory to France and Russia in order to maintain the balance of power.

If we are successful in securing the victory of Russia in this war, we shall upset that balance enormously by making her the dominant military Power of Europe, possibly the dictator both in this Continent and in Asia. Her own population numbers 170 millions, while she is the head and leader of populations numbering at least 200 millions, partly Asiatic and Mahemetan. All her history shows her to be impregnable by invasion. She has not the modern commercial and industrial life which is paralysed by war, and she is likely to feel the strain of war less than more highly developed nations. She is able to put nearly six million men in the field, to draw upon vast resourse of human military material only partly civilised, governed by a military autocracy largely hostile to Western ideas of political and religious freedom.

Germany, on the other hand, is a nation of 65 millions, wedged in between hostile States, highly civilised, with a culture that has contributed enormously in the past to Western civilisation, racially allied to ourselves, and with moral ideals largely rssembling our own, possessing a commercial and industrial life that is dependent on an orderly and stable Europe. Our two peoples have maintained unbroken peace since their earliest history.

The last war we fought upon the Continent was for the purpose of checking the growth of Russia. We are now asked to go to war to promote it. That war was very popular, and those who condemned it were bitterly derided. Yet it is now admitted to have been a monstrous absurdity.

We are told that if Germany is victorious she may annex Holland, Belgium, and Normandy, and so threaten us. However much we may condemn an attempt at such a monstrous violation of international morality, German experience in Alsace has shown that conquered provinces do not necessarily make an empire stronger. They generally so add to the internal and external difficulties of developed countries like Germany as to make them weaker from a military point of view.

It has also been urged that we are bound by our agreements with France to come to her aid, but both the Prime Minister and Sir Edward Grey have stated emphatically in the House of Commons (the former on March 12, 1912, and on March 24, 1914, and the latter on June 11, 1914) that no such obligation exists, that there is no undertaking, written or spoken, calling for our intervention. The "Entente Cordiale" was certainly never intended by the British nation as a war alliance, but as an expression of goodwill marking the settlment of old quarrels, and it has always been understood that our diplomatic obligations were discharged by our support of France in the Morocco crisis.

It is then urged that our obligations under the treaties of Belgian neutrality compel us to intervene. But such an obligation if it existed would compel us to resist the troops of France as much as those of Germany in the case of the violation of the Belgian frontier. The contingency may never arise. Lord Derby, when dealing with the similar collective guarantees of Luxemburg, declared that if the other signatories of the treaties declined to join us:—"We are not bound single-handed to make up the deficiency. Such a guarantee has obviously rather the character of a moral sanction to the arrangements which it defends than of a contingent liability to make war. It would, no doubt, give a right to make war, but would not necessarily impose the obligation."

If Great Britain refrains from wasting her resources during the war and is the one great European Power that remains unexhausted by the drain of war, she will be at the close in the best position to exercise her influence for the protection of Belgian interests, to see that justice is done, and to act as arbiter in the general interest.

Italy, always presumed to be a party to the Triple Alliance, has declared her neutrality. Surely, therefore, we who are party to no alliance can do as much, and as the forces of Italy were brought into the general calculation of the resources of the Triple Alliance and are not now forthcoming we should be still further tilting the balance if we were to join the other side.

No British interest is involved in this war, while the gravest interest will be placed in jeopardy by our entrance into it. A state of war in England would render it impossible for Britain to remain the financial centre of the world. The function which London fulfils would temporarily, and perhaps permanently, be transferred to the other side of the Atlantic

If we go to war it will not be to defend any British right from violation. We do not even allege that Germany or Austria has wronged or affronted us in any way. We cannot even pretend to a sense of wrong. We shall attack them because in a quarrel of very complex issues, in which we have no qualifications to act as judge, we presume to decide between them and their opponents, or because on the basis of some cold calculations of high politics—which all the facts show to be of very questionable correctness—our security and interest render it opportune to do so.

The British people can best serve the cause of right and justice, their best interests and those of civilisation, by remaining the one Great Power in Europe that has not yielded to the war madness.

Cambridge Scholars' Manifesto.

CALL FOR NEUTRALITY.

The following manifesto to the nation was issued at Cambridge before the declaration of war:—

The undersigned Professors, Fellows, and Masters of Arts in the University of Cambridge desire to express their conviction of the supreme importance of preserving England's neutrality in the existing situation, considering that at the present juncture no vital interest of this country is endangered, such as would justify our participation in a war.

(Signed) J. C. H. Howe, W. Johnson, W. T. Layton, Alex. Macalister, M. D., F. R. S. Professor of Anatomy; D H. Macgregor, Norman McTaggart, Litt. D, B. A; E. H. Neville, J. E. Nixon, G. H. F. Nuttall, Sc.D., F.R.S., Professor of Biology; J. E. Purvis, A. S. Ramsay, J. S. Reid, Litt. D., F.B.A., Professor of Ancient History; J. Holland Rose, Litt. D., Reader in Modern History; Bertrand Russell, F.R.S.; F. R. Salter, J. E. Sandys, Litt. D., F. B. A., Public Orator; F. A. Simpson, H. F. Russell Smith, G. I. Taylor, J. R. F. Taylor, F.R. Tennant, D.D.; Austin, H. Thompson, A. I. Tillyard, E. A. W. Tillyard, E. O. Vulliamy, James Ward, Sc.D.; F.B.A., Professor of Mental Philosophy; G. N. Watson, C. K. Webster, W. C. D. Whetham, F.R.S; C. T. R. Wilson, F.R.S.; D. A. Winstanley, F. J. Wolstenholme.

A. Wood, G. Sims Woodhead, Professor of Pathology; Alfred J. Wyatt; L. Alston; Walter G. Bell; A. C. Benson, C. V. O.; Arthur Berry F. F. Blackman, Sc.D. F.R.S.; W. H. Blythe; Henry Bond; C. D. Broad, F.J; I. A. Bromwhich, Sc.D., F.R.S.; A. E. Brooke, D.D., Dean of King's College; J. R. M. Butley; A. Y. Campbell Norman; R. Campbell, Sidney; G. Campbell; H. C. Carter; J. H. Clapham, Litt. D.; J. A. Crowther; Edward J. Dent; G. Lowes Dickinson; R. S. Eves; J. E. Few; G E. Green; W. W. Greg, Litt. D.; G. Dawes Hicks, Litt. D.; E. W. Hobson, Sc.D., F.R.S., Professor of Pure Mathematics.

The signatures were obtained in less than twenty-four hours, and more are coming in hourly.

International Arbitration League.

STATEMENT AS TO NEUTRALITY:

THE International Arbitration League has issued the following manifesto:—

At meeting of the Executive Committee of the International Arbitration League, presided over by Mr. Thomas Burt, M.P., the following statement was ordered to be circulated:—

The Government has declared that in certain contingencies, altogether apart from the defence of the neutrality of the Belgium Great Britain will go into the war on behalf of France. This is the assurance which Sir Edward Grey gave to the French Ambassador on Sunday afternoon, and quoted by him in the House of Commons on the following day:—

"I am authorised to give an assurance that if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power. This assurance is of course subject to the policy of his Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding his Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contigency or action of the German fleet takes place."

This is a plain offer of naval aid to France, which, once given, would be unlikely to stop there. The expeditionary force would surely follow, if it were thought to be needed, to assist the partner of Russia in the difficulties which her unholy alliance with the Muscovite autocarcy has entangled her. For years we have protested against the policy of "special" friendships. It has not stood the test of war. "Special" friendship has become a prospective alliance in action.

The only international interest worth defending is the neutrality of Belgium or of other States which declare and strictly observe neutrality. We of the Peace movement stand for the sacredness of international obligations, and whoever breaks them becomes the enemy of all nations.

But this is not the issue on which the Government commits the nation to intervention. We may at any hour be at war simply because we belong to a certain group of Powers.

In such a situation we are compelled to adhere to our declaration of absolute neutrality—the only policy consistent with British interests and with our duty to our Continental neighbours. Never before has the modern world been faced with such a catastrophe. Out of the welter of anarchy we must be kept. We therefore urge the Government to confine its efforts to the preservation of neutrality rights and to the use of the machinery of the Hague Conventions or other like means for bringing about peace.

(Signed)

THOMAS BURT, M.P., President.
HOWARD EVANS, Chairman.
F. C. BAUM, C. GREEDY, J MORGAN,
G. PROCTOR, Executive Committee.
F. MADDISON, Secretary.

Public and the War.

THE PRESERVATION OF NEUTRALITY.

To the Editor of the "Manchester Guardian."

Sir,—Sir Edward Grey's speech marks a new departure in the intertional situation, but we would urge that it should make us all more strenuous to preserve the British neutrality which is not yet lost. Sir Edward Grey dwelt on two points—first the necessity of defending the north-east of France, which has been left unprotected by the French fleet, and next our obligation of interest and of duty to maintain the neutrality of Belgium. On both these questions the German Government has made advances which the Foreign Secretary puts aside as insufficient, but which may not have been made as the last word.

The neutrality of Belgium has up to this moment of writing not been infringed; the French coast has not been attacked. We cannot but hope that the Government and the Foreign Secretary may still be made further to examine and secure modification of the proposition of Germany so that an agreement may be reached on these two points and British neutrality preserved:—Yours, &c.,

BRYCE.
COURTNEY OF PENWITH.
L REBURN.
SHUTTLEWORTH.
FARRER.

The "Manchester Guardian" and the War.

England's Duty.

RUSSIA has ordered a general mobilisation, Germany has proclaimed martial law throughout the Empire and may begin at any moment now to mobilise. The outlook in Europe is as bad as possible, short of being quite hopeless. Under other political conditions in England we should now be wringing our hands over the situation in Europe. We advise Englishmen that they have no sympathy to spare for Europe. Let them keep it for themselves, and think first of all for England, for English honour and English interests. For there is in our midst an organised conspiracy to drag us into the war should the attempts of the peace-makers fail. "Conspiracy" we say because it is disloyal to Parliament which is the constitutional guardian of the national interests in times of crisis. The conspirators prefer the confidence of selected newspaper editors to that of the representatives of the people. The objects of the conspirators are now openly avowed. We are to join in, not under certain conditions or in defence of this or that British interest which may happen to be threatened, but in any case. We are to do so for three reasons. The first is that we are bound in our own interest to maintain the balance of power in Europe. The second is that we are the protectors of the neutrality of Belgium. The third, that we are in honour bound to stand by our friends. Each of these reasons must be considered separately and tried not by tests of self-interest alone, but also by the highest standards of British honour. For we seek no peace except with honour intact.

The Balance of Power, as a doctrine of English policy, was responsible for the long feud with France in the eighteenth century culminating in the war with Revolutionary France. It made the National Debt. It lost England the great lead that it had obtained in constitutional liberties, and condemned us to the worst period of reaction in our history. After the Congress of Vienna its effects disgusted Canning, and even a Tory like Castlereagh, and in the nineteenth century it fell into oblivion and disgrace with both parties. Bright pronounced its obituary in a passage quoted by one of our correspondents, of unexampled bitterness. Its revival has been the work of the last seven or eight years, and, we deeply regret to think, has been coincident with the access to power of the Liberal Government—we do not say that it has been its doing. The doctrine has at all times been the greatest enemy of progress, and, so far from rallying Englishmen against a foreign enemy, should incline them to look for the enemy at home. But, even if we admired the doctrine as much as we in fact detest it, it supplies no reason why we should take the side of Russia against Germany. If Russia wins there will be the greatest disturbance of the blance of power that the world has ever seen. The whole conditions of our continued existence as an Asiatic Power will have to be revised, and over all the world, wherever we come into contact with Russia, we shall have a repetition of the self-effacement which we have witnessed in Persia. The victory of Germany, on the other hand, would in effect be a victory for the principle of the balance of power. If we believed in this principle—which we do not,—then we might be for intervention on the side of Germany. Because we do not believe in it we are able, without the least misgiving, to counsel neutrality as the right policy of this country.

Then we are to side with Russia against Germany because we are guarantors of the neutrality of Belgium, which, it assumed, is in danger from Germany, and from her alone. The "Times" has quoted the authority of Gladstone for this proposition. Now it is quite true that during the Franco-German War Lord Granville concluded treaties with both France and Germany guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium. Article 3 of both treaties declares that they are to remain in force during the continuance of the war and for twelve months afterwards. Both treaties have, therefore, expired. But it will be said there are the earlier treaties of the forties in which we, in common with most of the Great Powers, guaranteed

Belgian neutrality. Are we not bound by those? Let the great Lord Derby answer for us. He was asked in 1867 whether we were not bound by a similar collective guarantee in the case of Luxemburg. He said No. "We are bound in honour—you "cannot place a legal construction upon it—to see, in concert "with others, that these arrangements are maintained. But if the "other Powers join with us it is certain that there will be no viol- "ation of neutrality. If they, situated exactly as we are, decline to "join, we are not bound single-handed to make up the deficency. "Such a guarantee has obviously rather the character of a moral "sanction to the arrangement which it defends than that of a contin- "gent liability to make war. It would, no doubt, give a right to "make war, but would not necessarily impose the obligation." And that is the view taken by most international lawyers. We are, therefore, absolutely free; there is no entanglement in Belgium. Is any further argument needed? It is supplied by the fact that Belgium herself does not desire our interference. If we landed an army for the defence of Belgium it would be fired upon by the Belgians. Belgium does not aspire to the distinction of being the cockpit of Europe.

Then is it honour that we must fight for? No; for honour's sake we must keep the peace. There are, as Mr. Asquith and Sir Edward Grey have both told us, no engagements with European Powers that would take away our perfect freedom of choice in the event of a general European war. Being free as regards Europe we are not free as regards our own people, but must decide in favour of neutrality. For if we decide differently, then we violate dozens of promises made to our own people—the promises to seek peace, to protect the poor, to husband the resources of the country, to promote peaceful progress. These promises are in honour binding, and if they are broken, then not only are our interest sacrificed but our honour is tarnished.

Peace or War?

If and when England joins in the war it will be too late to discuss its policy. Meanwhile we hold it to be a patriotic duty for all good citizens to oppose to the utmost the participation of this country in the greatest crime of our time. Sir Edward Grey's speech last night, for all its appearance of candour, was not fair either to the House of Commons or to the country. It showed that for years he has been keeping back the whole truth and telling just enough to lull into a false sense of security, not enough to enable the country to form a reasoned judgment on the current of our policy. This long course of disloyalty to popular rights—which are as sacred in foreign as in domestic policy—is not atoned for by the deathbed confession of last night. It is a mockery to throw on the House of Commons the responsibility of deciding at a moment's notice and in circumstances of great excitement on a policy that has been maturing for years. Had the House of Commons as a whole risen to the full height of its duty it would have shown itself wiser than its rulers. But a minority did protest, and nobly, against the incompetence and secretiveness in the conduct of our foreign affairs which now threatens to wreck the moral and material progress of half a century. Whether that protest will now avail to prevent a war which had we known what we now know a fortnight ago would never take place we cannot say. We do know that it is the duty of all friends of liberty and progress, whatever their party allegiance may be, to support it. Until we actually go to war it would be criminal for any Englishman who believes, as in our opinion the majority still do, that participation in it would be against the honourable duty that we owe to our people to give up the struggle for lost, and so to acquiesce in action which stabs them suddenly—perhaps fatally—in the back. Rallying our forces for peace, what hopes can we descry of victory? They still, as we shall see, make a presentable array even after Sir Edward Grey's speech. But before we review them, one preliminary reflection. We do not defend German, or rather Prussian, military policy. It is, in our opinion, profoundly mistaken, though we have not the heart to achieve eloquence in denouncing what men do who are fighting against tremendous odds for very life. But the miscalculations of the German General Staff of Germany's interests, however great, would not justify the miscalculation by English Ministers of British interests. Nor shall we repair the violation of Belgian neutrality by violating the neutrality of England.

The war, if it comes, will not be due to the terms of the Entente with France. There is, as Sir Edward Grey acknowledged, a great difference between this crisis and that which arose over Agadir in 1911. Then it was possible to say that even if we were not textually bound to support France she had got into her trouble as a sequel (not, we think, as a consequence) of her agreement with us about Morocco, and we were therefore bound in honour. But this quarrel has nothing to do with any subject ever contemplated in the political understanding with France. The Entente would be absolutely irrelevant to the whole question of our participation in this war but for two sets of facts of which we heard for the first time last night. It appears that as long ago as 1906 Sir Edward Grey consented to conversations between French and English naval and military men as to the best means towards the co-operation between the two countries which the terms of the Entente envisaged in certain circumstances. These conversations have been going on ever since; they were kept from the knowledge of the House of Commons, but, as we now know, revealed to Tory journalists in London and Paris. Sir Edward Grey reconciled this partial secrecy with his conscience by making the stipulation that they were not to commit us to any policy which the country might not support. They have, however, had this effect, that they have been so conducted as to give France the right to ask us exactly what we mean to do in the event of war, not merely over the subjects covered by the Entente, but apparently over any subject. The extreme form which these conversations took was in relation to the Mediterranean. As a consequence of her friendship with us France transferred her main fleet to the Mediterranean, and Sir Edward Grey appears to imply that this was done for our benefit. Sir Edward Grey argues that that act gave France the right to ask us whether we would defend her Atlantic and Channel coasts. It would only do so if the transfer were made on that understanding; but supposing it did, what then? The most that would follow is that in the absence of the French fleet we might be under some obligation to defend the northern and western coasts of France. That obligation Germany is quite prepared to respect. She has offered not to attack these coasts or the coasts of Belgium and Holland. That, says Sir Edward Grey, is not enough. We must have a promise to respect all the coasts of France. His reasons are extraordinary. If the French Fleet comes north, he says, and if Italy does not remain neutral, we shall be in great difficulties in the Mediterranean. The defence of the French coastline in the Mediterranean then is the sole cause for any breach of our neutrality so far as the Entente is concerned. That is to say, if we fight for France we shall fight for France's right to send her ships north and against Germany's right to send her ships to the Mediterranean. Is it rational? Can it be deduced, we will not say from the terms of the Entente, but from the account of secret conversations which was given yesterday? Can it be reconciled with any reasonable view of British interests? It cannot. Even from the point of view of France, we should have thought that a guarantee of her northern and western coast from attack gave her abundant cause for gratitude to the Entente.

There remains the question of the neutrality of Belgium. Sir Edward Grey is prepared to go to war for this object and he quotes the opinion of Gladstone in support. But had Gladstone really thought that it was in our interests always and under all circumstances to go to the support of Belgium in defence of her neutrality, why did he so carefully restrict our obligation under the Treaty of 1870 to the duration of the war between Germany and France and a year after? Was not that an admission that the maintenance of Belgium's neutrality was not a question of honour—the obligations of honour are immutable—but was one which might change with changing conditions? We can attach no other interpretation to it. The question of the integrity of Belgium is one thing; its neutrality is quite another. We shall not easily be convinced, even if the integrity of Belgium be a British interest for which we ought to go to war, that the sacrosanctity of Belgian soil from the passage of an invader is worth the sacrifice of so much that mattered so much more to Englishmen. And in that opinion we are fortified by the view of Lord Derby, who held in the case of Luxemburg, in which our treaty obligations are precisely the same, that there was no obligation on us in honour or in law to intervence by force.

Sir Edward Grey's Strange Blunder.

Sir Edward Grey's words last night, "If we are engaged in "war we shall suffer but little more than we shall suffer even if we "stand aside," show a strange ignorance of the working of trade. It is the sort of statement that one might expect from the Foreign Office, which is not remarkable for its commercial knowledge. But we should have thought that Sir Edward Grey might have remembered the famous case of the war of 1870-1 between France and Germany. At that time Great Britain stood neutral, and the result was that there was an abnormal prosperity in our textile and other manufactures, due to the simple fact that we were neutral, while France and Germany, our two great manufacturing rivals, were fighting one another, and had emptied their mills and were compelled to take our manufactures, leaving us at the same time to supply their customers in neutral countries. What will happen now if we go to war? Our trade with Germany will come to an end, and Germany is now our largest customer except India. We export to Germany something like forty millions sterling of goods every year, and we take back from Germany sugar and chemicals and all sorts of things that are necessary for our manufactures. If we remain neutral we shall continue to trade with Germany and Russia and France. On the other hand, war with Germany means the complete closing of our Baltic trade, and also, we are afraid, the suspension, in a large

part, of the North Sea trade, a great part of which is with Germany. The North Sea will be very dangerous of course.

Then there is another point. Sir Edward Grey has forgotten, apparently, that if we go to war it is probable that we shall soon be spending something like a million pounds a day, and, with a diminished trade and constantly increasing unemployment, we shall be increasing our taxes and loading ourselves with debt. Is it to be supposed that British commerce will not suffer under these conditions more than it would do if we remained at peace with the whole world, as we did in 1870-1? A Stock Exchange man said yesterday that if a proclamation of neutrality was issued the Stock Exchange might be reopened to-morrow with perfect safety. There would be a great return of confidence throughout the City of London, and many of the great financial houses would be saved from something like ruin. A declaration of neutrality would mean that thousands of failures which would otherwise occur would be avoided. It would also mean that tens of thousands of workmen who will be thrown out of employment if there is war would be able to remain at work. The effect of our not being neutral will, therefore, be felt at once by the whole trade of the kingdom. There will be, as we have said, a complete cessation of our timber trade and other important trades with the Baltic, besides the practical ruin of our North Sea traffic. Now, the Baltic and the North Sea trade constitute about one-third of our shipping and commerce. The plight of the North Sea coast, from Aberdeen and Dundee to Newcastle, Hull, and Harwich, can be more easily imagined than described. How the Foreign Office, with its cheerful ignorance of commerce and business, proposes to feed the unemployed on the north-east coast we do not know. From all parts of the kingdom we are hearing of businesses that are about to close down if Great Britain goes to war. It is going to be an appalling catastrophe; and when these events occur, and the working classes, being out of employment, begin to cry out, people may begin to quote Sir Edward Grey's speech and to ask once more how it is that the Foreign Office knows nothing of business and nothing of British trade.

On the Brink.

Saturday and Sunday were the fateful days of a century. On Saturday Germany declared war on Russia. Early the next morning her troops invaded Luxemburg, and in the course of the day they are alleged to have crossed the French frontier at two points not specified. The war party in England will use these facts to work up feeling against Germany as the aggressor and the violator of international law; but sober Englishmen, while grieving that Germany should have thought fit to take this frightful responsibility, will not let German military opinion of which is best for Germany affect their own judgment of what is best for England. Germany was not free to choose; whether war was to come depended not so much on what she did as on what Russia meant to do. Having convinced herself, and not without cause, that Russia meant war, she conceived that her policy was one for her soldiers to determine on purely military grounds. And they held, it would seem, that as war had to come it was Germany's duty to take advantage of the initiative that her superior system of mobilisation gave to her. She seems to have begun the fighting, but not, assuredly, with a light heart. Germany's position is graver than it has been since the days of the great Frederic. With the genius and the briliancy of France on the one flank and the overwhelming numbers of Russia on the other she felt herself fighting against odds for her very existence. Her only chance, she probably reflected, lay in taking her enemies in detail and in flinging herself on the one before the other was fully prepared. It was a desperate calculation, but so is her case. From Italy she will get no help, and Austria will be hard put to it to deal with Servia and maintain her own frontiers intact. Sooner or later she will bear the whole brunt of the war with France and Russia at once. And she was uncertain of the neutrality of England. Therefore she decided to strike the first blow. We deeply regret it, but we understand. Nor shall we apply a harsh judgment to what man or nation does for very life's sake.

The British Cabinet sat almost all day on Sunday discussing what the policy of this country ought to be. As we write we do not know what decision has been reached. But we are, if possible, more convinced than ever that duty and interest alike demand that this country should not make itself an accessory to the crime against reason and human happiness that is now beginning. We are asked by the war conspirators to make poor men destitute and rich men poor, to throw away in a wild gamble the accumulated progress of half a century, to starve every hope except those that can only be indulged by the suffering and impoverishment of others. The nations of Europe have been compelled to face this death by the network of promises and counter-promises in which the folly of their statesmen has enmeshed them. England alone of the Great Powers stood quite outside the entanglements of the European system which is now breaking up. Italy was involved—how deeply we do not know,—but she has managed by a great effort to extricate herself. And yet at the very moment that her Government has struggled free we are asked to put on her chains. A few weeks after we have been solemnly assured that we have no engagement on the Continent of Europe which would restrict or hamper the freedom of the Government or of Parliament to decide whether or not Great Britain should take part in a European war, we are told by the conspirators that honour bids us go to war. Whose honour? Not that of the Government, for if what the war party say were true, then what Mr. Asquith and Sir Edward Grey said was false. How could we be free to decide if honour compelled us to decide one way? Whose honour? Not that of the people, for no people are so sensitive as our own on the point of honour, and they are unstirred by the least trace of generous impulse that would inspire them if they had to make sacrifices for honour's sake. Whose honour, then? The honour of those who have led France to hope that we would undertake responsibilities which all the time they were anxious to conceal from Englishmen? If any have been guilty of that double perfidy to England and to France, not all the blood of every English soldier and sailor, not all the tears of widows and orphans, could restore to them the honour which they have so shamelessly lost.

Then it is for self-interest that we are to go to war? Whose self-interest? Let commerce witness, as it is doing, how serious are the blows that it has suffered by the mere prospect of war and imagine the widespread ruin of its fulfilment. Let those who can speak for industry and labour say what war has in store for them. Ask everyone who is doing any sort of good work what war will do for him. Read the history of the Great War of a hundred years ago to know the hideous scars that the Greater War of to-day would make in the face of liberty. Whose self-interest are they thinking of? They say that we cannot see France crushed. But can we see Germany crushed and Russia straddling across Europe as well as Asia? If France were without a friend, if she were being wantonly invaded, and if we could save her by threatening to throw our fleet into the balance, the position would be different. But we can in fact save her from none of the consequences in which her Russian alliance—an alliance hated by an enormous number of liberty-loving Frenchmen—may involve her. We might destroy or imprison.

A Shameless Argument.


We have not the space to give separate warnings against all the baits with which it is sought to entrap simple people here into acquiescence in the plot to drag England into the war. But there is one that cannot be passed over; its cynicism is too shameless. We mean the pretence that it would be in some way to the good of European morals that we should thrust ourselves in. It is actually said by the *Times* that Russia "will fight upon the side of European *moral*," and that the cause of "civilised relations between peoples" and even—crowning effort of cant—the cause of "the peace of the world" would gain by our backing her. Let us keep quite clear about this. If we are jockeyed into fighting it will be for a cause supremely disreputable. Of all the smaller Powers of Europe, Servia is, quite decidedly, the one whose name is most foully daubed with dishonour. The record of her rulers and her policy in recent years is unmatched as a tissue of cruelty, greed, hypocrisy, and ill-faith. If it were physically possible for Servia to be towed out to sea and sunk there, the air of Europe would at once seem cleaner. Disgraced in many things before, she has a disgracefully bad cause in her quarrel with Austria—the cause of a harbourer of murderers against the friends of the murdered persons. And what Servia is among the lesser Powers, Russia, so far as regards her Government, is among the great ones. We have lately touched so much diplomatic pitch that we have all tended to become tactful and considerate of the feelings of pitch, to the point of tacit insincerity. But the blackness of the Russian Government, as a dealer with men's and women's lives and liberties, is inky. We must not forget the brutalities practised in Finland, the wholesale baitings of Jews, the detestable barbarity and injustice with which every effort of the Russian people to gain a tolerable government has been suppressed.

We must remember that the Russian Government is now at last standing almost face to face with the peoples, Russian and other, that it has wronged, and that its best hope of staving off retribution is in foreign war. Foreign war is the lightening conductor with which every corrupt Government tries to divert from itself the fire that its crimes have called down on it. If we step in wantonly to back Russia we do not back her against Germany and Austria alone. We back her against her own maltreated and semi-insurgent subjects; we strengthen her brute fist in Finland; we set her up again as a confident and secure persecutor of Jews; we put back the clock of freedom and of civilised government throughout far the largest area that the misconduct of any one Power in Europe can injure, and besides all that we make securely dominant in Asia

the one Power which threatens us there. The idea of the Russian Government's caring one straw about "European *moral*," except perhaps as something that might become a danger to it if it came into existence, would be almost too grim as a joke. As a suggestion seriously offered for consumption by credulous people, it is a quite repulsive piece of humbug. The Russian Government, like most other despotic Governments, regards war with absolute cynicism, and any country of Western Europe which went into war, of its own free will, in league with so tainted an ally would do well to forget the language of morality and of Christianity until that particular association had ceased.

A Growing Paralysis.

The raising of the Bank rate to 10 per cent and the Proclamation issued by the Privy Council postponing for one month the obligation to meet bills of exchange carry one stage further the paralysis which is creeping over British industry. How many stages are there left before the paralysis becomes complete? Already the export business of the country to Europe and the East is coming to a standstill. Remittances for goods delivered are failing to come in, fresh orders have almost ceased, and, if they came, and cash with them, delivery could not be effected. How long can the home business survive the practical cessation of the most important branches of foreign trade? We cannot pretend to answer this question. There is not a single industry in the country which is not, at near or short remove, vitally despendent upon foreign trade. Severely restricted credit and prohibitive money rates make, in addition, what will be to many an immediately intolerable burden. We do not wish to exaggerate the seriousness of the situation, but we would really like to ask those who now talk so glibly of participating in war how they imagine our manufacturers are going to carry on, say, even for three months. Before a week of war is over we shall, to judge from present indications, have an army of unemployed—skilled workmen for the most part. That has been so before. The reaction of war on industry is now infinitely more rapid and the effects are cumulative. Unemployment will start sooner and increase more rapidly. Every man not of a job will help to throw out another. When and where will it stop? No one can say. No one has attempted to say. But if the Government should enter on this war they will incur a responsibility to capital and labour unequalled in history.



A British Minister's Resignation.

Remarkable Explanation.

Mr. C. P. Trevelyan has forwarded to his constituents in Elland, West Riding of Yorkshire, a letter in which he gives of his reason for resigning his position as Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Education. After expressing the view that "neither the original quarrel nor the remoter conflict arising out of it ought to have been regarded as involving ourselves," he writes:

We are going to war because we do not want to see France crushed. I want as little in the interests of civilisation to see Germany crushed. Yet who dares to judge the event of so huge a cataclysm, and to say that between France, Russia and England, German civilisation may not go down in ruin? And what then? Are we going to rejoice because Russia will be victorious, with its savage recuperative forces of countless populations to brood over our stricken Western civilisation? And remember it is for Russia first and foremost that we are fighting. The French did not want to fight. But they were dragged in by their treaty with Russia. We are now having to protect them because they put themselves at the mercy of the policy and the caprices of the Tsar's Ministers. So now Liberal England, so truly Liberal in more than a party sense, will be losing its prosperity and its lives which are even more dear to it, for the sake of a system which during the last ten years has been more illiberal, more reactionary, than even the infamous *règime* of Bomba.

When our Government entered upon the negotiations immediately precedent to this war with this spirit in their minds, that Germany must be regarded as the suspect enemy and France as the friend, I think it is not unnatural that other causes of friction should have been incapable of adjustment. I disapprove as heartily as anyone of the infringement of Belgian neutrality by Germany. But I am bound to say that if France had committed the offence I think we should have found some protest sufficient short of plunging our country into war.

Again, when we saw fit to deny to Germany its ordinary right as a belligerent to make a naval attack on an enemy's coastline, which had been left undefended, and when Germany was ready to waive that right in return for our neutrality, it did not argue an attitude in Germany out of which an accommodation might not have been obtained. But we were in no real humour for it. We had chosen our side already. We ought in my opinion to have had no side in this quarrel except the one overwhelming interest of our own people. That interest is peace.

I cannot agree with Sir Edward Grey when he says, "If we are engaged in war we shall suffer but little more than we shall suffer even if we stand aside." We shall be subject to crushing taxation, which we should have escaped as neutrals. We shall increase enormously—it may be we shall double—our National Debt. We shall completely lose all the trade of the nations against whom we are fighting. However overwhelming the victory of our Navy, our commerce will suffer terribly. It by no means went unscathed in the days of our complete naval predominance. In war, too, the first productive energies of the whole people have to be devoted to armament. Cannon are a poor industrial exchange for cotton. We shall suffer a steady impoverishment as the character of our work changes. As war proceeds, more and more of the workers are drawn into the fighting ranks, and the breadwinners, disappear.

All this I felt so strongly that I cannot count the cause adequate which is to lead to this misery. So I have resigned. But now, having made my protest, let me say to those who agree with me and to those who do not, this is no time for more words or continued recrimination. The time will come later when we shall debate the origins of the disaster. Blunder or no blunder, the war is here. That is the terrible present, and our simple common duty is to help to save our dear country.



The Insanity of War.

By Thomas Carlyle.

What, speaking in quite unofficial language, is the net purport and upshot of war?

To my own knowledge, for example, there dwell and toil, in the British village of Dumdrudge, usually some five hundred souls. From these there are successively selected, during the French war, say thirty able-bodied men. Dumdrudge at her own expense has suckled and nursed them; she has, not without difficulty and sorrow, fed them up to manhood and even trained them to crafts, so that one can weave, another build, another hammer. Nevertheless, amid much weeping and swearing, they are selected, all dressed in red, and shipped away at the public charges some two thousand miles, or say only to the south of Spain, and fed there till wanted.

And now to that same spot in the south of Spain are thirty similar French artisans from a French Dumdrudge in like manner wending; till at length, after infinite effort, the two parties come into actual juxtaposition; and thirty stands fronting thirty each with a gun in his hand. Straightway the word "Fire" is given, and they blow the souls out of one another; and in place of sixty brisk, useful craftsmen, the world has sixty dead carcasses which it must bury, and anew shed tears for.

Had these men any quarrel? Busy as the devil is, not the smallest! They lived far enough apart; were the entirest of strangers: nay, in so wide a Universe, there was even unconsciously, by commerce, some mutual helpfulness between them.

How then? Simpleton! Their governors had fallen out; and instead of shooting one another, had the cunning to make these poor blockheads shoot.



The Glory of War.

By Victor Hugo.

To-day force is called violence, and begins to be judged; war is arraigned. Civilisation, upon the complaint of the human race, orders the trial, and draws up the great criminal indictment of conquerors and captains. The Witness, History, is summoned. The reality appears. The fictitious brilliancy is dissipated. In many cases, the hero is a species of assassin. The people begin to comprehend that increasing the magnitude of a crime cannot be its diminution; that, if to kill is a crime, to kill much cannot be an extenuating circumstance; that if to steal is a shame, to invade cannot be a glory; that Te Deums do not count for much in this matter; that homicide is homicide; that blood-shed is blood-shed; that it serves nothing to call one's self Cæsar or Napolean; and that, in the eyes of the eternal God, the figure of a murderer is not changed because, instead of a gallow's cap, there is placed upon the head an Emperor's crown.

Ah! let us proclaim absolute truths. Let us dishonour war. No; glorious war does not exist. No; it is not good, and it is not useful, to make corpses. No, it cannot be that life travails for death. No; O, mothers who surround me, it cannot be that war, the robber, should continue to take from you your children.

No ; it cannot be that women should bear children in pain, that men should be born, that people should plough and sow, that the farmer should fertilise the fields, and the workmen enrich the city, that industry should produce marvels, that genius should produce prodigies, that the vast human activity should, in the presence of the starry sky, multiply efforts and creations, all to result in that frightful international exposition called war.

Imperial Legislative Council.

The Viceroy on the War.

KING'S MESSAGE TO PRINCES AND PEOPLE.

His Excellency the Viceroy delivered the following speech at the autumn session of the Imperial Legislative Council held at Simla on Tuesday last :—

KING'S MESSAGE TO PEOPLE AND PRINCES.

Before we pass to the ordinary business of the Council I will ask hon. members to stand up while I read to the Council the gracious message addressed to the princes and people of India by His Majesty the King-Emperor.

His Excellency then read the following message from the King-Emperor :—

" During the past few weeks the peoples of my whole Empire at home and overseas have moved with one mind and purpose to confront and overthrow an unparalleled assault upon the continuity, civilisation and peace of mankind.

" The calamitous conflict is not of my seeking. My voice has been cast throughout on the side of peace. My Ministers earnestly strove to allay the causes of strife and to appease differences with which my Empire was not concerned. Had I stood aside when, in defiance of pledges to which my Kingdom was a party, the soil of Belgium was violated and her cities laid desolate, when the very life of the French nation was threatened with extinction, I should have sacrificed my honour and given to destruction the liberties of my Empire and of mankind. I rejoice that every part of the Empire is with me in this decision.

" Paramount regard for treaty faith and pledged word of Rulers and peoples is the common heritage of England and India.

" Amongst the many incidents that have marked the unanimous uprising of the populations of my Empire in defence of its unity and integrity, nothing has moved me more than the passionate devotion to my Throne expressed both by my Indian and English subjects and by Feudatory Princes and Ruling Chiefs of India and their prodigious offers of their lives and their resources in the cause of the realm. Their one voiced demand to be foremost in conflict has touched my heart and has inspired to highest issues the love and devotion which, as I well know, have ever linked my Indian subjects and myself. I recall to mind India's gracious message to the British nation of good-will and fellowship which greeted my return in February 1912, after the solemn ceremony of my Coronation Durbar at Delhi, and I find in this hour of trial a full harvest and a noble fulfilment of the assurances given by you that the destinies of Great Britain and India are indissolubly linked.'

I think that I am voicing the views of my Council and of the whole of India when I say that we are profoundly grateful to his Majesty for His Gracious and stirring message, and that we can assure His Majesty of our unflinching loyalty and devotion in this time of crisis and emergency.

THE SITUATION.

I propose to add a few words explaining in greater detail the situation described by His Majesty in the first few sentences of his message. It is now five weeks ago that a British Empire was plunged into war with the two great military nations, Germany and Austria. As has been said by His Majesty, the war is none of our seeking, but it has been thrust on us in what one can only describe as a wicked and wanton manner. Although we all deeply deplore the horrible assassination at Serajevo of the Austrian Heir to the Throne and his consort, we cannot but feel regret that this was made the pretext for a conflict in which it was well known that there was every probability that most of the Great Powers of Europe would be involved. It was not, however, until Germany, with a callous disregard of international obligations, to which she herself was a party, refused to respect the neutrality of Belgium, guaranteed in the treaties of 1831 and 1839 by Austria, Russia, Great Britian and Prussia, that the intervention of Great Britain become inevitable. It is hardly necessary for me to describe the steps taken by the King-Emperor to ensure peace, and the patient, genuine and whole-hearted efforts of that great statesman Sir Edward Grey to induce Germany to take a reasonable attitude, nor need I relate in detail what Mr. Asquith has described as the infamous proposals of Germany to buy our neutrality while giving her a free hand to destroy the independence of Belgium and the integrity of France and her possessions. All these details have been given by Sir E. Grey and Mr. Asquith in the House of Commons on the 3rd and 4th August. It suffices for me to say here that Great Britain, having with the other Great Powers guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium the vital interest of England being concerned in the independence and integrity of that State, it was her duty to keep her word and to maintain that neutrality with all the forces and resources at her disposal. It was in accordance with this stern sense of duty and with the conviction that her cause was just and righteous, that Great Britain, in her accustomed role of protector of the smaller independent States, took up the sword to maintain the independence and integrity of Belgium and declared war on Germany.

We have only to refer to the words of the German Chancellor in the Reichstag where he admitted that Germany had done a grievous wrong to Belgium to find more than ample justification for the action of our statesmen. The excuse then given, that France meditated an attack on Germany through Belgium is one that can deceive no one, for it is notorious that France, who desires peace as much as we do, had already promised to respect the neutrality of Belgium. No Government and no people in Europe had less desire for war than the French, but their engagements by treaty and of honour compelled them to recognise their obligation to Russia. It is common knowledge that Germany for the last ten or fifteen years has been carefully planning and preparing for a campaign of aggression and self-aggrandisement, and in spite of all the denials of the German Government of any hostile intentions, those who like myself have been engaged in watching over the foreign interests of Great Britain during the past few years correctly gauged the intentions of Germany to force war upon England, France and Russia as soon as she was ready for it and at the most favourable moment. We are now face to face with a possibly long and exhausting war which, however just and righteous on our side, must be a terrible one, one through which we should pass with confidence in the justice of our cause and with a strong determination to spare no effort to bring it to a successful conclusion. When this result has been achieved as I have no doubt it will, let us not boast but thank Him who has given us the victory. War is a terrible and horrible thing but there is a worse thing than war and that is national dishonour and the failure of a nation to keep its engagements. This we have been happily spared by the firm and straightforward attitude of our statesmen in England.

FEELING IN INDIA.

In this great crisis, it has been a source of profound satisfaction to me that the attitude of the British Government had been so thoroughly appreciated in India and has met with such warm support that I have no hesitation in saying that the valuable offers of military assistance that I have received from the Ruling Chiefs of India and the countless offers of personal service and of material help made to me by both, rich and poor, in the provinces of British India have touched me deeply and have given me one more proof, which I never needed of what I have long known and never for an instant doubted, viz., the deep loyalty and attachment of the Indian people to the King-Emperor and the Throne and their readiness to make a sacrifice on their part to further and strengthen the interests of the Empire. The fact that the Government of India are in a position to help the mother country by the despatch of such a large proportion of our armed forces is a supreme mark of my absolute confidence in the fidelity of our troops and in the loyalty of the Indian people. I trust that this may be fully recognised in England and abroad. That owing to the war sacrifices will have to be made is inevitable, and that suffering will be entailed is unhappily certain, but I am confident that the people of India standing shoulder to shoulder will shrink from no sacrifice and will loyally co-operate with the Government in maintaining internal order and in doing all in their power to secure the triumph of the arms of our King Emperor. The countless meetings to express loyalty held throughout India and the warm response of the people to my appeal for funds for the relief of distress in India during the war, have filled me with satisfaction and have confirmed my first impression that in this war the Government would be supported by the determined courage and endurance of the whole country. It was, moreover, with confidence and pride that I was able to offer to His Majesty the finest and largest military force of British and Indian troops for service in Europe that has ever left the shores of India. I am confident that the honour of this land and of the British Empire may safely be entrusted to our brave soldiers and that they will aquit themselves nobly and ever maintain their high traditions of military chivalry and courage. To the people of India I would say at this time, "Let us display to the world an attitude of unity, of self-sacrifice and of unswerving confidence under all circumstances in the justice of our cause and in the assurance that God will defend the right."

COLONIAL IMMIGRATION.

I would now like to say a few words upon another question which has seriously occupied the attention of the Government of India during the past twelve months, a subject to which we attach the

very highest importance. I allude to the question of migration from one part of our Empire to another. Before dealing with this question I would like to remind you that in a speech which I addressed to you in Council on the 24th March last I informed you an announcement made in the Union House of Assembly at Cape Town that the Government of the Union would introduce in the following session legislation based on the report of the Commission which had been sitting to enquire into the grievances of Indians in South Africa. As all of you are aware, the proposed Indian Relief Bill has since become law, and I think that we may regard the passing of the Bill by both the Houses of the Union Parliament with grateful satisfaction. If the new law does not satisfy every Indian aspiration, it certainly remove the principle grievances from which Indians had for many years been suffering. The solution of this very difficult problem is a matter upon which we may legitimately congratulate the Government. General Botha and I would like to say in particular that the bold and generous statesmanship which inspired General Smuts and the skill with which he piloted the Bill through the South African Legislative Council have earned our warm admiration.

I will now revert to the general question which is one of far-reaching importance. It cannot be dealt with satisfactorily from merely a local standpoint. It is a question for which, in my opinion, a practical solution may be found, but it is essential that such a solution should be based on a reasonable apprehension of the requirements of other parts of the Empire. At the outset of the discussion of the problem which has arisen we are faced with this difficulty. It is being commonly asserted whether, on historical, legal or constitutional grounds, that the full rights of citizenship of the British Empire include the right to settle in any part of that Empire irrespective of the existence of local legislation barring or limiting access to the Dominion to which access is sought; but it must not be forgotten that to such a doctrine a political impediment exists of an almost insuperable character. Our Empire is largely compossed of self-governing units. The Dominions have been given their own legislatures by the Imperial Government in order that they may regulate the management of their internal affairs as may seem best to them. It is beyond question that the control of immigration is primarily an internal question for each self-governing unit must know best with materials it desires to provide its future citizens. Thus, indeed, it must clearly be seen that the right of free movement within the Empire is conditional on the exercise by the lacal legislatures of their undoubted powers, just as it is restricted even more rigorously by the physical characteristics of certain parts of the Empire. The principle of free emigration between all parts of the Empire may have attractions and many advantages. It is, indeed, the principle for which the Government of India long and consistently contended; but I have shown that to reduce this principle to practice would involve the most serious difficulties and the course of events has made it more and more clear that there is no hope of its adoption. On the other hand, when we review the whole situation and the policy that we have consistently followed for many years past, I fear that the obvious conclusion at which we must arrive is that the result of this attitude has been to force the Colonies to undertake more and more drastic legislation and thus to produce the present situation in Canada which has brought the problem to an acute stage.

An Alternative Course Suggested.

This being so, it seems to me that the time has come when we must change our course and we have to consider whether if we cannot get all we wanted some alternative is not feasible to relieve at least the present situation which already is unsatisfactory from the point of view both of Indian and colonial interests, and may in the future lead to serious troubles. I think that such an alternative can be found, and I shall indicate presently what it is.

I desire first to try to correct any misapprehension that may exist in this country regarding the attitude of the Government of the Dominions towards Indians as a whole and towards the position of the Government of India in this difficult matter. It is often stated that the Colonial Governments in formulating their measures for exclusion are actuated by feelings of animosity towards Indians and that they would not apply to residents of the United Kingdom any of the restrictions they freely impose on residents of this country. I do not think that such a statement is quite fair. To be impartial it must be admitted that the Colonies naturally place above all other considerations the interests of their own country as they understand them just as we in India should put the good of India in the front of our motives for legislation; but time after time the Colonial Governments have given evidence, whether during the discussions in their legislative assemblies or in their attempts to negotiate with the Government of India that they are by no means unmindful of the possible effects of their action on the Government and people in this country, and I think I may say with justice that they are quite willing to consider India's requirements once they are satisfied that the interests of their own country have been adequately secured.

Then as to the rights of resident of the United Kingdom to enter the Colonies without restriction I can assure you that the Colonial Governments both in theory and in practice, maintain their full right to reject such immigrants and use this right without restrictions. They may think their local conditions require so such. Is this the case that the freedom with which Canada excludes labourers of inferior physique while encouraging by every possible means the emigration of the fit, has been described as constituting a serious drain on the United Kingdom. I would also remind this Council how some years ago three English hatters were turned back from Australia on the ground that the local labour market for hatters was overstocked. At the present moment, an ordinance is in force in Canada which forbids any labourer, whether from the United Kingdom or elsewhere, landing in that country. Recently the Government of South Africa actually removed by force from their territories certain English labourers whose presence was felt to be undesirable. In the face of such incidents it is out of place to assert that the policy of exclusion is directed against Indians alone and that there is therefore an Indian grievance against the Colonies. I should like to add that I have seen a statement recently made by the Hon. Mr. Roche, Canadian Minister of the Interior, which I believe to be substantially correct, to the effect that during the past ten years previous to arrival at Vancouver of the "Komagata Maru," ninety-one English people have been rejected at Canadian ocean ports as compared with 376 Indians.

The "Komagata Maru" Incident.

I will now touch lightly on the incident of the "Komagata Maru." The despatch of this vessel from Shanghai to Vancouver with 400 Indians on board was carried out without the cognisance or approval of the Government of India. The object of the promoters of the expedition was undoubtedly to challenge directly the legality of the Canadian immigration laws on the lines that the would-be immigrants were British subjects and had therefore the right to enter Canada. Such a proceeding was indirect contravention of the existing embargo placed on all labourers of every nationality ariving in British Columbia and in variation of the condition that the immigrants should arrive by continuous voyage from their place of origin. It is unfortunate and to be regretted that such restrictions should exist, but when they do exist they cannot be ignored without causing suffering and distress. We must all regret the discomfort suffered by the 100 Indians on board the "Komagata Maru" for which the organisers of the expedition were, in my opinion, culpably responsible. They must have known perfectly well that entry would be refused and the sending of the ship could only be regarded as most unwise.

The promoters should have remembered that they who fail to consider the right of the Colonies can in return claim little consideration for their own. The Canadian Imigration Act gives the Government of Canada very wide powers and any body with any knowledge of its contents would realise how futile it would be to contest them. The case was taken as a test case before the Canadian law courts as was inevitable, the result being that with very few exceptions all those on board the "Komagata Maru" were deported. There were unfortunately some breaches of the peace committed by some of the Indian passengers on board, but in the end they left peacefully. In this connection I would like to mention the fact that the Canadian Government very generously gave £800 worth of supplies to the Indians on board for the return journey. This point should not be forgotten. I may add the developments of this incident were watched by the Government of India with closest attention, but as the question at issue was of a purely legal character there was no cause for intervention. "When, however, there was an apparent likelihood of the compulsion of the Indian passengers by armed force I addressed a communication to the Secretary of State deprecating the use of force on our fellow citizens, and as you are aware, no force was used. Within the last few days, I have learnt that these unfortunate peoples have been left stranded in Japan. I have, therefore, requested his Majesty's Consul General at Kobe to reparate them to India and at the expense of the Government in the case of those without means.

A Policy of Co-operation.

Having now cleared the ground of possible misunderstanding I will revert to the alternative policy to which I referred a few minutes ago as a possible solution, I think I have shown clearly that we have drifted into a position of isolation and it is evident that if we are to secure for our Indian fellow-subjects any of the advantages that are now denied, we must substitute for this a policy of co-operation. This can in my opinion be achieved only by negotiation with the Colonies on a basis of complete reciprocity. Taking Canada for instance, we know that a certain number of Japanese are admitted annually on a passport system. Surely, India may claim at least the most favoured nation treatment in any negotiations that are opened and secure equally favourable terms for Indians. It should not be difficult to limit by agreement the number of passports to be issued which, while providing very fully for temporary residence of students, tourists and

the like would at the same time strictly fight their right to settle permanently in the country. Those attempting to secure admission without such permits or passports would be rejected at the port after ample warning in the country of origin that such rejection would be inevitable. Clearly no reciprocal arrangements for controlling emigration at both ends can be outlined or considered in detail without full discussion with the Colonial Governments concerned, and it would obviously be undesirable to commence negotiations with the Colonies unless there was a reasonable prospect of some practical outcome of the discussions. If this alternative policy commended itself to the people of India it would be futile to consider any other line of action until it has been tried and has failed ; but with the knowledge in our possession that the Colonies have on various occasions shown themselves alive to the necessity of giving such consideration as is possible to the wishes of the Government of India I am full of confidence that they would be willing to go to some length in giving facilities to a moderate number of Indian immigrants, while obtaining through such a compromise of certain restrictions in India on free emigration to the Colonies. This is the policy which the Government of India would advocate at the present time, a policy based on a scheme of complete reciprocity, and it is for the consideration of hon. members and of the Indian public that I have developed our views here to-day. If these views meet with general approval the Government of India are ready to recommend them to the Secretary of State with a view to opening negotiations with the Colonies concerned. I appeal to the Indian public to view this question in the narrow light. India has her rights but equally have the colonies. Should it be decided to negotiate with the Colonial Government, I am confident that they, with their strong Imperial instincts, will meet us in no mean or niggardly spirit, provided that we on our side show our readiness to meet them half-way. The fact that in a few week's time our splendid Indian soldiers may be fighting side by side and shoulder to shoulder with our Colonial follows-subjects against the common enemy is a guarantee of fair and generous treatment on both sides in a controversy of this nature.

India's Expeditionary Force: 70,000 Men.

In winding up the debate Lord Hardinge in the course of his speech said: It was no longer a secret that they had already despatched two splendid divisions of infantry to Europe and one cavalry brigade, while three more cavalry brigades and four additional field artillery brigades would follow immediately. They also had another division of infantry with some excellent regiments of the Imperial Service Troops ready to start. That we had been in a position to send a military force of over seventy thousand combatants to fight for the Empire across the seas was a legitimate source of pride and satisfaction to India as a whole and with the knowledge that practically all the ruling chiefs had placed their military forces and resources of their states at the disposal of the Government it was clear that we were not at the end of our military resources. Several of the Ruling Chiefs had, in accordance with their desire, been selected to accompany the Expeditionary Force, whilst all who had any military training had expressed a desire to serve. Amongst those selected were Maharaja Sir Pertab Singh, Maharajas of Bikanir, Patiala, Rutlam, Kishengarh and Jodhpur, Nawabs of Jaora, Sachin, and Bhopal besides other Indians of rank and distinction, amongst them being Malik Umar Hayat Khan. Referring to the resolution which had just been passed to the effect that India should share the cost they had decided to accept such portion of the cost of the Expeditionary Force as would have fallen upon India had our troops continued to be employed in this country under normal circumstances, or roughly one million sterling up to the end of the current financial year. The patriotic contribution, of fifty lakhs from the Maharaja of Mysore would go towards the cost of transport for taking our troops Overseas. This was all additional to providing for the defence of India and to losses in Indian budget consequent upon the war. There is, I believe, his Excellency continued, nothing like comradeship in arms before the enemy and joint-participation in the dangers and hardships of war, to level all distinctions, to inspire mutual respect, and to foster friendship. This I regard as the bright side of the despatch of our troops to Europe and of the heavy and material sacrifices that are being made by India for the sake of the Empire.

The Council re-assembled at quarter past three. The Viceroy presided. Mr. Gillan introduced no less than three bills. These were the Sea Customs Bill, Life Assurance Company's Bill and the Telegraph Bill.

These measures are non-contentions. General Birdwood in the absence of the Commander-in-Chief introduced the Indian Army Bill and dwelt on the defective nature of sections 144 of the existing Act. Sir Reginald Craddock introduced the Airships Bill and spoke at length. He referred to the recent legislations in England.

Sir Ali Imam then introduced a small Repealing and Amending Act and it was purely a formal measure.

Sir Reginald Craddock finally introduced the Foreigners Bill and pointed out it was under consideration long before the war.

The Attitude of the Opposition.

Unhesitating Support for Ministers.

Mr. Bonar Law, who was received with cheers, said:—The right hon. gentleman has made an appeal for support and it is necessary that I should say a word or two, but they shall be very few. I wish to say in the first place that I do not believe there is a single member in this House who doubts that not only the right hon. gentleman himself, but the Government which he represents, have done everything in their power up to the last moment to preserve peace. (Cheers.) And I think we may be sure that if any other course is taken it is because it is forced upon them and that they have absolutely no alternative. (Cheers.) One thing only further I should like to say. The right hon. gentleman spoke of the bright spot in the picture which only a day or two ago was a black spot in the political horizon. Everything that he has said I am sure is true and I should like to say this further—that if the contingencies which he has not put into words, but which are in all our minds as possible, arise, then we have already had indications that there is another bright spot—that every one of his Majesty's Dominions beyond the seas will be behind us in whatever act it is necessary to take. (Cheers.) This only I should add. The Government already know, but I give them now the assurance on behalf of the party of which I am leader in this House, that in whatever steps they think it necessary to take for the honour and security of this country they can rely upon the unhesitating support of the Opposition. (Loud Ministerial and Opposition cheers.)

When Mr. Bonar Law resumed his seat both Mr. Redmond and Mr. Ramsay MacDonald rose, the one from the Nationalist and the other from the Labour benches. There were loud cries of "Redmond" from both sides of the House and Mr. Ramsay MacDonald resumed his seat.

Mr. Redmond and Irish Loyalty.

Mr. Redmond said:—I hope the House will not consider it improper on my part in the grave circumstances in which we are assembled if I intervene for a very few moments. I was moved a great deal by that sentence in the speech of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in which he said that the one bright spot in the situation was the changed feeling in Ireland. In past times, when this Empire has been engaged in these terrible enterprises it is true —it would be the utmost affectation and folly on my part to deny it—the sympathy of the Nationalists of Ireland, for reasons to be found deep down in centuries of history, has been estranged from this country. But allow me to say that what has occurred in recent years has altered the situation completely. (Ministerial cheers.) I must not touch, and I may be trusted not to touch, on any controversial topics, but this I may be allowed to say—that a wider knowledge of the real facts of Irish history have, I think, altered the view of the democracy of this country towards the Irish question, and to-day I honestly believe that the democracy of Ireland will turn with the utmost anxiety and sympathy to this country in every trial and every danger that may overtake it. (General cheers.) There is a possibility at any rate of history repeating itself. The House will remember that in 1778, at the end of the disastrous American war, when it might, I think, truly be said that the military power of this country was almost at its lowest ebb, and when the shores of Ireland were threatened with foreign invasion, a body of 100,000 Irish Volunteers sprang into existence for the purpose of defending her shores. At first no Catholic—ah! how sad the reading of the history of those days is—was allowed to be enrolled in that body of Volunteers, and yet from the very first day the Catholics of the South and West subscribed money and sent it towards the arming of their Protestant fellow-countryman. Ideas widened as time went on, and finally the Catholics in the South were armed and enrolled brothers in arms with their fellow-countrymen of a different creed in the North. May history repeat itself! (Cheers.) To-day there are in Ireland two large bodies of Volunteers. One of them sprang into existence in the North. Another has sprung into existence in the South. I say to the Government that they may to-morrow withdraw every one of their troops from Ireland. (General cheers.) I say that the coasts of Ireland will be defended from foreign invasion by her armed sons, and for this purpose armed Nationalist Catholics in the South will be only too glad to join arms with the armed Protestant Ulstermen in the North. (Cheers.) Is it too much to hope that out of this

situation there may spring a result which will be good not merely for the Empire, but good for the future welfare and integrity of the Irish nation? (Cheers.) I ought to apologize for having intervened— (cries of "No"), but while Irishmen generally are in favour of peace, and would desire to save the democracy of this country from all the horrors of war, while we would make any possible sacrifice for that purpose, still if the dire necessity is forced upon this country we offer to the Government of the day that they may take their troops away, and that if it is allowed to us in comradeship with our brethren in the North we will ourselves defend the coasts of our country. (Loud cheers.)

Position of the Labour Party.

Mr. Ramsay MacDonald.—I should have preferred, had circumstances permitted, to have remained silent this afternoon. But circumstances do not permit that. I shall model what I have to say on the two speeches we have listened to—I shall be brief. The right hon. gentleman to a House which in the great majority is with him, has delivered a speech the echoes of which will go down in history. The speech has been impressive. However much we may resist the conclusions, we have not been able to resist the moving character of his appeal. I think he is wrong. (A few Ministerial cheers.) I think the Government which he represents and for which he speaks is wrong. I think the verdict of history will be that they are wrong. We shall see. The effect of the right hon. gentleman's speech in this House is not to be its final effect. There will be opportunites, or there may not be opportunities, for us to go into details, but I want to say to this House, and to say without equivocation, that if the right hon. gentleman had come here to-day and told us that our country was in danger, I do not care what party he would have appealed to, or what class he would have appealed to, we would be with him and behind him, and we would vote him what money he wants. Yes, and we will go farther. We will offer him ourselves if the country is in danger. He has not persuaded me that it is. He has not persuaded my hon. friends who co-operate with me that it is. I am perfectly certain that when his speech gets into cold print to-morrow he will not persuade a large section of the country. If the nation's honour is in danger we would be with him. There has been no crime committed by statesmen of this character without those statesmen appearing to their nation's honour. We fought the Crimean War because of our honour. We rushed to South Africa because of our honour. The right hon. gentleman is appealing to us to-day because of our honour. (Ministerial and Opposition cheers.)

The Power of Russia in Europe.

There is a third point. If the right hon. gentleman could come to us and tell us that a small European nationality like Belgium is in danger and could assure us that he is going to confine the conflict to that question we would support him. What is the use of talking about coming to the aid of Belgium when as a matter of fact, you are engaging in a whole European war that is not going to leave the map of Europe in the position it is in now? The right hon. gentleman said nothing about Russia. We will want to know about that. We want to try to find out what is going to happen when it is all over to the power of Russia in Europe, and we are not going to go blindly into this conflict without having some sort of rough idea as to what is going to happen. Finally, so far as France is concerned, we say solemnly and definitely that no such friendship as the right hon. gentleman described between one nation and another can ever justify one of those nations entering into war on behalf of the other. France is really in danger—if as the result of all this we are going to have the power and the civilization and the genius of France removed from European history, let him say so. It is an absolutely impossible conception and we are talking about it and never justifying the action which the right hon. gentleman has foreshadowed. I feel that the feeling of the House is against us. I have been in this before, and 1906 came as part recompense. It will come again. We will go through it all. So far as we are concerned, whatever may happen, whatever may be said about us, whatever attacks may be made upon us, we will take the action that we will take of saying that this country ought to have remained neutral (some cheers) because in the deepest parts of our hearts we believe that was right, and that that alone was consistent with the honour of the country and the traditions of the party that are now in office. (Some laughter.)

Mr. Morrell (Burnley, Min.) rose to speak, but was received with murmurs and cries of "Agreed."

Mr. Stanley Wilson (Yorks, Holderness, Opp.)—On a point of order, may I ask, Mr. Speaker, whether there is any motion before the House?

The Speaker.—There is no motion before the House. If the House express any disposition to discuss the situation as it has been developed this afternoon——(Cries of "No.") The House will remember that we have to meet again in order to receive the Royal Assent to the Bill that has just passed. I think probably it would meet the general convenience of the House if I left the Chair till the Royal Commission was received.

Mr. Wedgwood (Newcastle-under-Lyme, Min.)—Something more behind our backs.

The Speaker.—Perhaps the best course will be for me to leave the Chair now.

Mr. Morrell.—We on these benches only wish to do what is for the convenience of the House. We wish to have an opportunity—an early opportunity—of expressing ourselves with regard to the proposed intervention of this country in a European war.

Mr. Asquith.—Certainly, Sir. The House will have an early opportunity.

Mr. Morrell.—To-day.

Mr. Asquith.—No.

Mr. Morrell.—I then beg leave to say—(cries of "Sit down")—I venture to suggest that it would be possible when the House is adjourned for this debate to be continued till 11 o'clock. If that is so, I suggest that we should debate the matter on the motion for the adjournment.

The Speaker.—I do not know whether it will be agreeable to the House, but one course that occurs to me is that I should leave the Chair now till 7 o'clock. I shall be here in order to go to the other House to hear the Royal Assent given to the Bill which has passed, and then the adjournment of the House may be moved on my return. That would give an opportunity for discussion. The adjournment of the House will have to be moved in any case. (Cries of "No.") I now leave the Chair till 7 o'clock.

The sitting was suspended at 25 minutes to 5 o'clock.

Radical Opposition to War.

Mr. Morrell was received with murmurs of dissent on rising to continue the debate. He said the Foreign Secretary had told the House that there were no formal obligation binding upon us to intervene in the war and that the House was free even now to decide whether or not we should intervene. What it came to was this, that the House was asked to involve the country in the perils of this great adventure because Germany insisted upon her rights. (Loud and angry Opposition cries of "Rights?") He was prepared to admit that if Germany threatened the annexation of Belgium we might be bound under our treaty obligation to go to war to protect Belgium. But the House was asked to go to because there might be a few German regiments marching across a corner of Belgian territory. He believed the real reason was the fear and jealousy, fostered by a section of the Press, of the supposed German ambitions. The Foreign Secretary said very little about Germany. But if we went to war we could do so just as much to preserve the despotism of Russia as to curb German ambitions; and little love as he had for Germany and German method, he had less love for Russia and Russian methods. (Hear, hear.)

Mr. Wedgood said this was not going to be one of the dear old wars of the 18th century. What was to be faced in this war was not a matter of battles, but a matter of sustaining the civilization which it had taken centuries to bring about. They had all seen how that civilization toppled down in a few weeks. Members themselves had seen what had happened in the increased prices which they paid in the dining-room. But people would let them buy things. They knew that a member of Parliament was still good for a fiver (laughter); but how about the people who could not pay? Was the Empire going to feed them? Would Canada send them foodstuffs for nothing? (A voice opposite,—"Yes.") Well, if Canada would feed his contituents he would sit down at once, but he knew it would not. Starvation was coming to this country. The people were no longer docile serfs, and there would be something far more important than a European war, there would be a revolution. (Cheers.)

Mr. T. E. Harvey (Leeds, W., Min.) said it was with a real feeling of pain that he differed from many of his personal friends and from leaders whom he honoured. He did not want to say one word to make the situation more difficult, and he recognized to the utmost the magnificent efforts made by the Foreign Secretary and his colleagues during the last fortnight on behalf of peace. But was it not possible to make further efforts? Would it not be possible, even at this last hour, for Great Britain to say that if there were no attack made on the coast of France, and if Belgium were respected, Great Britain would remain netural? As far as he understood there had been no definite offer like that made to Germany. He was convinced that this war, for the great mass of the countries of Europe, was not a people's war. (Cheers.)

Mr. Keir Hardie (Merthyr Tydvil, Lab.) pointed out that both Houses had with unanimity passed a Bill for the relief of the Stock Exchange. (Cries of "No," and Mr. Lloyd George shook his head) What was going to be done for the relief of the destitution that

was bound to prevail amongst the poor? What action was to be taken, not merely to ensure a sufficient food supply, but to safeguard the public against being rolled by food speculators? (Cheers.) The decision of the Government had been given without consulting the people, and it remained to be seen whether the House of Commons represented the country on this question. Some of them would do all they could to rouse the working class of the country in opposition to this proposal of the Government. The plea that our honour was involved in entering into war was always the excuse. A few years hence, if we were into this war, we should look back with wonder and amazement at the flimsy reason which induced the Government to take part.

Mr. Ponsonby (Stirling Burghs, Min.) said we were on the eve of a great war and he hated to see people embarking on it with a light heart (Cheers.) The war fever had already begun. He saw it while walking through the street the previous night. He saw bands of half-drunken youths waving flags and he saw a group outside a great club in St. James's street being encouraged by the members of the club from the balcony. That was what was called patriotism. He thought we had plunged too quickly, and that the speech of the Foreign Secretary showed that what had been rankling all these years was a deep animosity against Germany for which the balance of power was responsible. He believed there was still a ray of hope, and he regretted the tone of the Foreign Secretary's speech. He felt that it was in keeping with the scenes he had seen the previous night (Cries of dissent) The House had treated those who had protested that day with the greatest patience, but it was right that their views should be expressed. They looked forward with horror. When men must have food and could not buy it they would take it. He trusted the Foreign Secretary would use every endeavour to the very last moment, looking to the great central interest of humanity and civilization to keep this country in a state of peace.

Sir A. Markham (Notts, Mansfield, Min.) thought the House must feel that the remarks to which they had just listened relating to the Foreign Secretary were quite unjustified. (Cheers.) No man during the time he had been a member of the House had presented his case more free from bias than the Foreign Secretary. He had always opposed the Entente because he had always believed that unless it was accompanied by a similar undertaking to Germany we were likely to find ourselves at a time like this in a very grave position. But there could only be one issue arising from the question the House had to decide—namely, whether they were going to respect the rights of small States or to allow a large dominant Power in Europe to sweep out all these States. (Cheers.) If we faltered at this moment we faltered towards the end of the British Empire. When they were told that this war would be unpopular, as it was, in the country, it was for them to take a courageous stand, remembering that what they had to do was their duty to the State, whatever the cost in blood or treasure. He had no doubt that the Government would look after the condition of the workers. The hon. member for Merthyr had spoken of the opportunity the war would provide of rising prices. Speaking for one of the largest groups of mines in the country, he gave instructions the previous day that on no consideration was the price of coal to be raised a farthing above what it was at present. Those who wished well of their country would certainly not desire to use this terrible time for the purpose suggested by the hon. member. In listening to the Foreign Secretary's speech all doubt vanished from his mind, and he would give him every support in the policy he had advocated. (Cheers.)

Sir A. Spicer (Hackney, Central, Min.) recognized that the Foreign Secretary had made every effort up to the present to keep Great Britain out of the conflict. Germany had not said all we desired, but he had listened even to her first propositon with some hope in case the negotiation were still continued. He urged the Government to proceed with negotiations. If they could not be carried farther he recognized that we should be justified in taking up a certain position. He was prepared to support the Government in any measures for defence, but he hoped they would do what they could to prevent its being necessary to take the offensive.

Mr. Rowntree (York, Min.) agreed that they were indebted to the Foreign Secretary and the Government for their untiring efforts in the cause of peace and urged them not yet to give up those efforts.

Sir J. Jardine (Roxburghshire, Min.) pleaded for a policy of diplomatic delay and further negotiation with the view of avoiding conflict.

Mr. A. Williams (Durham, N.W., Min.) was not satisfied that the Government had done all that was possible for peace, and regretted the anti German tone of Sir E. Grey's speech.

Sir W. Byles (Salford, N. Min.) implored the Government not to lead the nation into disaster.

Mr. Bryce (Inverness Burghs, Min) expressed the view that a great body of opinion in this country was for maintaining neutrality. During the whole of the Foreign Minister's speech that afternoon there was not a single cheer from the Ministerial side of the House. (Cries of "That is untrue," "Withdraw," and "Be honest.")

Sir C. Henry (Shropshire, Wellington, Min.)—There were cheers time after time.

Fresh cries of "Withdraw" were raised when Mr. Bryce rose to continue his speech, and an appeal was made from the Chair for an opportunity to be given the hon. member of explaining his statement.

A Ministerialist.—He ought not to make an untrue statement.

Mr. Page Croft (Christchurch, Opp.)—And a cowardly statement.

Mr. Bryce said he was sorry if he had made a statement not strictly accurate. He had given his impression of the reception of the speech.

After further debate.

Mr. Pringle (Lanarkshire, N. W., Min.) said they had almost a a stream of speeches on a single line from that side of the House, but that section on the Ministerial benches had been vocal out of proportion to its numbers. (Cheers.)

Mr. Balfour Intervenes.

Mr. Balfour (City of London).—I do not rise to continue the argument on the policy of the Government announced so eloquently and so admirably by the Foreign Secretary this afternoon. I rise simply in consequence of an observation which fell from the hon. gentleman who has just sat down, to the effect that it was to be regretted that there should be a series of speeches delivered one after another without reply on the motion for adjournment which might give, I won't say to the public of this country, but to people in foreign countries less acquainted with our Parliamentary procedure and the weight of particular Parliamentary transactions, an entirely false view of the opinion of this House or of the general public of which this House is the representative. I hope the hon. gentleman is mistaken. The facts are so palpable and so obvious that I do not think anybody who studies the debate can doubt what those facts are. We are not now discussing in any effective sense the policy of the Government. (Cheers.) The question before the House is not the policy of the Government, but the adjournment of the House, which must take place in the ordinary course seeing that the business of the day is now concluded. On that question it would not be possible even in ordinary circumstances to have an effective discussion or come to any resolution, but these are not ordinary circumstances. Anybody who has watched the House in this debate knows perfectly well why we are met here and have to sit here. It is because various gentlemen below the gangway desire to express their particular views. We know perfectly well that this is not a debate upon the tremendous national issue which was brought before us earlier in the day. Nominally we are discussing the same subject, whereas the House of Commons in its strength was called together to hear the exposition of the policy of the Government upon an occasion to which there has been no parallel in our lifetime, and may be no parallel in the lifetime of the next generation. (Loud cheers) What we have been having to-night were the mere dregs and less of the debate (Loud cheers)—in no sense representing the various views of member of the House. (Cheers.) Let the House remember that the Prime Minister at 4 30 promised a full opportunity for debating the policy of the Government. That opportunity would come, I should imagine, upon a money resolution or a vote of credit for dealing with a national emergency. Then will be the opportunity for members by speech and by vote worthy of a great occasion to say what they have to say, and to vote as they desired to vote, but it is unfortunate and lamentable that we should spend the dregs of this evening in a series of speeches which, whatever their intrinsic excellence and earnestness, cannot be regarded as representing in any true sense the views even of the party for whom those members spoke. (Cheers.) I believe that party to be relatively a small section of the House. I would venture to appeal to the House to bring to a conclusion an important debate, which does not add to our dignity and may possibly be misunderstood in the country and will certainly be misunderstood abroad. (Cheers.)

Colonel Seely (Derby, Ilkeston, Min.) did not agree that they had only heard the dregs of a debate. The views which had been expressed on his side could not be dismissed so lightly. It would, he thought, be unfortunate if it should go out to the country that these views were irresponsible views. He held strongly that the Government were right. (Cheers.) He had a special responsibility in the matter (cries of "Why?" and "Order"), and he hoped that at the proper time there might be a full debate.

The House then agreed to the motion for adjournment and rose shortly after half-past 10 o'clock.

Lord Lansdowne and Sir E. Grey.

The Marquess of Crewe.—I think it possible that the House, or at any rate some members of it, might expect that I should make a statement on the grave situation with which your lordship are acquainted through the ordinary channels of information. In ordinary circumstances I should have desired to do so out of respect to your lordships' House. I have, however, had an opportunity of speaking to the noble marquees who leads the Opposition, and I find that he is in general agreement with me, in view of the statement which has just been made by my right hon. friend the Foreign Secretary in another place, that I should be doing more wisely to abstain from making a statement which must either be a precise repetition of that made by my right hon. friend, or in so far as it extended to general comments of a critical character on what has passed could only lead to debate which at this particular moment of extreme crisis would not, I think, be helpful to any of the real interest of the country and would possibly have a diametrically opposite effect. I can assure your lordships that it is from no lack of respect to your lordships' House (Opposition cheers), of whom so many are competent to express opinions from their political experience on these grave questions, that I will ask your lordships to permit me to confine myself simply to drawing the attention of the House to the Foreign Secretary in another place. (Cheers.)

The Marquess of Lansdowne.—I am sure those who listened to the noble marquess's short statement will realize the position in which we find ourselves this evening, and will recognize that, while on the one hand a full debate upon the foreign policy of his Majesty's Government might be extremely undesirable at this moment, a mere repetition of the speech delivered two or three hours ago by the Secretary for Foreign Affairs would really not serve any useful purpose.

A United Front.

The noble marquess referred to the fact that some of your lordships had the privilege of listening to that speech. I was one of them, and perhaps I may be permitted to express not only the great interest but the great pleasure with which I listened to it. (Hear, hear.) The Prime Minister a few days ago expressed his earnest desire that at this moment of suspense and tension this country might present a united front to the nations of the world. My lords, the statement made by the Foreign Secretary appeared to me to be a statement upon which such a united front might well be based. It appeared to me to be a statement of rare courage, and one showing that in this great crisis we need have no fear that any action will be taken by his Majesty's Government likely to jeopardize either the security or the reputation of this country. (Cheers.)

Lord Courtney of Penwith who rose amid murmurs of disapproval, said.—I really cannot allow a situation of this kind to pass without one word of comment. No motion is before the House, and I am not aware that any motion is about to be made. If one were made it would be competent for us to speak upon it, and before committing itself to approval of any action or policy this House ought surely to be acquainted with the motives for bringing such a motion forward.

The Marquess of Crewe.—As far as I am aware the only motion that is likely to be made is the motion which I propose to make at the earliest possible moment—namely, the motion for the adjournment of the House. (Cheers, and cries of "Move,"-"move.")

Lord Courtney.—I wish to ask whether it would not be possible to speak upon that motion.

The Marquess of Crewe.—It would possibly be in order, but I feel bound to address a personal appeal to my noble friend to refrain from speaking upon it (Opposition cheers) in the position in which we are now placed.

Lord Courtney.—I do not propose to engage in any debate, but I think one sentence must be uttered. We have heard from the noble marquess opposite the statement that he heard a speech elsewhere of which he spoke with great respect and admiration. But some of us have not heard that speech. Seeing from the morning papers that the House was to meet at 6 o'clock and that there might be a statement, I came here to hear it. No statement has been made, however, and I rise to utter a protest against this House so far abdicating its duty and functions as to commit itself to be bound without having a statement as to the reasons why it should be so bound.

EXPLANATORY NOTES.

AUDENARDE is a town of Belgium E. of Courtrai at about a distance of 9 miles by rail from that town. It is connected by a navigable canal from Ghent to Tournai. Marlborough's famous victory was won here.

ALOST is a town of Belgium, in the province of E. Flanders, situated on the left bank of the Dender. It had a population of 31,655 in 1904.

ABOUKIR, HOGUE AND CRESSY, all three belong to the same class of Armoured Cruisers, though not of the most powerful type such as the *Minotaur* (14,600 tons) or the *Warrior* (13,660 tons). They rank with the *Drake* class (14,100 tons), though the latter have a larger displacement, carry more numerous secondary armament and are a slightly later design. Their sister ships are *Eurydus* and *Bacchante* of the 1898 Estimates, (laid down in 1899 and launched in 1901) and *Sutlej*, which, like them, is of the Supplementary Estimates, and was, like them, laid down in 1898 though launched with *Cressy* in 1899, whereas the *Aboukir* and the *Hogue* were launched in 1900.

Length: (Between perpendiculars) 440 ft. (Water Line) 454 ft.
Beam: 69·5 ft.
Draught: (Mean) 26 2 ft. (Maximum at full load) 29 ft.
Displacement: 12,000 tons.
Indicated Horse Power: 21,000.
Speed: 21 knots.

Trials ... *Aboukir*, I. H. P. : 21,375; Speed: 21·6 knots. *Hogue* I. H. P.: 21,432; Speed: 22 knots. *Cressy* I. H. P.: 21,240; Speed: 20·7 knots.

Armour ... Heavy Nickel. Partial belt 230 ft. long, 11·5 ft. wide, 6 in.; Belt to bow, 2 in.; Bulkheads, 5 in.; Turrets and barbettes, 6 in.; Casemates, 5 in.; Conning tower, 12 in.; Deck, sloping, amidships and forward, 1·5 in.; aft, 2.5 in.; Main deck, amidships, 1 in.

Armament ... 2—9·2 in. (40 calibres in length) in turrets fore and aft; 12—6 in. (45 cals.) in casemates; 12—3 in. (12-pounders). 3—3-pounders. 8—Machine guns. 2—18 in. Torpedo tubes, submerged, broadside.

Complement: 700.

They are the largest vessels yet sunk since the War broke out. Hitherto the largest German ironclad sunk by the British fleet was the *Mainz* (4,280 tons). The *Magdeburg* which ran aground in the Baltic and was blown up by the Germans themselves had, like the *Breslau*, a displacement of 4,478.

AMIENS is a city of Northern France, capital of the department of Somme, on the left bank of the Somme, 81 miles N. of Paris on the Northern Railway to Calais. Its population in 1906 was 78,407. Amiens was once a place of great strength, and still possesses a citadel of the end of the 16th century, but the ramparts which surrounded it have been replaced by boulevards bordered by handsome residences. The famous Treaty between Great Britain, France, Spain and Holland which took its name from Amiens was signed on the 25th March, 1802. During the war between France and Germany, Amiens after an important action fell into the hands of Prussians on the 28th of November 1870.

AISNE is a frontier department in the north-east of France. Its area is 2,866 sq. miles. It had in 1906 a population of 534,495. It is bounded N. by the department of Nord and the kingdom of Belgium, E. by the department of Ardennes, S. E. by that of Marne, S. by that of Seine-et Marne, and west by those of Oise and Somme. The surface of the department consists of undulating and well-wooded plains, intersected by numerous valleys, and diversified in the north-east by hilly ground which forms a part of the mountain system of the Ardennes. Its general slope is from north-east, where the culminating point (930 ft.) is found, to south-west, though altitudes exceeding 759 feet are also found in the south. The chief rivers are the Somme, the Escaut and the Sambre, which have their sources in the north of the department; the Oise, traversing the north-west, with its tributaries the Serre and the Aisne the latter of which joins it beyond the limits of the department, and the Marne and the Ourcq in the south. The department is served chiefly by the lines of the Northern Railway; in addition, the main line of the Eastern Railway to Strasburg traverses the extreme south. The Oise, Aisne and Marne are navigable and canals furnish 170 miles of waterway. Aisne is divided into five arrondissement—St. Quentin and Vervins in the north, Laon in the centre and Soissons and Chateau-Thierry in the south. It forms part of the region of the second army corps, its military centre being at Amiens. Laon is the capital.

BOLJANITZA—We could not trace the place in any of our war-maps. It seems to be an insignificant village on the Austrian frontier of Herzegovina.

BUG is a river distinguished as the western Don, which rises in the E. of Austrian Galicia between Tarnopol and Brody, and flows N. N. W. as far as Brest-Litovsk, separating the Polish provinces of Lublin and Siedlce from the Russian governments of Volhynia and Grodus; it then swings away almost due W., between the provinces of Warsaw and Lomza, and joins the Vistula, 23 miles below the city of Warsaw. Its length is 470 miles. It is navigable from Brest-Litovsk downwards.

BINCHE is a small town S. S. E. of Mons at a distance of about 10 miles as the crow flies.

BACCARAT is a town of eastern France, situated on the river Meurthe to the north of Raon-la-Tape at a distance of some 6 miles.

CHATEU-THIERRY is a town of northern France, capital of a district in the department of Aisne, 59 miles E. N. E. of Paris on the Eastern Railway to Nancy. Its population in 1906 was 6,872. It is built on a rising ground on the right bank of the Marne.

CIANITZA or Chainitza, a small place in the S. E. of Serajevo at a distance of about 46 miles from that town. It is about a mile and a half from the extreme northern frontier of Montenegro, situated on the river Drina.

COMPEIGNE is a town of northern France, capital of an arrondissement in the department of Oise, 52 miles N. N. E. of Paris on the Northern railway between Paris and St. Quentin. Its population in 1906 was 14,052. The town, which is a favourite summer resort, stands on the north-west border of the forest of Compiègne and on the left bank of the Oise, less than one mile below its confluence with the Aisne. From 1870 to 1871 it was the headquarters of the German Army.

COULOUMMIERS is a town of northern France, 45 miles E. of Paris by rail. Its population in 1906 was 5,217. It is situated in the fertile district of Brie, in a valley watered by the Grand-Morin.

COURTRAI, (a corruption of its Flemish name *Kortryk*) is an important and once famous town of West Flanders, Belgium, situated on the Lys. Its population in 1906 was 34,564. Although the prosperity of modern Courtrai is considerable, yet it is a shadow of what it was in the middle ages. It had then a population of 200,000.

Courtrai, the *Contracum* of the Romans, ranked as a town from the 7th century onwards. It was destroyed by the Normans, but was rebuilt in the 10th century by Baldwin III of Flanders. The town was once more burnt, in 1385, by the French after the battle of Roosebake, but was rebuilt in 1385 by Philip the Bold, Duke of Burgundy.

CONDE-SUR-L-'ESCANT is in the department of Nord, at the junction of canals of the Scheldt and of Conde-Mons. Its population in 1906 was, town, 2,701; commune, 5,310. It lies 7 miles N. by E. of Valenciennes and two miles from the Belgian frontier.

CHAUNY is a town of northern France in the department of Aisne, 19 miles S. by W. of St. Quentin by rail. Its population in 1906 was 10,127. The town is situated on the Oise and at the junction of the canal of St. Quentin with the lateral canal of the Oise, and carries on an active trade. It was the scene of much fighting in the Hundred Years' War.

CRACOW is a town of Austria in Galicia, 212 miles W. by N. of Hamberg by rail. Its population in 1900 was 91,310. It is the most interesting town in the whole of Poland. No other polish town possesses so many old and historic buildings, none of them contains so many national relics, or has been so closely associated with the development and destinies of Poland as Cracow. And the ancient capital is still the intellectual centre of the Polish nation. It is situated on a fertile plain on the left bank of the Vistula and occupies a position of great stategic importance. Historically the town has passed through many vicissitudes, until at last on the third partition of Poland in 1795 Austria took possession of it. But in 1809 Napolean wrested it from that Power and incorporated it with the Duchy of Warsaw, which was placed under the rule of the King of Saxony. In the campaign of 1812 the Emperor Alexander made himself master of it and the other territory which formed the Duchy of Warsaw. At the general settlement of affairs of Europe by the great Powers in 1815, it was agreed that Cracow and the adjoining territory should be formed into a free State, and by the final act of the Congress signed at Vienna in 1815, "the town of Cracow, with its territory, is declared to be for ever a free, independent and strictly neutral city, under the protection of Russia, Austria and Prussia." In February 1846, however, an insurrection broke out in the city, apparently a ramification of a widely spread conspiracy throughout Poland. The Senate and other authorities of Cracow were unable to subdue the rebels or to maintain order, and at their request, the city was occupied by a corps of Austrian troops for the protection of the inhabitants. The three Powers, Russia, Austria and Prussia, made this a pretext for extinguishing this independent state and as the outcome of a conference at Vienna, in November 1846, the three courts, contrary to the expressed views of the British and French Governments, decided to extinguish the state of Cracow and to incorporate it with the dominions of Austria.

CHALONS is a town of north-eastern France, capital of the department of Marne, 407 miles E. of Paris on the main line of the eastern Railway to Nancy and 25 miles S. S. E. of Rheims. Its population in 1906 was 22,424. Chalons is situated in a wide level plain principally on the right bank of the Marne.

DYNOFF is a town to the west of Przemysl, situated on the San. It is at about a distance of 30 miles from Przemysl.

DELME is a town of German Lorraine near Nomeny on the Franco-German frontier.

DWARF is a sheathed or coppered British gunboat launched in 1898. Length: 180 ft. Beam: 33 ft; Draught: 8 ft; Displacement: 805 tons; I. H. P.: 1,300; Speed: 13·5 knots. Armament: 2—4 in. 4—3 in. (12-pounder); 10 machine guns. Complement, 70.

ETAIN is a town of north-eastern France in the department of Meuse. It lies to the N. E. of Verdun at a distance of about 12 miles.

FOCA, pronounced Fáwtcha, is a town of Bosnia, situated at the confluence of the Drina and Cehotina rivers, and encircled by wooded mountains. It had a population of 4,217 in 1895. With its territories enclosed by the frontiers of Montenegro and Novi-Bazar, Foca, then known Chocha, was the scene of almost incessant border warfare during the middle ages. It has still some monuments of the Turkish *régime*,—the Bogomil cemeteries and the beautiful mosques. It was a large settlement in the 16th century, with many magnificent buildings in Turkish style and the seat of the Governor of Herzegovina. Amongst its industries the most thriving was and is still to-day the silver filigree-work and inlaid weapons, for which it was famous.

GRODEK is a fortified town in Russia situated on the river Smotritch, a tributary of the Dniester. Grodek is S. S. E. of Tarnopol, an Austrian city in Galicia, and as the crow flies, its distance is about 50 miles from that city. The nearest point from Grodek in the Galician frontier is about 17 miles. This shows that in spite of the so-called "Austrian debacle" at Lemberg, the Austrians are still in Russian territory, near Lublin in the north and Grodok in the West.

GUEBVILLIER is a town of north-eastern France in the department of Moselle. It lies to the S. W. of Nancy at a distance of some 30 miles by rail.

HERSEAUX. We could not trace any place of such a name in any of our war-maps of Belgium.

HELIGOLAND is an island of Germany, in the North Sea, lying off the mouth of the Elbe and the Weser, 28 miles from the nearest point on the mainland. Its population in 1900 was 2,307. From 1870 to 1890 a British possession, it was then ceded to Germany and since 1892 has formed part of Schleswig-Holstein. There is a powerful lighthouse, and since its cession the main Island has strongly fortified it, the old English batteries being replaced by armoured turrets mounting guns of heavy calibre.

INVALIDES or Hôtel des Invalides, is one of the important civil buildings of Paris. It is situated on the left of the Seine and was founded by Louis XIV as a retreat for wounded and infirm soldiers. Its inmates are few in number, but the building also serves as headquarters of the Military Governor of Paris. It has got a garden and a spacious esplanade, and a courtyard called

"Cour d' Honneur" enclosed by a moat above which is a battery of cannon used for salutes on important occasions. On either side of this lie the Museums of military history and of artillery. Behind all rises a magnificent gilded dome sheltering a church, the Eglise Royal, the central crypt of which contains a fine sarcophagus of red porphyry in which lie the remains of Napolean I., brought from St. Helena in 1840, while close by are the tombs of his friends Duroc and Bertrand.

JARASLAV is an important fortified town N. of Przemysl, situated on the river San. It is some 25 miles distant from that town by rail.

KONIGSBERG is a German protected cruiser launched at Kiel in 1905. Length: 354·3 ft. (between perpendiculars): 376 7 ft. (water line), Beam: 43·3 ft.; Draught (mean), 15·8 ft.; Indicated Horse Power: 13·025; Speed: 23·5 knots. Armour: Deck, 1·8 in. on slopes, ·8 in. on flat amidships, 1·4 in. forward, 1 in. aft; Engine coamings 3·9 in., conning tower, 3·9 in. Armament: 10—4·1 (40 calibre, in length) guns; 2 Machine guns, 2—18 in. Torpedo tubes submerged or broadside. Complement: 322.

LA FERE is a town S. of St. Quentin at a distance of 12 miles from that city as the crow flies.

LA FERTE-GAUCHER, a town of eastern France. As the crow flies, it is about 45 miles E. of Paris.

LA FERTE SOUS JOUARRE is a town N. E. of Paris. As the crow flies, it is about 30 miles from Paris. It is situated on the river Marne.

LE CATEU, or Cateu-Cambrésis, is a town of northern France, on the Selle, 15 miles E. S. E. of Cambrai by road. Its population in 1906 was 10,400.

LUXEMBURG is the Capital of the grand-duchy of the same name, situated on the Alzette, a tributary of the Sûre. Its population in 1905 was 20,984.

LUNEVILLE is a garrison town of north-eastern France, capital of an arrondissement in the department of Meurthe-et-Moselle 21 miles E. S. E. of Nancy on the railway to Strassburg. Its population in 1906 was town, 19,199; commune 24,266, including troops. The town stands on the right bank of the Meurthe between that river and its affluent the Vezouze, a little above their confluence. It is an important cavalry station with a large riding school.

LILLE is a city of northern France, capital of the department of Nord, 154 miles N. by E. of the Paris Nothern Railway. Its population in 1906 was 196,624. Lille is situated in a low fertile plain on the right bank of the Deule in a rich agricultural and industrial region of which it is the centre. It is a first class fortress and headquarters of the 1st Army Corps and has an enceinte and a pentagonal citadel, one of Vauban's finest works situated to the west of the town from which it is divided by the Deule. The modern fortifications comprise over twenty detached forts and batteries, the perimeter of the defences being about 20 miles. Before 1858 the town, fortified by Vauban about 1668, occupied an elliptical area of about 2,500 yards by 1,300, but the rampart on the south side have been demolished and the ditches filled up, their place being now occupied by a great Boulevard de la Liberte. The new enceinte encloses the old communes, the area of the town being thus more than doubled.

METZ is a town, first class fortress and episcopal see of Germany, in the province of Alsace-Lorraine, capital of German Lorraine, on the Moselle, 99 miles N. W. of Strassburg by rail, and at the radiation of lines to Luxemburg, Colenz and Novéant, on the French frontier 10½ miles W. Its population in 1905 was 60,396. The Mosselle, which is here joined by the Seille, flows through it in several arms, and is crossed by fourteen bridges. As a fortress, Metz has always been of the highest importance, and throughout the history down to 1870, it had never succumbed to an enemy, thus earning for itself the name of *La Pucelle*. It now ranks with Strassburg as one of the two great bulwarks of the west frontier of Germany. The original town walls were replaced by ramparts in 1550, and the citadel was built a few years later. By 1674 the works had been reconstrusted by Vauban. Under Napolean III the fortress was strengthened by a circle of detached forts, which, after 1870, were modified and completed by the Germans, who treated the fortress as the principal point of offensive operations against France. In the years following 1900, a new outer chain of defences was constructed which extends as far as Thionville on the north side and has its centres in front of Metz on the Gravelett Cattle-ground the garrison chiefly composed of the XVI Army Corps, numbering about 25,000.

MITROVUZ or Mitrovica is a town of Croatia-Flavonia, Hungary, situated on the river Save, in the country of Syrmia. It is on the railway from Agram, 170 miles W. N. W. to Belgrade but at a point where the Austro-Servian frontiers meet.

MELLE is a town of northern France, capital of an arrondissement in the department of Deaux-Sèvres on the left bank of the Béronne, 21 miles E. S. E. of Niort by rail. Its population in 1906 was 2,231. Melle (Metellum) derives its name from the lead mine worked here during the Roman occupation and in the early middle ages.

MONTMIRAIL is a small place in the district of Marne S. S. E. of Chalons at a distance of about 40 miles from that place as the crow flies.

MARONITES (Arab. Mawarina,) a Christian people of the Ottoman Empire in communion with the Papal Church, but forming a distinct denomination. The original seat and present home of the nucleus of Mariontes is Mt. Lebanon; but they are also to be found in considerable force in Anti-Lebanon and Hermon, and more sporadically in and near Antioch, in Galilee and on the Syrian Coast. Colonies exist in Cyprus, in Alexandria and in the United States of America. The Lebanon community numbers about 300,000, and the total of the whole denomination cannot be much under half a million.

MELLE is a town of Belgium in the province of West Flanders. It lies to the South of Ghent at a distance of 5 miles by rail.

NOMENY is a town of north eastern France which lies very near the Franco-German frontier S. of Metz.

NANTEUIL is a town N. E. of Paris. As the crow flies, it is about 25 miles from that town.

NANCY is a city of north-eastern France, the capital of the department of Meurthe-et-Moselle, 219 miles E. of Paris on the railway to Strassburg. Its population in 1906 was, town 98,302; commune including troops, 110,570. Nancy is situated on the left bank of the Meurthe 6 miles above its junction with the Moselle and on the Marne-Rhine canal. The railway from Paris to Strassburg skirts the city on the south-west side; other railways—to Metz, to Epinal by Mirecourt, to Château Salins—join the main line near Nancy, and make it an important junction.

NOYON is a town of northern France in the department of Aisne S. E. of St. Quentin. It is at a distance of about 29 miles S. by W. of St. Quentin by rail. It is situated on the river Oise and is also connected by the Canal of St. Quentin.

OURCE is a river in eastern France south of Troyes. Rising from the Seine at Bar-sur-Seinine the district of Aube, it takes a meandering course towards the south and passing near Chatillon-sur-Seine is lost in the plateau near Racey.

OSTEND is a town of Belgium in the province of West Flanders. Its population in 1904 was 41,181. Situated on the North Sea, it forms almost the central point on the 42 miles of sea coast that belongs to Belgium. It has a very considerable passenger and provision traffic with England.

OISE is a river of northern France, tributary to the Seine, flowing south-west from the Belgian frontier and traversing the departments of Aisne, Oise and Seine-et-Oise. Its length is 187 miles. Its area of basin is 6,137 sq. miles. Rising in Belgium, 5 miles S. E. of Chimay (province of Namur) at a height of 980 feet, the river enters France after a course of a little more than 9 miles. Flowing through the district of Thierache, it divides below Guise into several arms and proceeds to the confluence of the Serre, near La Fère (Aisne). Thence as far as the confluence of the Ailette, its course lies through well-wooded country to Compiègne, a short distance above which it receives the Aisne. Skirting the forest of Compiègne, Hallatte and Chantilly, all on its left bank, and receiving near Creil, the Therain and the Breche, the river flows past Pontoise and debouches into the Seine, 39 miles below Paris. By the name of Oise, there is also a department of northern France, bounded N. by Somme, E. by Aisne, S. by Sein-et-Marne and Sein-et-Oise and W. by Eure and Sein-Inferieure. Its population in 1906 was 410,049 and has an area of 2,272 square miles.

PONT-A-MOUSSON is a town of north-eastern France situated on the river Moselle. It lies to the north of Nancy at about a distance of 10 miles from the Franco-German frontier.

PEGASUS is a Light British cruiser launched in Jarrow in 1897. Length: 300 ft.; Beam: 36 5 ft.; Draught (mean): 15 ft.; Displacement: 2,135 tons; I. H. P.: 7,000; Speed: 20 knots. Armour: Deck, 2 in., Conning Tower, 3 in. Armament: 8—4 in. (40 calibres in length) guns; 8—3 pounders; 2 Machine guns; 2—14 in. Torpedo tubes above water. Complement: 225.

PERONNE is a town of Northern France, capital of an arrondissement of the department of Somme, on the right bank of the Somme at its confluence with the Cologne, 35 miles E. by N. of Amiens by rail. Its population in 1906 was 3,698. Peronne's greatest misfortune occurred during the Franco-German war. It was invested on the 27th December, 1870, and bombarded from the 28th to the 9th of the following January, upon which date, on account of the sufferings of the Civil population, it was compelled to capitulate.

PRZEMYSL is a town of Austria in Galicia 60 miles W. of Lemberg by rail. In 1900 its population was 46,295, mostly Polish. It is situated on the river San and is one of the strongest fortresses in Galicia.

REIMS (Rheims) is a city of north-eastern France, chief town of an arrondissement in the department of Marne, 98 miles E.E N. of Paris, on the Eastern Railway. Its population in 1906 was 102,800. Reims is situated in a plain on the right bank of the Vesle, a tributary of the Aisne, and on the canal which connects the Aisne with the Marne. South and west rise the "Montagne de Reims" and the vine-clad hills. Reims is limited S. W. by the Vesle and the canal, N. W. by promenades which separate it from the railway. Beyond extend large suburbs, the chief of which are Cérès to the N. E., Coutures to the E., Laon to the N. and Vesle to the W.

RIBEMONT is a town S. S. E. of St. Quentin at a distance of about 8 miles from that city as the crow flies.

REVIGNY or Rumigny is a town of northern France, situated on the railway line between Laon and Origny. It is about 20 miles distant from Laon as the crow flies.

RAVARUSKA (probably the same as Nowa Rusca in a very but extremely well prepared map) is a northern town of Galicia and lies N. N. E. of Lemberg, at a distance of about 6 miles from that town.

RENAIX or Rennix is a town some 6 miles to the S. of Audenarde.

SEMLIN is a town of Croatia-Slavonia, in the country of Syrmia, situated beside the south bank of the Danube, on a tongue of land between that river and the Save. It had in 1900 a population of 15,679. Standing at the confluence of two navigable rivers, and on the main-line from Budapest to Constantinople and Salonica, it is the principal station for travellers between Austria-Hungary and the Balkan States. It communicates with Vienna and the Black Sea, by the Danube; with Sissek by the Save, and with Belgrade by a steam-ferry and a bridge over the Save.

SAN is a river which rises in the Carpathian mountains and flows through Sanok. It then turns to the right and swinging away at Przemysl to the N. W., meets the Vistula on the Galician frontier.

SENLIS is a town of northern France, in the department of Oise, on the right side of the Nonette, a left hand affluent of the Oise, 34 miles N. N. E. of Paris by the Northern railway on the branch line (Chantilly-Crépy) connecting the Paris Creil and Paris Soissons lines. Its population in 1906 was 6,074.

SOISSONS is a city of northern France, in the department of Aisne, 65 miles N. E. of Paris by the railway to Loan. Its population in 1906 was 11,586. Pleasantly situated amongst wooded hills, it stands on the left bank of the Aisne, the suburbs of St. Voast and St. Médard lying on the right bank. In 1870, it capitulated to the Germans after a bombardment of three days.

SEZANNE is a town in northern France in the department of Marne, situated on the railway line between Vitry-Le-François and Esternay. It is about 40 miles to the west of Vitry-Le-François as the crow flies.

SIERADZ is a town of Russian Poland in the Government of Kalisz, situated on the Warta, 110 miles S. W. of the city of Warsaw. Its population in 1897 was 7,019. It is one of the oldest towns of Poland, and was formerly known as Syra or Syraz. It was a wealthy town until nearly destroyed by fire in 1447. The old castle, which suffered much in the Swedish war of 1702-1711, was destroyed by the Germans in 1800.

TOMASZOW, or Towaszow Fabryczny, an industrial town of Russian Poland, in the government of Piotrkow, 41 miles N. E. of the town of Piotrkow. It had in 1897 a population of 21,041

TOURNAI is a city of Belgium, in the province of Hainaut, situated on the Scheldt. It is a very old city dating so far back as the time of Julius Cæsar, and in the course of its long history it has undergone many sieges and was sacked at various epochs by the Vandals, Normans, French and Spaniards. It preserves many monuments of its ancient days. It was near Tournai that the famous battle of Fontenoy was fought on the 11th of May 1745.

TERMONDE is a town of Belgium in the province of East Flanders, situated 25 miles S. W. of Antwerp at the junction of the Dender and the Scheldt. Its population in 1904 was 10,141. It is still one of the five fortified places in Belgium, although its defences are not modernised.

VARENNES is a town of north-eastern France, situated on the Aire in the department of Meuse. It is some 20 miles to the N. W. of Verdun. The line mentioned must be that of the river Aire running north and south.

VERDUN is a garrison town of north-eastern France, on the main line of the Eastern Railway between Paris and Metz, 42 miles N. N. E. of Bar le-Duc. Its population in 1906 was 12,837. In addition to the population, *comptée à part* (soldiers, etc.) numbers 8,198. Verdun is situated in a basin surrounded by vine clad hills on the Meuse, which here forms the Eastern Canal. Verdun as a fortress is of first rate importance. It lies directly opposite the frontier of German Lorrain and the great entrenched camp of Metz. At the time of the war of 1870, it was still a small antiquated fortress of the Vauban epoch, but in the long line of fortifications on the Meuse created in 1875, Verdun, forming the left of the "Meuse Line" barrier, was made the centre of an entrenched camp. The first lesson of 1870 being taken to heart, forts were placed on all the surrounding heights that the besiegers had used for their batteries, but the designers soon extended the line of the eastern defences as far out as the sharply defined cliffs that, rising gently for some miles from the Meuse, come to an abrupt edge and overlook the plain of Woëvre. On this front, which is about 5½ miles long, the most important works are (from right to left) Chatillôn, Manezel, Moulainville, Eix, Mardi Gras, Laufée, Vaux and Hardimont. At right angles to this line, the south front, the works of which are placed along one of the long western spurs of the time of heights, are forts Rozellier St. Symphorien and Haudainville, the last overlooking the Meuse. The north front also on a spur of the ridge is thickly studded with forts overlooking the Meuse. Behind the east front chiefly designed to close the valley by which the Metz-Verdun Railway penetrates the line of heights, is Fort Tavannes with its outworks and a series of batteries on the adjacent spurs. On the left bank of the Meuse, there is a complete semi-circle of forts. At the northern end of this semi-circle, and crossing its fire with the left of the north front, is Fort Belle-Epine, then comes Marre, Bourrus and Bruyères, all four being on a single ridge facing N. W. The west front is composed of Forts Germonville, Fort Boi de Sartelles, Fort Boi du Chapitre, Fort Landrecourt and Fourt Dugny, which last is within sight of Fort Haudainville over the Meuse. In second line behind these works are Fort Choisel, Chana redoubt and Fort Sartelles. In all, there are 16 large forts and about 20 smaller works, the peremiter of the whole being about 30 miles, and the greatest diameter of the fort ring 9. The whole town of Verdun is surrounded by a bastioned enceinte pierced by four gates. It was an important town at the time of the Roman conquest. It was destroyed during the period of the Barbarian invasions and did not recover till towards the 5th century. Cloviz seized the town in 502, and it afterwards belonged to the kingdom of Austrasia. In 843 the famous treaty was signed here by the sons of Louis the Pious. In the 10th century, Verdun was definitively conquered by Germany. Together with Toul and Metz, the town and its domain formed the territory of the Trois-Evêchés. In 1552, Henry II of France took possession of the Trois-Evêchés, which finally became French by the treaty of Westphalia. In 1792, after some hours of bombardment, the citizens opened their gates to the Prussians, a weakness which the Revolutionary Government punished by the execution of several of the inhabitants. In 1870, the Prussians unable to seize the town by a *coup de main* invested and bombarded it three different times, till it capitulated in the beginning of November.

The Troubles of the Hajis.

Messrs. Turner, Morrison Co.'s Defence.

The following has been sent to us for publication by Messrs. Turner, Morrison & Co., Ltd., Managing Agents, Bombay and Persia S. N. Co. Ltd. It is a copy of a telegram sent by the firm to the Hon. Mr. A. Ahmad, C. S., I. S. O., President, Behar and Orissa Provincial Haj Committee, Bankipur, in reply to an enquiry from the latter concerning certain communications published in the *Behares* of the 5th instant. Mr. Shaukat Ali's rejoinder and the *Bombay Chronicle's* opinion on the same subject are also reproduced.—"Reference your letter fifth September "to Calcutta Agents. Report stated to be from Khuddam-i-Ka'ba "false and grossly exaggerated. Highest single fare September first "never exceeded rupees eighty, return rupees 120. To-day's rate single "90, return 125. Detention Bombay this year much less than in "previous years. Four pilgrim steamers sailing this and next week. "Aden detention reports grossly exaggerated. Three steamers detained "temporarily under Government instructions have since proceeded "and landed pilgrims Jeddah. No detention now. Route to Jeddah "safe. Will be obliged if will kindly communicate this to Haj com-"mittees of other provinces and furnish us names of places where "Haj Committees are formed."

The Khuddam-i-Ka'aba's Rejoinder.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE "BOMBAY CHRONICLE."

SIR,— I had no desire in these days of anxiety to discuss in the press any subject that may be painful reading. It was solely for this reason that I had abstained from giving the harrowing details of the hardships which the Hejas pilgrims had to undergo. I had intended only to inform the Mussalman public all over the country what Government and its responsible officials were doing for the pilgrims.

The Port Health Officer, Col. Jennings, who is a friend of the Hajis and is very kind to them, on learning that the stamping the body of the pilgrim with the red ink seal to show that he was medically examined was misunderstood, modified the practice. He very kindly explained to me that he was originally obliged to put this extra burden of work on the staff in the interests of the pilgrims themselves as at the embarkation, bogus Hajis, with no tickets used to get on the steamers and the genuine Hajis were left behind. He also informed me that on his report the construction of a bigger disinfection shed would probably be taken soon in hand. He himself would sooner do away with the disinfection, but the requirements of the Venice Convention made it compulsory that all plague-infected ports, must have the bedding, etc., of the passengers disinfected. He and his department are doing and would do all they could for the comfort of the pilgrims. I am sure all Mussalmans will be very grateful to him for this.

Mr. Edwardes, the Police Commissioner, and his assistant Mr. Abdullah Ahmed, the Protector of Pilgrims, are also doing their best for the Hajis and fighting for them. Every one that helps the Hajis will receive our sincere thanks.

I saw the paragraph yesterday which Messrs. Turner Morrison & Co. have circulated in the press, in which they bring in, by name, our Society, the Khudam-i-Ka'aba, as sending "*false and grossly exaggerated reports.*" This reminds me of the Persian proverb "what a bold thief it is that carries the lamp in his hand at the search." I challenge Messrs. Turner Morrison & Co. to prove that my telegrams to the Moslem press for the information of the intending pilgrims were either *false* or *exaggerated.*

I would here explain the position of our Society. We have no personal animus against Messrs. Turner Morrison & Co., or any body else. In the sole interests of the Hajis and the Haj question we are here and our Society, at its own expense, has opened an Information Bureau, so that we could give intending pilgrims all the correct information about the dates of sailings, rates of fares, etc., besides meeting them at the station, escorting them and their luggage to the Musafirkhanas and giving them every possible assistance. Unlike Messrs. Turner Morrison and Co. or the other pilgrims brokers, we are a disinterested party, doing all the work without hopes of any return from the pilgrims.

I may also here mention that one of the chief objects of our Society is to induce as many Musalmans, rich and poor alike, as possible to go for the Haj which is compulsory on all who can afford to go.

Why is it that we have now been advising them not to go this year and thus incurring the wrath of Messrs. Turner Morrison and Co., who even go so far as to accuse us of telling a lie.

The Turner Morrison steamer "Islami" left Bombay on the 28th July, the Khandwani steamer "Lawoe" left on the 29th July and the "Jedda" also on the 29th July. In the ordinary course they would have reached Jedda by the 15th August or so. We sent the following press message on the 28th August on learning definitely that the above steamers were detained at Aden :—

"Facts oblige emphatically advise all intending pilgrims postpone going Haj this year. Three pilgrim steamers 'Lawoe,' 'Jedda' and 'Islami' with about 2,500 pilgrims left Bombay one month ago detained at Aden till to-day owing to war. Steamers allowed now to proceed at owner's risk Hajis undergoing great hardship."

What is false in this and where is the exaggeration? Every word of this could be verified from the officials concerned. Mr. Edwardes and his department wired the same advice to Bengal pilgrims through the Commissioner of Police, Calcutta.

The same message contained the following also :—

"Turner Morrison did not send 'Akbar' as advertised but 'Mansuri' on 26th which is still in Bombay as lascars refused going. Under no circumstances should pilgrims think of going.

"Deck fare to day raised eighty Rupees. Steamer companies only anxious to make money out of Hajis otherwise no tickets should have been issued knowing that over two thousand pilgrims already detained at Aden. What use sending more? Great discomfort for poor Hajis who had food for fortnight only. Turkish steamer "Karadeniz" cannot take pilgrims this year only cargo. Mussalmans must know real facts."

What is false in this we would like to know. As for the "Akbar-Mansuri" affair, it would not be to the credit of any shipping company, leaving aside one with a reputation like that of Messrs. Turner Morrison & Co. We are obliged to give the details :—

(1) Messrs. Turner Morrison & Co. advertised that the "Akbar" (one of the best steamers) would leave for Jedda on the 25th August.

(2) At least upto the 18th August, they were still issuing tickets in the name of "Akbar" when they knew that they would send the "Mansuri" and not the "Akbar," an old boat which gave lots of trouble last pilgrim season. At the same time in Karachi they were issuing tickets in the name of the "Mansuri."

(3) The ss. "Mansuri" with 350 Hajis from Karachi was expected at Bombay before the 26th August.

(4) In expectation of its arrival 365 pilgrims were put through the disinfection early on the morning of the 26th, but they had to wait inside the sheds till the afternoon, as the "Mansuri" had not arrived. Thanks to Mr. Kadwani, they were able to get something to eat. Old men and women were put in open fishing boats taken to the steamers which was 4 miles out in the stream, causing them a great deal of inconvenience.

(5) It was dark when they and their baggage reached the steamer. There was no light. There was no crew either. They had all refused to work, complaining of the treatment and bad food served out to them. Dr. Baker examined the stores and so did Superintendent Flannigan and others of the Harbour police. The fish was rotten up with maggots in it, the rice was eaten by insects and smelled badly and the water was dirty brown. All the stores were thrown into the sea by order of the doctor. Superintendent Flannigan and his two European assistants gave this information to the Protector of Pilgrims and myself. The pilgrims told me that it was a night of horrors for them when they had nothing to eat.

(6) The unfortunate pilgrims were detained on such a steamer for five days in Bombay itself in mid-stream. The bottom of the ship was reported to be damaged and the port officers ordered it to be taken to the Dry Docks. Then in midstream these poor pilgrims and their baggage were transhipped to the s. s. 'Budri" another old ship, till such time as the "Mansuri" was repaired. During this transhipment, they suffered heavy loss,—over 200 bags of corn and heavy baggage were reported to have been dropped into the sea and lost, owing to the carelessness and clumsiness of the ship coolies. Official eye-witnesses testify that baggage was dropped in the sea.

(7) Two days more of hardships on the ss. "Budri," which was not ready to receive visitors. Water had run short and two European officers of the boat in my presence informed the Protector of Pilgrims that, in spite of reported signalling to their office, they did not receive any water so far. On our return from the "Budri" the Protector through the assistance of Superintendent Flannigan of the Harbour police arranged to send the water.

(8) All pilgrims left the s. s. Budri on the 1st except the Kabulis, who desired to proceed to Arabia at any cost as they had done 40 days journey on foot and could not think of going back.

(9) Over 100 pilgrims naturally refused to go back to the "Mansuri" and demanded the refund of their passage money, which refund was promised by Messrs. Turner, Morrison & Co., through their Agent Abdulghafur Atashkhan before Mr. Edwardes, the Protector of Pilgrims and myself. But when the pilgrims with the recommendation of the Protector of Pilgrims went to the city office for payment they were refused.

(10) That is not all. The "Mansuri" after repairs was advertised to sail again on the 3rd August. The poor pilgrims had to go through another disinfection early on that day. Col. Jennings, the Health Officer, who was feeling greatly for the unfortunate Hajis, himself told me that while Messrs. Turner Morrison and Co. were taking pilgrims to the steamer, he believed it would not be possible for it to sail that day as the steamer was short of 10 firemen, one 2nd Engineer, one doctor and the stewardess. Again at mid-day in the burning sun, these man and women were put into open fishing boats and taken to the steamer.

Sir, the s. s. "Mansuri" as expected did not sail that day nor till the afternoon of the next, the 4th September. What hardship those poor pilgrims must have gone through or are undergoing now God alone knows. I would like to know if these are lies. If so let Messrs. Turner Morrison say so and prove them.

(11) In spite of the efforts and persuation of the brokers, over seventy refused to have anything to do with the "Mansuri" and demanded the return of the passage money which was promised. They went to the police office and had daily expectations of the payment, but so far they have not been paid. The war must have upset sailings of ships, but there is no justification for not returning the passage money. Waiting from the 26th August till the 4th September was sufficient punishment. Sir, I have a great many more harrowing details but I desist. The Government is busy and has its hands full. I would appeal to the Bombay press, both Indian and Anglo-Indian, to make independent enquiries in all quarters and then raise a voice in support of the poor, distracted, honest and simple Hajis, mostly from Bengal, who have had enough troubles.

In the end I would like to enquire from Messrs. Turner Morrison and Co., if it is not a fact that on the 1st September they had given notice to the Protector of Pilgrims of raising the deck fare to Rs. 120, and that on the strong protests of Mr. Edwardes it was brought down again to Rs. 80?

Yours, etc.,

SHAUKAT ALI,

Secy., Khuddam-i-Ka'aba Society.

Bombay, Sept. 14th.

The "Bombay Chronicle's" Views.

There has been a vast amount of discussion recently regarding the Haj Pilgrim Traffic, and it might have been hoped that the new regulations recently issued by the Government would have settled some of the difficult problems connected with the task of supervising this traffic. So far as the Government is concerned, much that is sensible has been done. The principle of a Government-conceded monopoly has been abandoned in deference to the bulk of Mahomadan opinion; the practice of double-stamping the pilgrims has been modified to a less objectionable form and is optional; other measures are being taken and we have the assurance of Mr. Shaukat Ali, the Secretary of the Khuddam-i Ka'aba, a society that looks after the welfare of the Hajis, that the various Government officials concerned are all keenly anxious to do their best for the pilgrims. Mr. Shaukat Ali, however, presents a somewhat severe indictment against the steamship company, Messrs. Turner, Morrison and Co., which, it seems to us, requires an answer. According to this, the Hajis have been subjected to unnecessary hardships for which the Company is responsible.

We have made enquiries into the matter, and had done so before we published Mr. Shaukat Ali's letter, and, in the absence of any explanation from Messrs. Turner, Morrison & Co. for which we have waited, we are left no conclusion but to agree with Mr. Shaukat Ali that the Company has been at fault. They have, no doubt, met with difficulties of an abnormal character in the conduct of the traffic on account of the war but the troubles that arose out of what Mr. Shaukat Ali describes as the "Akbar-Munsoorie" affair seem none-the-less inexcusable. Unfortunately the Company's subsequent attitude in the matter has made matters worse, and, as a result a number of unfortunate people appear to have lost their passages, a good deal of property, and their money as well, owing to the refusal of the Company to refund their passage money to those who naturally refused to travel in the steamer after preliminary experiences of such an unfortunate character. Circumstances have at the present moment favoured Messrs. Turner, Morrison & Co. with an actual monopoly of the traffic, an eventuality which it was desired so much to prevent,—a monopoly of which they do not seem to be making a generous use, either in the matter of fares or general treatment of their patrons. Under these circumstances it is a question whether the Mahomedan community would not be well advised to change their minds regarding the establishment of a monopoly,—on condition that the concession can be given to a company that has not brought itself into bad odour with the Hajis.

The Regulations Enforced in Bombay.

GOVERNMENT EXPLANATION.

In connection with the embarkation of Haj pilgrims at Bombay the following Press Note was issued on Monday:—

In view of certain statements which have been made on the subject the Government of Bombay consider it desirable that the Mahomedan public should be made acquainted with the exact facts in connection with the medical examination which pilgrims to the Hedjaz undergo before they embark at Bombay.

The medical examination is necessary both by reason of international obligations and for the protection of the pilgrims themselves. Even passengers by the mail steamers, European as well as Indian, are medically examined before being permitted to embark. Medical examination and disinfection are of service to the pilgrims, because as a result of these precautions it is unlikely that any one suffering from a contagious disease will be able to go on board a pilgrim vessel. If *one* such person succeeded in embarking, the Turkish authorities would not allow his fellow-pilgrims to disembark at the journey's end until many days were passed, and all danger of the disease spreading was over.

When the pilgrims arrive at the bunder, they are accommodated in waiting sheds. From there they pass with their kit to the examination shed, where they themselves are examined by the doctor and their kit is disinfected.

It has been suggested that pilgrims should be medically examined in the waiting sheds. This is not possible because the sheds are not suited for the disinfection of their kit. The existing disinfection shed cannot be extended for want of space, but the Port Health Officer is submitting proposals to Government for the demolition of the present shed and the erection of a new shed on the Modi Bunder Estate which will serve both the old and the new docks. It will, it is hoped, possess the further advantage that the waiting and examination sheds will all be in one building, so that pilgrims will only have to pass from one room to another.

When the pilgrims have been passed by the doctor they have to proceed any distance between 200 yards and three-quarters of a mile to the particular wharf out of 33 wharves from which their ship will start. It is, therefore, necessary to adopt some means of identifying them when, after traversing this distance, they arrive at the embarkation barrier; otherwise impostors might rush in before them and prevent *bona-fide* pilgrims going aboard. For this reason the medical staff stamps each pilgrim's ticket with a seal. This precaution, however, was long ago found to be insufficient, as impostors procured dummy tickets and forged the seal. It was therefore thought advisable to place a stamp on the back of the left hand of each pilgrim who voluntarily agreed to this course. Later it became necessary to ask pilgrims to receive two stamps on their skin, because impostors learnt to forge the stamp by pricking their hands. Now, however, the Port Health Officer has devised a more complicated stamp which cannot easily be counterfeited, and only one impression on the back of the hand will be necessary. Saloon pilgrims receive numbered and stamped passes and the skin impression is dispensed with in their case.

Government wish to emphasize the fact that in every case the rubber-stamp skin impression is entirely voluntary. The method of identification is adopted simply to save the pilgrims' time and trouble. It enables the authorities at the embarkation barrier to see at once who are entiled to go aboard, and, as a consequence, the embarkation of a whole boat-load of pilgrims, which formerly was a long and tedious process, now seldom lasts an hour. Pilgrims who can show the stamp on their hands are admitted on board first of all. The remainder have to be re-mustered for identification by their brokers and for the elimination of impostors before they may embark. It is, therefore, obviously to the advantage of pilgrims to have the stamp impressed on their hands as well as on their tickets, but those who prefer not to submit to this are merely put to the inconvenience of having to wait a little longer before they are allowed to go on board. This system of rubber impressions has been in force for the past fifteen years and, so far as Government are aware, has never been objected to by the pilgrims.

Our Constantinople Letter.

Constantinople, August 19.

AN ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF THE KHEDIVE.

AMIDST the calm preceding the horrors of a bloody and disastrous war now being waged in Europe, the thunder of which is reverberating on the shores of the Bosphorus also, the people of Turkey were

startled by the news, coming like a thunderbolt from the blue, of an attempt at assassinating His Highness Abbas Hilmi Pasha, the Khedive of Egypt, on Saturday, July 24. The Khedive paid an official visit to the Grand Vizier at the Sublime Porte. The streets were filled with eager spectators, and as soon as the State-carriage drove out and passed through Rue de la Sublime Porte, two bullets whizzed from the crowd into his mouth and right arm and he narrowly escaped death. The perpetrator of the crime who made such a daring attempt with a Browning pistol, probably with political motives, was a nineteen-year-old lad, Mahmoud Muzhar, a student of the Naval Engineering School at Scutari, who himself fell a victim to the shot of a Turkish gendarme on duty at the Porte right on the spot. He was dressed in the Naval uniform with a scarf-pin on his neck-tie bearing a photograph of El Wardani (who had murdered Boutros Pasha Ghazi, the Prime Minister of Egypt,) and an ensign on his uniform having a photograph of the Pyramids with the inscription in Arabic "Egypt for Egyptians."

Young Muzhar was born at Beni Soueffe near Cairo; his father is a Justice of the Peace at Alexandria and his mother a very intelligent lady of Circassian origin. During the Tripolitan War he was one of the organisers of an Amateur Theatrical Company for the relief of the sufferers, and during the late Balkan War he served for sometime as a Volunteer in the Ottoman Army. His Indian acquaintances will remember that he offered his services voluntarily in the All-India Medical Mission of Dr. Ansari which visited Turkey during the late war.

His friends found in his room to their amazement a beautiful picture of the Pyramids with the words in his own handwriting: *I would not die before serving my country.*

The Austro-Servian Imbroglio.

The fatal bullets resulting in the assassination of the heir to the Crown of Austria, Franz Ferdinand, and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenburg, by a Servian student at Serajevo in Bosnia, seem to be the outcome of a well-hatched plot to be traced back to Servia as a revenge for the loss through Austrian intervention of the port of Durazzo on the Adriatic taken by Servia during the first Balkan war. The Balkan States had for some time past been the scene of frequent assassinations of kings and political leaders. By many their inspiration was believed to have come from the Pan-Slavic movement in Russia, and the latest event was undoubtedly one of its off-spring. It strained political relations in the Chancellories of Ballplatz, Wilhelmstrasse, St. Petersburg, Quai d'Orsey, Downing Street, the Quirinal and of other minor states, heralding the advent of a general conflagration in Europe. With the ultimatum by Austria to Servia huge clouds arose from that storm-centre spreading far and wide over the political firmament.

A Disastrous War In Europe.

Army and navy have been mobilised in all countries declaring a general state of war; and central Europe has once more become a scene of bloody and disastrous war between England, France, Russia, Belgium and Servia on one side and Germany and Austria-Hungary on the other. Italy, Switzerland, Holland, Sweden, Norway, Bulgaria, Roumania and Greece, though they have maintained a policy of neutrality, have been none-the-less moved by the war-drum to mobilise their armies and navies.

Activity in Turkey.

Although the Ottoman Government has followed a policy of strict neutrality, yet the excitement was so intense that martial law was immediately proclaimed all over the country and the mobilisation of the army began with unusual rapidity in consequence of an Imperial *Iradé*. Every Ottoman citizen between the ages of 20 and 45 years, whether Moslem, Greek or Armenian, was called to bear arms and severe punishment was to be meted out to those who kept off after their country's call. In days gone by poor men bore the heat and brunt of battles and died heroically unnamed and unthanked; rich and distinguished citizens when called in times of emergency had not unoften had themselves exempted from military service by paying a certain amount of money to the authorities. This is now a thing of the past and universal service is the order of the day. Military service is compulsory in Turkey as in Germany and France.

Harkos Asker, that is to say, everybody must be a soldier. Rich and poor, high and low, students, hotel-keepers, merchants, professional men, traders, cultivators, *hamals* (porters), etc., have responded to the call and are to be seen in the streets of this city in military uniforms elbowing each other, and everyone seems to have caught the fire of patriotism and devotion to the Motherland. Even the son-in-law of H. I. M. the Sultan has been enrolled as an ordinary soldier! A duty indeed! Turkey has been able to raise uptill now a million and a half of her valiant sons for national defence. I cannot resist the temptation of letting your readers know *en passant* an incident which may not prove uninteresting to them. When the mobilisation was in full swing, one of the magnates of Turkey asked the Minister of War to allow his only son to stay in the city instead of being sent to the frontier. In order to give a worthy lesson to his countrymen and especially to those who are afraid of answering the nation's call and are wanting in the spirit of sacrifice for the sake of their motherland, the Minister of War has affixed the letter to the door of the War Office and immediately sent a letter telling him that his son has been accorded the same privilege as the son of H. I. M. the Sultan—the privilege of defending his country at all risks and all costs! A week after the mobilisation, a proclamation had been issued by His Imperial Majesty the Sultan which runs as follows:—

"Now that we are making every effort to assure the progress of our dear country in tranquillity and peace, a great war has broken out in Europe.

"In order to safeguard our sacred rights, by the grace of God the Almighty, I have called all my dear children to arms.

"Before the expiry of the very first week of mobilisation, the number of young men who hastened to join and stand under the flag had so risen that the first requirements of the army were completely satisfied.

"I am extremely touched by the patriotic enthusiasm and readiness shown by my nation during the present crisis.

"I have also ordered the provisional enlistment of those untried conscripts of age whose presence at the present moment is not necessary in the army, but who are to come under the flag whenever their presence is deemed necessary.

"My Government desires to preserve peace. I am persuaded that, by the grace of the Almighty God, the spiritual assistance of the our holy Prophet, and by the patriotism of our nation, we shall be able to defend our country and our rights in all circumstances that may arise. I send my salutations to all my children.

"I desire at the same time that my soldiers who are my children should render absolute obedience to their superiors.

"The words of those to whom obedience is due should be regarded as emanating from MYSELF.

"In case of need, soldiers, my children, you are to march united to face death.

"I am certain that my army, sharing the path of duty and right with our ancestors, would work with courage and energy and will soon complete aught that is wanting. May the Almighty God be our supporter in all circumstances."

A similar manifesto (calling the people "*To Arms!*", "*To Arms!*" has been issued by Enver Pacha, the Minister of War, along with His Majesty's Proclamation. It runs thus:—

"I communicate the decree of our august and well-beloved Sovereign and our venerable Khalifa.

"I deem, as a happy augury for our army, the industry and endeavour which the nation has put forth during this momentous week of mobilisation, industry and endeavour that have attracted the Imperial benevolence also towards the army.

"Under the present circumstances our army will have to make the greatest sacrifice, exerting both body and mind, and by the protection of Allah, it will erase the black spot of the Balkan war.

"The future of the Holy Khilafat and the prosperity of Ottomanism depend on the sacrifices and the merits which the army will show in the accomplishment of its duty. Every officer and every soldier must know that a single step backward and without the orders of his superiors would bring ruin and destruction on the country and the nation. For the army and the nation there is death in retreat, but there is safety and prosperity in every step forward. That the enemy may know there is no terror in his cannon and rifle, we must ever advance forward.

"Such is the reality, and I repeat that there is moral and material prosperity in a march forward.

"If each soldier becomes alive to his appointed task and if they all advance forward, with faith in Allah, I am certain that our army will be as victorious as the armies of our glorious ancestors. *Padshahim Chok Yasha*—Long may the Sultan live!"

The Economic and General Crisis.

The war in Europe has provoked a veritable crisis in the country bringing about a stagnation in commercial transactions and rarity of gold. The foreign and Ottoman banks issued a moratorium for two months. The Imperial Ottoman Bank has issued bank-notes for the first time. All articles of necessity are excessively dear, and poor people have begun to feel the pinch of it. All the daily news-

papers both in Turkish and foreign languages are publishing just a sheet only for want of paper in the market. Business is entirely standstill.

The foreign inhabitants who had been engaged in business or otherwise have enrolled themselves as volunteers in their respective consulates and left for Europe. There are at this moment German, English, Italian, French and Austrian ships at the port coming from the Dardanelles or Black Sea. They have all anchored in the Bosphorus near Scutari or Haidar Pasha owing to the risk of being captured by belligerent nations. In the Black Sea the Russian and Turkish lighthouses have been extinguished.

American Battleships for Greece.

Incited by some of the Powers and supplied by two of them with money to pay for the purchase of two battleships *Idaho* and *Missisipi* the Greeks are willing to provoke another war with Turkey. At White House in Washington a hot debate arose among the senators as to the sale of battleships to Greece. Some of the well intentioned senators who had enough clearness of vision to see another forthcoming disturbance of peace in the Balkans raised a storm of opposition, but President Wilson under the false conviction of thereby *keeping the peace of the world* consented to the sale.

But on the outbreak of war in Europe good sense prevailed in the American Senate and President Wilson has withheld the delivery of the battleships till the situation becomes normal and peace is restored in Europe. It has created a wild excitement and an outburst of indignation at Athens.

England's Requisition of Ottoman Ships.

When the people of this country have been busy preparing to defend themselves and watching with bated breath the events occuring near at hand, a telegraphic message of the Ottoman Agency flashed across into the city bringing news of England's requisition of Turkish Dreadnoughts which had been expected in Turkish waters in the course of a few days. *Sultan Osman* and *Reshadiyeh* and two other destroyers were taken from the Armstrong Navy Yard only half an hour before the Ottoman flag was to be hoisted. The delivery of the battleships had been delayed, but after a protest from the Subline Porte it was decided to deliver them to the Government on the 1st of August. Captain Rauf Bey, the Commandant of the *Hamidiyeh*, had consequently been deputed to England to take charge of the Dreadnoughts. But the ships were taken over by the British Government and baptised with English names 48 hours before the mobilisation of the Ottoman Army.

Th Ottoman Government lodged a protest against British action and, in the meantime, started negotiations with Germany for the purchase of *Goeben* and *Breslau* which had been lying in the Dardanelles after naval operations on the coast of Algeria. Germany consented; the battleships were bought and named *Yavouz Sultan Selim* and *Medill* and are to be seen to-day lying at anchor in the Bosphorus.

The Ottoman Agency learns that England has informed the Ottoman Government by the order of his Imperial Brittanic Majesty that the detention in England of the two Turkish men-o'-war *Sultan Osman* and *Reshadiyeh*, as also the detention of the Chilian vessels of war is due essentially to the exigencies of war and is consistent with the past usage of England in time of war.

The Government of His Imperial Brittanic Majesty profoundly regrets the necessity which has obliged it to detain the Turkish ironclads for the requirement of which the Ottomans had made so many sacrifices.

This is to remove the wrong impression which is being created in the minds of the public in general. It is for the purpose of removing these wrong notions that His Imperial Brittanic Majesty has authorised the English Ambassador at Constantinople to declare formally that if the British Government has no necessity for utilising these vessels in the present war, then the said vessels are to be returned to Turkey after the war.

An Alleged Alliance between Turkey and Austria.

The air seems to be surcharged with rumours of an alliance between Turkey, Austria, Bulgaria and Roumania. Whether these rumours are true or not we shall come to know in the course of the next few days. Talaat Bey, the Minister of the Interior, and Halil Bey left for Bukharest and Sofia to enter into negotiations. The *Magyar Hirlap* of Budapest has published an interesting article from the pen of Count Jules de Andrassy on the present situation in the course of which he writes:—"Turkey has her place at our side. It is obvious that a community of mutual interests exists between Turkey and other Powers of Central Europe which could be transformed for an united and common policy of action. The success of our policy will not be a danger to the maintenance of the *status quo* in Turkey, but the success of the Triple Entente will surely be a grave political danger to her. Our victory will create a situation favourable to the development of the Ottoman Empire, while our defeat will, on the contrary, bring about disastrous results. An alliance between Turkey and Austria will ameliorate our political situation, and Turkey in concert with Bulgaria and Roumania will be able to establish a new equilibrium in the Balkans."

[Needless to say the spoliators of Turkey who usurped Bosnia and Herzegovina only six years ago are not as disinterested in their offers of help as they would wish the Turks to believe. In this awful and sanguinary flood Turkey's policy must be one which keeps her high and dry.—Ed., *Comrade*]

Islam in Japan.

[By Our Japan Correspondent.]

Nearly a week before I left India I read in the *Zemindar* that a very rich man, formerly Minister of Education in Japan, had embraced Islam. His name is Umar Yokohama, and he was reported to have given £50,000 to build an Islamia Institution for propaganda work and for an Engineering School. He had also appealed to the Japanese Government to give the right of representation in the Parliament to the Muslim community of Japan, and had urged upon the Government to take possession of the Philippine Islands because they had in the main a Muslim population.

No doubt this was very pleasant news, and soon after I landed here I began to make an inquiry about the matter. Well, the result of my investigation is that this news contains a good deal of nonsense and exaggeration. The fact is that a Turk, Abdur Rashid Effendi, came here some years ago and he converted a Japanese named Umar Yamaoka. This newly converted gentleman went to Mecca and became a Haji, but he was so poor that he could hardly live. All his expenses were met by Abd-ur-Rashid Effendi. People even doubt the sincerity of his Islam and attribute his Haj to the desire to satisfy his curiosity and reveal the supposed mystery of Mecca to the world. He also wrote a book in Japanese about Islam which is said to be tolerably good. This new Muslim is now sent out to the Islamic countries to make inquiries about Islam by an Osaka journal. He is at present in St. Petersburg.

When Abdur Rashid Effendi was working here M. Barkatullah also joined him and converted a young Japanese M. Hatano. As the term of Maulvi Barkatullah's office has expired and the school for foreign languages dispensed with his services, he left Japan in May last. And thus the movement of Islamic propaganda came to a standstill.

The rest of the Muslim population in Japan consists of some Indian merchants who live at ports and some six or seven students of whom five are from Turkey.

There are, no doubt, some people among the Japanese who have much sympathy with and regard for Islam; but speaking quite frankly the Japanese nation is more political and practical than religious and philosophical. They always look first to their own interests, the safety and well-being of their country and the glory of their nation. There are many religions among the Japanese—Shintoism, Confucianism, Budhism, Christianity, etc., but when there is a question of their country and nation they are all one and the same.

In some *Zemindar* issue of June, M. Hatano has published an appeal for money. It was probably when Maulvi Barkatullah was here, but as he has left the place and there is no other Muslim here to undertake the propaganda work I think it is too late now to do much without the active co-operation of some body like Maulvi Barkatullah. The Muslim business men and the students cannot work here owing to their respective engagements and M. Hatano knows English and Japanese only. The whole source of his Islamic knowledge is some lectures of Maulvi Barkatullah, some English books and George Sale's translation of the Quran.

There is an Islamic Association of Japan here. I had an interview with the Secretary. He explained to me that at present they could not undertake the propaganda work, because it required a good deal of money and especially a more competent man, well versed in Islamic literature, having at the same sime complete mastery over the Japanese language and familiar with their way of thinking. The only thing that they want to do is to buy a piece of land in Tokio and build a Boarding House for Muslim students. At present they do not like to appeal for money from abroad. They want to buy the land with their own subscription and, if necessary, they may appeal for building to India or other places.

It is so often being experienced that whenever such funds and *Auqaf* are put into the hands of *one individual* they always meet with failure, either through the incapacity of the Manager or his want of integrity and honesty.

The most unhappy experience of the kind was the scandal which concerns Mr. Abdullah Quilliam of Liverpool.

All such affairs should be put in the hands of a body of trustees. As I have dealt with the Muslim population of Japan and their engagements so in order to avoid any misunderstanding and distrust I like to advice my brethren in India to wait till better time comes.

TETE À TETE



We have received the following communication from the Acting Ottoman Consul-General, Bombay, with regard to undelivered receipts for subscriptions toward the Turkish Relief Fund. Those persons who have not received their receipts should apply to the said officer:—"I have "a large number of receipts arrived from Constantinople lying at "this Consulate undelivered to the subscribers who kindly remitted "money on behalf of the Turkish sufferers in the late Balkan "War. As their address is insufficient, I would be much obliged "if you could insert a notice in your widely read paper to the "effect that those subscribers who have not yet got their receipts "may apply to this Consulate giving their full address. As this "notice concerns the Mohamedan community, I should be glad "if you could kindly publish it free of charge.'

Undelivered Receipts for Turkish Relief Fund.

A valued correspondent signing himself "Faithful" writes :—"Could you or any of your readers kindly throw some light on the race and religion of the 'Algerian soldiers' and the 'Turcos' who, according to Reuter, are fighting so bravely on the side of France in the European War? Should it be presumed that they are the Arabs and the Turkomans of the French Army from Algeria and Tunis? If so, Musalmans may well be proud of the gallantry and dash displayed by these men when pitted against the disciplined legions of Germany and of their steadfast loyalty to the flag to which they owe allegiance. There can be no doubt that if sent to fight for the prestige and the honour of England against the Austro-German hordes the Musalman soldiers in the Indian Army will emulate the fearlessness and the stubbornness of their brothers in faith in the French Army from North Africa and will prove to the world that to whatever clime they may belong, gallantry and loyalty are, among others, the distinguishing traits of those who profess Islam. What a contrast the chivalrous sacrifice of their lives for the Government under which these Musalmans soldiers of the French Army live bears to the treachery of the Christian soldiers of the Turkish army in the last Balkan War!"

The French Algerian Troops.

The French forces contain a number of Moslem troops which were brought over from Africa in the course of the first fortnight after the declaration of war, and which have already done so splendidly in Lorraine and elsewhere. Their total number can only be guessed, but it is probable that they can not be less than 50,000 and have already found application in the very first great battle which is destined to exercise, as is universally assumed, a decisive moral, if not perhaps military, influence on the subsequent course of the war. What leads one to assume this is the fact that they are excellent soldiers, and will materially contribute to the outcome of the great collision. They were first used in the Franco-Prussian War. At that time three regiments of Algerian infantry (Turcos) and cavalry (Spahis) were employed at Weissenburg and Wörth, and though they were partly annihilated and partly taken prisoners by the Prussians, their performance was exceedingly creditable. Quite recently Lieutenant General von Wroschen, writing on this very question in one of the leading German papers, said: "I myself fought in 1870 these Turcos, and I can say that the smashing up of one 'Turco' regiment demanded on our part more effort and sacrifice than the defeat of three French regiments." Two years ago France had in Algeria four Fusilier regiments, consisting of 31 battalions, and four Spahi regiments, consisting of 20 squadrons. This gave a peace strength of 18,600 infantrymen and 1,800 cavalry, and allowed for a war footing of 35,650 of infantry alone. The Algerians are Arabs and Berbers, but in 1884 the first attempt was made by the French to create a regiment of Senegalese sharp-shooters (Tirailleurs de Sénégal). The experiment proved a success. The Senegalese possess a very accurate eye, are natural adepts in taking advantage of cover, are free from all nervousness, cool in attack, and highly amenable to discipline in battle. Three years ago France already possessed in Equatorial Africa 35 battalions of these sharpshooters aggregating 32,000 men. These two classes of troops thus form together a force of nearly 70,000 men, which is equal to two army corps. But during the last few years considerable augmentation must have been effected in these troops, thanks chiefly to the efforts of Lieutenant Colonel de Mangin, whose book "La Force Noire" has exercised great influence in military circles. Colonel Mangin is an old colonial officer, who saw a great deal of military work under Marchand, of Fashoda fame. He knew more than anybody else in France the value of these troops, and his book was devoted to showing what an important part they could play in compensating France for the decrease of her population. He succeeded in gaining the Minister of War and of Colonies over to his views, and made, in company of several high officials of these departments and the vice president of the Army Commission, an extensive tour in West Africa in 1910 with a view to verifying his theory. His report was accepted, and in that year began the systematic realisation of his plan, which consisted in raising annually from the Senegalese a force of 5,000 men by voluntary recruitment, so as to form in ten years an army of 50,000 men, which, together with the 32,000 already existing, would give more than two army corps of black sharpshooters alone. At the same time compulsory military service was to be introduced in Algeria, which would considerably increase the Turco and Spahi forces. What progress has since then been actually made with this scheme we have no means of judging.

The "Turcos" and the "Spahis."

The Grand Duke Nicholas, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian forces, telegraphed Reuter's correspondent at St. Petersburg on August 18th, has published the following appeal to the inhabitants of Calicia :—"Brothers,—A judgment of God is being wrought. With Christian patience and self-annihilation the Russian people of Galicia languished for centuries under a foreign yoke, but neither flattery nor persecutions could break in it the hope of liberty. As the tempestous torrent breaks the rocks to join the sea, so there exists no force which can arrest the Russian people in its onrush toward unification. Let there be no longer a subjugated Russia. Let the country which forms the heritage of Saint Vladimir throw off the foreign yoke and raise the banner of united Russia, an indivisible land. May the providence of God who has blessed the work of the great uniters of the Russian lands be made manifest. May God aid His anointed, Emperor Nicholas of All the Russias, to complete the work began by the Grand Duke Ivan Kalita. Rise, fraternal Galician Russia, who have suffered so much, to meet the Russian Army for you and your brethren, who will be delivered. Room will be found for you in the bosom of our mother Russia without offending peaceable people whatever nationality. Raise your sword against the enemy and your hearts towards God with a prayer for Russia and the Russian Tsar!"

The Czar's Appeal to Galicia.

According to the Paris correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*, the *Matin* published the opinions of M. Casimir de Wozuicki, Secretary of the Agence Polonaise, and M. Téodor de Wyzewa, both of whom expressed great satisfaction at the proclamation of the Tsar. The correspondent, however, had an interview with a well-known Polish nationalist resident in Paris, a native of Russian Poland, who declared that neither M. de Wozuicki nor M. de Wyzewa is at all representative of Polish opinion. "The rich men in Poland," he said, "are nearly all hostile to the Nationalist movement; they are, in consequence, detested by the Poles as much as the Russians are." "What," the correspondent asked, "is the opinion of Polish Nationalists in general in regard to the Tsar's proclamation?" "They think it an excellent thing that the question of Poland should thus be raised before Europe, but they are quite unable to put any confidence in the promises of the Tsar, after their own experience and that of Finland. After the war between Russia and Japan the Tsar granted certain meagre liberties to Poland; they lasted only about two years, and since then Russia has oppressed Poland as much as ever. What guarantee have we that, even if the Tsar granted to Poland at the end of the present war complete autonomy, it would last any longer? The case of Finland is even worse. Finland is not a conquered country; it voluntarily accepted the rule of the Tsar, who, in return, solemnly undertook to preserve its autonomy and liberties. That solemn pledge the present Tsar has broken without the shadow of an excuse, for Finland had remained perfectly loyal. In these circumstances we can, I repeat, only regard the pledges of the Tsar as worthless." The Polish nationalist went on to say that the German and Austrian Emperors had already issued proclamations to Poland of a similar character to that of the Tsar,

Polish Comment.

of which nothing had been heard in France or England. When the German troops entered Russian Poland the other day they scattered broadcast copies of this proclamation, which were destroyed by the Poles, partly because they have no more confidence in Germany than in Russia, partly because they would have been liable to a charge of treason had the proclamation been found in their possession. He went on to say that the Austrian Poles already enjoyed all the rights and liberties that the Tsar now offered them. For about twenty years Austrian Poland has had complete local autonomy under a Governor nominally appointed by the Emperor, but practically chosen by the Poles themselves. They had, therefore, nothing to gain and everything to lose by rallying to Russia. The case of the Prussian Poles was different; they had been very badly treated by Prussia, but at least they enjoyed great commercial prosperity under Prussian rule, whereas Russian Poland was in a state of economic misery and chaos. Russia had destroyed everything. Was it possible to believe in the sincerity of the Tsar's sudden conversion? "We appeal," he said in conclusion, "to the democratic peoples of England and France not to allow us to be treated like chattels, and transferred from one allegiance to another without being consulted on the matter. A nation of twenty-five million people has a right to complete independence under rulers chosen by itself. Might it not be possible to give such independence to a reunited Poland by offering Russia compensation elsewhere (always supposing that the war ends in the defeat of Germany and Austria)? No grant of autonomy by Russia would be worth the paper on which it was written unless it were guaranteed by England and France in as solemn a manner as they have guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium."

The Prophet of Young Germany.

A brilliant series of lectures on "Germany and England" delivered in 1913 by the late Mr. J. A. Cramb, Professor of Modern History in Queen's College, London, have just now been published and they together form a rare exposition of the metaphysics of modern German thinkers and reveal the inspiration that is at the back of the German *weltpolitik*. Along the line of thought, which has found its supreme military expression in the well-known work of General Friedrich von Bernhardi, the soldier has followed in the tracks of Nietzche and Treitschke. It is to the importance of Treitschke—the historian who died in 1895—as the prophet of young Germany that Mr. Cramb directs the attention of his readers. To every German who dreams glorious dreams about the future of his country, Treitschke's teaching is a Bible. Young Germany has travelled further from the idealism of Goeth or Beethoven, the cosmopolitanism of Lessing and Schiller and the "humanity" of her later philosophers. She now dreams of power and empire. Treitschke has conjured the latest vision and Mr. Cramb thus summarises the spirit of his teaching:—"It is very well for England to protest that she has no aggressive designs against Germany; England's mere existence as an empire is a continuous aggression. So long as England, the great robber-State, retains her booty, the spoils of a world, what right has she to expect peace from the nations? England possesses everything and can do nothing. Germany possesses nothing and could do everything. What edict then, human or divine, enjoins us to sit still? For what are England's title-deeds, and by what laws does she justify her possession? By the law of valour, indeed, but also by opportunity, and violence. In the time of Roon and Möltke the attitude of Germans when the question of enmity to England was discussed was always, 'Is it possible to land a German army upon English soil? And, once landed there, how is it possible to bring it safely back again with its plunder to the shores of the Elbe and the Rhine?' What was argued was a problem of abstract strategy, rather than of political or national aim. A generation has passed. The heroes of the war of 1870 have one by one disappeared—Bismarck, Roon, Möltke, Manteuffel. That problem of strategy does still exist in Germany, but it occupies a much less prominent place than it occupied thirty or forty years ago. It seems to have solved itself during the last ten or fifteen years. It has become a secondary matter, and the quasi-historical form which the question of enmity to England now assumes in the minds of thousands of intellectual Germans is this: As the first great united action of the Germans as a people, when they became conscious of their power, was the overthrow of the Roman Empire, and ultimately, in Charlemagne and the Ottonides, the realization of the dream of Alaric—the trans-figuration of the world, the subversion of Rome, and the erection upon its ruins of a new State; so, in the twentieth century, now that Germany under the Hohenzollern has become conscious of her new life, shall her first great action be the overthrow of that empire most corresponding to the Roman Empire, which in the dawn of her history she overthrew. In German history the old Imperialism begins by the destruction of Rome. Will the new Imperialism begin by the destruction of England?" Mr. Cramb makes it clear that the incapacity of Britain is a theme which has been gradually permeating all classes of the German nation:—"England's supremacy is an unreality, her political power is as hollow as her moral virtures; the one an arrogance and pretence, the other hypocrisy. She cannot long maintain that baseless supremacy. On the sea she is rapidly being approached by other Powers; her resources, except by immigration, are almost stationary, and her very immigration debases still further her resources. Her decline is certain. There may be no war. The display of power may be enough, and England after 1900, like Venice after 1500, will gradually atrophy, sunk in torpor. An England insensibly weakened by brutalization within and the encroachments of an ever-increasing alien element, diseased or criminal, and, by concession on concession without, sinking into a subject province though nominally free, whilst Canada, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, carves out each its own destiny—such an England is easily conceived. Who is to succeed her? It may not be Germany; some Power it must be. But if Germany *were* to inherit the sceptre which is falling from her nerveless hands . . . . ?"

Germanism.

The ideal behind the young German dream of a world-power is not a mere brute dominance upheld by Prussian militarism. Mr. Cramb says:—"Treitschke has defined the aim of Germany, and Treitschke's definition, which has been taken up by his disciples, is this: That just as the greatness of Germany is to be found in the governance of Germany by Prussia, so the greatness and good of the world is to be found in the predominance there of German culture, of the German mind, in a word, of the German character. This is the ideal of Germany, and this is Germany's role as Treitschke saw it in the future. For, observe, this world-dominion of which Germany dreams is not simply a material dominion. Germany is not blind to the lessons inculcated by the Napoleonic tyranny. Force alone, violence or brute strength, by its mere silent presence or by its loud manifestation in war, may be necessary to establish this dominion; but its ends are spiritual. The triumph of the Empire will be the triumph of German culture, of the German world-vision in all the phases and departments of human life and energy, in religion, poetry, science, art, politics, and social endeavour. The characteristics of this German world-vision, the benefits which its predominance is likely to confer upon mankind, are, a German would allege, truth instead of falsehood in the deepest and gravest preoccupations of the human mind; German sincerity instead of British hypocrisy; Faust instead of Tartuffe. And whenever I have put to any of the adherents of this ideal the further question: 'Where in actual German history do you find your guarantee for the character of this spiritual empire; is not the true role of Germany cosmopolitan and peaceful; are not Herder and Goethe its prophets?' I have met with one invariable answer: 'The political history of Germany, from the accession of Frederick in 1740 to the present hour, has admittedly no meaning unless it be regarded as a movement towards the establishment of a world-empire, with the war against England as the necessary preliminary. Similarly the curve which, during the last century and a half, Germany has traced in religion and metaphysical thought, from Kant and Hegel to Schopenhauer, Strauss and Nietzsche, has not less visibly been a movement towards a newer world-religion, a newer world-faith. That fatal tendency to cosmopolitanism, to a dream-world, which Heine derided and Treitschke deplores, does, indeed, still remain, but how transfigured!'"

How Germans View the War.

Patriotic demonstrations throughout the British Empire and France go to show that the British and the French nations are practically resolved to face any sacrifice and see this war through without flinching. The reports about Germany also prove that the Germans too are inspired with similar feelings of patriotism and national resolve. The following account from the *Manchester Guardian* would serve to show that tales about indifference and half-heartedness of the German people must be taken with suspicion. A naturalised German living in London received from his brother, a medical man in Hamburg, a letter which may be said to reflect the views of his circle regarding the war. The letter, which is dated August 12, was delivered in London yesterday, having been conveyed by an American traveller returning *via* Holland and posted on Dutch soil. The writer says:—"The war here is taken with the greatest calm. We know that in the end we must win—we hope also against England. To-day, eight days after England declared war, we are still awaiting the attack by sea which was going to annihilate us. On the other hand we already have successes in France and Russia. It will be a terrible slaughter, taking away from all countries the flower of their youth, and yet nobody will gain by it. Whatever could have induced England to join is entirely incomprehensible to us. It must be envy of our commerce and fleet. Sir Edward Grey must have thought it the

opportune moment to go for us. But he miscalculated, for on the sea we are worth more than he thinks—not to mention the army. Don't believe anything your papers say. Lies are told to any extent. Only with us the truth prevails. Later on you will learn the inner history of the war. "If we broke Belgian neutrality it was a natural necessity, because France had already commenced to march into Belgium, against which action neither England nor Belgium made any protest. But we anticipated this, as on August 7 we took Liège. The map after the war will look somewhat different. As for the Russian rabble, we do not trouble it at all. Their preparations for war will take another two months, while we have already marched towards the east. My son and nephew have repeatedly presented themselves as volunteers, but had to be refused owing to the great overflow of offers of service. Two other doctors and I are going to offer ourselves next week, but there again the overflow is so enormous that we have little chance." The doctor's sister, also writing to her brother in London, says: "We are getting on very well after the first terrible excitement has passed. When your compatriots declared war on us last week I thought: 'They will soon be at Heligoland, and then it will be all over with us, but you know that is not so. On the contrary we are all in good spirits. Nothing will happen to us. Never has there been such unity in the whole nation, even including the Social Democrats. With laughing and singing, the soldiers pass our doors all day long. It is touching to us to see them in such a right mood. I am keeping the newspapers from August 1 for you to see how true the facts were as conveyed by them. I hope you do not suffer too much from the increase in the price of food. When shall we hear from you? Not, I suppose, until a fugitive brings you a letter."

German Official News.

Almost all the ordinary German and Austrian postal and telegraphic communications with the outside world being cut off, the official German versions of the progress of the war are being circulated through the German wireless stations. They are received by the Marconi Company and are published by many English papers. A Berlin message circulated, on August 24, announced a great German victory in Lorraine. It stated:—"The troops commanded by the Crown Prince of Bavaria followed up their successes in Lorraine by crossing the Luneville-Blamont-Cirey line. The 21st Army Corps entered Luneville to-day. The pursuit of the French is beginning to bear rich fruits for in addition to the large number of prisoners and banners taken our left wing, now penetrating in the Vosges, has captured 150 guns. The Crown Prince's army is moving in the direction of Longwy. Troops commanded by Duke Albrecht of Wurtemberg are advancing on both sides of Neufchateau, where they completely defeated a French army which had advanced through the Semois. Our troops are proceeding towards Maubeuge to the west of the Meuse. They encountered an English cavalry brigade and defeated them. The Austrian army is making a successful advance into the interior of Servia, which is now hard pressed on all sides owing to the heavy losses they have suffered. It is stated that there is panic in Nish, and that large numbers of fugitives are moving in the direction of the Bulgarian frontier town. A similar message circulated on 25th August instead the following statements: "The Emperor Francis Joseph has given orders to the Austro Hungarian battleship "Kaiserin Elisabeth" to participate in battle at Tsing-tau. It is reported from Constantinople that Turkish students arriving there from England describe the situation in that country as bad Opposition to the war is growing, and rebellion is feared among the working classes. The Kaiser has granted 5,000 mark towards the municipal fund for the relief of Berlin unemployed. Twelve guns, together with gun carriages and ammunition carts captured by Bavarian troops from the French, have been brought to Kalsruhe and placed in the palace yard." Some of these official statements should, of course, be tested on the principles indicated elsewhere.

Discontent with French Official News.

The English papers received by the last mail, however, leave little room for doubt that the French offensive in Lorraine met with a breakdown of a serious character attended with disastrous results. The Germans claimed that they had taken 10,000 French prisoners, with 150 guns, though the French official statement declared that the French losses had been exaggerated. However, as a correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* stated, many military experts were of opinion that the advance in Lorraine, like the first advance on Mulhouse, had been conducted in a way that had made it unlikely to be successful. M Gervais, the senator, stated in the *Matin* that one of the chief causes of the reverse was the precipitate flight of part of the 15th Army Corps, composed of contingents from Toulon, Antikas, Marseilles and Aix-en-Provences. At the same time the *suppressio veri* practised by the military authorities, at least in the earlier phases of the war, was being severely criticised by the press. It began to be generally believed that the first occupation of Mulhouse was entirely misrepresented and that it was, in fact, an error which cost very dearly. **There was a strong feeling in Paris that truth should be told about events that were over. In particular the refusal of the authorities to give any particulars in regard to French casualties was much criticised. The result was that all sorts of rumours, often, no doubt, exaggerated, were current and that the public confidence in the official information was gravely impaired. Papers of such different colours as the *Temps* and the *Humanite* agreed in saying that the Government was making a great mistake in treating the French people like children and withholding from them the truth about any unpleasant occurrence. M. Clemenceau, who had consistently protested against the obscurantist policy, returned to the charge with a vigorous article in his paper, the *Homme Libre*. He demanded that the Press Bureau at the Ministry of War should be "turned out neck and crop." "If," said M. Clemenceau, "he continues likes this, M. Messimy will end by provoking a very disagreeable movement of public opinion and will at the same time discredit the Government abroad, where people will cease to believe us when we claim a success." The military authorities had taken the extraordinary step of prohibiting the sale of English newspapers in Paris. The result was that the French readers who were accustomed to buy English papers imagined that they contained some terrible information that had been concealed from the French public.**

Field Marshal von der Goltz on the War.

Field Marshal Von der Goltz, formerly the reorganiser of the Ottoman army and recently appointed Military Governor of Brussels, is one of the most distinguished living German soldiers. In the *Tag* he discusses the lessons of the present war. He begins by emphasising the value of German military discipline and then passes on to the fire-training of the infantry. He says:—"It seems that under anything like equal conditions we can be certain of superiority in fire. We were convinced of that before the war, and needed only the confirmation of experience. That has come in the most decisive fashion. In the East, the Russian cavalry has been frightened by its experiences from raiding into East and West Prussia. It was often said that the six Russian cavalry divisions which always stood on the frontier on a war footing, would immediately on the outbreak of war sweep across the province to the Frischer Haff, destroy the railways, and bring our advance to confusion. The frontier brigades could help them greatly in this enterprise. Nothing of the kind has happened, and the first dangerous period is over. Apparently the Russian cavalry is not disposed to ride into such a sure fire as that which our infantry, with their admirable weapon, can deliver. I ought to explain how it has happened that our infantry has even captured the Russian guns, as at Bialla. They were left under our long-distance fire, just as the English batteries were at the Tugela. The cavalry, thinking only of their own safety, left them in the lurch. Hitherto no proper appreciation existed of such fire-effects. It is satisfactory that even our Landwehr has fought so finely and proved itself better than the Russian line. The same picture is revealed on the Western frontier; the fights at Mulhausen and Lagarde, where we captured many cannons, machine guns, and prisoners, prove that our enemies are inferior in personal qualities, military discipline, and training. That is an advantage, which will endure and be worth much. Less weight should be attached to the reports of bad feeding and inadequate lodging which deserters have brought us. Still, it can be taken for granted that the feeding, especially of the Russians, cannot be anything so well organised as with us. It is doubtful whether that will change. Supply is easier in the early war days than when the great armies have crossed the frontier. The most important incident is the fall of Liège. It is not a first class fortress like Toul or Belfort, but it was thought out of the question that such a place could be taken by storm without a regular siege. It is now certain that the equipment of our field army in artillery is adequate for such enterprises, and this gives us good hopes for the outcome of the approaching struggles round the French frontier fortresses."**

An A. B. C. to the Guns.

As a rule, Indians have little knowledge of the types, powers and ranges of the various infernal military weapons that are used in dealing death in modern warfare and a brief account of modern artillery which we take from a military writer would no doubt be interesting to our readers. Modern armies are complex organisations, and this applies with equal force to the artillery with which a modern army is equipped. The types of guns to be found with a modern field army are machine guns, horse artillery guns, field artillery guns, field artillery howitzers, heavy guns and mountain guns; and in this war all types are bearing their share in the fighting which is taking place in such varied terrain. Machine guns are automatic guns of rifle calibre, capable of delivering a heavy, rapid fire; they are attached to infantry battalions, as well as to cavalry regiments; and in the infantry they render the closest possible co-operation with their own unit at the final stages of the fire-fight, acting as a real reserve of fire in the unit commander's hand, to use by surprise as the crisis approaches, so as to ensure that fire supremacy is gained, and that the bayonet can be brought into play. Given suitable targets (of considerable depth) and close ranges, these weapons are capable of great results, but they are unsuited to a long drawn out frontal fire-fight against a shallow target. Horse

artillery guns are the most mobile of all guns in the field; they are intended to co-operate with cavalry. Naturally what these guns gain in mobility they lose in power, and in the latter they are distinctly inferior to our powerful field artillery guns, which are intended for co-operation with the infantry. By controlling the hostile artillery fire, their field-guns enable the infantry to advance across the helpless zone, when the infantry could be fired at by hostile guns without having the power to respond. In addition, the field-guns prepare a position for assault; and, finally, they assist the assault by battering down the enemy's final resistance, shaking his aim, and destroying his reserves as they show themselves. Thus all through the action the field artillery guns act as the good comrades of their infantry, and the greater the difficulties of their infantry the closer is the support accorded by their own quick-firing field-guns. The field artillery howitzers are short, light pieces of mobile artillery, capable of throwing a comparatively heavy shell at high angles of elevation. Their rôle is to search the reverse slopes of hills, deal with redoubts, trenches, shielded field-guns, villages, and houses, and support an assault until the last moment. Heavy field howitzers—firing a 500lb. high explosive shell, such as the Japanese used at Port Arthur—do not accompany an army in the field, but are sent to the front when necessity for their employment arises. The material effect produced by one of their shells exploding in any confined space, room, casemate, &c., is prodigious, and cover to keep out their fire is rarely worth the labour of construction, except in the case of magazines. But in line of battle these powerful weapons have not proved so successful, as the targets are less favourable and the slight modern field entrenchments are notoriously difficult to injure. Heavy artillery are the most powerful and the least mobile of all forms of artillery accompanying our field army. Their use is to destroy defended buildings, knock out shielded field-guns by direct hits, to deliver an enfilade fire against part of the enemy's position that the less powerful field-guns can only reach with frontal fire, and to mete out destruction to the enemy's reserves before they can be engaged. Mountain artillery consist of very light and less powerful weapons; but they fire a comparatively heavy shell. Mountain artillery can move wherever an infantryman is not forced to climb; and in the rough, mountainous country which forms part of the present theatre of war doubtless these guns must be playing a useful part. All the guns mentioned—except the machine guns, which naturally fire rifle ammunition—use shrapnel shell, the man-killer; whilst howitzers and heavy guns also fire high-explosive shell, the defence-destroyer. Shrapnel is fired with the idea of killing or disabling the troops themselves; the material damage it does to a parapet is infinitesimal, while even a direct hit by it on the shield of a gun may inflict little damage. On the other hand, a shrapnel hitting a wall will usually penetrate before bursting, and if it is then inside a room the releasing of its 200 bullets may have disastrous effects on the garrison. But it is shrapnel which kills, and it is used primarily as a man-killer, and not as a defence destroyer. Its bullet-cone has great depth, covering 200 yards when burst properly in the air by a time-fuse at effective ranges; and thus for enfilading a fire trench, flanking a position, raking a bridge or stretch of road, the effect produced by shrapnel on a line of troops or a marching column is excellent, and its moral effect deadly. High-explosive shell is an aerial mine, projected by a heavy gun or howitzer, to burst either in the air or on impact. The effect of a direct hit by one of these shells on the shield of a field-gun is disastrous both for the gun and for the detachment; it is much the same also when one pitches in a house the wreckage is considerable, and the number of splinters in such a confined space has great effect. Prominent houses can be rendered quite untenable by high-explosive shell fire in a very short time. But against the modern low-command fire trench parapets the effect is very slight; in fact, the material obstacle presented by a modern parapet is usually so small that it is not worth destroying or breaching, and thus energy is concentrated on disabling the defenders, and as a man-killer the high explosive is not a great success in the open, its radius of activity is too small—only 25 yards around the centre of impact. But although it is said that artillery frightens more than it hits, it must be remembered that accurate statistics are very difficult to get, and men hit by shrapnel bullets and splinters of shell are more often killed outright than wounded, and after action the dead are buried hurriedly, no note being taken of how the casualty occurred, whereas accurate records are always made of patients who undergo hospital treatment.

How to Test The News.

Most people find it difficult, for want of proper care and method, to follow intelligently what is happening in the various theatres of war. Now that correspondents, except for a very small number, have been removed from the Allied armies—and even those who are there are certainly far from the front—we are thrown back mainly for each day's news on the official reports from the various sides, and it may be useful, therefore, to mention some general principles by which the truth, or a measure of it, may be extracted from them. We may leave the British official announcements out of the question altogether, since for the most part they have made no attempt to give more than a bare outline of what has happened in some quarters of the field, and nothing could be said against them except that they have been rather meagre, of which no one will complain. The French, German, and Russian reports have been much fuller, and for the most part, they tell only part of the truth—that part, in short, which it suits the convenience of the General Staff to tell,—and it is only possible to discover what has really happened by carefully comparing the various reports and observing not only what is said but also what is not said. The silences and reticences of official reports are almost as valuable to the seeker after truth as positive information. Roughly speaking the reader may assume, when he begins to compare official reports, that they give positive informations as to successes gained, with a tendency to exaggerate their importance and that they omit to mention reverses, or say very little about them, or attempt to minimise and explain them away. Every Staff is anxious to announce its victories. It will certainly not under-estimate them, but it is not likely to exaggerate them too far, because sooner or later the public and the army will learn the truth, and an unpleasant reaction will follow. The *Manchester Guardian* says:—"It is possible to test the assertions of victory by the details which are given. When the German official report says that the Bavarians advancing through the Vosges have captured 150 guns and taken 10,000 prisoners we may believe that they have exaggerated the numbers, but we may be quite sure that the victory has been a substantial one. We may be sure also that since large numbers of guns have been abondoned the French retreat was not as deliberate and orderly as that which took place in the great battle on Sunday and Monday along the Sambre and Meuse. So, too, the Servian official report of the battle with the Austrians shows pretty conclusively, by its detailed list of captures, that the Austrian defact was very severe." Reverses, for the most part, will not be freely admitted in the report of the side which has lost or, if admitted, will be treated as lightly as is possible. "Our Paris correspondent," says the *Manchester Guardian*, "mentioned the discontent now arising in Paris because of the suppression of unpleasant news. Then there is the silence of Germany as to the Russian advance. The Russians have described in great details their victories in East Prussia. The details themselves bear the stamp of truth, but any doubt that might be on the subject is resolved by the fact that the German official reports contain no mention of the battle of Gumbinnen. The German Staff that is, has thought it inadvisable to tell the public of the German defeat in East Prussia, so confirming the impression that it was really substantial. The same point is illustrated by the reference in the French official reports to the failure of the great offensive movement in Belgium. The failure is, of course, admitted, but its importance to the campaign as a whole is understated. More remarkable still is the total omission of any mention of the fall of Namur. Then there is the point that the French, finding themselves in the face of greatly superior numbers, were yet able to draw off in good time and order and without heavy losses of men and guns. That is a very considerable achievement, and shows that the *morale* of the French army remains quite good, but the importance of it can only be guessed by reading between the lines of the French and German reports. The German report, too, is significant in its reticence. Of the French army in the Semois Valley it only says that it was 'completely defeated.' It gives no details, describes no captures. From this, and from the fact that almost nothing else is said as to the furious fighting along the lines of the Sambre and Meuse, we may argue with some confidence that the Germans suffered pretty heavily, and were not able to press hard on the heels of the retreating Allies. We find this impression confirmed when we turn to the French reports; of the British portion of the front we know it to be true." It is not difficult to lay down some general rules for the reader to apply when he sits down to compare the official reports of the Continental Powers. 1. Above all, he should note the places at which the armies, or part of the armies, are said to have arrived, or fighting has taken place, or firing has been heard, or scouts have been seen. Whatever the reports may say about victories and defeats, the ebb and flow of battle cannot be concealed if places are definitely named at which fighting takes place day by day. 2. The small details of reports, especially the capture of guns, deserve special attention. The retreating force may claim that its withdrawal is purely strategic and that it has even achieved a "moral victory," but if we find that it has left twenty or thirty guns behind it, we know positively that it has left its positions in haste and has been in danger of being cut off by the pressure of the enemy's advance. 3. The silence of A's official report as to a movement which we already know to be in progress generally means that A has so far no success to announce; if, in addition to A's silence, B claims a success, there is almost certainly something in it. 4. All retreats which are alleged to be due not to the pressure of the enemy, but to the spontaneous desire of the retreating army to take up a better position are to be regarded with suspicion. 5. In general, the truth will lie at some point to be ascertained between the reports of the sides announcing respectively victory and defeat. News from Russian and Servian sources should be taken with a considerable pinch of salt—unless they are confirmed through independent testimony.

War and Peace.

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[We specially commend to the British Nation, no less renowned for the victories of peace than for those of war, the following poem sent to us by our distinguished contributor Nawab Nizamat Jung, of Hyderabad, whose loyal tribute of verse to Great Britain will, we feel sure, be no less welcome to her than other offerings from India's dutiful sons.—Editor.]

A hundred toilsome years have rolled in vain
Since one proud eagle drooped his shattered wings:
Another rises—and the welkin rings
With the mad cry "For Glory" once again!

And legions rush through carnage to attain
Some fancied good that blood-stained Conquest brings.
Is it the boast of Councils and of Kings,
O God! to triumph over millions' pain?

Guardians of Good! Ye Nations of the West!
Shall Mind still worship brute Force deified?
'Tis Mind not Force doth Nations' worth attest:
Force died with Rome—high Thought hath outlived Greece!
Be thine O England! thine the nobler pride
To win true Glory with the arts of Peace!

—NIZAMAT JUNG.

The Comrade.

"Fight to a Finish."—I.

It should be obvious even to the meanest intelligence that behind the awful stresses, desolation and horror of the present conflict in Europe lie the hungers, passions, desires, no less than the thought-energy and a sort of morbid spirituality of a whole generation. The battlefields are to furnish the last physical test of the ambition or a series of ambitions that is to survive and dominate—at best for a few future decades. The world will soon learn to console itself that the crude, stark physical stroke achieved by gun and muscle is the ultimate moral verdict of humanity and the measure of right and justice. Such has been the way of history. It is not our purpose to see if there exists any vital moral principle in the affairs of man that is not dependent for its excellence on supreme military efficiency or organised and irresistible "will to power." A nation in the hour of victory has every excuse to feel that its success is the result of its superior culture, and higher "cause" as much as of its armed might. Such illusions have been the mainsprings of human actions that have wrought fateful events and supplied heat and energy for the movements which are generally summed up as the "progress of the world."

The world is face to face with just such an epoch; it is assisting at the birth of events which may altogether change the course of history. We need not speak of the frightful material waste that this gigantic crash would involve. For such inevitable sacrifices the teeth of the combatants are grimly set. We look beyond the visible desolation and ruin to the infinitely more painful though invisible travail of the human spirit and the probable changes of mood and temper with which men would set themselves to mould afresh into a coherent dream the shattered fragments of the hopes and purposes of the race. In order to know how Europe would emerge out of the war it is necessary to know how it has entered it. Every combatant is fighting for a "cause," and is primed with all too sufficient reason and motive for the fight. The stakes are heavy indeed. The prizes must to all appearances be great. The whole subject is worth a brief examination. That a new Europe will emerge out of the fire, there can be no question. What that Europe will be depends on the character of the winning side, or rather on the purposes and ambitions of the class that controls the will of the victors.

We need not pause to consider what will happen to Europe if victory is on the side of the Germanic Powers. We can not calculate the quality of the Germanic impact with the subdued peoples of Western Europe, for Germanism is still an unmeasured and unexploited offer. Even if the German people may not be the German Kaiser, and the Kaiser may not be as he has been painted within the last few weeks, German culture is still a fruit that has not yet flourished beyond its habitat and we have little ground to judge whether it will retain its innate relish out of the Fatherland. To say this, however, is not to imply that Germany has no faith in her "cause." She believes in herself, in her mission, in the supreme beauty and power of her culture, in the justice of her fight against her foes. The *Cologne Gazette*, one of the most powerful organs of German opinion, declared on August 4 that every dweller in the farthest hut of the German forests should realise that a great "culture" State, "despite its abounding strength, strides forward with modesty and dignity and with the full pride of the sword-grit man into the struggle for the defence of his holy possession."

But we must take the more calculable position that ultimate victory will rest with the Allies and the task of reshaping Europe will fall to the united efforts of France, Russia and England. It must be observed that the Allies are naturally full of a set determination and have no doubt as to the final issue. What France and England are fighting for has not lacked in discussion in the public press of both the countries, and it would be interesting to trace through the enormous mass of writing of all description the spirit of the fight and the ends they have in view.

We begin with the most authoritative view expounded about the war by the Prime Minister of England. Mr. Asquith is a level-headed statesman, constitutionally averse to displays of rhetoric, but his utterances about the war have been charged with deep and concentrated passion. In his memorable speech in the House of Commons he said: "If I am asked what we are fighting for I can reply in two sentences. In the first place, to fulfil a solemn international obligation. . . . . I say secondly, that we are fighting to vindicate the principle in these days when material force sometimes seems to be the dominant influence and factor in the development of mankind, that small nationalities are not to be crushed in defiance of international good faith at the arbitrary will of a strong and overmastering Power." These words breathe a lofty aim, and if war is ever justifiable, it would not be condemned on the score of wantonness for such a cause.

But Mr. Asquith's pronouncement is based on the diplomatic issues which have furnished the immediate cause for the struggle. Thought and opinion in non-official circles have ranged far and wider afield and there is no limit to the points of view in which English papers and Englishmen of varying shades of opinion and intellectual eminence regard the war. The most popular belief is that this war has been undertaken to smash German militarism which is a perpetual menace to the liberties and peace of Europe. There have of course been subtler, broader, that is to say, philosophical varients of this theme. The most striking feature of the mass of opinion is the sympathy and support for the war shown by the school of thought headed by Mr. H. G. Wells. Mr. Wells has all his life been a socialogical thinker of rare originality and merit who has always looked upon war as a wicked, vulgar and brutal waste of human resources. Just now he has been writing perfervidly in the Press and using all his gifts of word and reasoning to convince the world that this war must be fought bravely and cheerfully as it would "end war." He is against Prussianism, Bernhardi-ism, against the whole theory and practice of the Empire of the Germans. He says that "Prussianism took its mortal wound at the first outset before the trenches of Liège. We begin a "new period of history." It is not Germany that has been defeated, he says; Germany is still an unconquered country. "Indeed, now it is a released country. It is a country glorious in history and with a glorious future. But never more after this war has ended will it march to the shout of the Prussian drill sergeant and strive to play bully to the world. . . . Never more will the harshness of Berlin overshadow the great and friendly civilisation of southern and western Germany. The work before a world in arms is to clean off the Prussian blue from the life and spirit of mankind." He says that no European country has any quarrel with Germany. The British quarrel is with the Empire of the Germans—not with a people, but with an idea. As regards the recasting of the map of Europe, "there may be restorations of alien territory—Polish, French, Danish, Italian; but we have seen enough of racial subjugation now to be sure that we will tolerate no more of it. From the Rhine to East Prussia and from the Baltic to the southern limits of German-speaking Austria, the Germans are one people. Let us begin with the resolution to permit no new bitterness of 'conquered territories' to come into existence to disturb the future peace of Europe. Let us see to it that at the ultimate settlement the Germans, however great this overthrow may be, are all left free men."

All Englishmen of deep conviction and broad judgment, who regard this war as necessary and just, adopt towards its causes, its moral implications and results more or less the attitude of Mr. Wells. They feel admiration for Germany as a civilising Power and pay handsome tributes to her influence in the world of thought. They wish to bring the militarist German Empire to an end, but have no desire to enslave the German people. They regard this struggle as a war against war and hope that it would end by breaking the curse which for *more* than a generation has been blighting civilisation—the curse of military oppression, which has arrested progress, poisoned morality, sucked the life out of religion, made a mock of every human ideal, and filled the heart of millions of men with the basest of passions. They even think that they are fighting *for* the German people, who themselves would be delivered from the militarist bondage by the overthrow of Prussianism.

But these are the views of the peace-loving idealists, who recognise in this war a hateful necessity imposed on Europe. Is it reasonable to suppose that their views of the ultimate settlement would prevail when, according to the *Times*, the war has been fought to the finish and Germany has been "beaten to her knees?" Their views never weighed an ounce with the real masters of the destines of the peoples of Europe who had built up the armaments and reared the Balance of Power, and who will surely suffer no outside advisers to intervene when they together set themselves to rear again a new "Balance" over the ashes of the old: It is all their doing—this awful European muddle. They have made the war and they will see to it that no alien dog barks and embarrasses them in redrawing the European map when the war is over. It is primarily their business. How they brought this crisis about we need not pause to consider. How they mean to end it is easily manifest from the hints which their henchmen in the press have already begun to make.

"Germany should be beaten to her knees"! This gives a glimpse of the spirit that fills the majority of the persons who exercise the real directing influence over the decisions of the men of power in Western Europe. And what does the demand mean? It means simply that the war must not end until German warships are sunk, her fortresses razed to the ground, her army disbanded, her munitions destroyed, her military and civil authorities responsible for this war are shot or exiled, her territories dismembered and the

whole people left to grieve for national loss in deep pain and humiliation. Will this end future war? It will be the surest way to bind a proud and great nation in the hour of her terrible fall to a grim resolve for sure and swift *revanche*. The curse of militarism would fall heavier over Europe. Another Armaggedon will descend over the groaning nations before many years are past, and cause another deluge of human blood—for the sake of peace! If small nations have a right to freedom and independence and life, great nations have surely the same title and cannot be permanently thwarted or suppressed. The ultimate settlement after the war would finally show whether it was a just war or a new form of aggression under various pleasing and peaceful disguises. Europe with all that it stands for is on its trial. It cannot recover its former position. Will it attain to a better or a worse position after the bloodiest war of history is over? That is the question.

"The Choice of the Turks."

"War is Deceit," says the Arabic proverb, and the English saying, "Everything is fair in Love and War", not only supports it, but extends it by pointing out the analogy between the opposite passions of love and hatred. The justification for deceit in love may or may not be quite clear, but the necessity for it in war is obvious. The object of war is to destroy the power of the enemy by causing him the maximum amount of harm at the minimum cost to ourselves. In primitive times reliance may have been placed entirely on force for the destruction or subjugation of the enemy; but it must soon have dawned even upon primitive man that cunning sometimes succeeds quite as well as courage, and that skill is no less effective in a struggle than strength. Leadership makes all the difference between two armies of equal strength, and often a well led but smaller army scores a success against badly led hordes that lack nothing in the way of dash and determination. And it is not without its significance that strategy, or military leadership, and stratagem, or wile, have one and the same derivation.

The point is in fact too obvious to be laboured; but what we desire to explain is that stratagems have their use not only on the field of battle when war has begun, but also in the Chancelleries before and during a war. It is not sufficient for a nation to make no strategic mistakes in the course of a campaign. It must not also commence a campaign with political mistakes of any importance nor commit them in the course of that campaign. Mr. W. S. Blunt tells us in his "Secret History of the British Occupation of Egypt" that the late Sir Auckland Colvin, who had unceasingly worked for the forcible intervention of Great Britain in the internal difficulties of Egypt and had denied himself all rest and many comforts during some weeks preceding the bombardment of Alexandria, went to sleep immediately after boarding the British man-o'-war and the commencement of the bombardment, and slept the sleep of peace in spite of the cannonading. Now the Chancelleries of nations at war with each other cannot afford to enjoy the sleep of the just in similar circumstances. When diplomatists bent upon war have worked up the passions of the people to the pitch necessary for their purpose, and the first acts of war have in consequence already occurred, leaving not even a "sporting" chance for an early re-establishment of peace, they do not go to bed with an easy conscience and the satisfaction of having done their duty. They work all the more in order to reap for their country or their party the full harvest of benefits which they anticipate from the war. A Foreign Minister has seldom a shorter day than one of eight hours even in the piping times of peace. But when the drums of Mars drown the music of the pipes of Pan, the Foreign Minister is extremely lucky, if not extremely lazy, who can get eight hours in the day and night that he can call his own. It is not only the army that has a Great General Staff. Diplomacy too has its General Staff, and its Napoleon or Moltke. It is not only the battle-field but the bureau of foreign affairs also that has its strategy and its tactics. The object of war, as we have stated, being to destroy the power of the enemy by causing him the maximum of harm at the minimum cost to ourselves, what could be a better strategy for effecting this purpose than to induce one of our neighbours to fight our battles, or, at least, to share our risk and travail? The object of the invitation is not exactly identical, but nevertheless many a message is sent by the Spider to the Fly, begging in the sweetest possible manner that the Fly should forsake the freedom of its neutrality and enter the Spider's snug little parlour of belligerency. In this the greatest struggle since the dawn of the world at which it is our privilege or misfortune to "assist," it could not be that neutral nations could escape the blandishments of the belligerents. Every State that is still fancy free must have her maiden meditations constantly disturbed by the attentions of militant suitors. Appeals to wordly interest must be succeeding those to mere sentiment, and flattery must be following in the footsteps of reminders of long devotion.

The two Powers most persistently sought after to-day are Italy and Turkey, and it is an object-lesson in persuasiveness to watch the efforts of Alliance and Entente to secure their consent. The struggle for the hand of Great Britain did not last very long. That was an easy elopement. The Teuton's engagement-ring cast off by Italy was soon after placed by the Slav and the Celt on the finger of Britain, and within a day or two exchanged for one still more binding in its significance. But Germany and Austria did not for a long time lose all hope of bringing Italy to the fulfilment of her plighted troth, while the Entente Group of Powers has even to-day lively expectations of inducing the jilt to say to the "Wilt thou?" of the priest a half reluctant but effectively binding "I will." Turkey, hated and oppressed all her life by one of the Entente trio, neglected and in practice deprived of her rights by the other two since the eighties of the last century, spoliated by two of the Alliance Powers and only flirted and played with by the third, all of a sudden discovers herself to be a person whose affections are of some consequence and are neither to be slighted nor altogether taken for granted. She has to be won, and therefore to be wooed, or, at least, to be persuaded to believe that the hated rivals at any rate are no proper match for her. The whirligig of time brings many changes, but a change of sentiment from hatred or utter estrangement to love cannot be so easily effected. It needs much persuasion and a world of tact. We have been told—and we have ourselves seen enough to be convinced of it—that German diplomacy is "stupid." Of Sir Edward Grey's diplomacy we desire to say nothing at present, and, in fact, can say nothing at any time except this that, like the man who had caught a Tartar, his tact has captivated the Tartar of Muscovy. There has so far been no other opportunity for the display of his diplomacy if we may consider the debtor and creditor sides of his account as cancelling each other when, after having proudly preserved the "Peace of Europe" for eight long years, he finds his country plunged in a war of unparalleled proportions. To-day we are concerned entirely with the tactful *Times* and its retailing of tact—in two qualities.

To take the case of Italy. Macaulay in his Essay on Machiavelli says that while ruder nations usually attained their ends by hard blows, among the polished Italians everything was done by superiority of intelligence. Their very wars, more pacific than the peace of their neighbours, required rather civil than military qualifications. Hence, while courage was the point of honour in other countries, ingenuity became the point of honour in Italy. Lest we should be held responsible for traducing this gifted artistic nation, and come under the lash of the custodians of law, let us repeat that the author of these observations was Macaulay, once Law Member of the Government of India and—what is perhaps more significant—the author of a still more tremendous judgment on the Province of the Lower Ganges. Well, the *Times* evidently needed all its tact in the effort to persuade Italy to tie herself to a new suitor so soon after disentangling herself from a prior attachment. We do not blame the *Times* for the effort, for it is the most natural thing for that journal to do after its sweeping success in converting the Liberal Party and some members of the Labour Party also in England to the foreign policy of the Tories. Never was success more complete and never did a journal organise a political campaign with more skill and efficiency. Whatever our own opinion about the genesis of the war and its "responsibilities," we must frankly recognise that the policy of the present war is to-day the national policy of Great Britain, and so long as she is one of the belligerents it is the duty of every loyal subject of His Majesty at least to refrain from all acts which may in any manner and to any degree embarrass His Majesty's Government in conducting this war to a successful issue. But because we are convinced that in no way will our own words uttered in an obscure corner of the world influence the Government and people of Italy, we venture to point out the contrast between the *Times'* manner in dealing with the two neutral States, Italy and Turkey.

The terms of the Triple Alliance have never been published. Hence it may be that in declaring her neutrality in this war, and not throwing in her lot with her old Allies, Italy has *not* looked upon the treaty with Austria and Germany as a mere "scrap of paper" as the German Chancellor regards the treaty concerning Belgian neutrality, and as a bit of faded writing scrawled a generation ago, as at least one English journal characterised the treaty of Alliance renewed only a couple of years ago, but that, on the contrary, she has adhered to it to the letter. So much about honour. As regards her interests, the moment she created for herself commitments in the Tripolitan littoral along the southern coast of the Mediterranean we were convinced that the Triple Alliance was dead and that thenceforward only the Dual Alliance of Austria and Germany remained. Her navy, which was her chief attraction for her Allies, could not assist them in the Mediterranean and the Adriatic against England and France without placing her occupation of the Tripolitan littoral in jeopardy. Now that she is not assisting them, she

may just as well make a bid for *Italia Irredenta* and redeem it by force of arms. A better opportunity is certainly not likely to recur. This may not have the appearance of altruism, but after the acquisition of Tripoli she should not find that to be an insurmountable obstacle even if her diplomats cannot devise a neat formula to garnish her greed. Possibly she is only waiting to see on which side the Cat of Fortune jumps, and though, for all the apologia of the *Times*, "her own time" may not suit the Entente Powers equally well as now and to-day, it seems certain that Italy would under no circumstances fight on the side of the Hapsburgs. The *Times* has, therefore, adopted a well considered and appropriate method of first defending Italy with much apparent warmth against criticisms upon her inaction in the present war, which, according to that journal, "do not make allowances for the difficulties of the position in which the sudden outbreak of hostilities has placed her," and then asking her to reflect "what would be the consequences to her prestige and to her power were these (the British and the French) Fleets to liberate the Slavs over against her coasts, and even the Italians of Dalmatia and of Istria while she stood idly by". We have not the least doubt that, as the *Times* says, her old Allies have made her alluring offers, but she has obviously refused to be allured. She hastened to declare her neutrality. "What more could she have done," asks the *Times*. "In what other way could she have met with propriety the "immediate needs of the situation? Was it reasonable to expect "that she would have forthwith assailed her Allies before any "of her own interests were directly menaced? What judgment "would her self-respect have pronounced upon such action?" Now, while we offer to the *Times* our humble tribute of admiration for such a subtle preamble to the final appeal to Italy's sense of her "deep and vital interest" which should "bring her, of her own free will and "as mistress of her own destinies, into line with them (England and "France) in the present struggle," we cannot help remarking that though the argument and the manner are characteristic of the *Times*, they do not accord well with the utterances of Ministers of the Crown such as Mr. Asquith and the writings of such leaders of thought as Mr. H. G. Wells, whose sincerity is obvious to everybody no matter what he thinks himself about the genesis of the war.

However, we did not set out to judge, but only to compare and to contrast. Let us now turn to the tact displayed by the *Times* in trying to help the Turk to make his choice. Although we have already expressed it as our emphatic opinion that from the Turk's own point of view—after all the only point of view that the Turk could appreciate—it is better that he should maintain the strictest neutrality in the present struggle, it is with a pang of regret that we peruse the *Times* article on "The Choice of the Turk" and fail to find the least trace of the possible existence of a third alternative besides the two, neutrality and support of Germany—the alternative of supporting the Ally of the Crimean War and of the Berlin Conference. To the extent that the Turk has wantonly destroyed the capital of goodwill that stood to his credit in England in the days of Palmerston, of the "Great Elchi" and of Disraeli, he stands guilty and condemned. But how many Mussalmans are convinced that not an iota of responsibility lies at the door of England of fanatical Gladstone, of cynical Salisbury, of sleepy Lowther, and of a whole host of present day Ministers, both of the silent and the blabbing varieties, for the deplorable estrangement of to-day? But let that pass. This is not the time to apportion praise or blame. We have launched our bark on this perilous sea for another and a more practical purpose. Whosoever may have been responsible for the present state of Anglo-Turkish relations, we desire that instead of there being no trace of a possibility of Turkey throwing in her lot with the English there should, at least be no trace of the possibility of her throwing in her lot with the enemies of England. But for that, is the tact of the *Times*—the other quality—the most effective method?

While every allowance has been made for "the difficulties of the position in which the sudden outbreak of hostilities has placed Italy", is there none that the Turk deserves for the difficulties of *his* position? From every source available to us we have ascertained that, as every sane person would do, the Turk desires nothing better than peace for at least a decade. If ever war was sudden, it was the Balkan War. If ever war found a nation wholly unprepared it was the Turks in October 1910. If ever war was absolutely unrighteous it was the one waged by the Balkan Allies. If ever the sword was thrust into a people's hands it was thrust into the hands of the Osmanlis on that occasion. If ever war was waged brutally it was waged by the robber bands of the Balkans whether they were the Komitadjis or formed part of the regular troops of the Allies. If ever a treaty was treated as a mere "scrap of paper" it was the Treaty of Berlin. And if ever a judge was guilty of gross partiality it was the Powers to whom Turkey appealed repeatedly in her need and appealed invariably in vain. Practically the whole of Belgium has been overrun by the Germans and is now in German occupation. But Germany has not yet annexed Belgium as Italy had "annexed" Tripoli before she had even occupied it. Germany in her last war against France had occupied Paris and captured Belfort. But the Treaty of Luxembourg did not leave a German garrison at Belfort much less cede Paris to Germany as the Treaty of London would have left a Bulgarian garrison in Adrianople even before it was taken, in fact ceded Salonika to Greece, although it was occupied through some treachery without a shot having been fired, and would have also ceded Constantinople if the Tchataldja lines had not provided extensive graveyards for Bulgarian assailants of Europe and had not the disinterestedness and generosity of Russia and Greece and, in fact, of the whole of Europe totally failed them when faced by the idea of a Bulgarian occupation of ancient Byzantium which they considered as their own destined prey. Providence in its inscrutable ways caused discord between the Allies and the bandits quarrelled over the booty. The *Grandes Puissances* that had only fifteen years ago turned back the Turk from the gate of Athens became the *Grandes Impuissances* and could not make Roumania abate an iota of its shamelessly unjust demands on Bulgaria, nor save a shred of their great creation, the Treaty of London, from being torn up at Bukharest. Because Austria threatened the "Peace of Europe," Servia—"little Servia" of the great victory of Shabatz—was cleared out of Durazzo and the formula of protecting small nations was improvised. Albania—considerably curtailed to suit Greek sensibilities—was handed over to the Albanians and the Albanians, among whom Mussalman, were far more numerous than people of any other denomination, were handed over to a Prince of German extraction when it is an open secret that an Indian Mussalman of approved loyalty was available for the throne of the M'pret. But Greece, foiled in her greed in Albania, must needs have some compensation. Who could be despoiled more safely and securely than Turkey? So she demanded, among others, the Islands of Chios and Mitylene. These were two loaded pistols one for each temple of the Asiatic Turk's Asiatic Empire just as much as Antwerp or Flushing in German hands must be in the case of England, and as Heligoland is to a smaller extent proving now to be. Heedless of all protests the Turks stuck to Adrianople and Adrianople has stuck to them. Had *Georgio Averoff* been purchased by the Turks when it was offered to them before it became Greek, and on account of its speed and the range of its guns gave to Greece the supremacy of the Ægean Sea and to the Allies most of the successes that they achieved, Chios and Mitylene would have also stuck to the Turks as the Turks are still sticking to them. But *Averoff* belongs to the Greeks and the Powers have not yet decided the fate of Chios and Mitylene. For nearly two years a Ministry of murderers, according to the *Times*, but of patriots according to British conscience has been at the helm and has hitherto safely steered the ship of state. They realized that a stronger navy was a *sine qua non* for a nation that would sit astride and control the sea-horses of Marmora with one foot in the stirrup of Europe and another in the stirrup of Asia. Impoverished by war, crushed by defeat, bled by the usurious bourses of Europe, harassed by civil strife instigated and encouraged by some of the foreign Powers, they yet succeeded, by starving their State employees, snatching away their trinkets from their women and sharing with the very *Hammals* their daily earnings, in scraping together enough cash to purchase two Dreadnoughts and two destroyers. These meant the fate of Chios and Mitylene and ultimately of Constantinople and Asia Minor. A few days before these ships were expected to be in Turkish waters and no more than 48 hours before Rauf Bey, the intrepid captain of the *Hamidiyeh*, could hoist on their masts the red ensign of the Crescent, a war broke out in Europe which promised to be universal. As any one would have easily guessed, who was not so entirely lost in the contemplation of a near future in which two of the most powerful Dreadnoughts in the world would ride at anchor in the blue waters of the Bosphorus, Great Britain, as desirous of backing her way through on the high seas as the Germans are on land, exercised her right of requisitioning the two Dreadnoughts and the two destroyers of Turkey still in her dockyards. This is what any Power so circumstanced as Great Britain would have done, and no blame attaches to her for thinking of her own needs before those of the Turks. But it was the case of the Caliph's palace and the old woman's hut all over. For the Caliph it was all a matter of symmetry and surroundings. For the old woman it was all the difference between a home and homelessness. English journalists, ridiculing weakness as if it were falseness, had sneered at the petty Ottoman officials satisfying their own and their children's hunger with looking at the picture of the *Resha iyeh* and the *Brinji Osman*. These were not merely ships to them, but also their food and their clothing, the heavy-footed porter's extra burden carried from day to day and the woman's primeval desire of adornment suppressed and unsatisfied. If in reply to their passionate protest an ancient precedent was quoted or a reference given to a certain chapter and page of Professor Westlake's standard work on International Law, what meaning could it have for these simple sacrificing people? Again, when the doors of all the banks and bourses were closed to them, Greece, which ought not yet to command more confidence than Turkey if only commercial considerations entered in-

to these transactions, could easily obtain the necessary cash to purchase from the United States two of their battleships, the *Idaho* and the *Mississippi*, and obtain the sanction of President Wilson to their delivery "for the preservation of peace." There was no ship in the Turkish Navy to match even *Averof* with its speed of 23 or 24 knots. Even the *Hamidieh's* speed is only 22 knots an hour. Imagine then the Turkish consternation at the news that the *Idaho* and the *Mississpi* with a displacement of 13,000 tons and an armament including four 12 in. guns would soon be in the Ægean. But Providence knows as well as human beings the law of substitution. A year ago a Power higher than they had given back Adrianople to the Greeks when the Powers had given it to the Bulgarians. Once again the prophetic verse of Shibli came true:

عجب کیا هی یه بیڑا غرق هوکر پهر اوچهل آئے
که هم نی انقلاب چرخ گردان یون بهی دیکهی هین

(What wonder if this fleet once sunk comes to the surface again; for thus too have we seen the vicissitudes of the revolving firmament.)

So far as the Turks were concerned the *Reshidiyeh* and the *Brinji Osman* had both gone to the bottom of the sea. Now the sea has given back one of these at least in the shape of the *Goeben* (or *Yavuz Sultan Selim*) and another but a smaller vessel in the shape of the *Breslau* (or *Midilli*) wherewith to recapture Khans, or Chios, and Midilli or Mitylene. Both have a speed of about 27 knots an hour, and the former has a displacement of 22,635 and ten 11 in. guns, to which the *Averof* can only oppose a speed of 23 or 24 knots and four 9·2 inch guns. The moment these ships entered the Dardanelles and Reuter wired that they would be dismantled, we felt so sure about it that we could that minute have taken our oath on it that nothing of the sort would be done and that Turkey would give a permanent asylum to and adopt as her own the two German waifs and strays.

The Turkish papers published the news of the sale gleefully within a few hours of the transaction. Reuter did not wire it to us until several days later. But when England heard of the sale, what did she do? She construed this as a violation of neutrality and in company with two neutrals, that had no *locus standi* in the matter, Italy and Greece, began to protest and to threaten. And why? It is true that the *Goeben* and the *Breslau* did not go to the bottom of the sea. But they were lost to the Germans just the same. Did they endanger the safety of the British coast? Not a bit. What danger then did England apprehend from them? "They are hankering after Salonika", remarks the *Times*. But what is Salonika to England or England to Salonika that she should care a burnt match for it? Nothing, at any rate, that the Musalmans can appreciate whether in Beirut or Bengal. And why should they not hanker after Salonika?

Strassburg and Salonika.

Yes, why not? Are not the Turks men? Do they not have feelings and sensibilities as other men? Look at France. Had she forgotten the claims of *Revanche* nearly half a century after the loss of Alsace and Lorraine? M. Ernest Lavisse, the eminent French historian, recalling in the the *Temps* columns of the experiences and memories of forty-four years ago, writes:—

> Since the terrible year (1871) I have never for a moment despaired. The hope and the confidence which were in me I have preached tirelessly. To millions of children I have explained repeatedly their permanent duty towards the lost provinces; for the Cathedral spire of Strassburg has never faded from my horizon. I have always seen it mounting up towards heaven in its solitude: "I am Strassburg, I am Alsace, I have a signal, I wait."

But what of Salonika? It could not have been necessary to explain repeatedly to millions of Turkish children "their permanent duty" towards the lost vilayets of Turkey. That was not lost forty-four years ago. Not half as many months have passed since the surrender of Salonika by Kiamil and Nazim who, if they had been Englishmen and had acted as they did, would have been torn limb from limb by the nation that they had betrayed. And yet *we* know better than the whole brood of liars at the Printing House Square that Enver, that fine flower of Moslem chivalry whom the *Times* has never failed to traduce, shrank for a long time from attempting the *coup*, not from want of courage—for even if it needed proof the 23rd of January, 1911, itself proved it amply enough—but from motives of patriotism and humanity. Does not Salonika call the Turks as Strassburg has been calling the French? Has not the dome of its Aya Sofia, or the ancient pile of its Eski Juma or Old Mosque, the same meaning for the Osmanli warrior or statesman that the Cathedral spire of Strassburg has for the French historian? Does it not flash across the dividing land and sea the never-changing message: "I am Salonika. I am Islam—the Unity of your Allah, the Truth of His Messenger. I am a signal. I wait"? Can its neat white houses enclosed by their white walls, scattered on the edge of its bay and the summit of its hill, and mingling with the domes and minarets of its mosques that rise through groves of elm and cypress and mulberry, ever fade from the Turk's horizon? Cyrenaica, with Tripoli, was the hush-money that they had paid to the blackmailer of Rome. They had reluctantly paid that price in order to be free to go to war in the Balkans and had reluctantly bidden adieu to their Arab brethren because their own hearths and homes had to be defended. But when they lost Salonika they also lost the memorial of an early Moslem victory, for Salonika had been first stormed by their spiritual ancestors from Cyrenaica a thousand years ago. Between the tenth century and the fifteenth the Turks themselves thrice held it before Murad II captured it finally for the House of Osman and for Islam twenty-three years before his son earned the title of the "Conqueror" by capturing the city of Constantine. For the patriots that have on two occasions redeemed Turkey and now rule her she has more recent memories no less sacred. It was from Salonika that this heroic band of the lovers of their country, suspected, imprisoned and exiled, worked the overthrow of a soul killing despotism. Salonika is to them the cradle of Turkey regenerated and reborn.

What does Salonika Say?

Let us ask what Salonika says itself about the return of the Turk. Half of her population of a hundred thirty thousand souls consists of Sephardhic Jews. They are the descendants of those who had fled thither in the 16th century to escape religious persecution in Spain, since Spain was no longer ruled by the Moors, but was under the Christian sway of Ferdinand and his successors who persecuted and exiled Moslem and Jew alike with perfect impartiality. Heine writes that when he saw the *Merchant of Venice* at Drury Lane there stood behind him in the box a pale, fair Briton, who, at the end of the Fourth Act, fell aweeping passionately, several times exclaiming: "The poor man is wronged." He adds:—

> When I think of those tears I have to rank the *Merchant of Venice* with the Tragedies. . . . . Wandering, dream-haunted that I am, I looked round everywhere on the Rialto to see if I could not find Shylock. . . . . But I found him nowhere on the Rialto, and I determined to seek my old acquaintance in the synagogue. . . . . Although I looked all round the synagogue, I nowhere discovered the face of Shylock. I saw him not. But towards evening, when, according to Jewish belief, the gates of Heaven are shut and no prayer can then obtain admittance, I heard a voice, with a ripple of tears that were never wept by eyes. It was a sob that could come only from a breast that held in it all the martyrdom which, for eighteen centuries, had been borne by a whole tortured people. It was the death rattle of a soul sinking down dead-tired at heaven's gates. And I seemed to know the voice, and I felt that I had heard it long ago, when in utter despair, it moaned out, then as now, 'Jessica, my child!'

Salonika has for four centuries been the harbour refuge of many a Hebrew derelict, many a poor man wronged who has sobbed out his sorrow with some plaintive wail such as "Jessica, my child." The Musalmans are naturally biassed in favour of the Turks as the Christians are biassed against them. But the Hebrew is the best arbiter, for he has had experience both of Christian and Moslem toleration. Let us ask him what he thinks of the claims of the Turks to a return to Salonika. The least sophisticated and naturally the most impartial must be the children. Well, when the Turks had been exiled from Salonika, as the Jews had been exiled four hundred years ago from Spain, and the Greeks occupied the place, one of the Greek officers went to the Jewish school and asked such boys to stand up as liked the Greeks to rule over Salonika. With great difficulty one after another three boys stood up and looked rather uncomfortable. Then the Greek officer asked them to sit down and wished such boys to get up as wanted the Turks to return. The whole of the form got up with evident alacrity—including the three who had first got up as supporters of the "man in possession." Take another example. Pierre Loti was one of the few Frenchmen that stood up for Turkey when she had fallen on evil days and evil tongues. In the course of his advocacy of the cause of the Turks and of truth he received among many others the following letter. It came from a Spanish Jewess like so many that live in Salonika. She wrote:—

> What you have just done for the unhappy Turkey reminds me o' the man who comes to sit by the death-bed of a forsaken human being and takes his hand and keeps it in his own so that the other shall not die alone.
>
> Please write again! May your heart help you to find, not only the words that tell, but those that persuade, those that the men who will have to give the verdict will remember in spite of themselves. Proclaim them loudly, all these reasons which prove the necessity for the existence of the poor dear nation, so little known, in truth a humble existence, but their own nevertheless. You who have lived in my adopted country, testify to the comfort which your soul received there in its longing for faith, kind-heartedness, honesty, wisdom and peace. But I beg of you, do not yet speak of them with tears. Those who love Turkey have not yet the right to weep over her as over a dead body. She may not die, speak not of the tomb. If the dreadful event took place, then only would I cry, because I know that they will become as we are, even us poor Jews scattered here and there, without a corner that we can call our own. It is said that they are going to lose Asia also. Unhappy people!

> If you only knew this feeling of the exiled which is buried in us from our childhood, and which follows us wherever we pass! I hate to think that the Turks, whom I love, should ever know it. It is years since I left Constantinople and I thought I had forgotten. I did not know that, when one has lived among the Turks, one loves them throughout one's life. I beg of you to write again, to act. Time presses! And I thank you.

"What could I add," says Loti, "after this spontaneous testimony? What could I add to it that could but weaken it?" This is the testimony of Salonika itself about the Turks and even if Salonika fades from the horizon of the Turk, would the Turk also fade from the horizon of Salonika?

Turkey's "Riechland."

The province Salonica is nearly three times the size of Riechland which the French desire to win back and has a population considerably more than half of France's lost provinces. Even after the loss of part of Alsace and Lorraine, France has an area hardly less than that of the conqueror who imposed on her the treaty of Frankfurt. But what is the position of Turkey since the last war? We have before us at this moment a map of Europe in 1812 which may, for the purposes of Turkey, be regarded as the map of Europe in 1865, before Maldavia and Wallachia had become the independent State of Roumania under Prince Charles (1866); before the Ottoman garrisons had been withdrawn from Servia through the persuasive charms of Princess Julia, who went on a mission to Gladstone and Bright (1867); before Bosnia and Herzegovina came to be administered by Austria (1878) and were finally annexed by the Dual Kingdom (1908); before Bulgaria became a Principality under Prince Alexander, and Eastern Roumelia became autonomous (1879), and both became a united and independing Kingdom under Tsar Ferdinand (1908); and before Thessaly was ceded to Greece (1881) The boundaries of Turkey even then ran parallel to the boundaries of Hungary and Russia. The whole expanse of the country as seen on this map resembles nothing so much as a big river in the Indian plains in a flood. Those who have seen the river only at such a season can hardly recognise it as a shrunken stream in the summer. That shrunken stream was Turkey in Europe on the eve of the Balkan War. But even then the European Provinces of the Sultan had an area of more than sixty-five thousand square miles and a population exceeding six millions. A year later even the shrunken stream in the summer appears by comparison a mighty river in flood, for in less than a year European Turkey is reduced to a sixth of its dimensions and its population to less than a third. If France can remember the loss of five thousand square miles and a million and a half of her population for forty-four years and cannot forget that her "permanent duty towards the lost provinces" is summed up in the one word "Revenge," a schoolboy's sum in arithmetic ought to tell us how long Turkey should keep the memory green of fifty thousand square miles and four and a quarter million people. The poet thought only of a single life when he wrote:

عرفی اگر بگریه میسر شدی وصال * صد سال میتوان بتمنا گریستن

(Urfi, if union could be secured through tears, it would be possible to weep through a hundred years).

But what is the life of an individual, specially in the East, to the life of a nation. For nearly six hundred years the Turks have ruled over Europe and the House of Osman may well shed tears over its recent losses for a thousand years if it can shed nothing more manly. But its tradition, even as its traducers must admit, has always been to shed blood instead of tears, whether it be its enemies' or its own, and without the efforts of eminent historians to explain to them their "permanent duty" to their lost country, hundreds of thousands of little children in schools remember twice a day, with all the fervour of patriotic song, the Balkan hills where the sun is still bleaching from day to-day graveless bones of their fathers and brothers, their mothers and sisters. How could they dry their tears before the blood of their martyrs is dry on the Balkan soil? Chauvinists! Why the Turks would be something more than angels, if not something less than brutish beasts, if they could forget their loss, or the divine truth: "In Revenge there is Life." Being men, they have not forgotten it, and within a week of mobilization enough of them had flocked under the flag to satisfy the first requirements of the army.

The Opportunity of the Turks.

We know the impulse that moves the Turks to-day, and we also know that opportunity gives it a greater momentum. On the last occasion when they were forced to unsheath the scimitar they were not ready. They were lulled by some of the Powers and betrayed by their own rulers. They found themselves surrounded by four enemies, to their north, to their west and to their south. The unexpected combination of Bulgaria and Greece gave them a configuration of frontiers wholly disadvantageous, and the stupid credulity of the Albanians, who had only a little while ago been instigated by their enemies to revolt on the promise of autonomy—God save the mark!—deprived them of the full support of some of their most dashing troops. What is more, their "Ottomanism" was rewarded by the surrender of their Christian fellow-subjects in companies and whole battalions—a thing that the Moslem troops of England have never done on our frontier when fighting against Moslems and will never do in Egypt or Germany. Well, the Turks have cut their losses in men as well as area, and the Albanians have learnt the value of the Ottoman flag which they have at last hoisted on Durazzo. The Prince of Wied first sent away his wife and children, and has now himself returned to fight for the Fatherland. If Servia had been able to take it she would not have allowed the Albanians to occupy the port on which she had set her heart and for the loss of which the Servians wreaked their vengeance at Serajevo. There is no Conference of Ambassadors now, at any rate, to turn her back from the gateway to the Adriatic, and neither Franz Ferdinand nor Franz Joseph can thwart her wishes. She is evidently too busy on the Drina to think of Durazzo. Montenegro's northward march on Serajevo may be trusted to keep her away from Scutari in the south. At any rate, Essad Pasha is still in the land of the living and his experience of the M'pret will not incline him to be any kinder to Montenegrins to-day than he was a year ago. Roumania is not in direct contact with Turkey at any point and is not very likely to risk the fruits of her easy victory of last year by attacking Turkey through Bulgaria. And human nature in general, and Bulgarian nature in particular, must have changed remarkably within a year if Bulgaria is sufficiently reconciled to the Treaty of Bukharest not only to stand idly by when Greece or Roumania as well as Servia are otherwise engaged, but also to allow Roumania or Greece to attack Turkey through her territory. As for Greece, the one thing that had restrained the Turks from wreaking their revenge on the country they had been compelled to spare in the course of their triumphal procession in 1897—miscalled war—was Europe, and now that Europe is not, so to speak, "in being", but only "hopes to be", the path is clear for an attack by land, if Bulgaria wishes to try conclusions with Constantine the Bulgar-killer, or by sea, if Bulgaria remains neutral. The last war was the war of *Georgio Averoff* only, but even then the *Hamidiyeh* had put the fear of God into Greece. Now that Turkey combines with a commander such as Rauf Bey a cruiser such as *Yavouz Sultan Selim*, the Turkish Navy will have another rôle than that of escorting the transports across the Marmora and shelling the Bulgarians from Derkos and Buyuk Chekmeji. If Turkey chooses to strike Greece when her patron saint, Russia, cannot come to her rescue, who can blame her?

The Warners.

The attitude of the *Times* is perfectly comprehensible, for between Northcliffe and the city on the Neva, whether it still calls itself St. Petersburg or, like Harmsworth "ennobled", changes its name, there has been for years a direct and an open connection. Instead of the Russian censor inking the whole columns of the *Times*, or the Tsar turning the *Times* correspondent out of All the Russias, the latter wires to it the appreciation by the Tsar of its appreciation of the Russian avalanche, and the *Times* now issues "Russian Supplements" more than once a year. If the *Times* would not favour Russia and her protégé, angels will not come from Heaven nor devils from Hell to do it. But what interests have England and France in the spoliation of Turkey by Greece? The Treaty of Bukharest is not the Treaty of London that Sir Edward should hold it as sacrosanct. It is and will always remain a mere "scrap of paper", if it remains even that, when Turkey and Bulgaria or both are in a position to re-adjust now the relations thereby recognised as then existing. Indian Mussalmans hate the idea of a British and Ottoman collision, whether military or diplomatic. But Greece is not Great Britain, and the authorities are greatly mistaken if they are led to believe that Turkish neutrality means anything more than Turkish neutrality in the struggle between Austria and Germany on the one side and England, France and Russia on the other. The *Times* is wiser and offers no reason against the Turks taking a bit of their own back from Greece. But the smaller reptile, the *Near East*, has no such reticence. It writes a leader in its issue of the 4th September under the heading of "A Word of Warning" and commences it with the following:—

> Little more than two years ago we received a letter from the Imperial Ottoman Embassy in London acknowledging that "the *Near East* has strenuously and impartially defended the interests of the (Ottoman) Empire" and referring to the "loyal and friendly attitude of the *Near East* towards Turkey" which, it was hoped, "would facilitate the re-establishment of more friendly relations between England and Turkey, a result which is in conformity with the interests of the two countries." We quote these sentences as showing that *for* years past the *Near East* has laboured unceasingly to promote the traditional friendship which has so long existed between Great Britain and the Porte.

We have taken the liberty to italicise one small preposition in the last sentence, for it must be the creation of the Printer's Devil. What the *Near East* must have meant is that it was not *for*, but *in* years past that it had tried to promote the traditional friendship between the largest Moslem State and the State that has the largest Moslem population. When the *Near East* was first issued in 1907 in

a somewhat different form it certainly aimed at promoting those relations. But more recently its Constantinople and Cairo Correspondents have been the vilest calumniators of the best elements in Turkey and Egypt and its editorial observations have been weak echoes of Downing Street diplomacy. We do not wonder that "little more than two years ago" the *Near East* got a *chit* that it is exhibiting so boldly. But is that the latest "reference"? Besides, its own character has not changed so radically in recent times as the character of the people whose "reference" it is using. "Little more than two years ago" Kiamil and his gang were ruling Turkey, while Talaat and Javid were in prison and Enver was redeeming the honour of Turkey in Tripoli! Now this very ingenious journal thinks that "from its proved friendship to the Ottoman Empire in the past" it is "entitled to utter a word of warning to an old friend." The warning is: "keep the peace." Evidently the *Near East* has forgotten the well-known adage of the Middle East :

هرچه برخود نه پسندی بردیگران هم مپسند

(Whatever thou likest not for thyself do not choose for others.) But let that pass. The question is not of Turkey's declaring war against an old friend which according to the *Near East*, in 1908 "forbore to 'regularise' her position in Cyprus and Egypt, preferring to consider herself bound by her agreements," even though the agreements that *should* have bound the old friend were those which said in unequivocal terms that the friend was to have *no position* in Egypt—not even an "irregular" one. We fully agree that "events in western Europe are of no immediate interest to them and that they have no call whatever to feel any obligation to participate in the *present war.*" (The italics are ours.) But the question is of a war between Greece and Turkey and the *Near East* "forbids the banns" with the naïve remark : "Nor, if they are wise, will they embark upon a private war of their own. *As matters stand there is no room in Europe for two separate and distinct wars.*" Pray why so? The *Near East* is once more innocent of the reticence of the *Times*. It supplies an answer in these words : "If the Sultan once more takes the field, he is bound to find himself in opposition to one or other of the groups of warring powers or there protégés." Ay, there's the rub. So far as the High Contending Parties are themselves concerned, the poor Turk may avoid a brush with them. But the order of the day is "Love me, love my dog," and the Turk has an aversion to the breed. What has England to do with protégés? Neither honour nor interest require her intervention in any conflict between Greece and Turkey. Great Britain was no signatory to the Treaty of Bukharest as she was to the treaty guaranteeing the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, though we need not refer to it since it has been associated with the name of a capital that is now associated with a brutal frankness in the description of sacred screeds.

The Turks and Russia.

Hitherto we have discussed the question of a conflict between the Turks and the Greeks. Let us now turn to the question of a conflict between the Turks and one or more of the Allies. Against Russia the Turks have innumerable grievances, for after the Hungarians and the Poles had stemmed the tide of Turkish advance the Russians found them an easy prey and have ever since been assailing them in their retreat from the walls of Vienna. Every revolt against Turkey in Europe and Asia Minor has been instigated by Russia, and the object has not been the protection of small nationalities, as in the case of Belgium to-day, but to detach them from Turkey as her own destined prey. The Slav nations and the followers of the Orthodox Church are supposed to be her protégés, but she does not love her protégés as herself. The "Big Bulgaria" of the treaty of San Stafano was a hope rather than a threat, but even when the "Big Bulgaria" of that treaty, wrung from impotence by treachery, did not materialize, Prince Alexander of Bulgaria ceased to be a *persona grata* to the Tsar the moment he set himself up as the symbol of Bulgaria's national identity. Prince Ferdinand's experience has been no better, and since he assumed the title of Tsar and proclaimed his independence he has been a thorn in the Russian side. Russia assisted him in the formation of the Balkan League, but when Bulgaria came out of the war with Turkey so well, the jealousy of Bulgaria and its Tsar got the better of the protection of "the small nationalities." It is now the turn of Greece to incur her wrath because there is a talk of Greece being given the heritage of Constantine which Russia has coveted for two hundred years. Who can blame the Turks if they have learnt to define their Fatherland like the French worshippers of *Revanche*. "*Patrie?*" said a Norman peasant who was a recruit in the conscript army of France, "*Ca veut dire tuer des Prussiens.*" (Fatherland? That means killing Prussians). Well may the Turks say : "*Vatan?* That means killing the Russians."

The Turks and France.

France, besides bartering away Turkey's suzerainty in Egypt for a "free hand" in Morocco and herself usurping Tunis, has been pegging fresh claims every day in Syria, and even when she was robbing the Church of Christ in France stood forth in the country round the Sepulchre of Christ as the protector of Latin Christianity. During the Balkan war her present President's attitude as Premier was entirely hostile to Turkey, and in spite of all efforts of Pierre Loti few in France stood up for the wronged Turk. Is the Turk likely to stand up for France to-day or spare the French when he can regain the suzerainty over Tunis? The French occupation of Tunisia and the declaration of French Protectorate over it have followed the most approved European models of "peaceful penetration." Its crime was its close proximity to Algeria which the French had overrun after a struggle lasting a generation. They regarded it as a "natural adjunct" to Algeria. It was allowed to become a debtor to Europe. In 1869 it went bankrupt, a contingency which was by no means unforeseen or undesired. The triple control of Great Britain, Italy and France was established. In 1878, at the Congress of Berlin, Lord Salisbury agreed to allow France a "free hand" in Tunis in return for French acquiescence to the British lease of Cyprus. In 1880, France became alarmed at Italian commercial enterprise in Tunis and acted on the secret understanding with Great Britain. In 1881 a French force crossed the frontier "under pretext of chastising the Khmir independent tribe in the North East of the Regency, and, quickly dropping the mask, advanced on the capital and compelled the Bey of Tunis to accept the French Protectorate." "The actual conquest of the country", adds the historian from whom we have quoted, "was not effected without a serious struggle with Moslem fanaticism, specially at Sfax", and after that came the customary recognition of the *fait accompli* by the Powers that watch over "small nationalities." The Protectorate was not recognised by Turkey, the Suzerian, which claimed the Regency as part of the Ottoman dominions. But who heeds the protests of weak suzerains? France has always ignored them and punished Turkey by occupying several points across the Tunis-Tripoli frontier, including Janet which was occupied in 1906. It was re-occupied by the Turks in 1910, but pending the delimitation of the frontier Turkey withdrew her troops in deference to French protests, at the same time maintaining the claim that the Tunisians were Ottoman subjects. It would be interesting to see if Italy would now press her claims to suzerainty as Turkey's successor in Tripoli by the sacred right of "annexation."

Turkey, England and Egypt.

As regards England, her attitude towards Turkey in the Crimean War, and subsequently at the Berlin Congress at the conclusion of the Russo-Turkish War, when Cyprus was leased to England, are only too well known. Equally well known are the facts about Egypt and the British Occupation, its original purpose and the after-thoughts that grew out of England's duty as the bailiff of Europe. Even the "man in the street" in India knows all about the neutrality of Egypt during the Tripoli war and the refusal of the British Agency even to permit the troops of the Suzerain to pass through the vassal country into Libya, much less assist her with the 18,000 troops for which Mohamed Ali had stipulated. We have now the converse situation when the vassal is at war with a Power on the friendliest terms with the Suzerain. We have never disguised our views about the British Occupation of Egypt and have no desire to recant to day. But no purpose would be served by going over old ground once again, and it might be thought that we desire to excite the Turks and Egyptians or the Mussalmans of India with a view to embarrass the authorities in India and in England. So we refrain. But we do not like to play hide-and-seek with the authorities or with our readers. If we are asked whether the Turks or the Egyptians would have a moral justification in urging on the British the evacuation of Egypt our reply must unequivocally be that in view of the following clear and emphatic pledges of British statesmen we cannot consider such a request unjustifiable. Now that Europe seems to have regained her respect for old pledges and guarantees, the following should be read with interest.

> "I, admiral commanding the British fleet, think it opportune to confirm without delay once more to Your Highness that the Government of Great Britain has no intention of making the conquest of Egypt, nor injuring in any way the religion and liberties of the Egyptians. It has for its sole object to protect Your Highness and the Egyptian people against rebels." (Sir Beauchamp to Khedive Tewfik, Alexandria, July 26, 1882, Published in the official Journal of June 28.)
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> "I can go so far as to answer the honourable gentleman when he asks me whether we contemplate an indefinite occupation of Egypt. Undoubtedly, of all things in the world, that is a thing which we are not going to do. It would be absolutely at variance with all the principles and views of His Majesty's Government and the pledges they have given to Europe, and I with the views, I may say, of Europe itself." (The Rt. Hon. W. E. Gladstone in the House of Commons, August 10, 1882.)
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> "You should intimate to the Egyptian Government that it is the desire of His Majesty's Government to withdraw the troops from Egypt as soon as circumstances permit, that such withdrawal will probably be effected from time to time as the security of the country will allow it, and that His Majesty's Government hope that the time will be very short during which the full number of the present force will be maintained." [Lord Granville, December 29, 1882; Egypt, No. 2 (1883) p. 33.]

"The territory of the Khedive has been recognised as lying outside the sphere of European warfare and international jealousies". (Lord Dufferin's despatch, February 6, 1883 ; Egypt, No. 6 (1883), p. 41.)

Had I been commissioned to place affairs in Egypt on the footing of an Indian subject State the outlook would have been different. The masterful hand of a Resident would have quickly bent everything to his will, and in the space of five years we should have greatly added to the material wealth and well-being of the country by the extension of its cultivated area and the consequent expansion of its revenue ; by the partial if not the total abolition of the *corvee* and slavery ; the establishment of justice and other beneficent reforms. But the Egyptians would have justly considered these advantages as dearly purchased at the expense of their domestic independence. Moreover, H. M.'s Government have pronounced against such an alternative". (*Ib.*, p. 83.)

"The uncertainty there may be in some portion of the public mind has reference to those desires which tend towards the permanent occupation of Egypt and its incorporation in this Empire. That is a consummation to which we are resolutely opposed, and which we will have nothing to do with bringing about. We are against this doctrine of annexation ; we are against everything that resembles or approaches it; and we are against all language that tends to bring about its expectation. We are against it on the ground of the interest of England; we are against it on the ground of our duty to Egypt; we are against it on the ground of the specific and solemn pledges given to the world in the most solemn manner and under the most critical circumstances, pledges which have earned for us the confidence of Europe at large during the course of difficult and delicate operations, and which, if one pledge can be more solemn and sacred than another, special sacredness in this case binds us to observe. We are also sensible that occupation prolonged beyond a certain point may tend to annexation, and consequently it is our object to take the greatest care that the occupation does not gradually take a permanent character..... We cannot name a day, and do not undertake to name a day, for our final withdrawal, but no effort shall be wanting on our part to bring about that withdrawal as early possible. The condition which will enable us to withdraw are those described by Lord Granville—restored order in the state of the country and the organisation of the proper means for the maintenance of the Khedive's authority. . . . The Rt. Hon. gentleman (R. S. Northcote) has treated us as if we intended to stay in Egypt until we had brought about institutions which would do credit to Utopia. We have no such views.....In popular language we mean to give Egypt a fair start and if we secure it order, supply a civil and military force adequate to the maintenance of order and with a man on the throne in whose benevolence and justice we have confidence, with institutions for the administration of justice under enlightened supervision and in fairly competent hands..... ..if we have made a reasonable beginning towards legislative institutions into which is incorporated some seed of freedom our duty may be supposed to be complete." (Mr. Gladstone in the House of Commons, August 9th, 1883.)

"H.M.'s Government . . . are willing that the withdrawal of the troops shall take place at the beginning of the year 1888, provided that the Powers are then of opinion that such withdrawal can take place without risk to peace and order". (Lord Granville's despatch June 16, 1884 ; Egypt, No. 23 (1884), p. 13.)

"From the first we have steadily kept in view the fact that our occupation was temporary and provisional only.....We do *not* propose to occupy Egypt permanently.....on that point we are pledged to this country and pledged to Europe; and if a contrary policy is adopted it will not be by us." (Lord Derby in the House of Lords, February 21st, 1885.)

"It was not open to us to assume the protectorate of Egypt, because His Majesty's Government have again and again pledged themselves that they would not do so .....My noble friend has dwelt upon that pledge, and he does us no more than justice when he expresses his opinion that it is a pledge which has been constantly present to our minds.....It was undoubtedly the fact that our presence in Egypt, unrecognised by any convention.....gave the subjects of the Sultan cause for a suspicion which we did not deserve." (Lord Salisbury in the House of Lords, June 10, 1887).

"When my noble friend.....asks us to convert ourselves from guardians into proprietors.....and to declare our stay in Egypt permanent .....I must say I think my noble friend pays an insufficient regard to the sanctity of the obligations which the Government of the Queen have undertaken and by which they are bound to abide. In such a matter we have not to consider what is the most convenient or what is the more profitable course; we have to consider the course to which we are bound by our own obligations and by European Law." (Lord Salisbury in the House of Lords, August 12, 1889.)

"I cannot do otherwise than express my general concurrence.....that the occupation of Egypt is in the nature of a burden and a difficulty; and that the permanent occupation of that country would not be agreeable to our traditional policy, and that it would not be consistent with our good faith towards the Suzerain Power, while it would be contrary to the laws of Europe ...I certainly shall not set up the doctrine that we have discovered a duty which enables us to set aside the pledges into which we have so freely entered..... The thing we cannot do with perfect honour is either to deny that we are under engagement which preclude the idea of an indefinite occupation, or so to construe that indefinite occupation as to hamper the engagements that we are under by collateral considerations." (Mr. Gladstone in the House of Commons, May 1, 1893.)

"Great Britain has engaged herself by official agreement with Turkey and the European powers to respect suzerainty of the Sultan of Egypt. She will keep her engagements." (Sir Eldon Gorst's interview with Dr. Nimr, Editor of the "Mokattam," October, 21, 1908. This interview was acknowledged as official by Sir E. Grey in the House of Commons.)

A Problem of Law and Morality.

Germany's greatest offence, or at least the one that has impelled England to intervene against her, is that she has broken into an unoffending poor neighbour's house in order to jump into her enemy's house that adjoins her unoffending poor neighbour's. Belgium had every moral and legal justification to resist this trespass with force, and, whatever view one may hold of the blood-guiltiness of this Power or that, no one can find anything to blame in Belgium's heroic resistance, while there is so much to respect and admire. Now, suppose Germany had entered Belgian territory not to invade France but to protect the King of the Belgians from his mutinous troops, and while storming Liège and defeating the Belgian army at Louvain, General Von Emmich had declared that Germany had no intention of making a conquest of Belgium, but that her sole object was to protect His Majesty and the Belgian people against rebels, and suppose Kaiser Wilhelm, Chancellor, Dr. Bethman Hollweg and Foreign Secretary, Von Jagow, had all repeatedly assured the Belgians that the occupation of Belgium was to be temporary and provisional and was on no pretext to be continued beyond the time necessary for restoring order and establishing a secure administration to assist King Albert in governing Belgium, and had even named a day—say, about 6 years after the bombardment of Liége—would King Albert's successor have been justified more than thirty years after the German Occupation in asking Germany to evacuate the country and remove Field Marshal Von der Goltz from a position where he overshadowed the Belgian King, Ministry and Parliament? We may assume—even if it is a very rash assumption in Germany's case—that her rule was just and equitable and popular, and that she had brought the culture of Schubert and Schumann, of Hegel and Kant, of Goethe and Schiller and not the wicked philosophy of Neitzsche nor the wile of Bismark and his blood and iron diplomacy and the masterful militarism of the "mailed fist" and the "shining armour" of the War Lord,—even then, could Germany consider the request of the Belgian King and people unreasonable and unjust? We leave the matter to the judgment of the soberest and the most loyal in this country and the most conscientious respectors of old pledges in England.

What should the Turks do?

So much about moral and legal justification. But the matter does not end there. Every act that is not illegal or immoral is not on that account obligatory. The expediency of an act has also to be taken into consideration. When morality and expediency are opposed to each other no one who values principles can say that morality must be sacrificed to expediency. But where morality is not opposed to expediency, he who does what is both expedient and morally permissible does better than he who does what is inexpedient though morally permissible. For the Turks or Egyptians to demand by force the evacuation of Egypt is to our mind morally permissible but wholly inexpedient at this juncture. Before England intervened in the Egyptian troubles she asked the Suzerain to join her in the enterprise. Abdul Hamid Khan did not join England and France also held back. That does not by any means deprive Turkey of her rights as a Suzerain of Egypt, and it certainly did not deprive France of the power to intervene later—a power that she exchanged for a "free hand" in Morocco. But when British intervention was not forcibly opposed by Turkey nor by the Khedive himself, it is more expedient to ask for the fulfilment of British pledges in a friendly manner rather than a hostile manner. Had Mr. Redmond asked for the Home Rule Bill, the whole Bill and nothing but the Bill at this juncture as the price of peace in Ireland, England would have been compelled to purchase peace on his own terms. But England's difficulty was, in a sense other than that generally understood, Ireland's opportunity, and in acting as he has done Mr. Redmond has made the best of Ireland's opportunity. Mr. Balfour's churlish attitude on a recent occasion will bring in its train its own Nemesis and we feel certain that Mr. Redmond's bread cast upon the waters will return to him not after so very many days. We say the same to Egypt and Turkey. However just their demands, however great their need, however long they may have waited for the fulfilment of British pledges, however weak the present day statesmen's sense of the solemnity of promises made in the sight and hearing of the entire world, if they give England one more opportunity to redeem her pledges and fulfil her promises they would do that for which none will blame their generosity of heart, even though some may blame their judgment. England has gone to war with the noblest sentiments on the lips of her statesmen. No one can predict the end of such a struggle. But if England emerges out of this supreme trial of her manhood, resources and organisation, a stronger and a still more beneficent Power, then the Turks and the Egyptians just as much as the Irish and the Indians will pin her down to her promises even if she showed the least disposition to wriggle out of them. No one can say that even such a struggle would be final. The settlement may only prove—as so many settlements have proved—the seed of another and still more terrible war, and unfulfilled

promises have an inconvenient habit of coming home to roost. Nations do not generally trust twice without good grounds and unredeemed pledges provide their own punishment. In asking the Turks to defer the pressing of their demands by force we wish to remind them that something is even to-day due to the Allies of the Crimean war and the supporters of the Berlin Congress. Palmerston and Disraeli's assets of military and diplomatic support ought to be able to balance the blunders of the foolish word recklessly uttered and the wise word heedlessly left unsaid by some of their successors.

Caution.

We are not unappreciative of the temptations and trials of the Turks; but even here a word of caution must be uttered. They must not be lured by the blandishments of those opposed to England and her Allies. They must remember that "War is Deceit." We desire from the bottom of our heart that this may be the last of the wars, and that human intelligence and human sense of justice may never know such constantly recurring eclipses. But we are bound to admit that as things are to-day there are some-things worse than war. We shall not, therefore, pretend to believe that the Turks must have peace at any price. They must beware of entering into a quarrel, but once in it they must not come out of it till the claims both of honour and self-interest are satisfied. God knows they will have enough occasions to fight, for they have to contend against numerous army corps of prejudice and passion. That is all the more reason that they should fight only their own battles and not those of another. At present the fear is that they may be led into the firing line in a quarrel only outwardly their own. The Turks are not wanting in gratitude. In fact, few nations could equal the Turk in those characteristics which have extorted for him even from his enemies the title of "The Only Gentleman in Eastern Europe." To quote the old Arab saying mentioned by Gibbon, their women know not how to grant favours and their men know not how to refuse. Every Indian whom we know who has had any relations with them is loud in praises of their courtesy, which is as natural to the peasant as to the prince. But if courtesy is one of their great qualities, they also possess the defects of that great quality. In matters of business they are imposed upon, and often imposed upon knowing that they are being imposed upon. Now nothing is a more serious business than war in which a nation can destroy in a month in the way of life, energies and resources what it had taken a generation to build. The Turk knows not what fear is, but life can be valueless only to those in the lowest scale of humanity. It is a rich treasure and a divine gift which we are not permitted by our Maker to squander. We must learn in war even more than in peace the importance and value of economy in human life. As regards material resources, the Turks have never had even so much as could balance their peace requirements. All these considerations point the way in the direction of peace. This is not all. Almost every other great nation of Europe has had peace for a generation or more. Even Russia with her immense resources did not find herself equal to a second war three years after her first in which she had to fight only a small island kingdom. She has launched this new enterprise no less than a decade after her last war. France, Austria and Germany have each enjoyed nearly half a century of peace. England has not fought in a continental war for a century, and her little war against two little peasant States of South Africa, which was enough to prostrate her for many years after, was fought no less fifteen years ago. Servia and Montenegro alone are fighting soon after their last war. But only a child could believe that they are paying their own way. Turkey must therefore proclaim a moratorium against her warlike instincts and her clamant revenge. But if she cannot do so, and must enter this terrible business, let her make sure that the quarrel is her own, that her good nature and courtesy are not being imposed upon, and that she is not hatching a cuckoo's egg believing all the time that it is her own. We cannot withhold our admiration from the German nation that is facing the odds against itself with such courage and determination, and we sometimes find it hard to repress the expression of disgust against the campaign of vilification that is being carried on with greater vigour and persistence than is deserved by German actions, harsh and ruthless though they undoubtedly are. We have not even once heard the phrase "military exigencies" applied in their case, although the war is now nearly two months old, whereas Italy was tried in the very first month of her war on much graver charges of brutality, discharged and declared to leave the court of Europe's humanity without a stain on her character. A thousand advocates had rushed to plead her cause unasked and had put forward the solitary plea of "military exigencies." The foremost among them was once our own Commander-in-Chief, Lord Roberts, whose testimonial an eminent Mussalman published in his quarrel with his community. The Germans do not seem to have spared the living and have rendered thousands of them homeless. But they have yet some way to go down the ladder of inhumanity before they could descend to the place on which the dead are robbed of their last resting place. Lest any one should suspect us of being isolated in having these views and expressing them in order to excite others, let us assure him in advance that he is woefully misled if he believes that a vast majority of Indians think otherwise. Had the country not been demoralized by the constant condemnation of unpalatable truths and the repeated rewarding of cheap lies, everyone in India would be confessing such admiration and sympathy openly. But admiration and sympathy are one thing, making the cause of Germany our own is another. If any cause can be ours it is the British, and if Germany counts on us she is grievously mistaken. It would be bad business for Turkey also to lavish on Germany the lives and energies and resources that she needs for her own quarrels and that Germany never spared for her when she was beset by still greater perils. We do not wish to be cynical, and selfishness has not yet come to be regarded by us as a virtue. But self-preservation is the first law of nature, and nature is inexorable and ruthless in punishing disobedience to her decalogue. Germany has done nothing yet for the Turks to deserve the sacrifice of a single Anatol, much less a street riot in single town or village of India by the Moslem sympathisers of Turkey with a view to embarrass their own Government. This is what we had felt impelled to tell that level-headed Turkish statesman, Talaat Bey, in private, and through him that astute diplomat, His Highness Prince Said Halim, and that soul-inspiring soldier, Damad Enver Pasha. This is what we said to the Turkish nation publicly in brief on a recent occasion. This is what we say to-day in greater detail and without the least effort at disguise. We ask forgiveness for inflicting what are after all truisms and platitudes on a nation no less gifted than most of those that have been lecturing her in season and out. We do not in the least mean to insult the intelligence of Turkey, and to convince her of it we frankly confess that whether her choice is peace or war, the consequences will be hers and not ours. Hence she must exercise her own judgment and surrender it to none. If she chooses badly the suffering will be entirely hers, though the sorrow will be ours also. It was not because we believe that she is incapable of weighing these elementary considerations that we have said all that we have said. It was merely to satisfy the promptings of our own heart, for it beats in unison with the Turks'. If after balancing all considerations they decide for peace, we pray that it may, as it should, prove profitable to them. If, however, they decide for war, we shall mingle our prayers with theirs and ask for divine protection. But if, by some evil chance, they engage in hostilities against our own Government, we shall ask them to pray for us also, for they can hardly imagine the mental anguish and the heart-pangs that will be ours. We shall be torn between two passions, or rather the same passion will be warring with itself within us. When in a household the parents fall out, whichever of them may be at fault the children are bound to suffer. That will be our plight, and we shall deserve all the sympathy that we may secure.

What Must we Do?

What shall be our attitude towards our Government is a simple question and presents to us no difficulty. He who goes by principles and not by consequences should have not the slightest hesitation in answering it. We have of our free will and as masters of our destinies chosen to remain in this country as the subjects of our King and Emperor and the fellow-citizens of our neighbours. We have done this because the benefits of his rule and their co-operation exceed whatever discomforts we may have felt at any time or we may be likely in future to feel. To be more particular, we had taken no pledges from England that she shall not shed the blood of our brothers even in an unrighteous war. That was not in the bond. In fact, we have not hesitated ere this in shedding the blood of our brothers on the border at the bidding of England. We have therefore given a pledge of obedience to English behests as binding as that which guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium and more binding than that which assured Egypt of its complete and early evacuation. This much must be presumed of all reasonable and intelligent beings. When we entered the field we must have known all the rules of the game. And whatever the fortunes of the game, we must abide by the rules and take both defeat and victory in the manner of sportsmen. Sir Syed Ahmad's clean cut logic must come to the rescue of every one who finds his situation distressing. He said in his own inimitable way: "Our attitude towards the Government established in this country must be governed only by one consideration—the attitude of that Government towards ourselves." Every other consideration is foreign to the subject, and whether we fight the Turks or the Russians, our services we must place at the disposal of our Government and our souls we must commend to God.

This may be a bald and unattractive sort of loyalty to those who have grown used to epics even on commonplace occasions. If so, we regret we cannot adjust our talents to their tastes. May we say, however, that our principles are our only professions, and that they are not meant so much for export as for home consumption. We have always worn our heart on our coat sleeve and we have cared not if daws peck at it. We shall not pack it in cotton wool to-day and lock it up in a Bank of England safe out of the range of official eyes. As for the writers of epics, they will never be averse to the bringing out of revised editions amended and brought up-to-date if Germany or

Russia would to-morrow be mistress of India. The change of name would hardly affect the metre.

What may England Do?

We regret that the most mischievous and provoking article of a journal that has only too often done its best to create perils for a none too well-poised empire has compelled us to revert to a subject which we thought we had done with a month and a half ago. But the latest excursion of the *Times* into the politics of the Turks and Indian Mussalmans was so well calculated to precipitate the evil that it had set out, or pretended to have set out, to avert that we could not remain silent. This omniscient journal thinks it knows every detail of the Moslem world from the characters of Enver Pasha, its *bête noire*, and Aziz Bey, its *protégé*,—who, by the way, seems to be no better than Cæsar's wife in the matter of fidelity to his patron and his patron's patron, if we trust Egyptian reports—down to the value and worth both in India and Turkey of the messages of "Bengal Moslems." One thing is, however, certain. It neither knows the Turks nor Indian Mussalmans. If it believes that its references to the accessibility of the Hejaz Railway, to the sowing of discord between Turk and Arab in Yemen, which it says has already begun, and to the vulnerability of Arabia, would add an iota to the fear or affections of a single Mussalman that counts at such times, it is woefully mistaken. We know that it often adopts the manner and the accent of authority when it has no more influence with those in power than it has, say, with the Kaiser. But after its sweeping success in capturing the Liberals it is apprehended that the uninitiated may take it for an official oracle. The London correspondent of the Anglo-Indian daily of Lucknow goes even so far as to say that "the *Times* in such matters represents the views of the Foreign Office." The danger to which we have alluded is, therefore, very real and should soon be met by official action appropriate to the occasion. England must at least officially repudiate the threats recklessly flung by the *Times* at the Turks, and in fact at the entire Moslem world. For this very reason the *Hamdard* has avoided all reference to this pernicious article of the *Times*, for some of its readers may have otherwise been led to think that the *Times*, cancelled at one stroke the pledges given by H. E. the Viceroy only last March. Arabia has been a Moslem land and must and shall remain Moslem to the end of the world. Even those who do not regard the Caliphate as a religious institution, or substitute for it the institution of Imamate, cannot disregard the clear mandate that after the year during which it was revealed to the Prophet of Arabia, the sacred soil was to be kept free even from the shadow of *shirk*, and He who gave that mandate did not forget to provide for such a contingency as may occur to-day. For to the mandate is attached the message of hope which says:

وَإِنْ خِفْتُمْ عَيْلَةً فَسَوْفَ يُغْنِيكُمُ اللهُ مِنْ فَضْلِهِ إِنْ شَاءَ إِنَّ اللهَ عَلِيمٌ حَكِيمٌ *

(If you fear weakness, God will soon in His kindness make you secure if He wishes it. Verily God knows all and judges rightly.)

We have praised the clean cut logic of Syed Ahmad Khan, but what could be clearer than the logic of God himself, and we would advice everyone who wishes to know what a Mussalman may do or must do, and what he may not and must not, to read the 9th Chapter of the Quran on "Repentance". The limits of all contracts, legal and social, are clearly laid down and no territory is more justly or unmistakably demarcated than that of right and wrong in the dealings of Moslems with non-Moslems.

The Test of Conscience and of Courage.

But the truest test of conscience and of courage for England is not so much to declare war on Germany for a breach of Belgium's treaty rights as to evacuate Egypt of her own free will even before a diplomatic demand is formulated by Turkey or Egypt. Nothing would shame Germany so well as this act of clear justice. The embarkation of the last English soldier from Alexandria will put the fear of God into the heart of the Kaiser more assuredly than the disembarkation of the last English soldier available in the Empire at Boulogne or Havre. The Uzbegs had troubled the Moghals a great deal on the borders of India when Shah Jahan sent Aurangzeb to punish them. The battle was at its hottest when the hour of evening prayer arrived. With characteristic coolness Aurangzeb spread his prayer mat on the ground in the thickest part of the battle and bent his head in silent submission before the Lord God of War. The chief of the Uzbegs was an unobserved witness of this simple scene and when Aurangzeb had finished his prayer, he came and laid down his arms before him "To fight against such a man", said the Chief of the Uzbegs, "is madness. I'll have none of it." If this is really a war of Right against Might, of Conscience against soul-crushing Militarism, of the Sacredness of Treaties and the Dignity of Law against their treatment as mere "Scraps of Paper" and Moral Impedimenta in the advance of Brute Force, and Clean Hands are sincerely adjudged better than Countless Hordes, then England must go to the Land of the Sphinx and solve the new riddle of this war in the only way it can be solved. It must leave Egypt. Need we say this will win over to her side the Mussalmans of the world better than all the threats of the tactful *Times* and the promises of destroying Turkey's contracts with Germany *after* Germany has herself been destroyed. This is the claim of self-interest. This is the demand of honour. This way lies the path of duty. Whatever may have kept England in Egypt thirty or twenty years ago, to-day England is there because she prefers the route of Lesseps to India to that of Vasco da Gama. Germany needed only a temporary right of way through Belgium. England should in all conscience be satisfied with a permanent right of way through Egypt. But to come as friends of the owner of the land and to protect him from unruly tennants, and then not to be satisfied even with the right of way through his fields but to claim a practical ownership is neither friendly nor honourable. Let England have the *iter*, but the *dominum* must remain with Turkey and the usufruct with the Khedive. Will not England be satisfied with the easement?

No Bribes!

We have already filled many pages, but before we conclude, let us repeat that whatever England may do to Turkey or Egypt, our anchor holds. All truly loyal people have closed the chapter of civic controversy with the officials and into that book they are likely to look no more. Whatever our grievances, whatever reforms we desire, everything must wait for a more seasonable occasion. Even if the Government were to concede to us all that we ever desired or dreamt, if, for instance, the Moslem University were offered to us on our own terms, or the Press Act repeal were to be announced, or even if Self-Government were to be conceded to us, we would humbly tell Government this is no time for it, and we must for the present decline such concessions with thanks. Concessions are asked for and accepted in peace. We are not Russian Poles. We need no bribes!

Matrimonial.

A middle class Mohammedan under-graduate, bachelor, of excellent moral character, a medical practitioner, of a respectable family, wishes to marry in a well-to-do respectable house of liberal views, or invites correspondence on the subject with either a young lady medical practitioner or a medical girl-student willing to settle in life as a medical practitioner. Communicate with:—

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Delhi.

SUMMONS FOR DISPOSAL SUIT.

(Order V, Rule 1 and 5, of Act V of 1908.)

Suit No. 57 of 1914.

IN THE COURT OF THE MUNSIF, FYZABAD.

Raghubar Diyal of Mohalla Dalmandi, city Fyzabad. .... *Plaintiff,*

versus

Baij Nath .... *Defendant.*

To

Baijnath, son of Ratan, at present residing at Rangoon, Dist. Pegu, Station and P. O. Changa-house of Ram Bodh.

Whereas the above named Plaintiff has instituted a suit against you for 332/6/- you are hereby summoned to appear in this Court in person, or by a pleader, duly instructed and able to answer all material questions relating to the suit, or who shall be accompanied by some person able to answer all such questions on the 13th day of October, 1914, at 10 o'clock in the forenoon, to answer the claim; and as the day fixed for your appearance is appointed for the final disposal of the suit, you must be prepared to produce on that day all the witnesses, upon whose evidence and all the documents upon which you intend to rely in support of your defence. Take notice that, in default of your appearance on the day before mentioned, the suit will be heard and determined in your absence.

Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this 7th day of September 1914.

Judge.

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OPINION.

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